Bower v. Dockweiler

This is an appeal by the contestants of the will of Abagail Stark from a judgment determining that they were not her heirs at law and as a consequence not entitled to maintain their contest against the validity of her will. The vital and only controlling question upon which our decision must turn is whether Abagail Stark was or was not the legitimate or legitimated child of Robert Stark. If she was his legitimate child, or a natural child legitimated either by his own public acts or conduct or by virtue of law, the decision below was erroneous; otherwise not.

The trial court found that while Abagail Stark was the issue of Robert Stark, a white man, and Catherine Stark, a mulatto, her parents had never married, and that Abagail had never been legitimated by any act of public acknowledgment by Robert Stark or by virtue of the provisions of any statute; and as a consequence the court held that the contestants, who are the descendants of Robert Stark by his marriage to Mary Virginia Elizabeth Stark, a white woman, were as a matter of law not Abagail Stark’s heirs at law.

As the errors assigned deal wholly with the claim that the evidence was either contradictory to or insufficient to sustain the findings, we set forth only the competent evidence which favors the findings.

As has been indicated, Robert Stark originally married a white woman named Mary Virginia Elizabeth Stark, by whom he had four children. The contestants here are either children or grandchildren of these four children of Robert and Mary Stark. Mary Stark died some time prior to 1853, and thereafter Robert Stark, with his four children and his slave Catherine, emigrated by wagon train from his home in Kentucky to California, stopping seemingly for a short period, while on the way, in the State of Texas. Prior to the time Robert Stark left Kentucky he had a child by his slave Catherine, which died during infancy. In 1859, Catherine, while living with Robert Stark, gave birth to a second child. This was Abagail, whose will is here involved. In 1869 or 1870 Robert Stark, Catherine Stark and Abagail left Saugus, California, where Robert and Catherine Stark had resided since they came to California in 1853, and moved into a home in Los Angeles. It appears from the evidence that one Brophy held title to the Los Angeles property, and by his

There is no evidence in the record that Robert and Catherine Stark ever went through any ceremony of marriage. Neither is there any evidence of declaration or admission, direct or indirect, by either that they were ever married, except that years after the death of Robert, when Abagail made a quitclaim deed to her mother for the purpose of removing any cloud on her mother’s title to the Los Angeles property, Catherine, over her signature by her mark, certified that “the grantor in the foregoing deed named, viz., Abagail Stark, is the sole living issue of myself and my deceased husband, Robert Stark.” There was competent testimony of declarations made by both Catherine and her daughter Abagail, after the death of Robert Stark, that Catherine was never married. Likewise, declarations were shown to have been made by Catherine that she was “of the Indian and negro races” and that Abagail “could not marry a colored man because she had so much more white than colored blood.” Moreover, it was shown that Abagail had declared that she was of the “negro race”; and that she had “some negro blood”; that her mother had been a “negro slave.” Additional testimony bearing on the fact that Catherine was a negro or mulatto is the testimony that she had declared she had no living relations. There was no testimony as to the percentage of negro blood that flowed in the veins of Catherine or Abagail.

The only evidence in the record which affirmatively indicates that Robert Stark was a white man were the declarations of Abagail to that effect. No issue was made in the trial below that he was not white; the issue there on the question of race being only as to whether Catherine and Abagail were white persons.

The only evidence that bore on the question of legitimacy of Abagail by reason of any acts or conduct by Robert Stark, other than the fact that she lived from the time she was born until the death of Robert Stark with him and her mother, is the testimony of a single witness that on some three or four occasions after their removal to Los Angeles

Under their first specification of error appellants contend that six rulings by the court on evidence were erroneous. For failure to comply with our rules the appellants are not entitled to a review of the alleged errors. Nevertheless we have examined the rulings and we find that all of them are indubitably correct. With respect to the ruling on appellants’ offer of proof we should perhaps say a word to clear up what seems to be a rather too general misapprehension as to the function of an offer of proof. Counsel for appellants sought to have a witness read data from a record, which was not an original record. Objection having been properly sustained on the ground the record was secondary, counsel made an offer to prove by the witness some half dozen or more separate matters embodied in the written record. If counsel intended by his offer to prove these several matters by having the witness read them from the secondary record, the ruling was obviously correct. If, however, he intended to prove by the witness these various matters through the personal knowledge of the witness, without reference to the record, he did not by the offer of proof achieve error in the ruling on the offer. The proper procedure in that situation would have been for counsel to propound the pertinent questions to the witness. He was not entitled to use an offer of proof, as a dragnet, to obviate asking the witness the particular questions to which he desired answers from the witness’s own personal knowledge. Accordingly, even though the witness could have testified as of his own knowledge to every fact set forth on the secondary record, counsel foreclosed himself by his offer to prove, when instead he should have asked direct questions of the witness. (See Indianapolis etc. v. Hall, 165 Ind. 557 [ 76 N. E. 242 ].)

Contestants concede that the evidence established that Catherine Stark “had some colored blood,’’ but they contend that there was no evidence to indicate that she had a sufficient percentage of negro blood so as to require that she be classified as a negro or mulatto. Accordingly, they contend that the statute of this state, which was in force from

The controlling California statute (Statutes of 1849-1850, chapter 140), enacted by the legislature in April, 1850 (now, with additions, Civ. Code, sec. 60), reads as follows: “All marriages of white persons and negroes or mulattoes are declared to be illegal and void. ’ ’ While this statute did not define a “mulatto,’’ two other statutes enacted at the same time, which prohibited a “black or mulatto’’ from testifying for or against a white person, or in a ease where a white person was a party, defined a “mulatto’’ as a person having “one-eighth part or more of negro blood.’’ (Statutes of California, 1849-1850, chapter 99, sec. 14; chapter 142, sec. 306.) These are statutes in pari materia, to be read and considered together. So read and construed it is plain that under the statute a marriage between a white person and a mulatto having one-eighth part or more of negro blood was illegal and void. Whether, as has been held (Daniel v. Guy, 19 Ark. 121 ; State v. Hayes, 1 Bailey [S. C.] 275; cf. People v. Hall, 4 Cal. 399 ), a marriage between a white person and a person with less than one-eighth part of negro blood may be classed as illegal and void on the theory that such person is a “mulatto’’ within the meaning of our statute (now Civ. Code, sec. 60), we are not, in view of the facts of this case, required to decide.

Our statute, which expressly declares marriages of the kind mentioned therein as being illegal and void, may

Contestants further contend that if in fact there was a marriage which was illegal and void because Catherine was a mulatto, Abagail was nevertheless legitimated under Civil Code, section 85, reading: “The issue of a marriage which is void or annulled or dissolved by divorce is legitimate”; and, moreover, they contend that Robert Stark so publicly acknowledged Abagail as his child that he legitimated her by the rule laid down in Civil Code, section 230. The answer to this contention, we think, is to be found in two decisions of our Supreme Court. In Estate of Shipp, 168 Cal. 640 [ 144 Pac. 143 ], the court in stating that while the statutes of this state since 1895 require a solemnization as an essential to a valid marriage, a child of such a marriage is by Civil Code, section 230, legitimate even though no marriage license was procured. In so holding the court construed the language of the then statute reading: “The issue of all marriages null in law . . . are legitimate” (Civ. Code, sec. 1387) as not being limited to marriages that might be annulled under the provisions of Civil Code, section 82. However, it went on to say: “There may be some question whether the enactment [legitimizing children of marriages null in law] applies to the offspring of marriages which are declared by the code to be ‘illegal and void,’ or ‘void, from the beginning,’ such as incestuous marriages (sec. 59), marriages of whites with negroes (sec. 60), or (under certain conditions) marriages between persons one of whom is already married. (Sec. 61.) ” In Estate of Gregorson, 160 Cal. 21 [ 116 Pac. 60 , Ann. Cas. 1912D, 1124 L. R.

The two cited cases, even though they do not squarely decide the question before us, as the particular issue which we have here was not there involved, are nevertheless sign-posts that leave no doubt as to the decision which must be here made. Accordingly we must, and do, hold that the statute applicable at the time here in question (Civil Code, section 1387, now section 85 with some change of verbiage), reading, “the issue of all marriages null in law . . . are legitimate,” did not at or prior to the time of the death of Robert Stark embrace children of an illegal and void marriage, such as a marriage between a white and negro or mulatto.

As this holding is clearly required to effectuate the policy laid down by our legislature in the period 1849 to 1870, it would seem to follow that we would not give effect to that policy if we were to hold that under chapter 385, section 9, Statutes of California, 1869-1870 (with variations now Civil Code, section 230), a white person could by public acknowledgment legitimate his or her natural child by a negro or mulatto. However, we are not required to decide this point, as the evidence was wholly insufficient to' meet the requirements of that statute. The only evidence bearing at all on the question whether Robert Stark legitimated his natural child, if he could, comes from a single witness who testified that when she was a child of 14 years of age she saw, on some three or four occasions in 1869 or 1870, Robert

Before proceeding to apply the controlling legal principles to the facts of this case it is necessary to discuss the earnest contention of contestants that the burden of proof as to the invalidity of the alleged marriage between Robert Stark and Catherine Stark rests with the proponents of the will rather than with the contestants. The contention is clearly without merit. Our Probate Code provides that only “a person interested” in the will may contest it. (Probate Code, sec. 370.) Among those who are classed as being “persons interested” are the heirs at law. (Estate of Land, 166 Cal. 538 , 540 [ 137 Pac. 246 ].) If a person claims that he is an “heir at law” and so entitled to contest the will before probate, he is required to file written grounds of opposition. (Probate Code, sec. 370.) Having filed such grounds he is on the trial, by virtue of the provisions of the statute, classed as being a plaintiff and the petitioner as the defendant. (Probate Code, sec. 371.) If an issue is made as to the right of the objector as plaintiff to contest the will, that question, on issue joined, is to be determined by the court before the issue as to the validity is tried before a jury, where a jury has been demanded. (Estate of Land, supra.) On such a trial to the court, involving only the right of the plaintiff, as an “interested party” under the statute, to contest the validity of the will, the burden of proof is upon such plaintiff, as in every case where one is a plaintiff, to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he has

One of the most familiar examples of this rule comes from negligence cases. Under the law of this state a plaintiff who alleges that the defendant was negligent, and proves the fact by a preponderance of the evidence, is entitled to have a jury pass on his case without alleging or proving his want of contributory negligence. In short, if he makes a prima facie case on his claim of defendant’s negligence a nonsuit may not be granted against him. But if it be shown, on his own case, that as a matter of law he was eontributorily negligent, then a nonsuit must be directed against him, upon motion therefor,' even though he was not required to negative by his pleading his freedom from contributory negligence nor to adduce evidence on the point. (Elliott v. Chicago etc. Ry. Co., 150 U. S. 245 [ 14 Sup. Ct. 85 , 37 L. Ed. 1068 ].) So here it would seem it was not necessary, in the first instance, for the plaintiff to have averred and proved that the parties had the capacity to contract the marriage which they claim took place between Eobert Stark and Catherine Stark. (38 C. J. 1326, note 74.) So, too, apparently it would have been sufficient for them to have proved facts indicating a common law marriage, without introducing any evidence as to whether one was a negro or mulatto and the other a white, or that both were white, or both were negroes

The plaintiffs then having failed—they having the burden of proof—to prove a marriage valid under the statute, they have failed to prove that Abagail as a matter of law was legitimated, for the simple reason that the statute applies only to the issue of those who would, as we have already pointed out, have the capacity to marry under the law.

The judgment is affirmed.

Moore, P. J., and McComb, J., concurred.

Appellants’ petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied January 29, 1942.