Thompson v. Bd. of Dirs. of Turlock Irrigation Dist.

Appellant Board of Directors of the Turlock Irrigation District appeals from a judgment of the superior court issuing a writ of mandate directing the appellant to change the boundaries of the divisions of the district. The undisputed facts are substantially as follows.

The Turlock Irrigation District, a special district embracing 195,802 acres of land located within three counties,^[1] was formed in 1887 under the “Wright Act.” This act was superseded 10 years later by the “Wright-Bridgeford Act,” which is now codified in the state Water Code as division 11 commencing with section 20500 and is known as the Irrigation District Law. The district is governed by a governing board (appellant herein) consisting of five members, and is divided into five divisions with one director elected from each division. These divisions have not been modified for over 30 years; their land areas and estimated populations are as follows:

Division One 42,319 21.6% 4,925 7%

Division Two 33,015 16.9% 23,621 33%

Division Three 40,016 20.4% 8,949 13%

Division Four 38,111 19.5% 24,996 35%

Division Five 42,341 21.6% 8,554 12%

The respondents (who are landowners, assessment payers, residents and electors of the district) petitioned the appellant hoard of directors to redraw the division lines so that there would be less disparity in the population among the five divisions. The appellant declined to make the change and as a consequence respondents petitioned the Superior Court of Stanislaus County to compel appellant to do so. At the hearing on the petition the only evidence taken was the testimony of the assessor of the district; he testified that not more than 10 percent of the assessment revenue of the district came from property within the two incorporated cities located in the district.^[2] The cause, by stipulation of the parties, was then submitted “on the pleadings,” the appellant apparently admitting the facts as stated herein. The trial judge granted judgment issuing a writ of mandate, directing the appellant “to redraw the boundary lines of the divisions within said district so that there will no longer be the wide deviation in population which presently exists between the various divisions.” This appeal followed.

The first question raised in this appeal is both basic and fundamental, and profoundly affects the many forms of local government within this and other states. This question is whether the “one man, one vote” doctrine originating from the federal apportionment cases applies to a special district such as an irrigation district formed under the Irrigation District Law. If it does, the appellant board of directors has no choice but to change the boundaries of the district divisions in order to equalize the population, and in doing so may not consider land area as a factor.

The “one man, one vote” doctrine grew out of the now historic and often cited case of Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 [ 7 L.Ed.2d 663 , 82 S.Ct. 691 ], where the court reopened the question of the extent to which federal courts will review the

“ ‘No right is more precious in a free country than that of having a voice in the election of those who make the laws under which, as good citizens, we must live. Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined____’ ” ( 377 U.S. 560 [ 12 L.Ed.2d 526 , 84 S.Ct. 1380 ].) And, the court added, the right to vote “. . . ‘touches a sensitive and important area of human rights,’ and ‘involves one of the basic civil rights of man,’ presenting questions of alleged ‘invidious discriminations . . . against groups or types of individuals in violation of the constitutional guaranty of just and equal laws.’ ...” ( 377 U.S. 561 [ 12 L.Ed.2d 527 , 84 S.Ct. 1381 ].)

It goes without saying that the ‘‘one man, one vote” doctrine grew out of abuses in voting procedures in state Legislatures. Moreover, it is reasonably apparent that the underlying reasons behind these decisions apply not only to the state itself but to those municipalities, state agencies or political subdivisions that exercise general government functions and are designed to be controlled by the voters of the geographic area over which they have jurisdiction, such as cities and counties. (Miller v. Board of Supervisors, 63 Cal.2d 343 [ 46 Cal.Rptr. 617 , 405 P.2d 857 ] ; Wiltsie v. Board of Supervisors, 65 Cal.2d 314 [ 54 Cal.Rptr. 320 , 419 P.2d 440 ].) The question, however, as to whether the doctrine applies to a limited purpose district, public authority or similar entity, is more

To the one extreme it is arguable that special districts and similar entities are creatures of the Legislature, deriving their powers therefrom, and that in the exercise of these powers, whether legislative, administrative, ministerial or quasi-judicial, they are subject to the same constitutional standard in prescribing the voting procedures for the selection of the members of their governing bodies as the Legislature itself. To the other extreme it is arguable that the doctrine is applicable only to legislative bodies exercising pure legislative powers and that although cities and counties meet this test, since they are important organs of local government exercising general powers of government with the right to exert coercive force upon the people within their territorial jurisdiction, special districts do not, and are not subject to the rule. We believe, however, that a middle course is preferable and that whether a special district is subject to the doctrine depends upon such factors as its purpose, the number and exact nature of its functions, and the manner in which they are exercised. Stated otherwise, if the principal purpose of a district is to provide a service or services which can be and are sometimes provided by a private or quasi-public corporation (such as a public utility company), and if in the accomplishment of this purpose it does not exercise general powers of government, it is not subject to the “one man, one vote” rule. If, however, its principal purpose is to govern or if its functions are primarily governmental in nature, or if not governmental in nature they are accomplished by the exercise of general powers of government, it meets the test, and the doctrine is applicable. Thus, we believe that each type of district must be considered by itself and upon the basis of its own facts and circumstances.

With this in mind, we have examined the Irrigation District Law and we conclude that an irrigation district formed under this law is clearly distinguishable from a city or county, possessing none of the essential characteristics which would require the application of the “one man, one vote” doctrine.^[5] The principal purpose for which the district

From the foregoing, we conclude that the Legislature was not required to set up a voting procedure for the election of the members of its board of directors. However, there is a secondary question. Having set up a voting procedure, did the Legislature thereby become bound by the ‘1 one man, one vote’ rule so as to make Water Code section 21605 with its dual criteria of population and area unconstitutional f We think not, for we believe that this classification by the Legislature is reasonable.^[8] As we have seen, an irrigation district is

Appellant relies on the case of McKim v. Imperial Irr. Dist., 201 Cal. 110 [ 255 P. 506 ], in support of its position that Water Code section 21605 does not require it to change the boundaries of the divisions, and that it cannot be compelled to do so. Respondents, on the other hand, argue that this case supports their position that the board’s discretion is not unlimited, and that under proper circumstances it may be compelled to change the district boundaries in order to keep the divisions as nearly equal in area and population as may be practicable.

We do not believe that McKim helps either side on this particular point. In that case, the board of directors had changed the boundaries of the divisions and the question before the court was whether it had conformed with the mandatory language prescribing the primary standard to be applied in making the changes. In other words, the court was not concerned with the question as to whether an irrigation district board may be compelled to change division boundaries, but, rather, whether it had acted within the limits of its powers in doing so. This is an entirely different question from that presented in this appeal, for it is fundamental that even where a public board cannot be compelled to act, when it does act it must do so within the limits of its powers.

The leading California Supreme Court decision on the subject of a public board’s discretion in relation to its permissive right to change the boundaries of the districts or divisions from which its members are elected is the case of Griffin v. Board of Supervisors, 60 Cal.2d 318 [ 33 Cal.Rptr. 101 , 384 P.2d 421 ], There, the Supreme Court rejected the concept of earlier appellate cases that the word “may,” as used in Government Code section 25001, granted unlimited discretion to the board of supervisors for making boundary changes in supervisorial districts. That is, the court recognized that the

Ill

The final question is whether the respondents ’ evidence is sufficient to establish an abuse of discretion in this case. We believe it is.

It is evident that while the land areas in the district divisions are substantially equal, the disparity in population among the five divisions is extreme. In fact, as between some divisions, there are drastic deviations. For example, the disparity between Division No. 1 and Divisions No. 2 and 4 is almost five to one, and the disparity between Divisions No. 3 and 5 and Divisions No. 2 and 4 is almost three to one. Moreover, appellant has admitted that no boundary changes were made (and apparently none were attempted) in any of the divisions in over 30 years, and this despite the vast increases in population which occurred throughout the entire state during this same period.^[10] And, significantly, the appellant’s attitude before the superior court was not that it had properly exercised its discretion in failing to change the division boundaries because it was impracticable to do so, but rather that it could not be compelled to do so by the court.^[11]

It is true, as we have stated, that the court in McKim v. Imperial Irr. Dist., supra, 201 Cal. 110 , indicated that the discretion of the board of directors of an irrigation district in changing the division boundaries is a broad one. As a matter of fact, the court at page 114 of the opinion, in referring to the two elements to be considered, had this to say: "... Both these elements must be taken into consideration and equalized as nearly as practicable, and if equality in one element must be sacrificed somewhat for equality in the other the question of which element shall be considered as the more important must rest in the broad discretion given to the directors. The directors are not compelled to defend their division as the most nearly perfect one possible, and this is

Respondents’ evidence, therefore, establishes a prima facie case of abuse of discretion on the part of the appellant board of directors. In view of the board’s attitude that it could not be compelled to change the division boundaries irrespective, apparently, of drastic deviations in population in the divisions, the trial court was justified in granting judgment ordering it to do so. The judgment, however, is much too broad and fails to include the second element (land area) within its direction, thereby foreclosing the appellant from taking into consideration geographic problems, location of cities and similar factors, which could well justify reasonable deviations in population among the five divisions. Moreover, the judgment assumes that a more equitable equalization of the population is absolutely possible, and it does not afford the board of directors the opportunity to justify its position by showing, after conscientious and exhaustive study, that such changes are highly impracticable because of geographic conditions or similar factors.