Majority
In an information filed by the district attorney of Los Angeles County, appellant was charged with the crime of murder. Upon his arraignment he moved for a dismissal under section 995 of the Penal Code which motion was denied, whereupon he entered his plea of “not guilty” and personally waived trial by jury. After hearing the evidence, the court found him guilty of murder of the first degree. This appeal is prosecuted from the judgment of conviction, as well as from the order by which his motion for a new trial was denied.
It is here urged that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the judgment for the reasons that:
1. Appellant produced certain evidence to show that the act was committed by him in self-defense, which was neither rebutted nor refuted.
2. The record is absolutely devoid of any evidence which would tend to show that the killing was a wilful, deliberate and premeditated killing with malice aforethought. Under no theory known to the law is the evidence in this case sufficient to support a first degree murder conviction.
About 9 o’clock on Saturday night, May 4, 1940, several men, including appellant, Rufus Eckford (the deceased), T. L. McGowan and Oscar Pugh, were playing a crap game in a welding shed at the rear of Leon’s Garage on Central Avenue in the city of Los Angeles. Just prior to the altercation which resulted in the fatal stabbing of Rufus Eckford, he was shooting the dice. He hit five straight naturals, five deuce sevens, at $1.05, and when he hit the fourth deuce seven, ap
McGowan’s version upon cross-examination of what occurred from that point is as follows: “When he said that Mr. Eckford made at LaFleur with the knife and I jumped in between ... I shoved Mr. Eckford back ... I would say about a foot or a foot and a half. . . . Q. And he struck over your shoulder at LaFleur a foot and a half in the rear of you? A. Yes. Q. Then what happened? ... A. When LaFleur broke out from behind me, Mr. Eckford met him on the opposite side. Q. LaFleur was down here, and Eckford was north of him, farther away from the door then LaFleur was? A. Mr. Eckford was back in here and Mr. LaFleur was back here and I was between them. . . . LeFleur tried to go around to the right of me and Mr. Eckford cut by him on that side . . . Mr. Eckford struck at LaFleur with the pocket knife. Q. How many times did he strike him? A.
Eckford apparently collapsed near the said Ford V-8 where he was found lying in a pool of blood with his clothing torn and disarranged, and the right front pocket of his trousers turned outside. The autopsy surgeon testified that his examination showed five clean cut stab wounds: (a) One 1% inches long on the left shoulder; (b) one five-eighths inches long which entered the chest wall just below the left arm pit; (c) a cut five-eighths inches long which en
Appellant took the stand in his own defense and his version of the affray from the time the witness McGowan joined him and decedent was as follows: McGowan “came over and asked me what was the matter, and I explained the matters to him, and in about an instant he (Eckford) cut at me, and cut my sweater on the shoulder, and about that time McGowan was trying to talk to him and tell him about being crooked, and I was up against the wall, and I said to McGowan, ‘I am trying to get out of here’, and I kind of gave him a soft punch, that was all I did, and he came back in turn, and about that instant ... I reached in my pocket and got my knife, and in my own defense, and McGowan said ‘He cut me’, and we started to swinging at each other, and all I remember, he put his hand on his neck and about that time he cut at me again, and I ducked out of his way and swung at him again, and the last time I swung at him I got him to stop and he acted like he was crazy or something, and McGowan then said, ‘Why don’t you stop fighting?’ I said ‘I can’t stop this fellow from cutting me, why don’t you catch and hold him, or do something with him?’ He acted like he was crazy and about that instant he stopped and he kept holding his hand on his neck, and I didn’t even bother him, and he stood up looking at me, and in the meantime everybody was cleared out of the place, and he went outside and McGowan said, ‘Come out here, he is not out here,’ I peeked out of the door and I didn’t see him, and I went on out, and I called to Violet Shaw (a friend of appellant,
Mrs. Arzilia Nelson, a witness for the prosecution, gave an entirely different version of the affray, to the following effect: She testified that she was in the kitchen of her home between the hours of 8:00 and 9 :30 in the evening of May 4, 1940, when she heard loud talking outside; that she looked out of her kitchen window and observed two men close to the alley in the vacant space at the rear of Leon’s Garage; that they were both talking and moving, one with his hands raised was moving backward toward the alley, and the other man was moving toward him at the same time saying, “Give me the money”. When they reached the third window of the Shaw house directly across the alley from the witness’ house, “They were both talking and one man kept saying, ‘Give me my money’, and the other man says, ‘I haven’t got your money, I have not got your money, I have not got it, I ain't got your money’, and the other man said, ‘You give me my money’, and then I heard the man with his back to the window at that time, he says, ‘I ain’t got your money’, and then he says, ‘Oh, I am stabbed in my heart, somebody stop him’, and at that time this other man said, ‘I will kill you about my money’, and then he says . . . the man with his hands up, ‘I ain’t got your money, I ain’t got your money, I ain’t got your money.’ He said that three times, after he said he was stabbed.” In reply to the question, “Did you see the man who was facing the man with his hands up, did you see any motion on his part?, the witness Nelson stated: “I saw one motion just before the man said that he was stabbed. I saw one motion. I didn’t see it, which one made it, but there was one motion in the shadows. You see they were in the dark of the house. Q. What was that motion ? A. It seemed like it was a strike. . . . Mr. Wildey: For the purpose of the record, bringing the arm slightly forward and downward. Q. Was that with the right or left hand? A. It seemed like it was the right. Q. With the right hand? A. Yes.”
The witness then testified that she ran from the kitchen window to a window in her living room where she observed one man had backed up against the house with his hands still in the air and the other man “was placing his hands both
Officer Broady testified that he arrived at the scene of the homicide at about 9:40 P. M., that he found deceased lying in a pool of blood near a car in the vacant lot; that there was a trail of blood from where deceased lay to a point in the alley under one of the windows of Mrs. Shaw’s house; that there was another stream of blood from there back down the alley to the parked cars and then it turned and went just inside the door of the welding shop; that when he examined deceased, he saw that his right front pocket was turned out about three-fourths of the way.
Appellant contends that the fatal blow was struck in the welding shed and that decedent was the aggressor. Respondent urges that the fatal blow was struck by appellant in the vacant lot where deceased was later found, and that appellant was the aggressor.
The “fact that an unlawful killing by the defendant may have been established, and in that connection that assumed ‘ circumstances of mitigation’ have been placed in evidence either by the prosecution or by the defendant, as far as the jury is concerned, they are not necessarily conclusive either as to the proof of the several items of evidence by which such ‘ circumstances of mitigation’ have been sought to be established, or as to the effects of such items taken either separately or as a whole. The jury (or the court sitting without a jury) has the right, and it is its duty, to weigh such evidence and thereupon to determine what credit, if any, it deserves, and thereupon to accord to it the weight to which it is entitled. And in so doing, should the jury conclude that the ‘circumstances of mitigation’ either have not been established by credible evidence, or that even if isolated respective facts should have been satisfactorily es
Appellant admitted the killing, consequently, considering the state of the record and the evidence which is hereinbefore narrated, the issue of mitigation or self-defense, as well as the degree of the crime became questions of fact for the determination of the trial court.
The evidence adduced at the trial of the instant cause was absolutely sufficient to justify a verdict of second degree murder, but it was hardly sufficient to support a verdict of murder of the first degree, when reviewed in the light of all the surrounding circumstances shown by the record, and taking into consideration the decisions of the Supreme Court in the eases of People v. Howard, 211 Cal. 322 [ 295 Pac. 333 , 71 A. L. R. 1385 ], and People v. Kelley, 208 Cal. 387 [ 281 Pac. 609 ].
Doran, J., and White, J., concurred.
Cases cited
- People v. Howard 211 Cal. 322 p. 57
- People v. Kelley 208 Cal. 387 p. 57