People v. Lay

Elmer Lay was convicted after a court trial of the crime of forcible rape. Upon his appeal he attacks the sufficiency of the evidence to support the finding of guilt.

Defendant Lay, a tailor and presser by trade, is 30 years of age, married and living with his wife. He was driven to a café in Culver City by a neighbor, one Bullerdick, at about 8:00 p. m., and spent some two hours there drinking beer. Bullerdick left the café in the meantime and did not return. The prosecutrix, 27 years of age, weighing 110 pounds, and married to a soldier who was overseas, entered the café at about 10 o’clock and had dinner. It was her intention to go window shopping until time to take a bus at 11:40 p. m. for the Hughes Aircraft plant where she was employed on the midnight shift as a key punch operator, punching time cards. Defendant engaged her in conversation in the café, offered to buy her a drink, which she refused, and left the café with her. He walked beside her for half a block and invited her to take a ride, which she declined. As they crossed an intersecting street defendant took hold of her arm, which alarmed her. She testified that as they proceeded defendant took hold of both of her arms and held them behind her. She saw a woman and two men leaving the café and called to them for help as defendant was shoving her along, but they paid no

The officer who appeared first on the scene had come to the station by motorcycle after a young boy had appeared at the scene and directed attention to the automobile. The officer first stopped some distance from the car, shut off his motor and listened. He then went on and parked close to the car where he encountered Bullerdick, who had returned from his stroll to the vicinity of the car. After a brief conversation, and hearing no noise from the ear, the officer approached it and threw his flashlight upon the occupants of the rear seat. Prosecutrix called out for help, defendant emerged from the ear, prosecutrix replaced her clothing and all parties were taken to the police station. In reply to an inquiry by the officer as to whether “it” was against her will prosecutrix stated that it certainly was. At the station, according to the testimony of several officers, prosecutrix was found to have three livid marks upon one side of her throat and one upon the other side. Her slacks, which were introduced in evidence, were torn on one side. She required no medical attention. Bullerdick was jointly charged and convicted of rape. For his participation in the affair, as related, he received 30 days in jail and probation and did not appeal. His testimony while generally favorable to defendant did not relate to the occurrences in the ear while it was parked.

Defendant’s argument that the evidence failed to prove that prosecutrix resisted as vigorously as the law requires proceeds from the false premise that “there must be the most vehement exertion of every physical means or faculty within the female’s power to resist penetration, and a persistence in such resistance until the offense is consummated.” The statement is but part of a paragraph in Corpus Juris quoted in full in People, v. Cline (1931), 117 Cal.App. 181 [ 3 P.2d 575 ]. It is not the language of the court or the law

If the court had believed that prosecutrix finally desisted in her calls for help and her struggle with defendant and submitted to the-act, this alone would not have proved consent. Submission induced by the fear specified in the code is not consent. It is primarily for the woman who is attacked to decide to what extent, if at all, she can safely resist. Under such circumstances as the record here shows the law allows a woman a free choice of what she may consider the lesser of two evils and the prosecutrix had a right to choose between rape and possible strangulation.

The trial court decided, as a question of fact, that the resistance offered by prosecutrix was in good faith and legally sufficient. If her testimony was-believed no other conclusion would have been justified. That she was helpless in the hands of defendant is evident from the fact that she was a small, frail woman. The fact that there were livid marks upon her throat strongly corroborated her testimony that she had been choked. Defendant has offered no explanation of the marks and his counsel offers none, merely commenting “how they got there, or when, I am not able to say.” The trial court would have been justified in believing that prosecutrix was threatened with great and immediate bodily harm accompanied by apparent power of execution, if in doubt whether her ' resistance had been overcome by actual force.

The judgment and order denying defendant’s motion for new trial are affirmed.

Wood (Parker), J., and Pox, J. pro tern., concurred.