Yorty v. Chandle

Opinion

Libel action for $2,000,000 by Samuel W. Yorty against Otis Chandler, Los Angeles Times, The Times-Mirror Company (sued as Times Mirror Corporation), and Paul Conrad, in which plaintiff complains of a cartoon drawn by Conrad and published on the editorial page of the Los Angeles Times. The trial court ruled on demurrer that the cartoon was not defamatory and entered judgment for defendants.

The cartoon was published under the following circumstances: in mid-November 1968 Richard M. Nixon, having been elected President of the United States, was engaged in the selection of nominees for appointment to his cabinet. At a press conference Samuel W. Yorty, Mayor of the City of Los Angeles, publicly expressed interest in such an appointment, and, in particular, appointment as Secretary of Defense. According to the allegations of plaintiff’s complaint, President-elect Nixon was then considering Mayor Yorty for appointment to a cabinet post, and that fact was known to defendants.

“I’ve got to go now . . . I’ve been appointed Secretary of Defense and the Secret Service men are here!”

In claiming that the cartoon was defamatory, the complaint asserts:

“In publishing said cartoon, Defendants and each of them, intended to mean and convey to the readers of the editorial page of the Los Angeles Times, that Plaintiff was claiming that he had been appointed Secretary of Defense by President-elect Richard Nixon, and that he was further claiming that he was qualified to serve in such capacity; and that in making such a claim, he was insane and should be placed in a straight jacket. The defendants, in publishing said cartoon, intended to insinuate to [their] readers that plaintiff was unfit to serve as Secretary of Defense and, that in believing he was so qualified, he was mentally ill.” Plaintiff thus interprets the cartoon as a factual report that Mayor Yorty suffered from the delusion that he had been appointed Secretary of Defense and that because of his delusion he was insane and needed to be placed in a straight jacket.

The sole question is whether the cartoon is reasonably susceptible to the interpretation placed upon it in plaintiff’s complaint. The trial court concluded it was not, ruled as a matter of law that the cartoon was not libelous, and dismissed the complaint. Plaintiff appeals.

First, some consideration of the subject matter of this suit, the political cartoon. Ever since stone-age man began to draw on the walls of his cave, caricature has been used as a device to express opinion on matters of current interest. Examples of the art of caricature in ancient Egyptian and Roman times still abound. With the advent of printing, caricature became a form of social and political commentary, and in one of its aspects began to manifest itself as critical opinion on public issues and public figures. Thus the political cartoon was born. In America the first political cartoon was designed by Benjamin Franklin, and by the time of the Civil War the political cartoon had become a standard adjunct to public fife. In the 1870’s Thomas Nast proved the effectiveness of the political cartoon by a devastating series of drawings which helped break the corrupt political regime of “Boss” Tweed and the Tammany Ring. From Daumier and Tenniel to Low and Herblock the political cartoon has occupied a central position in the presentation of critical comment on events and personages of the times.

The genius of a well-conceived political cartoon lies in its ability to communicate in graphic form a statement of editorial opinion which might other

A cartoon, of course, remains subject to the law of libel (Civ. Code, § 45), and, like any other form of depiction or representation, it may be found libelous if it maliciously presents as fact defamatory material which is false. For example, a political cartoon which falsely depicts a public official selling franchises for personal gain, or a judge taking a bribe, or an attorney altering a public record, or a police officer shooting a defenseless prisoner, will not be exempt from redress under the laws of libel merely because the charge is depicted graphically in linear form rather than verbally in written statement. (Snively v. Record Publishing Co., 185 Cal. 565 [ 198 P. 1 ]; Newby v. Times-Mirror Co., 173 Cal. 387 [ 160 P. 233 ]; Gloria v. A Colonia Portuguesa, 128 Cal.App. 640 [ 18 P.2d 87 ].) On the other hand, a cartoon which depicts a fanciful, allegorical, anthropomorphical, or zoomorphical scene will not be considered libelous merely because it depicts a public person as a flower, a block of wood, a fallen angel, or an animal. Because a political cartoon presents critical opinion in imaginative and symbolic form, in claimed instances of defamation a court must ferret out the underlying themes of the cartoon and then determine whether these can reasonably be considered libelous. (Blake v. Hearst Publications Incorporated, 75 Cal.App.2d 6 [ 170 P.2d 100 ].)

The present cartoon is said by plaintiff to have made two basic assertions: First, an assertion that the mayor was unqualified for high national office. Second, an assertion that the mayor, in believing he was qualified for high national office, demonstrated mental incompetency to such a degree that he required the restraint of a straight jacket. Defendants concede the first assertion and defend their right to make it. Defendants deny the second assertion and deny that any reasonable viewer would interpret the cartoon as having made such a statement.

On the first point, it is settled law that mere expression of opinion or severe criticism is not libelous, even though it adversely reflects on the

On the second point, plaintiff contends that the Los Angeles Times, in expressing its views on Mayor Yorty’s fitness for a cabinet post, published a false report that he was in fact insane and needed the physical restraint of a straight jacket. If in fact defendants had published such a report unquestionably the publication could be found libelous. For example, in Goldwater v. Ginzburg (S.D.N.Y. 1966) 261 F.Supp. 784 , affirmed (2d Cir. 1969) 414 F.2d 324 , cert, denied 396 U.S. 1049 [ 24 L.Ed.2d 695 , 90 S.Ct. 701 ], a

Plaintiff, however, while conceding that the cartoon might be interpreted as charging him with no more than foolish and unrealistic expectations, argues that the cartoon is also susceptible to a literal interpretation which charges him with mental disorder, and he contends that since the cartoon is susceptible of two interpretations—one innocent, one defamatory —it is for a jury and not a court to make the choice between conflicting interpretations (Mellen v. Times-Mirror Co., 167 Cal. 587 , 593 [ 140 P. 277 ]; MacLeod v. Tribune Publishing Co., 52 Cal.2d 536 , 546 [ 343 P.2d 36 ]). Hence, he argues, the trial court usurped the fact-finding,function of a jury when it held the cartoon non-libelous as a matter of law. In debatable instances of libel the correctness of this view is not open to question. But here, there can be only one reasonable interpretation of the cartoon, and that interpretation is non-libelous. In such circumstances a court is required to rule as a matter of law that the material is not defamatory, and it is not allowed to submit the issue to a jury. This has always been the rule in California (Mellen v. Times-Mirror Co., 167 Cal. 587 , 593 [ 140 P. 277 ]; Arno v. Stewart, 245 Cal.App.2d 955 , 959 [ 54 Cal.Rptr. 392 ]; Corman v. Blanchard, 211 Cal.App.2d 126 , 132 [ 27 Cal.Rptr. 327 ]; Howard v. Southern Cal. etc. Newspapers, 95 Cal.App.2d 580 , 586 [ 213 P.2d 399 ]; Harris v. Curtis Publishing Co., 49 Cal.App.2d 340 , 346 [ 121 P.2d 761 ]; Eva v. Smith, 89 Cal.App. 324 [ 264 P. 803 ]), and in recent years it

In Greenbelt Publishing Assn. v. Bresler, supra, plaintiff Bresler was seeking to obtain from the City Council of Greenbelt a zoning variance on land owned by him, and at the same time the city was seeking to buy a different tract of land from him on which to construct a new high school. Bresler refused to agree to sell the high school property unless he were given a zoning variance on his other land, and at a city council meeting he was charged by persons from the community with “blackmail.” Defendant, a weekly newspaper, reported these charges. In reversing a jury verdict for plaintiff and holding as a matter of constitutional law that the references to “blackmail” were not defamatory, the Supreme Court said: “For the reasons that follow, we hold that the imposition of liability on such a basis was constitutionally impermissible—that as a matter of constitutional law, the word ‘blackmail’ in these circumstances was not slander when spoken, and not libel when reported in the Greenbelt News Review. ... It is simply impossible to believe that a reader who reached the word ‘blackmail’ in either article would not have understood exactly what was meant: it was Bresler’s public and wholly legal negotiating proposals that were being criticized. No reader could have thought that either the speakers at the meeting or the newspaper articles reporting their words were charging Bresler with the commission of a criminal offense. On the contrary, even the most careless reader must have perceived that the word was no more than rhetorical hyperbole, a vigorous epithet used by those who considered Bresler’s negotiating position extremely unreasonable. ... To permit the infliction of financial liability upon the petitioners for publishing these two news articles would subvert the most fundamental meaning of a free press, protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.” (Greenbelt Publishing Assn. v. Bresler, 398 U.S. at pp. 13-14 [26 L.Ed.2d at pp. 14-15].)

These comments in Bresler have a parallel application to the cause at bench, and we paraphrase them thus: It is simply impossible to believe that a viewer of the cartoon would not have understood exactly what was meant: it was Mayor Yorty’s public aspiration for appointment as Secretary of Defense which was being ridiculed. No reader could have thought that either the cartoonist or the editor of the Los Angeles Times was charging Mayor Yorty with mental derangement or mental incompetency. On the contrary, even the most careless reader must have perceived that the cartoon was no more than rhetorical hyperbole, a vigorous expression of opinion

We conclude that under both state and federal law the trial court correctly determined that the cartoon was not reasonably susceptible to a defamatory meaning and that consequently plaintiff had failed to state a cause of action.

The judgment of dismissal is affirmed.

Roth, P. J., concurred.

I concur in the result reached by Justice Fleming in his very scholarly and learned analysis of the subject matter at hand, but for somewhat different reasons.

Because of what appears to me to be a continuing escalation in the frequency and viciousness of both physical and verbal attacks on duly elected public officials, I feel compelled to add some comments of my own.

The Los Angeles Times’ right to express, in cartoon form, its opinion concerning the mayor’s qualifications for public office is protected by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. On the other hand, as Justice Fleming points out, the political cartoon is not protected if it is libelous and maliciously presents false and defamatory material. In other words, a cartoonist or an artist who undertakes, in pictorial form, to criticize an individual must be held to the same standards as though he used the printed word.

I am persuaded also that in determining whether or not a matter is defamatory, the fact that it is presented as a subjective opinion rather than a statement of fact is not completely controlling.

This is especially true where, as here, the issue is the imputation of mental illness. As a practical matter the question of an individual’s sanity under the present state of the art is always determined on the basis of opinion— whether it be the opinion of a psychiatrist or the opinion of a layman, as those opinions are accepted under our rules of evidence.

As Justice Fleming so clearly points out, if the defendants in this case had published a false report that the mayor was in fact insane and needed the physical restraint of a straight jacket, such a report could be found libelous. (See Goldwater v. Ginzburg (S.D.N.Y. 1966) 261 F.Supp. 784 , affd. (2d Cir. 1969) 414 F.2d 324 , cert. den. 396 U.S. 1049 [ 24 L.Ed.2d

The question presented on this appeal is whether the cartoon in question is susceptible of a defamatory interpretation, i.e., and imputation of mental illness in the real sense. If the cartoon is so susceptible, it is defamatory whether it is viewed in terms of the Times saying “The Mayor is insane” or “In our opinion the Mayor is insane.”

It is one thing for the Los Angeles Times to express an opinion that the mayor because of a lack of administrative ability, a lack of experience or qualification, or for a myriad of other reasons, was not a qualified candidate for political office, but it is quite another thing to falsely opine that his lack of fitness for political office was premised on mental imbalance.

Our affirmance of the trial court’s decision deprives the plaintiff of an opportunity to have that question decided by a jury. For that reason we should be very careful about reaching the conclusion that “no reasonable viewer” could assume that the matter was defamatory.

Standing alone, the cartoon is susceptible of a defamatory meaning. Straight jackets and men in white coats are commonly associated in the popular mind with violent insanity. It is possible for a “reasonable viewer” to equate what was depicted in this cartoon with the type of words which were condemned in Goldwater v. Ginzburg.

In my view the cartoon in question is cured of any possible defamatory interpretation only when viewed in light of the retraction, by which the Times specifically disavowed any imputation of actual mental incompetency.

My concurrence in affirming the judgment is premised on the fact that the retraction sufficiently dispells the defamatory nature of the cartoon and that the plaintiff did not plead any special damages.

Justice Fleming points to a Currier and Ives lithograph of 1860 depicting President Lincoln on his way to an insane asylum as some precedent for reading out of the present cartoon any defamatory interpretation. Apparently that lithograph was never challenged. The fact that one libel goes unchallenged does not provide a sound basis for exculpating a second or similar libel.

Additionally, I discern a trend in the laws of libel comparable to the very frightening developments which we have witnessed in the obscenity field. Our courts have continued to pay lip service to the principle that obscenity does not enjoy First Amendment protection. At the same time, however, individual decisions holding matters not to be obscene have so raised the

Similarly, reiterating the principle that libel does not enjoy First Amendment protection while at the same time sanctioning progressively vicious and scurrilous false attacks upon public officials will render the laws of defamation meaningless.

The protection of the freedom of a responsible press does not require that we insulate from liability for libel the artists whose pens drip venom and whose skill in drawing and cartooning far exceeds their sense of responsibility, respect for the truth and the depth of their understanding of public issues.

In my opinion the defendants in this action escaped possible liability only because of a prompt and adequate retraction.

Appellant’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied February 10, 1971.