Majority
This is an appeal from a judgment ordering a writ of mandate to issue, commanding the trustees of an elementary school to pay a certain salary to a teacher.
The petitioner had taught in this school for some seventeen years and for some years had been classified as a permanent teacher under the tenure law. For two years, beginning in 1928, she was paid an annual salary of $1650; the next year she received $1550; the next three years she was paid $1400 a year; and for the next two years she was paid $1200 a year. In May, 1936, she was offered a contract for the year beginning July 1, 1936, her salary being fixed at $1,000. In August, 1936, the board wrote her a letter stating that she had not signed and returned her contract, that the reduction in her salary was made necessary because of lack of funds and requesting her to let them know whether she intended to accept the contract and teach during the coming year. She replied that she intended to teach, that she was informed that there was no lack of funds, that she believed the reduction in salary to be arbitrary and unjust, that the salary fixed was not a reasonable one and that she intended to take such steps as were available to have the same adjusted.
She then filed a petition asking that a writ of mandate issue directing the board to fix her salary at $1400 for the ensuing year ‘1 or at such lesser sum as to the court shall seem just and reasonable”. At the hearing evidence was introduced that there was available the sum of $1418 in the teacher’s salary fund for the school year 1936-1937. On behalf of the board there was testimony that during the school years 1933-34 and 1934-35 the board became indebted to the Santa Ana High School District in the sum of $846.91 for the tuition for pupils sent to that school; that it was unable to pay this bill during those years; that the same was paid
A number of questions are raised by the appellants, but the only ones requiring consideration are whether the evidence supports the finding that the reduction in salary was arbitrary and unjust, and whether the court exceeded its jurisdiction in ordering the board to pay a salary of $1200 for the year in question.
Under the provisions of the School Code the power and duty of fixing salaries for teachers is given to and imposed upon the board of trustees of the district. There can be no question that such a board has the power to exercise a reasonable discretion in the matter of fixing salaries and to reduce the salary of a teacher if such reduction is not arbitrary or discriminatory. (Hodge v. Board of Education, 22 Cal. App. (2d) 341 [ 70 Pac. (2d) 1009 ].) No question of discrimination arises here, since the petitioner was the only teacher in this district. In Abraham v. Sims, 2 Cal. (2d) 698 [ 42 Pac. (2d) 1029 ], it is said:
“ ‘The legislature in this state designed to give teachers, under the defined conditions, a permanency of tenure, but this has, however, been held to carry with it no assurance against change in salary. That phase of the subject has been
so ably discussed in Fidler v. Board of Trustees, supra ( 112 Cal. App. 296 , pp. 301, 305 [ 296 Pac. 912 ]), that it is needless to enlarge upon it here. The power of the trustees to raise or reduce the salaries of permanent teachers cannot be doubted, provided it is reasonably exercised and no attempt is made after the beginning of any particular school year to reduce the salaries for that year. ’ ’ ’
In Chambers v. Davis, 131 Cal. App. 500 [ 22 Pac. (2d) 27 , 30], the court said: “There can be no doubt the board possesses a reasonable discretion in determining the amount of compensation to be paid to teachers under their jurisdiction. Except for a clear abuse of this discretion the amount of salary which is allowed by the board may not be interfered with by a court.”
The evidence, although conflicting, would support a finding that sufficient funds were on hand to pay a salary of $1200. The fact that funds are available, standing alone, is not sufficient to establish that a lesser salary would be arbitrary and unreasonable. If that be the criterion the court should have fixed this salary at $1418, as there was some evidence that this amount was available. The fact that a district employing one teacher might through fortuitous circumstances happen to have a large amount of money available in a particular year is not sufficient to justify a court in fixing the salary at that amount or in holding that a lesser amount would be unreasonable. The right and power to fix salaries rests with the board of trustees and in exercising a reasonable discretion they must take cognizance of many things. It is not only their duty to handle the public funds economically but they must anticipate and make allowances for expenses which may reasonably be expected and for emergencies.
Whether or not a certain salary is arbitrary and unreasonable involves many things other than what funds are available. Without doubt a reduction in salary made for the purpose of getting rid of a teacher who had acquired permanent status would be arbitrary and subject to correction by a court. But the mere fact that a salary is reduced is not in itself conclusive. It may be possible to suppose a case where the nature of the reduction would be such as to disclose in itself that it was unreasonable and arbitrary but this cannot be said of the one here in question. While there had
Moreover, a court is without jurisdiction to decide what salary is reasonable and fix the same. The fact that a certain salary was paid for the previous year does not necessarily show that it is the reasonable and proper salary for the ensuing year. A discretion rests upon the board of trustees which can neither be arbitrarily exercised nor assumed by a court.
The judgment appealed from is reversed.
Marks, J., and Jennings, J., concurred.
Cases cited
- Fidler v. Board of Trustees 112 Cal. App. 296 p. 435
- Chambers v. Davis 131 Cal. App. 500 p. 435