MacDonald v. Neuner

Appeal from a judgment in an action to recover for services rendered.

Appellant was an unsuccessful candidate for the office of mayor of the city of Los Angeles at the primary election held May 2, 1933, and during his campaign had employed campaign workers whose claims for services were unpaid and who assigned to respondent their demands, found by the court to amount to a total of $4,229.89. Other claims were included in the action but were not substantiated and were dismissed. It is claimed that Act 2262, Deering’s General Laws,. 1931, applied to said primary election, and that since, as such candidate, appellant was limited in his campaign expenditures to $2,000, a sum equal to 20 per cent of $10,000, the annual salary of the mayor of Los Angeles at the time, and since he had incurred expenses in excess of this amount, he was not liable therefor.

Act 2262 makes no mention of what are commonly termed primary elections, and refers and applies only to public elections. Does the act apply to primary election expenditures ? Primary elections merely take the place of previous methods of nominating candidates for public office. The effect of the primary election here involved was not to “elect” any person to the office of mayor but merely to nominate persons who should be candidates at the ensuing election when the mayor would actually be chosen and elected. The Primary Election Law, Act 2256, Deering’s General Laws, defines a primary election as a “primary nominating election”, and separately defines the word “election” as “a general county, city or city and county election as distinguished from a primary election, recall election or special election”. The act further discloses the difference by referring to the successful candidates at a primary election as being “nominated”. We can assume that the legislature had these distinctions in mind when it some years later passed Act 2262. It might also be noted that expenses of candidates at a primary election are specially provided for in the Primary Election Law, and no limitation is made therein as to the amount which may be incurred or paid. While it is true that under some circumstances a primary election may be included within the-term “election” (Spier

It is appellant’s contention in effect that the total expenditures for both primary election and the ensuing election must be kept within the limits laid down by Act 2262. Under such an interpretation unsuccessful opponents at a primary election would be within the law if they had expended up to the maximum amount allowed, but a successful candidate who had expended a like amount would be precluded from incurring or paying anything for campaign expenses between the primary and the election itself. Or, putting it another way, the amount which a candidate could spend between the primary and the election would depend upon the amount spent up to the primary. We believe that the legislature in passing Act 2262 intended to limit campaign expenditures as to amounts only during the campaign following the primary, leaving the limitation of the expenses for the primary election to the limitations provided in the Primary Law.

The case of Mathewson v. Bean, 114 Cal. App. 519 [ 300 Pac. 56 ], cited by appellant, is not in point, as the expenses there involved were incurred at an election and not at a primary election. The cited cases from other jurisdictions are not persuasive here.

The point just decided also disposes of the point that respondent’s assignors had not complied with the provisions of section 4 of Act 2262.

Appellant’s final contention is that respondent failed to show at the trial that his assignors were financially unable to employ counsel. This point is based upon Act 4089, Deering’s General Laws, which in defining the duties of the labor commissioner provides that he is to prosecute

Judgment affirmed.

Stephens, P. J., and Grail, J., concurred.