Plum v. City of Healdsburg

trailer camp or mobile-home park on their property, respondents, by letter dated December 31, 1963, requested a determination by the Planning Commission (hereinafter referred to as the “Commission”) that this proposed use was similar in nature to the uses set forth in section 10.1 of the zoning ordinance; that on January 13, 1964 the Commission, consisting of seven members, by a four to three vote approved respondents’ request, determining that the proposed use of respondents’ property as a trailer camp was of a similar nature to those described in section 10.1 of the zoning ordinance; that on January 15, 1964 respondents applied to the Inspector for a building permit; that the Inspector refused to issue such a permit until the Council had reviewed the Commission’s determination in regard to respondents’ proposed use of their property; that subsequently, on January 27, 1964, the Council adopted a resolution “Denying Building Permit To William R. Plum For Establishment Of Trailer Camp In M-l Zoning District On His Mill Street Property”; that as is indicated in the resolution, the basis of the Council’s action was that “the action of the Planning Commission was not based upon fact; that the decision of the Planning Commission overrides the decision of the City Council; that the proposed trailer-camp is not a similar use as noted in Section 10.1 of the Zoning Ordinance; that said use would pose future problems in the area; and that this permission would jeopardize the other industrial areas in the city”; that on February 19, 1964 respondents filed a second application with the Inspector for a building permit to construct a trailer camp on their property, which application was denied by the Inspector “due to denial by City Council—Res. 7-64”; that the action of the Council in adopting said resolution was without authority, since under the ordinance the right to make a final determination that the proposed use of respondents’ property as a mobile-home park was a similar use to other uses permitted within an M-l zone rests in the Commission and the right of appeal to the Council from a determination of the Commission is given only to an applicant who is not satisfied with its decision; and that it was and is the duty of the Inspector to issue the requested permit.

Appellants filed both an answer and a demurrer to respondents’ petition. The basis of the demurrer was that the petition did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action and that the trial court did not have jurisdiction because respondents had not exhausted their administrative remedies

were essentially ones of law. The matter having been submitted, the trial court thereafter made its order overruling appellants’ demurrer and granting a writ of mandate as prayed. In its findings of fact the trial court found that the action of the Council in adopting a resolution denying respondents’ application for a building permit was without authority; that under the zoning ordinance the Commission had the right to make a final determination that respondents ’ proposed use of their property was similar to other uses permitted within an M-l zone; that it was the duty of the Inspector to issue a building permit to respondents; that respondents were not required to request an amendment of the zoning ordinance before bringing their action for a writ of mandate; that the determination of the Commission was neither unreasonable nor arbitrary, nor was it an abuse of its discretionary power; that “It is not true that a trailer camp is not similar to any use described in Section 10.1” of the zoning ordinance; and that the subject zoning ordinance was not unconstitutional. Accordingly, the trial court, in the form of a conclusion of law, determined that respondents were entitled to the issuance of a writ of mandate directing the Inspector to issue a building permit to them.

In the light of the foregoing it is apparent that the issues presented to the trial court were questions of law which involved the interpretation of the subject ordinance. Accordingly, since the construction of a statute and its applicability to a given situation are matters of law, we are not bound by the trial court’s construction of the subject ordinance. (Estate of Madison, 26 Cal.2d 453 , 456 [ 159 P.2d 630 ] ; Neal v. State of California, 55 Cal.2d 11 , 17 [ 9 Cal.Rptr. 607 , 357 P.2d 839 ] ; Code Civ. Proc., § 2102.) Before proceeding to discuss the interpretation and meaning of the ordinance as applied to the instant situation it should be pointed out that at oral argument appellants abandoned their contention that section 10.1 is unconstitutional.

The first question presented is whether the Commission had authority to determine whether a trailer camp is a use permitted in an M-l zone. An analysis of the subject zoning ordinance discloses that Healdsburg is divided into six zoning districts, referred to, respectively, as zones R-l, or single-family residential zone; R-2, or two-family or duplex zone; R-3, or multiple-family residential zone; C-l, or retail (light) commercial zone; C-2, or wholesale (heavy) commercial zone ; and M-l, or industrial zone. The uses permitted in any R or C zone are specifically described and enumerated. Those

decision to the Council “In case the applicant is not satisfied with the decision of the Planning Commission. ...” It thus appears that where the Commission authorizes a zoning permit its decision in favor of the applicant is, under the terms of the ordinance, not subject to review by the Council. It is only when the applicant is not satisfied with the decision of the Commission that he may appeal to the Council. It should be here noted that similar provisions prevail in situations involving use permits. (§§15,15.1,15.2,15.3,15.4.) Our conclusion is fortified, moreover, by the fact that in certain situations the ordinance specifically provides for review by the Council of the Commission's determination irrespective of whether this determination is favorable or unfavorable to the applicant. Accordingly, it is provided that an application for a variance is to he made to the Commission whose written findings of fact, after a public hearing, shall be submitted to the Council, and that thereupon the Council may grant or deny the variance. (§§ 14, 14.1, 14.2, 14.3, 14.4, 14.5.)

In justification of their refusal to issue respondents a building permit appellants argue that the action of the Council was a municipal affair and therefore justifiable, and that the Inspector would have been acting contrary to the terms of section 10.1 of the ordinance had he issued a building permit to respondents. In answer to this argument it should be stated that if the Commission’s determination is a proper one under the terms of the ordinance, both the Council and the Inspector are bound by such determination since both are bound by the provisions of the zoning ordinance, which the Council itself enacted, until such time as these provisions are changed by means of proper amendment. (Magruder v. City of Redwood City, supra, 203 Cal. 665 , 675; City & County of San Francisco v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.2d 236 , 251 [ 1 Cal.Rptr. 158 , 347 P.2d 294 ].) The important question which projects itself, however, is whether the Inspector, who is charged under sections 20.1 and 20.2 with the enforcement of the ordinance and with the issuance of building permits, can properly refuse to issue a building permit when he believes that the authorization for the zoning permit is null and void. Stated another way, the question is whether the Inspector, although a ministerial officer, is entitled to question the validity of a zoning permit authorized by the Commission.

Adverting to the instant case we note that section 16.3 of the ordinance specifically provides that “If any permit is issued, by error or otherwise, where a proposed use or building is not in conformance with the provisions of this

ordinance, such permit shall be null and void.” Mandamus will not lie to compel the performance of acts which are void, illegal, contrary to public policy, or which tend to aid in an unlawful purpose. (Cook v. Noble, 181 Cal. 720 , 721 [ 186 P. 150 ]; McCutcheon v. Superior Court, 134 Cal. App. 5 , 13 [ 24 P.2d 911 ].) Moreover, to authorize the issuance of a writ of mandamus the party sought to be coerced must be bound to act. (Sherman v. Quinn, 31 Cal.2d 661 , 664 [ 192 P.2d 17 ]; Coon v. Biscailuz, 1 Cal.App.2d 346 , 348 [ 36 P.2d 430 ]; Ross v. O’Brien, 1 Cal.App.2d 496 , 501 [ 36 P.2d 1108 ]; Albori v. Smith, 18 Cal.App.2d 615 , 618 [ 65 P.2d 18 ]; Code Civ. Proc., § 1085.) Accordingly, even though mandamus is the proper remedy to compel the performance of a ministerial act (Williams v. City of Stockton, 195 Cal. 743 , 748 [ 235 P. 986 ]; Munns v. Stenman, 152 Cal.App.2d 543 , 557 [ 314 P.2d 67 ] ; Palmer v. Fox, 118 Cal.App.2d 453 , 458 [ 258 P.2d 30 ]), a ministerial officer cannot be coerced into doing that which his plain duty under the law prohibits him from doing. (Laurelle v. Bush, 17 Cal.App. 409 , 417 [ 119 P. 953 ].)

In the light of the foregoing, while it was the ministerial duty of the Inspector to issue a building permit upon the Commission’s determination that respondents were entitled to a zoning permit, he was not obliged to issue the building permit in violation of the terms of the ordinance. The crux of our inquiry, therefore, is whether this determination by the Commission was in conformance -with the ordinance, and specifically, whether a trailer camp is a use of a “similar nature” to those permitted by section 10.1 of the ordinance. The word “similar” does not necessarily mean identical, but is defined as “ ‘Nearly corresponding; resembling in many respects; somewhat like; having a general likeness.’ ” (Hansen v. Waring, 123 Cal.App.2d 165 , 168 [ 266 P.2d 560 ].) Webster’s Third New International Dictionary defines “similar” as “having characteristics in common; very much alike; comparable;... alike in substance or structure; identical....”

Consonant with the foregoing definitions we are satisfied that a trailer camp is not of a nature similar to a retail or wholesale store, nor to a storage or service establishment, nor to an industrial or manufacturig use. A “trailer camp,” “trailer court” or “trailer park” is defined as “an area where house trailers are congregated”; and a “house trailer” is defined as “a trailer that can be used as living quarters.” (Webster, supra.) Section 21.44 of the subject

ordinance defines a “ ‘Trailer Court' ” as “Land or premises used or intended to be used, let or rented for occupancy by or of trailers or movable dwellings, rooms or sleeping quarters of any kind.” The use to which trailers and trailer camps are put, and particularly their use primarily for living quarters, is a matter which involves such a substantial number of people in this country and is of such common knowledge that we may take judicial notice of it. (See Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140 , 146 [ 63 Am.Dec. 113 ] ; People v. Mangum, 31 Cal.App.2d 374 , 382 [ 88 P.2d 207 ]; City of San Diego v. Van Winkle, 69 Cal.App.2d 237 , 239 [ 158 P.2d 774 ].) It is a basic rule of statutory construction, moreover, that courts are bound to give effect to statutes according to the usual, ordinary import of the language employed in framing them. In so construing a statute, a court should not seek hidden meanings not suggested by the statute. (Chaves v. Sargent, 52 Cal.2d 162 , 203 [ 339 P.2d 801 ]; Benson v. Superior Court, 214 Cal.App.2d 551 , 558 [ 29 Cal.Rptr. 760 ]; People v. Knowles, 35 Cal.2d 175 , 183 [ 217 P.2d 1 ] ; In re Miller, 31 Cal.2d 191 , 198 [ 187 P.2d 722 ].)

It is an equally basic rule of statutory construction that when called upon to construe a statute the court should do so in accordance with the intent of the framers of the statute so as to effectuate the purpose sought to be achieved and avoid the evils desired to be eliminated. (Select Base Materials, Inc. v. Board of Equalization, 51 Cal.2d 640 , 645 [ 335 P.2d 672 ]; Benson v. Superior Court, supra, p. 558; Lesem v. Board of Retirement, 183 Cal.App.2d 289 , 298 [ 6 Cal.Rptr. 608 ].) A perusal of the subject ordinance discloses a studied legislative attempt to avoid use of property zoned M-l for living quarters or for residential purposes. While single-family, two-family, and multiple-family residences are permitted in retail (C-l) and wholesale (C-2) commercial zones, these uses are not permitted in an M-l industrial zone. Nor is the “trailer camp” use which is specifically permitted in a C-2 zone extended by the ordinance to an M-l zone. It is apparent, therefore, that in enacting the ordinance it was the intention of the Council that the uses permitted in an M-l zone should not include uses for residences, dwellings or living quarters. It is equally apparent from the ordinance that the Council intended to create an M-l zone for essentially industrial purposes and that the possible danger to health if persons were permitted to reside on property which was so zoned, particularly in view of the inherent noxiousness of uses such as those permitted in an M-l zone by virtue of the

provisions of section 10.2, subdivisions (a) and (b) of the ordinance, was an evil which the framers of the ordinance sought to avoid. We accordingly conclude that the determination of the Commission to permit a trailer camp or trailer court in an M-l zone was not in conformance with the provisions of the ordinance and, therefore, null and void. The Inspector was, therefore, justified in refusing to issue the building permit for that reason, and not upon the misconceived basis that the action of the Commission required the approval of the Council.

In view of the conclusion reached by us we need not dwell upon appellants’ contention that respondents did not exhaust their administrative remedies because they did not seek to amend the ordinance so as either to have their property classified as C-2, or to have “trailer camp” specifically included as a permitted use under section 10.1. Suffice it to say, the amending of an ordinance is a legislative and not an administrative act. (Banville v. County of Los Angeles, 180 Cal.App.2d 563 , 570 [ 4 Cal.Rptr. 458 ].)

The judgment is reversed with directions to the trial court to amend its conclusions of law to provide that respondents are not entitled to a peremptory writ of mandate and to enter judgment in favor of appellants denying respondents a peremptory writ of mandate and discharging the alternative writ.

Sullivan, P. J., and Sims, J., concurred.

A petition for a rehearing was denied October 22, 1965.