Majority
The decedent died March 11, 1934. Later a document purporting to be her will, dated February 27, 1934, was admitted to probate. Thereafter L. E. Inman, B. F. Barnhart, V. Warren, and C. T. Headen, three sisters and a brother, being the children of Mrs. Eva Headen the surviving widow of George Headen, deceased, who was a half brother of the testatrix, appeared and filed a contest. Two of the legatees named in the purported will appeared and answered. By its verdict the jury found (1) that the decedent was not of sound mind at the time the purported will was executed; (2) that she was not able to understand the nature of the act she was performing, to understand and see the nature and situation of her property, to remember and understand her relations to the persons who had claims on her bounty and who were affected by the provisions of said will; (3) and that the alleged will was executed by decedent Avhile acting under undue influence. Thereafter the proponents made a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The trial court granted the motion in so far as it was based on the third division of the verdict as returned by the jury. As to the other portions of the verdict the motion was denied. Thereafter the proponents made a motion for a new trial. That motion Avas denied by operation of Iuav. From said orders and judgment the proponents have appealed.
The first point made by the proponents is that the verdict is not supported by the evidence, however we think said contention may not be sustained. The contestants presented their case in such a manner as to present two different theories. They claimed the insanity of the decedent was of such a broad character as to establish mental incompeteney generally. They also claimed it Avas a form of insanity under
Taking up the first theory the record discloses that in the month of October, 1932, the decedent was about seventy years of age and was and had been for some time in ill health. Her home was on a farm adjacent to the city of Santa Clara in Santa Clara County. At that place she consulted local physicians, Dr. Beattie and Dr. Bothe. The latter caused her to be taken to the French Hospital in San Francisco where, on October 13, 1932, she was treated by Dr. Janes. Later she returned to her home but not recovered. In January, 1934, she returned to San Francisco and again consulted Dr. Janes. Acting upon his suggestion she entered the hospital again on March 1, 1934. The will under attack was an holographic will dated February 27, 1934. She died on March 1,1, 1934. After the death of the testatrix an autopsy was performed by Dr. Janes and Dr. J. B. McNaught. The report of the autopsy was full and complete. On the trial Dr. Janes was called as a witness by the proponents of the will. During an extended examination he made a very complete statement of the conditions he found. The autopsy disclosed the following: 1. Leukemia, myelogenic; 2. Anemia secondary; 3. Splenomegalia; 4. Hemorrhage, gastrointestinal mucosa; 5. Arteriosclerosis, general; 6. Arteriosclerosis, local, renal arteries with scars in kidney; 7. Arteriosclerosis, local aorta; 8. Tuberculosis pulmonary, apical, healed; 9. Accessory spleen; 10. Fibromyoma of uterus (calcified) ; 11. Atrophy of pelvic organs; 12. Appendicitis, chronic, obliterative ; 13. Diverticula, large bowel, multiple. Dr. Janes testified the first seven were causes of death. He also testified as follows: The decedent called at his office on February 13, 1934. He made something of an examination and asked her to return, which she did on February 21st. At that time he thought she was in a serious condition and directed her to go to a. hospital. He next saw the patient on March 1, 1934, at the French Hospital. She was suffering from acute infection. She had an enlarged spleen. The enlargement was on the left side and the patient complained more or less of her stomach. He then diagnosed the case as enlarged spleen and possibility of cancer of the stomach. Prior to March 11, 1934, he saw the patient once a day and sometimes
In support of their other theory the contestants introduced evidence of specific facts relating to the health, acts, and statements of the deceased. They introduced evidence that in 1925 she suffered a breakdown, was taken to the Livermore
The contestants called Dr. Will Rebec as an expert. To him they propounded a long hypothetical question. That question recited among others the foregoing facts, including the report of the autopsy. In reply the doctor testified that the decedent at the time she made the purported will was of unsound mind—she was suffering from senile dementia, that is, she was insane. Taking up each one of the afflictions set forth in the report of the autopsy the witness described its effects on the body and the effect of the diseased organs of the body on the nervous system. He described in detail the nature of arteriosclerosis; that it results in a deposit of calcium in the tissues of the arteries; that the deposit is permanent; that, in the case of the decedent, the condition was chronic, and that it was progressive. He stated such facts as would show the mentality of the patient would be lessened in proportion to the progress of the affliction and that the progress thereof depended upon all of the facts which were presented for the determination of the jury. After the cause had been submitted the jury found the facts against the proponents. Giving effect to the facts above recited, we think it is clear it. may not be said the verdict was not supported by the evidence, nor that the verdict does not support the judgment.
The next point made by the proponents is that the contestants failed to serve the citation on all of the beneficiaries named in the purported will. In reply to that point it is sufficient to state the record does not disclose who were served or who were not served.
It is next contended that counsel for contestants were guilty of prejudicial statements and misconduct. In support of this assertion proponents quote questions asked by, or statements made by counsel for contestants. The record shows that in some instances no objection was made in the trial court. In other instances proponents made an objection and it was sustained. In other instances there was no assignment of error and the court was not asked to rule thereon. The court was not asked to admonish the jury to disregard the erroneous conduct, if any. There was no failure on the part of the court to grant a request to admonish counsel nor to rule on objections duly made. On the record as made the
It is next asserted that the trial court erroneously received evidence of statements made by Dr. A. C. Bothe. That assertion arises out of the following facts. The contestants had alleged that the purported will was executed under undue influence. At an early date they announced they expected to prove that Dr. A. C. Bothe and his wife, and Earl L. Paltenghi, their son-in-law, entered into a conspiracy to obtain title to the property of the deceased and that the will was the outgrowth of said conspiracy. In presenting that theory the contestants introduced in evidence many declarations of Dr. A. C. Bothe not made within the hearing of the deceased. It is those declarations of which" they now complain. There is no merit in the contention. The proponents claim the contestants had not pleaded a conspiracy and therefore said declarations were hearsay. Assuming, but not deciding, that the contestants had not pleaded a conspiracy, nevertheless, as we understand the record, they had asked permission to do so and the trial court had ruled that later they might ask for permission to amend to conform to the proof. At a later date, on motion duly made, all of the evidence complained of was stricken out. Furthermore, when a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict was made, the motion was granted as to the count pleading undue influence. As to the other counts the admission of the evidence complained of was wholly immaterial and nothing appears in the record showing it was prejudicial to the rights of the proponents.
Under the heading " Other Prejudicial Statements and Rulings” the proponents list ” Miscellaneous Errors”. We have examined the record. We find nothing therein presenting anything purporting to be prejudicial error. Furthermore, the alleged irregularities were not called to the attention of the trial court and it was not asked to rule thereon.
Finally the proponents contend the trial court erred in denying the proponents’ motion for a directed verdict and later denying their motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the issue of unsoundness of mind. We think they are mistaken. Our reasons are clearly set forth hereinabove
The judgment appealed from is affirmed.
Nourse, P. J., and Spence, J., concurred.
A petition by appellants to have the cause heard in the Supreme Court, after judgment in the District Court of Appeal, was denied by the Supreme Court on April 24, 1939.
Cases cited
- People v. Edgar 34 Cal. App. 459 p. 218