Alterauge v. Los Angeles Turf Club

Respondent sued for “wrongful arrest.” He was awarded $300 compensatory damages against all defendants, $2,000 exemplary damages against the corporation a,nd $750 against the latter’s agents. A motion for a new trial having been denied, the matter was transferred to this court on appeal.

The corporate defendant operates Santa Anita Park, a race track which engages in pari-mutuel wagering pursuant to the California Horse Racing Act. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 19400 et seq.) At the time herein mentioned the club employed the Security Service Agency, a copartnership composed of appellants Williams and Rhyn, who in turn employed appellants Marshall and Dietz to perform the actual service of policing the club’s grounds, including the placing of respondent under surveillance.

Respondent having paid for his admission to the clubhouse on January 5,1946, remained until the end of the seventh race. Then, feeling ill, he withdrew and seated himself in an automobile on the parking lot. He was there approached by Dietz and Marshall who stated to him that they were track detectives in the employ of the Turf Club and demanded to know the name of the owner of the automobile in which he sat. Upon his refusal to give the information, they requested him to accompany them to the inside of the clubhouse. He declined to do so saying that he preferred to remain in the car. “No,” said the two men, “you are going into the place, we have got to take you.” Thereupon they pulled him out, tearing his coat, and forced him to accompany them to the office of the clubhouse where he was searched for evidence of bookmaking. He was questioned by Messrs. Patton and Pugh, employees of Security Service, detained for about 15 minutes and then released with instructions never to return to the track.

In demanding a reversal, appellants contend that the evi

It is thus seen that appellant knew previously all facts concerning which they questioned him on January 5. If they had been in good faith and desired merely the exclusion of respondent from the club grounds, they could have informed him at the time of his first visit of the management’s determination to forbid his presence there. Knowing his record prior to the visit and having had an opportunity to forbid his presence at the race course, his detention was unreasonable. Not only were the facts fully developed but the jury were correctly instructed that probable cause is a suspicion founded

In addition to the fact that respondent was taken forcibly from the automobile, it was established that he was pulled along the walk until they arrived at the front of the clubhouse. There he consented to visit the Security office. He was never taken before a magistrate or at any place arraigned under any form of accusation, but was forbidden to return.

In view of such proof it cannot be said that the jury acted arbitrarily in awarding damages to respondent or that the trial court abused its discretion in denying a new trial. He was not only the victim of a wrongful arrest and detention but he was the victim of an unjustified battery for all of which the compensatory damages awarded were not unreasonable. Reasonable and civil treatment of respondent necessitated a previous demand upon him not to enter the club grounds. Instead of doing this they subjected him to indignities that humiliated him, made him nervous and to suffer from ulcers. Their conduct was reprehensible. Their knowledge of him was complete. They gained nothing new by dragging him from the automobile and to the office. Fair treatment of him would have compelled appellants to advise respondent where he sat in the machine to leave the grounds and not to return. Their assault upon and detention of him were unreasonable and such implied finding by the jury left no course open to them but to award him a just compensation.

It cannot be said that $300 was an unreasonable sum. Neither was there error in allowing respondent to recover $750 against the four agents of the Turf Club as punitive damages. Such an award is authorized “in addition to the actual damages” where “the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud or malice, express or implied.” (Civ. Code, § 3294.) The proof of their having previously learned from respondent his personal history and his wayward career, their manner of approach and pulling him out of the automobile and forcing him to visit their office to be detained, searched and admonished not to return—such proof was sufficient support for the jury’s implied finding of oppression and that no act of respondent justified such treatment. The trial court is

While no specific attack is made on the award of $750 as against the operatives, appellants have assigned as prejudicial error that part of the judgment granting respondent $2,000 against the Turf Club as vindictive damages and contend that it cannot be liable for such damages -since there is no proof of its authorization or ratification of the wrongful arrest. In this they are correct in view of the prevailing rule in this state. (McInerney v. United Railroads, 50 Cal.App. 538 , 549 [ 195 P. 958 ] ; 19 C.J.S., p. 964.) There is no evidence that the arrest was made by or with the consent or knowledge of the board of directors or of the governing officers or vice-principals of the corporation; nor is there proof of a subsequent-ratification by such board or officials of the action of the agents. The language of Mr. Justice Richards in the Mclnerney case, supra, is the final word upon the subject. Since it has not been modified by statute or decision in the 30 years that have elapsed since its publication, that part of the judgment for respondent’s recovery of $2,000 from the corporate defendant will be reversed.

It is therefore ordered that the judgment be modified by striking therefrom the following words and figures, to wit, “together with the sum of $2,000 from the said defendant, Los Angeles Turf Club, Inc., a corporation, ’ ’ and that as thus modified the judgment is affirmed.

McComb, J., and Wilson, J., concurred.