Wall v. Sonora Union High School District

This case turns on the question whether the time limit within which a public entity may he ordered to permit the filing by a minor of a late claim for

We are necessarily in accord with the viewpoint of the trial judge that the case of Artukovich v. Astendorf, 21 Cal.2d 329 [ 131 P.2d 831 ], requires a holding that after the expiration of one year from the date of the accident the Superior Court of Tuolumne County lacked jurisdiction to require the board of the Sonora Union High School District to permit a late filing of the claim. The appellant urges this court to adopt the reasoning contained in the dissenting opinion in that case; however, it is established that a holding of the Supreme Court binds all of the lower courts in the state, including an intermediate appellate court. (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court, 57 Cal.2d 450 [ 20 Cal.Rptr. 321 , 369 P.2d 937 ].) And, it needs no citation of authority to point out that a majority opinion of the Supreme Court states the law and that a dissenting opinion has no function except to express the private view of the dissenter. In the California Law Revision Commission Reports, Recommendations and Studies, January 1959, volume 2, page A-120, it is said: “A most difficult problem to solve is whether compliance with the claims statutes may be excused by reason of a claimant’s infancy, incapacity or death. At least four basic positions which have been taken on this question can be identified:

“1. Claims statutes apply to minors and incompetents in the absence of an express statutory exception. A preponderance of the California cases follow this view ■ but the seeming harshness of the rule is ameliorated by cases or statutes that allow someone else to file a claim on behalf of a claimant who cannot do so himself. This view, it is submitted, is reasonably satisfactory in most instances; but it is exposed to the possibility that the claimant’s rights may be lost by failure or neglect

on the part of a third party who has no legal duty to act and over whose actions the minor or incompetent person has no effective control.” (Italics added.) In California Government Tort Liability (Cal. Practice Book No. 24 of Cont. Ed. Bar), Professor Arvo Van Alstyne says in section 8.6, Claims and Actions, at page 362: “In the absence of express statutes to the contrary, claimant’s minority or other disability does not toll the running of the claim presentation period or make the claims procedure inapplicable,” citing Artukovich v. Astendorf, supra, 21 Cal.2d 329 ; Rounds v. Brown, 121 Cal.App.2d 642 [ 263 P.2d 620 ]; Wicklund v. Plymouth E. School Dist., 37 Cal.App.2d 252 [ 99 P.2d 314 ]. It is also stated that “as thus applied, claims procedures do not violate due process,” citing Goncalves v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 166 Cal.App.2d 87 [ 332 P.2d 713 ], (See also Wicklund v. Plymouth E. School Dist., supra, 37 Cal.App.2d 252 ; Cal.L. Revision Com. Reports, Recommendations and Studies, Jan. 1959, vol. 2, p. A75-A82.)

In California Government Tort Liability, supra, pages 384-387, 707-709, Professor Van Alstyne discusses the proper method of computing time for the purpose of applying the 100-day and the one-year-time requirements of section 911.2; he states that time begins to run from the date of the accrual of the cause of action, or the day on which the cause would be deemed to accrue under the law if the statute applicable to claims between private litigants were invoked. (Gov. Code, § 901.) Ordinarily, this would be when the injury was incurred, but, in some cases, the cause of action does not accrue until it is discovered or until plaintiff is put on notice of its existence. (See Thompson v. County of Fresno, 59 Cal.2d 686 [ 31 Cal.Rptr. 44 , 381 P.2d 924 ] and Souza & McCue Constr. Co. v. Superior Court, 57 Cal.2d 508 [ 20 Cal.Rptr. 634 , 370 P.2d 338 ].) Although the date of the accrual is the same as under the statute of limitations, the 1963 act does not provide for extending the presentation period by circumstances which would toll the period of limitations. (See Artukovich v. Astendorf, supra, 21 Cal.2d 329 ; State Farm etc. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 232 Cal.App.2d 808 , 810 [ 43 Cal.Rptr. 209 ].)

The Legislature has repeatedly set forth in the statutes its intention with respect to the time allowed for filing a late claim and now, clearly, after a series of amendments, it requires that the delayed claim be filed, if at all, within one

The order is affirmed.

Brown (R M.), J., and Stone, J., concurred.

A petition for a rehearing was denied April 13, 1966, and appellant’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied May 11, 1966. Peters, J., Peek, J., and Mosk, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.