Majority
—Defendant was convicted of furnishing dangerous drugs (§ 11912, Health & Saf. Code); he appeals from the judgment.
Appellant’s first contention is that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction in that the evidence “was not only confusing, in conflict and doubtful but wholly circumstantial.” He presents a lengthy factual argument that has no place in a reviewing court; and levels unfounded and unfair accusations against the deputy public defender who represented him as being “unskilled,” and that the police officers who made the arrest are “presumed to be brutal, biased and prejudiced and interested in making an arrest” and “it can be assumed that they would say anything and believe anything to make the arrest stand”— statements unworthy of a member of the legal profession. The record shows that the evidence of defendant’s guilt is direct evidence and that the only reasonable inference that can be drawn therefrom is that defendant furnished dangerous drugs to one Preyer.
Around 1 p.m. on September 28, 1966, Officers Kington and Whitehead were in the vicinity of 4422 South Avalon on an undercover investigation of bookmaking at the rear of that address; they were dressed in plain clothes and drove an unmarked vehicle. They parked in an alley and walked to a vacant lot area where they observed defendant and Preyer standing at the rear of 4422 South Avalon. Defendant and Preyer were facing each other. The officers saw defendant reach into a brown bag, pull out his cupped hand and place some white objects and foil wrapped objects into a small metal container held by Preyer; he appeared to be counting. Then defendant said to Preyer, “That’s it, Man”; Preyer said, “Come on, Man, give me some more. I’ll give you some money . . . tomorrow.” At that time, aware that this vicinity
The defense was that defendant and Preyer had been gambling in the rear of 4422 South Avalon and somebody called out “police”; as they started to leave the alley, they were stopped by the officers; dice were in Preyer’s pocket; Preyer did not attempt to buy any pills from defendant nor did defendant give him any pills; the conversation attributed to them did not occur.
Appellant’s second argument is as trite as his first. He contends that there was no probable cause for his arrest since he could only have been arrested by guess, surmise and conjecture in the “warped and biased minds of the arresting officers.” Also, he claims the ensuing search and seizure of the capsules and tablets were illegal.
“ Reasonable or probable cause is shown if a man of ordinary care and prudence would be led to believe and conscientiously entertain an honest and strong suspicion that the accused is guilty.” (People v. Cockrell, 63 Cal.2d 659 , 665 [ 47 Cal.Rptr. 788 , 408 P.2d 116 ]; People v. Hillery, 65 Cal.2d 795 , 803 [ 56 Cal.Rptr. 280 , 423 P.2d 208 ]; People v. Talley, 65 Cal.2d 830 , 835 [ 56 Cal.Rptr. 492 , 423 P.2d 564 ].)
Aware that the vicinity in which he saw defendant and Preyer was a high frequency dangerous drug area, dangerous drug arrests had taken place in several businesses in the block and one of these places just south of 4422 South Avalon was known as the “Pill Palace,” when Officer King-ton, who had been trained to recognize dangerous drugs, saw defendant reach into a brown bag, pull out some white objects and some foil wrapped objects and put them in a metal container held by Preyer, heard their conversation indicating a sale transaction and saw defendant look in their direction, simultaneously drop the bag and say “Cops” and walk away, according to his own testimony he then formed the opinion that defendant was selling dangerous drugs in violation of section 11912, Health and Safety Code. Thus, even though Officer Kington had reasonable cause to believe defendant had committed a felony he did not then arrest defendant and Preyer but only detained them for questioning and further investigation. This he had a right and a duty to do. (People v. Mickelson, 59 Cal.2d 448 , 450 [ 30 Cal.Rptr. 18 , 380 P.2d 658 ]; People v. Martin, 46 Cal.2d 106 , 108 [ 293 P.2d 52 ]; People v. Blodgett, 46 Cal.2d 114 , 117 [ 293 P.2d 57 ]; People v. Michael, 45 Cal.2d 751 , 754 [ 290 P.2d 852 ].) While circumstances short of probable cause to make an arrest may justify such action (People v. Mickelson, 59 Cal.2d 448 , 450 [ 30 Cal.Rptr. 18 , 380 P.2d 658 ]; People v. Ellsworth, 190 Cal.App.2d 844 , 847 [ 12 Cal.Rptr. 433 ]; People v. Dumas, 251 Cal.App.2d 613 , 616 [ 59 Cal.Rptr. 541 ]), it is apparent that the officer could then have made the arrest. However, the detention of defendant and Preyer for questioning and further investigation did not in and of itself amount to an arrest. (People v. Amos, 190 Cal.App.2d 384 , 388 [ 11 Cal.Rptr. 834 ].) While they were being detailed by Officer Whitehead for questioning, Officer Kington found on the ground where the transaction had taken
Inasmuch as the dangerous drugs and other evidence were recovered from the ground, there appears to have been no search and seizure. Observing things which are open to view does not constitute a search (People v. Martin, 45 Cal.2d 755 , 762 [ 290 P.2d 855 ]; People v. Terry, 61 Cal.2d 137 , 152 [ 37 Cal.Rptr. 605 , 390 P.2d 381 ]; People v. Roberts, 47 Cal.2d 374 , 377 [ 303 P.2d 721 ]) and picking them up does not constitute a seizure.
The judgment is affirmed.
Wood, P. J., and Fourt, J., concurred.
Cases cited
- People v. Ingle 53 Cal.2d 407 at 412 p. 16
- People v. Cockrell 63 Cal.2d 659 at 665 p. 16
- People v. Hillery 65 Cal.2d 795 at 803 p. 16
- People v. Talley 65 Cal.2d 830 at 835 p. 16
- People v. Mickelson 59 Cal.2d 448 at 450 p. 16
- People v. Martin 46 Cal.2d 106 at 108 p. 16
- People v. Blodgett 46 Cal.2d 114 at 117 p. 16
- People v. Michael 45 Cal.2d 751 at 754 p. 16
- People v. Ellsworth 190 Cal.App.2d 844 at 847 p. 16
- People v. Dumas 251 Cal.App.2d 613 at 616 p. 16
- People v. Amos 190 Cal.App.2d 384 at 388 p. 16
- People v. Martin 45 Cal.2d 755 at 762 p. 17
- People v. Terry 61 Cal.2d 137 at 152 p. 17
- People v. Roberts 47 Cal.2d 374 at 377 p. 17