McManus v. Sequoyah Land Associates

Plaintiffs brought this action to recover from defendant, Sequoyah Land Associates, a corporation, one-half of the costs of improving an easement which runs across plaintiffs ’ property and which, at the time the improvements were made, was owned by defendant, and to enjoin defendant from trespassing on plaintiffs’ property. After trial without a jury, the court entered judgment for $21,374.82 in favor of plaintiffs, this amount constituting one-half of the amount the court found to be the fair and reasonable cost of

Plaintiffs proceeded with the construction of the roadway along the line of defendant’s easement across parcel B upon securing approval of their plans from the City of San Leandro. During the course of construction plaintiffs advised defendant of the nature and cost of the work and, upon completion of the roadway in January 1964, presented defendant with a statement for one-half of the total cost amounting to $44,963.55. Payment was refused by defendant. Subsequently, the roadway was approved by the City of San Leandro and, upon being dedicated as a public street, was named Neptune Drive. Following the filing of the instant action defendant sold parcel A and recorded a document entitled “Declaration of Election Not to Use Easement.” In finding for plaintiffs the trial court disallowed an “overhead” item and set the actual total cost of the roadway improvement at $42,749.64, of which one-half was assessed against defendant.

Existence of the Easement

Considering defendant’s first contention, namely, that at the time plaintiffs constructed the roadway on their property,

In construing an instrument conveying an easement the rules applicable to the construction of deeds generally apply. (Kerr v. Brede, 180 Cal.App.2d 149 , 150 [ 4 Cal.Rptr. 443 ]; Eastman v. Piper, 68 Cal.App. 554 , 561 [ 229 P. 1002 ].) Accordingly, where the language of a grant of easement is ambiguous, extrinsic evidence is admissible to determine its meaning. (Schofield v. Bany, 175 Cal.App.2d 534 , 536-537 [ 346 P.2d 891 ]; Wright v. Best, 19 Cal.2d 368 , 383 [ 121 P.2d 702 ]; Code Civ. Proc., § 1856; see Laux v. Freed, 53 Cal.2d 512 , 522-523 [ 2 Cal.Rptr. 265 , 348 P.2d 873 ].) Where such evidence is properly received the appellate court will accept or adhere to the interpretation adopted by the trial court where the extrinsic evidence is conflicting and conflicting inferences arise therefrom. (Parsons v. Bristol Development Co., 62 Cal.2d 861 , 865-866 [ 44 Cal.Rptr. 767 , 401 P.2d 839 ]; Estate of Platt, 21 Cal.2d 343 , 352 [ 131 P.2d 825 ].) Where, on the other hand, extrinsic evidence is received but there is no conflict in the evidence the interpretation of the instrument becomes a question of law and the appellate court is not bound by the trial court’s interpretation of it. (Parsons v. Bristol Development Co., supra, pp. 865-866; Estate of Platt, supra, p. 352.)

In the instant case the only extrinsic evidence contained in the record concerning the interpretation of the grant of easement is the document entitled “Declaration of Election to Use Easement,” which was recorded on behalf of defendant, plus the series of communications between plaintiffs and various officers of defendant. This evidence makes it abundantly clear that the officers of defendant, throughout their dealings with plaintiffs, believed that their company

It is a well-established rule in California that the acts of the parties under and pursuant to an instrument afford one of the most reliable means of arriving at their intention. (Cutter Laboratories, Inc. v. Twining, 221 Cal.App.2d 302 , 312 [ 34 Cal.Rptr. 317 ]; Sierad v. Lilly, 204 Cal.App.2d 770 , 774 [ 22 Cal.Rptr. 580 ]; Collins v. Home Savings & Loan Assn., 205 Cal.App.2d 86 , 99 [ 22 Cal.Rptr. 817 ].) This rule is stated in the case of Lawrence Block Co. v. Palston, 123 Cal.App.2d 300 , 311 [ 266 P.2d 856 ], as follows: “A construction given a contract by the acts and conduct of the parties with knowledge of its terms, before any controversy has arisen as to its meaning, is entitled to great weight and will when reasonable be adopted and enforced by the court. [Citation.] The practical construction of a contract made by the parties thereto is the best evidence of what they intended. [Citations.]” In the instant action the trial court found that the grant of easement to defendant was in force at the time of the filing of the action. Although we are not bound by this finding, the interpretation of the subject grant of easement being a question of law since there is no conflict in the extrinsic evidence in the present case (Parsons v. Bristol Development Co., supra, pp. 865-866.), we are, nevertheless, in accord with the trial court’s interpretation of the instrument based upon the extrinsic evidence consisting of defendant’s acts and conduct subsequent to the execution of the grant of easement. Accordingly, we conclude that there is no merit to defendant’s contention that at the time plaintiffs constructed a roadway on their property there was in fact no easement in existence.

Right to Reimbursement

The thrust of defendant’s appeal is focused on the conten

Applying these principles to the instant case we must conclude, absent any contractual obligation providing to the contrary, that: (1) If defendant was the sole owner of the easement it was its duty to keep the easement in repair; (2) if defendant and plaintiffs were coowners of the easement because of its nonexclusive nature, then, plaintiffs could require defendant to contribute to the cost of repairing the right-of-way in proportion to the use of the right-of-way made by plaintiffs and defendant; and (3) in either situation, however, defendant could not be compelled to contribute without its consent to the cost of major improvements such as the construction of the subject roadway.

The question presents itself, therefore, as to whether under the terms of the grant of easement in the instant ease, plaintiffs, as owners of the servient tenement, were authorized to construct the subject roadway improvement on the path of defendant’s easement, and, if so, whether one-half of the costs thereof could be charged by plaintiffs to defendant. Condition “1” of the grant of easement, as we interpret it, contemplates that a roadway be constructed along the path of the easement. The reference in said condition and in condition “3” to “use of the easement” means development of the easement by constructing a roadway thereon. The easement itself is described in the grant as a “ right of way for use as a roadway, for vehicles of all kinds. ...” Condition “1” of the grant speaks of “improving” the easement according to the City of San Leandro specifications and with the city’s approval “In the event . . . [the grantee] desire[s] to use said easement. ...” (Italics added.) Moreover, condition “3” of the grant, which states that “this instrument shall be considered null and void” in the event that the grantee “do[es] not want to use said easement as set forth herein,” is most reasonably susceptible to the interpretation that the grantee must desire to construct a roadway on the easement in order to prevent the grant from being nullified. Finally, we note

In accord with this interpretation of the grant of easement, it follows that defendant, by recording its “Declaration of Election to Use Easement” in which it stated that it intended to comply with all of the conditions of the grant of easement, must be held to have agreed to the construction of a roadway on the easement and to the obligation to pay one-half of its cost. This interpretation, made by us as a matter of law since there are no conflicts in the extrinsic evidence received with respect to the interpretation of the grant of easement, coincides with that made by the trial court. Moreover, if our scope of review were governed by the principles applicable where conflicting inferences may be drawn from conflicting evidence we would be required to hold that the trial court’s interpretation finds substantial support in the evidence.

Unjust Enrichment

Defendant’s final contention is that the payment by it of one-half of the cost to plaintiffs of improving defendant’s easement would constitute unjust enrichment to plaintiffs. On this issue the trial court found that the improvements to said easement were for the benefit of both the servient and dominant tenement owners and for the benefit of both parcel A and parcel B, and specifically found that such improvements were not solely for the benefit of plaintiffs and the property owned by them. We have concluded that these findings are substantially supported by the following evidence in the record and that accordingly defendant’s contention is without merit: Witnesses for defendant testified that their property was otherwise landlocked or that they were concerned about being landlocked; that the easement was advantageous to defendant; that defendant recorded its “Declaration of Election to Use Easement” in order to perfect the easement and that defendant wanted to comply with all of the terms of conditions of the grant; and that the right-of-way was frequently crossed from defendant’s property onto plaintiffs’ property. The record discloses, moreover, that the paved roadway extends to the railroad right-of-way separating parcel A and parcel B. Since there is nothing in the record to indicate that the railroad right-of-way prevented defendant from having access to the paved roadway, the trial court was justified in drawing the inference that a 60-foot wide paved roadway, consisting of a dedicated public street, running di

That portion of the judgment appealed from is affirmed.

Sullivan, P. J., and Sims, J., concurred.

Appellant’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied April 22, 1966.