People v. Huskins

Larry Huskins was charged in eight counts with sex offenses against his three natural daughters, ages six, three, and two, and in a non jury trial was convicted on one charge and acquitted on the others. Sexual psychopathy proceedings were initiated, but a jury found the defendant was not a sexual psychopath. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5512.) Thereafter, defendant, whose only prior offense was a 1948 conviction for resorting (Mun. Code 41.07), was sentenced to state prison. At all times, both in court and out of court, Huskins vigorously denied the charges against him. The principal issue is whether his motion for a new trial because of newly discovered evidence should have been granted.

Penal Code, section 1181, authorizes a new trial on the discovery of material evidence which a defendant could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the first trial. “ To entitle a party to a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence, it must appear, '1. That the evidence, and not merely its materiality, be newly discovered ; 2. That the evidence be not cumulative merely; 3. That it be such as to render a different result probable on a retrial of the cause; 4. That the party could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced it at the trial; and 5. That these facts be shown by the best evidence of which the case admits. ’ ” (People v. Sutton, 73 Cal. 243 , 247-248 [ 15 P. 86 ].) Here, undoubtedly the evidence was newly discovered, was not cumulative, and was the best available evidence. Reasonable diligence is conceded, for it appears that no one connected with the case had any inkling that Mrs. White had made comparable charges in the past. Was a different result on retrial probable ? The trial court thought not and denied the motion for a new trial, stating it had tried the case without a jury and did not think a different result on retrial probable. However, the test is not a subjective one whether a particular trier of fact would be persuaded by the new evidence to reach a different conclusion, but rather is an objective one based on all the evidence, old and new, whether any second trier of fact, court or jury, would probably reach a different result. We therefore consider the evidence on the basis of objective probabilities.

Ordinarily, evidence which merely impeaches a witness is not significant enough to make a different result probable, and respondent relies on the rule that “. . . newly-discovered evidence which would tend merely to impeach a witness is not of itself sufficient ground for granting a new trial.” (People v. Long, 15 Cal.2d 590 , 607-608 [ 103 P.2d 969 ].) But the new evidence in this ease does more than merely impeach

In People v. Williams, 57 Cal.2d 263 [ 18 Cal.Rptr. 729 , 368 P.2d 353 ], evidence impeaching the testimony of the principal prosecution witness was discovered subsequent to the trial. That evidence consisted of affidavits of witnesses who quoted the principal prosecution witness as having said he was going to concoct a story of armed robbery for the purpose of fixing the defendant. The court granted a new trial, not only finding a different result on retrial probable but also stressing the duty of the courts to be particularly alert to review their processes wherever the possibility of false charges exists, While the impeaching evidence in the present case does not directly contradict testimony at the original trial, still, it bears an intimate relationship to the subject matter and raises the possibility of false accusation. In People v. Clark, 63

We think it of utmost importance in this case for the trier of fact, in evaluating the credibility of Mrs. White’s current charges, to observe her demeanor and posture and reactions and behavior on the stand while she explains under cross-examination what brought about her prior unproved charges of child molestation against her husband. Her intimate involvement as accuser in two such matters could be the result of an unfortunate coincidence—or it could reflect a pattern of mind which predisposes her to jump to unwarranted conclusions on the subject. In our view this is one of those exceptional cases with unusual facts in which newly-discovered evidence impeaching the credibility of a prosecution witness makes a different result on retrial probable. (People v. Williams, 57 Cal.2d 263 , 274-275 [ 18 Cal.Rptr. 729 , 368 P.2d 353 ].) Our conclusion on the probability of a different result is fortified by the verdict of the jury in the sexual psychopathy trial, which, after hearing the evidence impeaching Mrs. White, concluded that defendant was not a sexual psychopath. ■

In denying the motion for a new trial and thereby determining the nonprejudicial effect of defendant’s ignorance of Mrs. White’s previous history, the trial court relied not only on the evidence in the case but also on the testimony of three psychiatrists at the sexual psychopathy trial as verification of the results of the criminal trial. The testimony of the psychiatrists illustrates the limitations of medical diagnoses for legal purposes and the dangers inherent in accepting legal conclusions from medical experts.

The first psychiatrist gave defendant a “very brief” examination at the time defendant was first admitted to Atascadero State Hospital and never saw Mm again. He did not attend the staff meeting which decided that defendant was a sexual psychopath, and he based his own conclusion that defendant was a sexual psychopath on a reading of other doctors’ reports, technicians’ reports, the probation report,

The second psychiatrist interviewed defendant for half an hour in the hospital unit of the Los Angeles County jail. He concluded that defendant was a sexual psychopath because he had been convicted of child molestation and stated that if he had not been so convicted he would not have classified him as a sexual psychopath. This psychiatrist confused his function with that of the court when he stated, “My conclusions would have to be, if he is guilty of the act, he will be considered a sexual psychopath.” Obviously, if everyone convicted of a sex offense were automatically classified as a sexual psychopath, there would be no need for a separate trial on that issue.

The third psychiatrist had read the transcript of the preliminary examination and interviewed defendant for an unspecified length of time. This psychiatrist found that Hus-kins was strongly inclined to religion and stated that this religious inclination “simply establishes the portion of the welfare and institutions code qualification of a sexual psychopath ; that is, he is either afflicted in some mental capacity or through a certain amount of mental aberration or mental retardation, something of that nature, predisposing him to the commission of sexual offenses. Q. Do you feel then that his strong religious feelings are some form of mental aberration? A. Yes, I think the manner in which he protested [his innocence] and the manner in which he expressed his religious ideas are not infrequently associated with a mental disorder. ’ ’ He, too, testified it would make no difference in his opinion what prior history of unproved accusations the principal witness had in her background.

The trial court relied in part on the testimony of these psychiatrists as evidence in support of defendant’s guilt which militated against the probability of a different result on retrial. The fact that the doctors’ testimony in turn was largely based on the outcome of the original trial was given no weight. The legal process thus found itself on a merry-go-round in which a new trial was denied because the psychiatrists were sure defendant was a sexual psychopath, and the

We conclude that in a case of such slenderness as this the discovery of previously unknown evidence which would tend to destroy the credibility of the principal prosecution witness on cross-examination provides a solid basis for a new trial. (People v. Williams, 57 Cal.2d 263 [ 18 Cal.Rptr. 729 , 368 P.2d 353 ].) The judgment is reversed.

Roth, P. J., and Herndon, J., concurred.