Majority
The will of Alice Downey, deceased, was admitted to probate on June 23, 1939, on the petition of American Trust Company, the executor named in her will. Thereafter Charles Mickey and several other persons, claiming to be heirs of the decedent, filed a contest on the ground of testamentary incapacity. Each and all of the contestants are nephews and nieces of Dr. Wallace Downey, the deceased husband of Alice Downey. The contest was heard before the trial court sitting with a jury. At the close of contestants’ case the proponent moved for a nonsuit. The motion was denied. After the conclusion of the introduction of evidence the proponent moved for a directed verdict. The motion was denied. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the contestants. The proponent moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The motion was denied. Thereupon judgment was entered on the verdict and the order admitting the will to probate was revoked on December 24, 1940. Prom the order of revocation the proponent has appealed.
Prior to the month of May, 1939, the decedent Mrs. Alice Downey had been residing in her home at Bay in Sonoma County, California. She was a widow and lived alone. But nearby Carl Engleman and his wife resided. Mr. Engleman acted as gardener for the decedent and did chores for her. Dr. Wallace Downey, the decedent’s husband, died in 1937 and by his will he left all of his property to his surviving widow. Dr. and Mrs. Downey had no children but Dr. Downey left surviving him a number of nephews and nieces.
In the morning of May 8, 1939, when Mr. Engleman called at the home of Mrs. Downey, she was ill. When he entered
Dr. Marsh diagnosed the decedent’s ailment as a disease of the kidneys. He found her to be in such severe pain that he could not operate. Therefore he directed such care and treatment as would build up the patient before an operation should be performed. The patient continued to suffer intense pain. Morphine sulphate was injected in one-quarter grain doses—on May 8, one dose; May 9, six doses; May 10, two doses ; May 11, two doses; and on May 12, one dose at 3:30 a. m., one at 10 a. m., one at 1 p. m., one at 6.45 p. m., and one at 8:30 p. m. (As will later be noted the will in dispute was signed at about 8 p. m.)
From May 8 to May 13, the patient was at all times suffering pain and sometimes the pain was intense. The patient had severe vomiting spells commencing May 8, and continuing until after May 12. As shown by the charts she was irrational on May 10, also on May 11 and May 12. On the latter date the patient got out of bed at 3:30 a. m., and again at 6:30 a. m.
While in the operating room on May 12, 1939, at 6 45 p. m. a dose of morphine sulphate was injected by Dr. Marsh. At 7 p. m. she was taken to her bed. At 7:10 she was drowsy and bewildered when Mrs. Custard, the day nurse, left.
The contestants called Dr. Marsh as a witness. At the same time they produced and had in the courtroom the chart kept by the nurses at Hillside Hospital from the time that Mrs. Downey entered the hospital. They also had produced and had in the courtroom X-ray photographs. Among other things he testified as follows: “I first saw Mrs. Downey as a patient on May 8, 1939, at my office in Sebastopol, California. Later on the same day I saw her at the Hillside Hospital in Sebastopol. On that date I made an examination of her body. I was
“On my direct examination I stated that Mrs. Downey was of sound mind. By that I meant that she wasn’t crazy. The cause of the dopiness was not entirely the morphine. Her toxic condition and morphine were some of the causes of the dopiness. At seven o’clock the pain was lessening, the morphine would be taking more effect. The patient would be continuing to get more dopey and the pain would lessen. On the 12th the patient had not begun to develop a tolerance for morphine. In three days no one develops a tolerance for morphine. 1 have stated what was her mental condition for am hour or so after I left the hospital. That opinion was based upon the fact that she was in a toxic condition and had been given morphine at about 6:45. That enters into the opinion also. If I assume that at about 8 o’clock a draft of an instrument was read to Mrs. Downey and that she asked that certain changes be made in it, such fact would not change my opinion. The effect of the morphine starts in ten or fifteen minutes and continues for three or four hours. During two hours after the injection of morphine it should still be in full force as to the killing of pain and deadening the senses. In asking to have the instrument changed Mrs. Downey might remember an item or two but she might not remember everything. Under the influence of morphine a person isn’t mentally clear, that is they are dopey. She might remember some property she had in the state and not remember that she had some in Sonoma County. When one is in a toxic condition and having a shot of morphine she doesn’t know the full extent of her property. When she asked the draftsman to make a change that does not alter my opinion. She was able to remember certain pieces of her property or parcels of
In connection with the testimony of Dr. Marsh as to the disorientation of the decedent on May 12, 1939, the contestants introduced the will showing the signature thereon. They also introduced many exemplars of decedent’s signature. One was a check written the day before, May 11, 1939. The latter is remarkably regular and legible. The former consists of scratches so illegible they cannot be read.
Mr. Engleman testified that for a week after May 8, 1939, he visited the hospital daily. At the time he left Mrs. Downey at the hospital she asked him to care for Bum, her cat. He called on her each day a.t about noon. On the day the will was made he testified, “I couldn’t hardly talk to her at all. I couldn’t get her to answer a question intelligently. She would talk a little, and then lapse off unconscious. I stayed there four or five minutes. I tried to ask her a few questions and she would give me a part answer and I couldn’t get no satisfaction so I walked out. In appearance she was very weak. She was very much weaker than the day I took her there. I wanted to get some feed for the cat, she was out of feed. She didn’t know whether I was talking about a cat or what I was talking about. I told her that the canned salmon—she always fed him canned salmon—was all gone and what should I do. She just said, ‘Bum out of salmon, Bum out of salmon, ’ something like that. On that day she was irrational.”
Mrs. Edna Elphick who had charge of Hillside Hospital had a desk in the hallway opposite Mrs. Downey’s room. She was at her desk when the will was being prepared. Mr. Hollingsworth called upon her to act as a witness. She went with Mr. Hollingsworth into Mrs. Downey’s room and later signed the will as a witness. She testified that at the time Mrs. Downey signed the will the latter was partly irrational.
The proponent called Dr. A.
In its first point the proponent claims the burden of proof is always upon contestant to prove unsoundness of mind and such unsoundness as would be sufficient to invalidate a will. The contestants do not controvert the claim but assert they assumed the burden and established the fact that the decedent was of unsound mind when she made her will. (Estate of Gill, 14 Cal. App. (2d) 526 [ 58 P. (2d) 734 ].)
The proponent also asserts that the time to which the proof should have been directed was the time the will was executed. (Estate of Nolan, 25 Cal. App. (2d) 738 [ 78 P. (2d) 456 ].) That assertion is not controverted, but the contestants call attention to the fact that from the time the decedent left the operating room until at least three or four hours later she was incompetent. But it was during that period and only about one hour after she left the operating room that she made the will.
The proponent then quotes from In re Redfield, 116 Cal. 637 , 655-656 [ 48 Pac. 794 ]: “It was the province and duty of the jury to draw the inference of fact from the evidence before them regulated by the rules of law stated to them by the court—being assisted but not superseded in that function by the opinions of experts. It is equally the duty of the court to determine whether there is any satisfactory evidence to
In connection with the last point the proponent contends that the opinion of a witness that a person is of'unsound mind can be no stronger than or superior in evidentiary weight to the reasons upon which he bases his opinion. (Estate of Campbell, 46 Cal. App. 612 , 621 [ 189 Pac. 812 ].) That is so, but it is equally true that the reasons given by Dr. Marsh were most convincing.
The proponent in its next point contends that the decedent had testamentary capacity. However, they admit the rule in this regard is correctly stated in Estate of Sexton, 199 Cal. 759 [ 251 Pac. 778 ], On page 764 the court said: “A testator is of sound and disposing mind and memory if, at the time of making his will, he has sufficient mental capacity to be able to understand the nature of the act he is doing, to understand and recollect the nature and situation of his property and to remember, and understand his relations to, the persons who have claims upon his bounty and whose interests are affected by the provisions of the instrument.” But, in the instant case both counsel and the learned judge of the trial court seemed to have had that book and page before them at all times. The testimony on both sides was confined to said rule as written in that decision.
It is also claimed that the administration of morphine is not ground for overturning a will, nor are physical disability and age. No one in the instant case has claimed that, standing alone, they are. But it will be conceded that each is a factor to be considered.
Again the proponent claims that the evidence of Dr. Marsh that the decedent’s condition would not and did not improve in one hour after he saw the decedent at 7 o’clock was unwarranted. We find no merit in the claim. It was purely a question of fact to be presented and proved by competent evidence and the question was for the jury to determine after all of the evidence was before it.
Because Mrs. Elphiek signed the will as a witness the proponent contends that she stultified herself by giving evidence in the instant case, and that said evidence should not be considered. We find no merit in the contention. Shortly prior to the execution of the will she was at her desk in the hallway. Mr. Hollingsworth went out and asked her to come in and act as a subscribing witness. She demurred and asked him
In its reply brief the proponent quotes from Estate of Casarotti, 184 Cal. 73 , 78 [ 192 Pac. 1085 ] : “Evidence which standing by itself might be sufficient to sustain a verdict may in the light of all the facts be wholly inadequate, and that without invading the province of the jury as the judges of the weight and sufficiency of the evidence.” Thereupon they apparently claim that in a will contest the rules regarding the burden of proof are different than in other actions. We think they are mistaken. On page 75 of the cited case the court said: ‘ ‘ There was no pretense that the testator was delirious, irrational, or insane or under any delusions. . . .” Clearly those are not the facts in the instant ease. Furthermore, in Estate of Ramey, 62 Cal. App. 413 , 425 [ 217 Pac. 135 ], the court said: “However, in will contests the rule is the same as in other proceedings, that all questions of the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses are for the jury and the trial court, and if there be any substantial evidence to support the finding or verdict it cannot be set aside by the reviewing court, although said court might believe the great preponderance of the evidence was the other way.” See, also,. Estate of Miller, 16 Cal. App. (2d) 154 , 159-160 [ 60 P. (2d) 498 ], The facts in the instant case are almost parallel with the case entitled Estate of Cill, supra. In that case, as in the instant case, it was claimed that the evidence was insufficient. However, the court held otherwise.
The proponent states facts showing the will was not “unnatural.” It then quotes: “If the disposition made of his property is not ‘unnatural,’ or an apparent injustice is explained, the instrument is to be sustained, notwithstanding proof of insanity. ...” (26 Cal. Jur. 632.) It cites in support of the text Estate of Shay, 196 Cal. 355 [ 237 Pac. 1079 ]; Estate of Casarotti, supra; Estate of Perkins, 195 Cal. 699 [ 235 Pac. 45 ]; Estate of Purcell, 164 Cal. 300 [ 128 Pac. 932 ]; In re Bedfield, supra. An examination of those cases discloses that not one of them sustains the text relied on. If
The order appealed from is affirmed.
Nourse, P. J., and Spence, J., concurred.
Appellant’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied June 11,1942.
Cases cited
- In re Estate of Redfield 116 Cal. 637 at 655-656 p. 283
- Tucker v. Campbell 46 Cal. App. 612 at 621 p. 284
- Sexton v. Daly 199 Cal. 759 at 764 p. 284, p. 286
- Casarotti v. Lyons 184 Cal. 73 at 78 p. 285
- McLaughlin v. Welsh 62 Cal. App. 413 at 425 p. 285
- Shay v. Shay 196 Cal. 355 p. 285
- Fink v. Bigelow 195 Cal. 699 p. 285
- In re Estate of Purcell 164 Cal. 300 p. 285