Majority
This is an action to quiet title to a lot in New Vernon, in Los Angeles County.
On March 1, 1917, Carrie E. Wilcox, who then owned this lot, executed, acknowledged and recorded two deeds. The first of these described this lot and purported to convey the same to the defendant George W. Young. The second, recorded one minute after the first, purported to convey to Bertha D. Ireland, a sister of Mrs. Wilcox, “all my real property, wheresoever the same may be situate”. The record remained in that condition until after the death of Mrs. Wilcox, which occurred about 4 o’clock A. M. on January 8, 1929. About 9 A. M. on that day, and before she had learned of her sister’s death, the defendant Ireland executed and acknowledged a quitclaim deed conveying her interest in the property to Mrs. Wilcox. About fifteen minutes later she delivered this deed to B. E. Ryder, who had been named executor in Mrs. Wilcox’s will. Ryder was appointed executor of the estate of Mrs. Wilcox by the Superior Court of Los Angeles County on March 15, 1929, and this quitclaim deed was recorded in the following June.
On October 19, 1929, attorneys for Mrs. Ireland filed an action in Los Angeles County seeking to quiet her title to this lot and naming George W. Young and B. E. Ryder, executor of the estate of Jessie Wilcox, deceased, as defendants. The complaint was verified by Harold E. Leddy as one of Mrs. Ireland’s attorneys. Summons was issued but was never served on either of the defendants named. In the latter part of 1929 Leddy, acting as attorney for Mrs. Ireland, arranged to sell this lot to the defendant S. F. Margozewitz, who started an escrow with the First National Bank of Vernon, where he did business, at some time prior to December 9, 1929. Both he and Mrs. Ireland gave the - bank written escrow instructions under which he was to pay $4,500 for the property and was to receive a grant deed from Mrs. Ireland with an owner’s policy of title insurance from a title company. He paid a part of the purchase price into the escrow, a portion of which was used in attempting to clear the title. Among other things, $250 was paid to George W. Young for a quitclaim deed to Mrs. Ireland, which was dated January 17, 1930. The escrow agent secured a preliminary report from a title company stating that the title was “apparently vested in
In this action which followed the court found upon ample evidence that the deed of March 1, 1917, from Carrie E. Wilcox to George W. Young was, in fact, an equitable mortgage. The court also found that Carrie E. Wilcox was the owner of the property up to her death and that the same now belongs to her estate; that George W. Young, in consideration of the payment to him by Bertha D. Ireland of his mortgage indebtedness in the sum of $250, executed and delivered to her a quitclaim deed releasing all of his rights in the premises; that the said Bertha D. Ireland was at that time fully advised and had actual knowledge as to the rights of Young and of the fact that he held the record title to the premises as security only for the payment of the indebtedness; that at the time the property was sold to S. F. Margozewitz for $4,500 the same was of the reasonable value of $6,600; and that at the time he purchased the property the said S. F. Margozewitz had notice and was chargeable with constructive knowledge of facts and circumstances which should have put a reasonable person on inquiry and from which inquiry he would have ascertained that Bertha D. Ireland acquired no title to the premises through the quit-claim deed she received from George W. Young and that the premises were, in fact, owned by the estate of Carrie E. Wilcox, deceased. Judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff and the defendants Margozewitz have appealed.
Appellants’ main contentions are that the evidence is not sufficient to sustain the findings to the effect that title to this property remained in Carrie E. Wilcox and her estate, and to the effect that the appellants were chargeable with notice as to the rights of the respondent. The appellants contend that since the deed to Young of March 1, 1917, was merely a mortgage, title passed to Bertha D. Ireland under the deed to
In our opinion, the evidence sustains the trial court’s findings and conclusion to the effect that the title to this property did not pass to Bertha D. Ireland through the deed executed by Carrie E. Wilcox on March 1, 1917. Much argument is presented by both parties on the question as to whether the description in this deed is sufficient to pass title to this property and the following cases are cited: Brusseau v. Hill, 201 Cal. 225 [ 256 Pac. 419 , 55 A. L. R. 157 ]; Pettigrew v. Dobbelaar, 63 Cal. 396 ; Oatman v. Niemeyer, 207 Cal. 424 [ 278 Pac. 1043 ]; Saterstrom v. Glick Bros. Sash, Door & Mill Co., 118 Cal. App. 379 [ 5 Pac. (2d) 21 ]. Assuming that the description in this deed was sufficient to pass title in a proper ease and especially where the equities were in favor of the grantee, other important questions remain as to whether that deed was intended to pass title, whether there was a consideration therefor and whether there was an acceptance on the part of the grantee named therein. The appellants argue that the presumption in all these respects is in their favor since the deed was recorded and since there was a notation thereon that it was recorded at the request of the grantee. Any such presumptions seem to have been pretty thoroughly overcome by the evidence.
It appears that Mrs. Wilcox deeded this property to her sister fearing that her stepdaughters would claim it and desiring to retain it for her support in her old age. While some hearsay evidence was admitted, the following facts are sustained by competent evidence: Mrs. Wilcox continued to claim to be the owner of the property up to the time of her death and Mrs. Ireland asserted no claim thereto, directly or indirectly, while her sister was alive. While the property was a vacant lot, an ornamental signboard was maintained thereon by Foster & Kleiser for a number of years before the death of Mrs. Wilcox under a written lease from her dated in
In her deposition, which was admitted in evidence, Mrs. Ireland testified that she had lived in Philadelphia for about forty years; that she had never had any business dealings with George W. Young; that he had never deeded the property here in question or any other property to her; that she had never paid any money through her attorney or otherwise for this lot; that she had not seen the lot and did not know where it was or anything about it; that she had never paid any money to George W. Young or had anything to do with him; that she sold the lot to S. F. Margozewitz; that she did not know what the selling price was or anything about the transaction as it was all handled by her attorneys, mostly by Mr. Leddy; that she did not recall ever receiving a deed to the lot from George W. Young; that she knew nothing about its value or what its value was at the time she sold it to Margozewitz ; that she did not know whether or not that was a cash sale; and that she did not know whether or not the sale was handled through an escrow. When asked if she ever paid any taxes on the lot she replied: “I gave the money to my sister and she paid them. I didn’t pay them direct.” She testified that she did not know what the taxes amounted to; that her sister had written saying she needed money for taxes but did not state the amount due; that she had no recollection of how much she had sent for taxes and did not know the amount of any assessments; that she could not remember how much money she had sent at any time or altogether; that she
It appears from the evidence that Mrs. Ireland knew practically nothing about this transaction and that the sale of the lot and the matter of attempting to establish title in Mrs. Ireland were handled by her attorney, Leddy. In her escrow instructions to the bank Mrs. Ireland stated that the property was being sold to Mr. Margozewitz for $4,500; that they were authorized to secure an owner’s policy of title insurance “in which I guarantee to be able to show the above described property vested in my name”; that the property “is now clouded by instruments of record”, but that the title was being cleared by her attorneys through a quiet title action then pending; that the escrow was to continue in force until thirty days after said quiet title action was completed; and that the escrow agent was authorized to pay to Mr. Leddy 25 per cent of the net proceeds of the selling price being paid by Mr. Margozewitz.
George W. Young placed a quitclaim deed in the escrow. In his instructions he stated that he was to receive $250 from Mrs. Ireland’s share of the net proceeds of the escrow; that his deed was “to be considered a final disposition of the property in any event”; that he would sign any other paper necessary to carry out his agreement with Mrs. Ireland and Mr. Leddy; that he agreed to the dismissal of the quiet title action then pending; that he would deliver, if demanded, a disclaimer of any interest in the property; that he waived any and all claims against Mrs. Ireland and the “estate of Carrie Wilcox”; and that “in the event the present action goes to trial, I will appear as a witness and do all in my power to assist Mrs. Ireland or her successors in obtaining a clear title to this property”. Mr. Young testified at the trial that before putting his quitclaim deed in escrow he told Mr. Leddy that the deed from Mrs. Wilcox which he received in 1917 was given to him as security for money he had loaned her.
While the escrow was pending Mr. Leddy wrote to the escrow agent as follows: “I wish to express to you my sincere appreciation of the very intelligent assistance you gave me in dealing with George W. Young yesterday. I feel that
It fully appears that Mrs. Ireland and her agents, Leddy and the bank, had full knowledge of the deed to Mrs. Wilcox which was executed and delivered after her death by Mrs. Ireland, of the action brought by Mrs. Ireland to quiet title to this property, of the pendency of the estate proceedings and of the fact that the estate of Mrs. Wilcox claimed to be the owner of this property. While the escrow was pending Mrs. Ireland’s attorney in Philadelphia wrote a number of letters to the escrow agent all of which were headed: “Re: Estate Carrie Wilcox”. It also appears that Mrs. Ireland’s attorney, Leddy, after securing the quitclaim deed from George W. Young, abandoned the quiet title proceeding and dismissed the same without serving the executor of Mrs. Wilcox’s estate and persuaded the title company that the deed executed by Mrs. Ireland after the death of her sister was of no effect. While this deed was not sufficient to pass a title it was not
It is earnestly contended by the appellants that, irrespective of the situation as between Mrs. Ireland and Mrs. Wilcox, they are innocent purchasers for value who relied only on the record title and who had no knowledge, constructive or otherwise, of any fact or circumstance which should have put them upon their guard or cause them to make any investigation as to the facts. This contention is not borne out by the record. The escrow agent had full and complete knowledge of practically all of the facts which have been mentioned, including the facts that a quiet title action had been started against the estate of Mrs. Wilcox, that Young did not claim to own the property, that the deed from Mrs. Ireland to Mrs. Wilcox was on record, that the property was leased to Foster & Kleiser for billboard purposes and the rental was to be prorated, and that the property was being claimed by the estate of Mrs. Wilcox. It is well settled that an escrow agent is the agent of both parties to such a transaction (Shreeves v. Pearson, 194 Cal. 699 [ 230 Pac. 448 ]). And further that the knowledge possessed by such an agent is to be imputed to each of the parties to the escrow (Early v. Owens, 109 Cal. App. 489 [ 293 Pac. 136 ]; Smith v. Brown, 1 Cal. App. (2d) 492 [ 36 Pac. (2d) 1081 ]).
The record also shows that the appellant S. F. Margozewitz had actual knowledge of facts which should have put him upon his guard and which were sufficient to place upon him the duty of making an investigation which would inevitably have led to the discovery of the other facts referred to. He was paying $4,500 for property which the court found was
Other points are raised by the appellants, including a large number of objections to the admission of evidence, all of which need not be considered under our view that the essential findings are supported by the evidence.
The judgment appealed from is affirmed.
Marks, J., and Jennings, J., concurred.
A petition by appellants to have the cause heard in the Supreme Court, after judgment in the District Court of Appeal, was denied by the Supreme Court on December 16, 1935.
Cases cited
- Brusseau v. Hill 201 Cal. 225 p. 548
- Pettigrew v. Dobbelaar 63 Cal. 396 p. 548
- Oatman v. Niemeyer 207 Cal. 424 p. 548
- Saterstrom v. Glick Bros. Sash 118 Cal. App. 379 p. 548
- Shreeves v. Pearson 194 Cal. 699 p. 553
- Early v. Owens 109 Cal. App. 489 p. 553