Majority
This is an appeal from an order denying a motion for a new trial.
In an information filed in Los Angeles on June 6, 1967, Stephen Oollom and Bruce Oollom were jointly charged with having possessed narcotics on March 15, 1967. It was further charged that Bruce Oollom on or about July 1961 was convicted in Los Angeles of a violation of the provisions of section 11715, Health and Safety Code, and that in September 1963 he was convicted in the federal court in Texas of a crime involving narcotics (receiving and transporting) and that he served a term of imprisonment therefor in a federal prison. He pleaded not guilty and denied the charges with reference to the prior convictions. The clerk’s transcript recites: “By stipulation of all counsel and the defendant (s) personally, the cause is submitted on the testimony contained in the transcript of the proceedings had at the preliminary hearing, subject to this Court’s rulings, with each side reserving the right to offer additional evidence, and all stipulations entered into at the preliminary hearing be deemed entered into in these proceedings.
“It is further stipulated that any—exhibits received at the preliminary hearing are deemed received in evidence in these proceedings, subject to this Court’s ruling.
“People’s Exhibit (transcript of the proceedings had at the preliminary hearing) admitted in evidence by reference. The court states that it has read and considered the transcript of the preliminary hearing. S Oollom: Defendant personally and all counsel waive jury trial on issue of alleged prior felony conviction. B. Oollom: Defendant personally and all counsel waives jury trial on issue of allged [sic] priors. Each: Motion of defendant continued to November 6, 1967 at 9 :00 am in Department 116 for further proceedings. S Col-lorn : Bail. B Oollom: Remanded. ’ ’
After additional testimony was introduced by each side the judge found each defendant guilty as charged. Stephen indicated that he desired to be committed to a narcotics treatment center for help. A probation officer’s report was ordered and was submitted. The court made no finding with reference to the charged prior convictions although the record is clear that defendant Bruce Oollom was so convicted as charged. Bruce
A résumé of some of the facts is as follows: at about 10 a.m. of March 15, 1967, Officers Najera and Black were on duty in a marked police car in the vicinity of Portóla and Huntington Drive. The officers observed a parked black Mercury station wagon containing four persons. The Collom brothers left the parked vehicle, walked westward on Huntington Drive, turned around and walked eastward past the parked vehicle. The two Colloms stopped and Arthur Hitch approached them. Najera had known Hitch for several years and knew him to be a person who had been selling heroin on the street and a user himself. Najera had 20 years of experience on the Los Angeles Police Department and a majority of his arrests had been for narcotics violations. Najera saw Hitch hand Stephen Collom an object and saw Bruce Collom hand something to Hitch which appeared to be money. At this time and occasion the heads of the Colloms and Hitch were turned toward Najera when the latter either pointed toward Najera or waved in the direction of Najera. Najera was in a marked police ear and in uniform. Immediately thereupon all three of the men who had
The testimony of defendants was that Bruce had hit Najera but that the blow was not “on purpose” and that after the scuffle the brothers were struck by the officers with “saps.” Bach of the two persons who had remained in the parked vehicle testified for defendants. Bach of the witnesses, as did Bruce, admitted to prior felony convictions.
Appellant now asserts that he should have been permitted to represent himself, that the heroin should not have been received into evidence for there was no reason temporarily to detain appellant, that it was error to refuse to suppress the evidence because it was obtained by brutal means and that the police used untested, unreliable informants with reference to their information concerning Hitch.
It is true that Judge Klein of the mimicipal court in answer to appellant’s statement, “I would like to conduct my own defense” said: “Sorry, sir, we cannot allow you to do that. This is a felony matter—” The appellant said that he thought he had had “sufficient experience and knowledge to do so.” He said: “I have conducted myself in other court
At the trial of the cause in the superior court appellant was represented by private counsel of his own choosing. Not one word was said in the trial court by appellant or his counsel of any desire to represent himself and the matter was submitted upon the stipulation and the testimony of appellant’s witnesses and himself. In o.ther words, appellant adopted the preliminary hearing proceedings without exception. The trial judge undoubtedly knew the law with reference to a defendant’s representing himself and had appellant asked to represent himself the trial judge would have conducted a proper hearing to ascertain appellant’s capacity in this connection and would have ruled accordingly. There was in our opinion no error under the circumstances but if there was error it was invited by appellant himself. Certainly counsel was not forced upon appellant for he engaged an attorney of his own choice. In short there was no insistence by appellant that he be permitted to represent himself in the trial court—the exact opposite appears to be the fact.
The detention of appellant by Officer Najera in the first instance was perfectly proper under the circumstances. Without extending the facts further, suffice it to say that Najera saw Hitch, a person known to be a narcotics user and pusher, engage in a transaction with the two brothers, all of whom ran when their attention was drawn to the police during the transaction. It was common sense for the officer to insist upon talking with them under the circumstances. (See
The arrest was with probable cause. Furtive and suspicious conduct contribute to probable cause and here, there was the utmost furtive action associated with and immediately following a transaction with a person known to be engaged in the narcotics traffic. (See People v. Rosemont, 221 Cal.App.2d 500 , 502 [ 34 Cal.Rptr. 667 ] ; People v. Barquera, 207 Cal.App.2d 725 , 728 [ 24 Cal.Rptr. 675 ] ; People v. Talley, 65 Cal.2d 830 , 835 [ 56 Cal.Rptr. 492 , 423 P.2d 564 ] ; People v. Currier, 232 Cal.App.2d 103 , 107 [ 42 Cal.Rptr. 562 ].)
The contraband in this instance was not secured by any brutal tactics. It is a fact that the appellant, an admitted ex-convict' and two of his witnesses, also admited ex-convicts, testified differently from the officers. The judge believed the officers as to how the events occurred and not surprisingly disbelieved the appellant and his witnesses.
The evidence in this ease is overwhelmingly in favor of the judgment. We have, pursuant to rule 12(a) of the Rules on Appeal, called for and viewed the original proceedings which were before the court at the time the order denying the motion for a new trial was made. There is nothing in the record which persuades us that the order should be reversed.
The order appealed from is affirmed.
Wood, P. J., and Lillie, J., concurred.
Cases cited
- People v. Hilliard 221 Cal.App.2d 719 p. 247
- People v. Mora 232 Cal.App.2d 400 p. 247
- People v. Mickelson 59 Cal.2d 448 p. 247
- People v. Henze 253 Cal.App.2d. 986 p. 247
- People v. Rosemont 221 Cal.App.2d 500 at 502 p. 247
- People v. Barquera 207 Cal.App.2d 725 at 728 p. 247
- People v. Talley 65 Cal.2d 830 at 835 p. 247
- People v. Currier 232 Cal.App.2d 103 at 107 p. 247