Majority
Appellant, by means of a bill of exceptions, takes this appeal from a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in an action for an accounting of the proceeds of a business venture, and from an order denying a motion to strike certain items from the plaintiff’s memorandum of costs and disbursements.
The complaint herein was one for dissolution of a partnership and for an accounting of the proceeds. Before trial of the action an additional cause of action for money had and received was added by amendment. After hearing the cause, the trial court, by an interlocutory judgment, decreed that the plaintiff and the defendants were not partners and that appellant was the sole owner of the business in question, a market enterprise conducted in the name of appellant and the D. Fromsky Markets, and that the plaintiff (respondent here) was entitled to an accounting of the books of said enterprise and was entitled to judgment for such sums as might be found to be credited to his account after the accounting of the books had been completed. The court thereafter, and on January 15, 1941, ordered a firm of certified public accountants to audit the books in the action. Included in the same minute order was the statement: “ The plaintiff is ordered to pay for
Appellant bases his contention, as to the impropriety of allowing respondent the cost of the audit, upon the sole ground that the minute order of April 30, 1941, by the terms of which it was attempted to amend nunc pro tunc the previous minute order, was void. The contention is not material. It should be pointed out that the minute orders in question were in no sense final orders and the court, in subsequently taxing costs, was not bound thereby. (See 15 Cal. Jur. 112, § 177, as to the effect of such orders. Also see McAllen v. Souza, 24 Cal. App. (2d) 247 , 250 [ 74 P. (2d) 853 ]; Hughes v. DeMund, 96 Cal. App. 365 [ 274 Pac. 405 ], and cases cited.) Moreover, there is no question but that the trial court could change or amend the minute order first entered, upon a proper motion in the course of proceedings. Whether the amendment was properly made in the instant case need not be decided, as already pointed out. Expense of services of an expert accountant, necessary for the proper presentation and determination of the case, who is appointed by and acting under the direction of the court, is properly charged as an item of costs. (Faulkner v. Hendy, 79 Cal. 265 [ 21 Pac. 754 ] ; In re Peterson, 253 U. S. 300 [ 40 S. Ct. 543 , 64 L. Ed. 919 ].) In the Peterson case, supra, an order requiring either or both parties to pay the cost of appointing an auditor was said to be erroneous, since the prevailing party would be entitled to such costs, the court there indicating that the expense of the auditor should abide the result of the action. Costs in an action in equity are matters within the discretion of the court. (Smalley v. Geo. C. Peckham Co., 175 Cal. 146 , 148 [ 165 Pac. 438 ]. See, also, 7 Cal. Jur. 280, §21; 20 C. J. S. 274, 275, § 10 (b); idem 284, § 13.) The item of expense for the audit was properly charged as a cost of suit herein.
Appellant’s contention, that in no event could a judgment for $6,000 be properly rendered, is without merit. The contention is founded upon the claim that the judgment was based solely on the count for money had and received, which cause of action was for but $5,851.65. The findings of the court and the judgment based thereon reveal that the basis therefor was the amount shown to be due upon the audit of appellant’s books; and a judgment for such sum as was shown to be due upon an accounting was properly rendered, the action being one for an accounting.
Appellant has raised no other points. The judgment and the order are affirmed.
York, P. J., and White, J., concurred.
Appellant’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied August 27, 1942.
Cases cited
- Hughes v. DeMund 96 Cal. App. 365 p. 255
- Faulkner v. Hendy 79 Cal. 265 p. 255
- Ex parte Peterson 253 U. S. 300 p. 255
- Smalley v. George C. Peckham Co. 175 Cal. 146 at 148 p. 255