People v. Meacham

Montell Rice Meacbam appeals his conviction by the trial court, sitting without a jury, on one count of bribing a public official in violation of Penal Code, section 165, a felony.

Appellant was charged with five counts of bribery of a city councilman (Pen. Code, § 165) and was charged in the sixth count with bribery of an executive officer (Pen. Code, § 67). The court found him guilty of counts I through V and not guilty as to count VI. Appellant was granted a new trial as to counts I through IV and those counts were thereupon dismissed. As to count V, proceedings were suspended and appellant was placed on probation for a period of three years on condition that he pay a $5,000 fine and penalty assessments; from this judgment he appeals.

Meacbam owned and operated two licensed beer taverns, the Barbary Coast on Western Avenue in Los Angeles County

On the evening of that day James W. Vigneau and Marvin J. Sehwarzwalter, both couneilmen of the City of Lawndale, visited appellant at the Barbary Coast. Vigneau, owner of a contract janitorial company, was then mayor of the city and Sehwarzwalter, employed by an electrical company, was also a deputy sheriff. This was the first time the three had met except for one occasion in the fall of 1965 when Vigneau and Sehwarzwalter, accompanied by Deputy Sheriff Ed Sampson, stopped in one evening at the Barbary Coast and were assured by Meacham, in response to their questioning, that lie did not contemplate having topless waitresses at the Junior.

Vigneau and Sehwarzwalter testified that on January 8 they went into appellant’s office and Vigneau asked why he “went topless” in Lawndale. Appellant replied that he could not afford to refrain from that activity because the area was ripe for such an innovation and he had an investment there, not only at the Junior, but at a proposed location on Prairie Avenue. Furthermore, Meacham said that since the use of “topless waitresses” was an area pre-empted by the state, which had no prohibitive legislation, he was conducting a legal enterprise and he would change only if topless was legally prohibited. He suggested that Vigneau and Sehwarzwalter should consider becoming his nondisclosed or silent partners without investment which he would arrange if they would cooperate. Although the couneilmen threatened that they would take every legal means to fight his use of topless waitresses, Meacham repeatedly refused to discontinue the activity because of the profit he was making on his investment. Finally, appellant invited the couneilmen to visit him at his home the next afternoon (Sunday) to meet Berrien Moore, his partner and a licensee in the Junior. Believing there was a good chance that they could convince appellant and his. partner to remove the topless operation from Lawn-dale, the couneilmen did not report to the police appellant's bribery offers.

As the councilmen were leaving, appellant suggested that Vigneau’s janitorial company might have the cleaning contract for appellant’s taverns or that Schwarzwalter’s employer might purchase business gifts at lower cost through appellant’s package liquor store. When Vigneau commented that appellant that day acted like a garbage collector or contractor, appellant said that he would remove topless Avaitresses if he could obtain a taxi or garbage operation in Lawndale. All of Meacham’s suggestions having been rejected, he finally alluded to the taxi operation he had successfully conducted in Hawthorne with political cooperation, intimating that the LaAvndale councilmen were no different from other city officials and advising them to cooperate with him on obtaining a taxi franchise in Lawndale. After this visit, Schwarzwalter had no further contact with appellant.

As they left Meacham’s home, the councilmen discussed what they should do about the bribery offers and it was agreed that Schwarzwalter should refer the matter to Captain Snover, Commander of the Lennox sheriff’s office, the first thing in the morning. Vigneau himself contacted the sheriff’s department in the morning to confirm arrangements to meet Captain Snover for dinner, and he also notified the office

The next day was January 11 and Meacham indeed went to Vigneau’s office around 3 p.m. Vigneau recorded on an office dictating machine, which stood on top of his desk, the first 10 or 12 minutes of their conversation, which lasted about 45 minutes. Appellant admitted that although his wife opposed and his children did not know about his use of topless waitresses, he found the business profitable and wished to provide his family with material advantages. When Vigneau reiterated that the council would be forced to fight to stop Meacham’s operation, Meacham requested that no steps be taken until he could meet once more with Vigneau and Sehwarzwalter, perhaps Saturday evening, but Vigneau declined.

Thereafter specific plans were laid to obtain evidence against Meacham. On Friday, January 14, at a luncheon meeting attended by the Lawndale council and members of the press, as well as other city officials, Vigneau addressed the assembly and publicly alluded to the recent bribery attempt by a local bar owner. Captain Snover interrupted him in an effort to protect the investigation against appellant, and he requested those present to remain silent. Following the meeting, Vigneau discussed the investigation with members of the sheriff’s department.

Finally, on Saturday, January 15, 1966, five intelligence officers from the sheriff’s department set up electronic listening devices on Vigneau’s telephone, in his office and the adjacent rooms. Vigneau then called Meacham and advised him that Vigneau and Sehwarzwalter would be unable to meet with him that evening and besides they felt that nothing could be gained from such a meeting. Meacham suggested that they might meet at another time or place, but Vign'eau said he would rather meet Meacham alone. He claimed that Sehwarzwalter was suspicious. When Vigneau suggested that appellant

The sheriff’s officers concealed themselves before Meacham arrived around 4 p.m. Vigneau and Meacham went directly into the kitchen where Vigneau prepared drinks. He then laid out on the table various ordinances that the city council was purportedly considering, explained them to Meacham, and together they discussed the ordinances, state pre-emption, and the whole problem of legal control of topless waitresses. Vigneau then inquired whether Meacham had been bluffing or trying to stall the councilmen when he had earlier offered to deposit $50,000 in the bank, or if he really meant it when he offered them $15,000 for a political campaign, or if he was serious when he offered a flat sum of money for each topless bar he was allowed to operate unhindered. Meacham at first made no direct response, but expressed concern about involving others besides Vigneau, said he did not want to talk about the subject any more and that anyhow he had only about $35,000 in cash. Vigneau pressed the subject, saying he could make no promises without some concrete offer, and Meacham then suggested a silent partnership to enable Vigneau to share profits without making an investment, but he admonished Vigneau that neither his other partners nor anyone else should know about their arrangement. Meacham added that one of his friends would pay $5,000 to obtain a taxi franchise, that a lot of money could be made in a legitimate taxi operation, and that the transaction would be worth $2,500 to each of them.

Thereafter, the men considered how long it might be, by state legislation or otherwise, before Lawndale might be permitted to draft and pass an enforceable ordinance eliminating topless waitresses. They concluded that it would be a year or more, and that Vigneau might delay city action even longer. During their conversation Vigneau occasionally intimated that he could hurt Meacham through “his pocketbook” or his family or by having his Barbary Coast entertainment license revoked, and by similar efforts sought to have Meacham reiterate and reaffirm his earlier offers. Appellant suggested that Vigneau should cooperate with him “for $100 a week for the first four weeks,” then hesitated in concern that Vigneau might interpret his offer as a bribe. Meacham explained further that he intended to manage bars operated by others and emphasized that for each one that operated topless “you get $100 a week” which might total $500 or $600 each week. He

Shortly thereafter Meacham left Vigneau’s office and the sheriff’s officers entered the kitchen, where Sergeant Martin found and took into custody the $10 bills which he found on the kitchen table. Two days later Meacham was arrested and charged with the crime of offering and giving a bribe with the intent to corrupt and attempt to bribe a public official.

Meacham, testifying in his own defense, denied that he had at any time offered Vigneau or Schwarzwalter a bribe for any purpose, and stated that although he had listened to the tape recording of his January 15th conversation with Vigneau, he did not recall offering or giving Vigneau a bribe. Concerning his use of topless waitresses in Lawndale, Meacham said he told the eounciimen that his partner, an attorney, assured him that there was no ordinance to prevent the use of topless waitresses in the city. He said that in making a decision to cease that activity he had to consider his partner, who would be coming to his home on Sunday afternoon; the eounciimen suggested that they meet the partner then. He denied offering to make the eounciimen silent partners or to give them any other financial interest in his businesses. The next afternoon his partner failed to appear as anticipated, so he merely had a few drinks with the eounciimen and they engaged in conversation centering about Meacham’s home, clothes and family. Meacham explained that the garbage cohtract was Schwarzwalter’s suggestion, while Vigneau initiated discussion concerning the use of his janitorial service for Meacham’s taverns. Meacham specifically denied offering $15,000 as a campaign contribution or $50,000 to be placed in the bank. The eounciimen laughed and jested, and said they would simply have to draw up an ordinance to get rid of the topless waitresses. Despite the pressure exerted upon him at the vari

Meacham’s state of intoxication the evening of January 15 was confirmed by the Roots and by his wife. The Roots saw Meacham driving along Hawthorne Boulevard that evening and blew their horn which Meacham at first disregarded, but several blocks farther on he responded and invited them to follow him home. Although he was already in the house when they arrived, they entered at his wife’s invitation and found Meacham intoxicated, loud and incoherent. Meacham’s wife said that when he arrived home the evening of January 15 his face was very red, his speech slurred, his talk disjointed, and he smelled of whiskey. He had just entered the house and lain down upon the couch when the Roots arrived. They had some conversation and left early; Mrs. Meacham went to bed around 11 p.m., but was unable to rouse her husband and left him sleeping on the couch.

Psychiatrist John Paul Walters testified in Meacham’s defense that alcohol intoxication can render a person incapable of entertaining the intent to bribe. Prior to the trial Doctor Walters listened to the recorded conversation and made a psychiatric examination of appellant; Meacham told the psychiatrist that he had six or eight double shots of whiskey at Vigneau’s office. It was Doctor Walters’ opinion, based upon his observations of Meacham’s personality and background, that Meacham on January 15 had no intent to bribe Vigneau. He found appellant to be a simple straightforward man who would have launched directly into a bribery offer had that been on his mind at the time. Doctor Walters believed that Meacham’s intoxication, which he found demonstrated on the tape recording, impaired appellant’s ability to appreciate the significance of what he said and to perceive nuances of conversation, as well as impairing his ability to form the intent to bribe. The psychiatrist admitted, however,

Appellant contends that the evidence establishes that he was entrapped into giving a bribe to councilman Vigneau, as charged in count V. The defense of entrapment is available where the crime perpetrated was not initially contemplated by the defendant, but was in fact planned and instigated by police officers, or those acting under their direction, and the defendant was, by persuasion or fraud, lured into its commission. (People v. Perez, 62 Cal.2d 769 , 775 [ 44 Cal.Rptr. 326 , 401 P.2d 934 ]; People v. Benford, 53 Cal.2d 1 , 9 [ 345 P.2d 928 ] ; People v. Monteverde, 236 Cal.App.2d 630 [ 46 Cal.Rptr. 206 ]; Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 , 453, 457 [ 77 L.Ed. 413 , 423, 425, 53 S.Ct. 210 , 86 A.L.R. 249 ] ; Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 [ 2 L.Ed.2d 848 , 78 S.Ct. 819 ].) Entrapment may be shown as a matter of law in certain cases (Sherman v. United States, supra, p. 373 [2 L.Ed.2d p. 851]), and when it is thus disclosed “the court has a duty to root its effects out of the trial upon its own initiative if necessary.” (People v. Perez, 62 Cal.2d 769 , 775 [ 44 Cal.Rptr. 326 , 401 P.2d 934 ].) Appellant argues that the classic elements of entrapment under California law appear from the evidence: the original contact was initiated solely by Vigneau acting under the direction of sheriff officers ; Vigneau, by direct and indirect solicitation, made repeated and unsuccessful attempts to have appellant offer him a bribe; the bribe was finally produced, but only as a result of the inordinate and abnormal pressure applied by Vigneau (People v. Marsden, 234 Cal.App.2d 796 , 798-799 [ 44 Cal.Rptr. 728 ]). Conceding that the objectionable element in entrapment is active police enticement of an individual to engage in incriminating conduct, we find no evidence of such activity in this case.

The specific intent to commit the crime of bribery is an essential element of the charge, but the trier of fact may resort to circumstantial evidence to determine its existence, and circumstantial evidence may also be utilized to determine

In California “the availability of the defense [of entrapment] depends upon whether the intent to commit the crime originated in the mind of the defendant or in the mind of the entrapping officer [citations], and that where a defendant has a preexisting criminal intent, the fact that when solicited by a decoy he commits a crime does not show entrapment [citations]. Similarly, the United States Supreme Court says that the defense is available ‘when the criminal design originates with the officials of the Government, and they implant in the mind of an innocent person the disposition to commit the alleged offense and induce its commission in order

Appellant further contends that Vigneau’s threats to expose his family to unfavorable publicity, to enact prohibiting ordinances, and to seek the revocation of the Barbary Coast’s entertainment license, constituted police efforts to threaten and intimidate a reluctant and extremely impressionable person into committing a crime by the use of improper coercion. The record belies this contention. It discloses instead that all transactions took place in an atmosphere of friendliness in which Vigneau explored frankly the avenues that were open to the city council in its effort to have appellant discontinue the disapproved activity. Vigneau did not confront Meacham with threats and alternative promises of cooperation for a price. Although the court was uncertain whether the earlier offers constituted the crime, it felt that there Avas no question that appellant’s activities indicated an intention to bribe and it found the actual bribery offer made beyond a reasonable doubt the afternoon of January 15, 1967. Not only is there no indication that Meacham felt coerced or intimated, but the law referred to by appellant and prohibiting the use of improper influence to extract an involuntary confession in violation of the indiAÚdual’s constitutional rights has no application to these circumstances. (People v. Dorado, 62 Cal.2d 338 [ 42 Cal.Rptr. 169 , 398 P.2d 361 ]; Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 694 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 10 A.L.R.3d 974 ].)

Appellant claims that the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law to support his conviction. He emphasizes that

Appellant finally contends that the trial court should have granted his motion for a new trial as to count V on the basis that he feels that the trial court was impressed with the overt acts of bribery, as shown on the latter portion of the tape, to prove appellant’s “origin of intent.” Appellant argues that the commission of the offense itself cannot be evidence of a disposition to commit the crime and that the intent must originate with the defendant at an earlier time. Appellant reiterates that the evidence relating to count V reveals that the intent originated with Vigneau, which returns us to the argument of entrapment earlier rejected in this opinion. A motion for new trial is addressed to the sound dis

The judgment is affirmed.

Wood, P. J., and Lillie, J., concurred.

A petition for a rehearing was denied January 2, 1968, and appellant’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied January 31, 1968.