Majority
Three persons, Calvin George Graham, Jr., Charles Pike, and James Edward Casey, were charged with grand theft by reason of the “till-tapping” on December 7, 1965, of the Z Market in Truckee, whereby $460 was stolen, in the form of 23 twenty-dollar bills. Charles Pike, who inserted his hand in the cash register, removed the bills and ran away, changed his original plea to admit guilt. This left the appellants, Calvin George Graham and James Edward Casey, for trial by the jury; each of them was found guilty as charged.
Appellant Casey, specifically, and appellant Graham, by inference, claimed that they were found guilty solely by reason of association with Pike; on the contrary, the People argue that the appellants were guilty, not by association, but by participation, and that the judgment against them must be affirmed.
The office manager of the Z Market in Truckee, Mr. Oliver Crose, testified that on December 7, 1965, he took care of the store for approximately an hour and a half during the head checker’s lunch hour, and that, when the three men came into the market, he was near the meat shop but came to the checkout stand. Two of the men approached the east stand, where Casey requested a package of Pall Mall cigarettes. Mr. Crose removed a pack of Pall Malls, which was above the register, laid it on the counter next to Mr. Casey and rang the price up on the till; the drawer opened and Mr. Casey gave Mr. Crose a dollar bill; Crose started to make change and immediately Graham, who was behind Mr. Crose, requested Life Savers; Crose then closed the cash register and turned around to discuss the request with Graham, who finally decided he did not want any; but he first asked Crose what brands and what flavors he had; then, Crose took the dollar, opened the cash register and started for the second time to make change; then Casey asked how much he had said the cigarettes were, and Crose told him 28 cents; Casey said to give back the one dollar bill, because he had the correct change; this was done, and Crose put the change in the register and closed the till; the three men left the store. Mr. Pike had entered the market with the two defendants, and while Mr. Crose did not see him during the negotiations, he saw him leave with the other two men.
Howard Glenn Lewis, Jr., the head checker at the Z Market, testified that during the late afternoon of December 7, 1965, he ran out of twenty-dollar bills and got additional bills from the combination safe by the front door. Lewis unlocked it and took out 25 twenty-dollar bills, or a total of $500, and put the bills in the cash drawer. After that, he had one customer who paid for her groceries by check, and then the next customers were Graham and Casey; they entered the store together; Graham asked for a pack of Pall Mall cigarettes, and Mr.
A woman customer was standing at the cheek stand to be waited on when David Rose, one of the owners of the store, responded to the buzzer. When he got to the front of the market, there were no employees in sight. The customer wanted a few items and she paid for them, and the owner opened the till; Mr. Rose noticed that only two twenty-dollar bills were left in the cash register, and remembered that not more than five minutes before, he had been out front and $500 in twenties had been taken out of the safe by an employee to be put in the cash register; Rose was surprised at the shortage of twenty-dollar bills, and thought that two or three large checks must have been cashed. As the owner was waiting on the customer, Lewis returned to the store. The owner then cheeked out the register with Mr. Grose. The cash register was short by $460 (i.e. 23 twenty-dollar bills) and some cents from what the total amount should have been.
Appellant Graham did not take the stand. Appellant Casey testified that he and Graham went into the store, but he did not see Pike come into the market and did not expect him to come in; neither did he see Pike put his hand in the cash register, and he stated that he himself did not take anything from the cash register—nor did Graham. Casey testified that he did not run out of the store; that he did see Pike leave followed by Lewis. Casey testified that Graham did not run out of the store. He swore that he did not know what happened at the scene of the alleged theft. He said that he and Graham walked out, went to their car, and that he himself got behind the wheel.
It is clear that the three men were acting in concert and that they entered the store three times and indulged, on each occasion, in an unusual pattern of conduct conclusively aimed at securing access to the cash register while the checker ’s attention was diverted so that he would not see the actual asportation of the money. This device of concerted action by thieves in a busy store to create an opportunity for one of them to steal money from the cash register is unfortunately a
In People v. Lodge, supra, 212 Cal.App.2d 410 , 413, the court said, quoting from another case, defendant “ 1. . . may have committed no overt act during the robbery but none was required. His presence could have given encouragement to his companion. . . ” Both Casey and Graham, by their unusual and repetitious conduct aimed at securing an unprotected open till, participated directly in the scheme for theft. The concerted action among Graham, Pike, and Casey was legitimately proved by ample circumstantial evidence; the record justifies a reasonable inference that the intent to steal existed from the start and the verdict cannot be disturbed. It should be noted that after Pike ran out of the market door, the two appellants took to their heels outside the store and ran in different directions. Also a summary of the proof showed that exactly 23 twenty-dollar bills were found upon the defendants after the arrest, and that each of them had some of the bills.
The verdict and judgment of conviction were entirely justified.
The only other point raised by either appellant on appeal is characterized by the following subheading in their brief:
“Appellant Graham was denied a fair trial by reason of the court’s prejudicial misconduct in failing, sua sponte, to give the jury instructions on not drawing an inference of guilt from defendant Graham’s election not to testify.”
We are not prepared to hold that a failure to give such an instruction in the absence of a request to do so constitutes an inevitable error. It may well be that many defendants who have not testified in their own defense may prefer not to have such a pointed reference to the fact made by the trial court in its instructions.
But if the failure to give such an instruction, sua sponte, is in fact an error, it would not follow that such an error would be automatically prejudicial.
The appellants were obviously convicted because of their activities in relation to Pike’s theft and not because Graham did not take the witness stand. An instruction as now requested by him would have added nothing to his defense. We, therefore, believe that this question is resolved by the ruling made in People v. Elliott, 241 Cal.App.2d 659 [ 50 Cal.Rptr. 757 ], in which a hearing was denied by the California Supreme Court and certiorari refused by the United States Supreme Court. ( 385 U.S. 941 [ 17 L.Ed.2d 221 , 87 S.Ct. 312 ].) That case is to the effect that the failure to give such an instruction, sua sponte, is not reversible error in a situation where proof of guilt was as strong as it was there. Here, as in the Elliott case, there was no miscarriage of justice.
In the Elliott opinion, the court discusses the Griffin rule (Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 [ 14 L.Ed.2d 106 , 85 S.Ct. 1229 ]) and the Bruno case (Bruno v. United States, 308 U.S. 287 [ 84 L.Ed. 257 , 60 S.Ct. 198 ]) and considers the holding set out in People v. Bostick, 62 Cal.2d 820 , 823 [ 44 Cal.Rptr. 649 , 402 P.2d 529 ]; in the latter case, the defendant was charged with murder and armed robbery but did not take the witness stand to testify in his own behalf on the issue of guilt; the district attorney made adverse comment, and the court instructed on the effect of the failure to testify, as provided in article I, section 13 of the California Constitution; the Bostick case held that the comment and the instruction constituted error, but that it was not reversible error unless it resulted in a miscarriage of justice within the purview of section 4% of article VI of the California Constitution.[1] The Elliott opinion at pages 667-668 stated: "If comment by the prosecutor and instructions by the trial court, which characterize the failure of the defendant to testify in his behalf upon the issue of guilt, as carrying an inference of guilt, do not require a reversal unless it can be said that such error has resulted in a miscarriage of justice then the failure of the trial court, of its own motion, to give an appropriate instruction directing the jury to draw no unfavorable inferences
* Now article VI, section 13, amendment adopted November 8, 1966.
The last paragraph of the Elliott opinion (p. 668), we believe, is applicable to this ease where the court said: “We have examined the entire cause, including the evidence, and if it can be said that the failure of the court to instruct the jury, of its own motion, concerning the right of the defendant to remain silent, constituted error, such error in view of the overwhelming evidence of guilt, did not result in a miscarriage of justice. (Art. VI, § 4%, Cal. Const.) ”
The judgments of conviction are affirmed.
Stone, J., and Gargano, J., concurred.
Cases cited
- People v. Clay 227 Cal.App.2d 87 at 100 p. 518
- People v. Moore 234 Cal.App.2d 29 at 30 p. 518
- People v. Lodge 212 Cal.App.2d 410 at 412, at 413 p. 518
- People v. Stone 155 Cal.App.2d 259 p. 518
- People v. Owens 98 Cal.App.2d 485 p. 518
- People v. Jollet 60 Cal.App.2d 245 p. 518
- People v. Wright 199 Cal.App.2d 30 p. 518
- People v. Elliott 241 Cal.App.2d 659 p. 519
- Griffin v. California 380 U.S. 609 p. 519
- Bruno v. United States 308 U.S. 287 p. 519
- People v. Bostick 62 Cal.2d 820 at 823 p. 519