Redevelopment Agency of City & County of San Francisco v. Superior Court

Opinion

In this proceeding an alternative writ of mandate was granted to review petitioner’s contention that the superior court abused its discretion and acted in excess of its jurisdiction by its order denying petitioner’s motion for a writ of assistance permitting it to collect rents upon real property condemned to petitioner by a final order of condemna

To effectuate the statutory mandate, the Urban Renewal Handbook of the Department of Housing and Urban Development, chapter 4, section 2, RHA 7208.1, provides, insofar as here pertinent, as follows; “Taking Possession The LPA’s [Local Public Agency’s] Land Acquisition Policy Statement, submitted with its application for Federal assistance, assures HUD that the LPA will ‘not require any person lawfully occupying property to surrender possession without at least 90 days’ written notice from the LPA of the date on which possession will be required, [f] The notice of at least 90 days required by the LPA’s statement shall be a written notice and shall be given to an owner-occupant as well as a tenant. If the property is acquired through eminent domain proceedings, the 90-day notice shall not be given prior to the date on which the LPA acquires title to, or the right to possession of the property. . . .”

Petitioner has not given the 90-day written notice specified in the aforementioned statute and regulations to real party, nor has such notice been given to any of the tenants or occupants of the subject premises. Petitioner asserts that such notice is not required because petitioner is not seeking to dispossess real party but seeks only to obtain possession of the “vacant” portions of said real property for the express purpose of enabling petitioner to comply with and fulfill' its duties under other HUD regulations, such as giving assistance in the relocation of the occupants of the premises.

Before proceeding to consider petitioner’s contention, we observe that when real party accepted the payment fixed in the judgment and the final order of condemnation was recorded in the office of the county recorder, title to the subject property vested in petitioner and it acquired all the appurtenances thereto and the buildings thereon. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1253; Brick v. Cazaux, 9 Cal.2d 549 , 554 [ 71 P.2d 588 ]; Los Altos School Dist. v. Watson, 133 Cal.App.2d 447 , 450 [ 284 P.2d 513 ]; see People v. Klopstock, 24 Cal.2d 897 , 903 [ 151 P.2d 641 ]; 3 Nichols, Eminent Domain, § 9.2[5].) The vesting of such title ordinarily would have entitled petitioner to immediate possession of the property condemned since the right to possession follows the title. (People v. Peninsula Title Guar. Co., 47 Cal.2d 29 , 32 [ 301 P.2d 1 ]; see Brown v. Sweet, 95 Cal.App. 117 , 123 [ 272 P.

In view of the federal statute and the regulation enacted pursuant thereto, the trial court acted properly when it provided in the order for entry of the final order of condemnation “That no writ of possession or order for possession with respect to the occupants of said property . . . shall be issued as to any such occupant until plaintiff has furnished to such particular occupant the 90-day written notice of the date possession will be required, ...” (Italics added.) We perceive, however, that there is no authority for the additional condition imposed that such possession could not be had “until further order of this court.” As we view the right to possession, the only limitation which could properly be imposed on petitioner’s right to immediate possession was the giving of the subject 90-day notice. (See Thorpe v. Housing Authority, supra, 393 U.S. 268 , 279-280 [ 21 L.Ed.2d 474 , 482-483].)

We are of the opinion, moreover, that the subject statute and regulation in no way purport to limit or restrict the title and estate in the condemned property which vests in the condemner, nor does it purport to grant or create any estate or tenancy in such property in favor of any tenant or occupant save and except the right to remain in possession of the premises lawfully occupied by such tenant or occupant until a notice of at least 90 days is given to such tenant or occupant to surrender possession of said premises. (See Thorpe v. Housing Authority, supra, 393 U.S. 268 , 278-279 [ 21 L.Ed.2d 474 , 481-482].) The subject statute and regulation specifically deal with persons “lawfully occupying . . . property” (italics added). The regulation specifically states that the notice required shall be given to an “ovmtx-occupant as well as a tenant.” (Italics added.) It is clear, therefore, that the statute and the regulation are concerned with persons who are “occupants” irrespective of the status that they have enjoyed prior to the vesting of title in the condemner.

Occupancy is synonymous with actual possession. (McKenzie v. Brandon, 71 Cal. 209 , 211 [ 12 P. 428 ]; Brown v. Spencer, 163 Cal. 589 , 596 [ 126 P. 493 ]; Nathan v. Dierssen, 146 Cal. 63 , 66 [ 79 P. 739 ]; Hart v.

The subject statute and rule, dealing as they do with the possession by an occupant of the premises following the final condemnation of the subject property, do not presume to change or affect the paramount title of petitioner nor the usual attributes of a condemnation proceeding. Here there was an entire taking for which a total award was given. Under such an award real party was reimbursed for the loss of its fee, for the loss of the income stream, and for the loss of any improvements to which it would be entitled under a lease. (7 Nichols, Eminent Domain, § 11.03.) Upon the recording of the final order of condemnation the award stood in place of the subject property and the interests of real party and those of its lessees were satisfied by such award. (4 Nichols, Eminent Domain, §§ 12.42; 12.42[1] and 12.42[3]; see Code Civ. Proc., § 1246.1.) Moreover, by such total taking the estate and interest of real party in the subject property was extinguished and terminated as was the estate and interest of the tenants and lessees of real property. (7 Nichols, Eminent Domain, §§ 11.02; 11.03.)

Adverting to the relationship of landlord and tenant which may have existed between real party and its tenants in said property prior to said taking, such taking resulted in a termination of the relationship, and the leases or tenancies by which the tenants held likewise came to an end. (4 Nichols, supra, § 12.42[1]; 7 Nichols, supra, § 11.03.) Accordingly, the tenants were no longer obligated to pay rent to real party upon the vesting of title in petitioner. (7 Nichols, supra, § 11.03.)

Upon the vesting of title in petitioner it became entitled to the rents, issues and profits accruing from the condemned property (see 6 Nichols, Eminent Domain, § 24.5; and see Regents of University of California v. Morris, 266 Cal.App.2d 616 , 625 [ 72 Cal.Rptr. 406 ]), and as between petitioner and the persons lawfully occupying such premises a new relationship was created. Such occupants became petitioner’s tenants. That tenancy was either one at will or from month to month or from year to year according to the circumstances. (See Psihozios v. Humberg, 80 Cal.App.2d 215 , 220 [ 181 P.2d 699 ]; Linnard v. Sonnenschein, 94 Cal.App. 729 , 735 [ 272 P. 315 ]; Ellingson v. Walsh, O’Connor & Barneson, 15 Cal.2d 673 , 675

Directing our attention to the occupancy of the real party as an “owner-occupant,” we note that at the time of the taking real party was in actual possession of the hotel premises and a bar and a store on the ground floor. As to the occupants of the parking lot and the store premises on the ground floor (other than the stores occupied by real party), real party was not in actual possession of said premises and was not entitled to arrogate possession to itself by presuming to continue to act as a landlord. As noted above, real party’s rights as a landlord were terminated and extinguished by the condemnation proceeding. Accordingly, the occupants of these premises are the persons in actual occupation thereof. As to these stores and premises, real party is not an occupant.

In view of the foregoing we conclude that real party occupies the hotel premises and the bar and store on the ground floor as petitioner’s tenant at will of such premises. As to the occupants of the remaining stores on the ground floor and the parking lot, they also became petitioner’s tenants at will at the moment title vested in petitioner. None of these occupants, including real party, may be dispossessed of the premises occupied by them until the subject 90-day notice is given them. With respect to the occupants of the rooms of the hotel, such parties are tenants of real party since the entire hotel premises are actually in the possession of real party as a tenant at will of said premises. As to petitioner, these roomers or occupants of the hotel rooms are sub-tenants at will. As “occupants” of the rooms they are likewise entitled to the subject 90-day notice before they can be dispossessed. We here point out that the “vacant premises” sought to be possessed by petitioner without the giving of the 90-day notice are

In the light of the foregoing petitioner is entitled to reasonable rent from the occupants for the use of the premises occupied by them from the date that title vested in petitioner. Petitioner is justified, therefore, in demanding rent from such occupants and, if it desires, to convert the tenancy at will into a periodic tenancy by the acceptance of rent. Real party concedes that it is liable for reasonable rent for the use of the premises but takes the position that such use extends to the entire building and not to the portion of the premises actually occupied by it. Accordingly, real party maintains that it is entitled to the rents it has received, and is receiving, until its possession is terminated by the subject 90-day notice from the other occupants. This assertion presupposes that the other occupants have continued in the relationship of landlord and tenant with real party. This contention, for the reasons already pointed out, is without foundation. In this regard we point out that if a condemnee is entitled to collect rents from the condemned premises until he is actually dispossessed, such collection would amount to an unjust enrichment since a condemnee who has accepted the condemnation award, as is the case here, has been fully compensated for the taking of his property. (See Regents of University of California v. Morris, supra, 266 Cal.App.2d 616 , 625.) To permit him to continue to collect rents is tantamount to increasing an award which has already been adjudicated.

We hold, therefore, that real party is liable upon petitioner’s demand for the reasonable rent for the occupancy of the hotel premises and the ground floor stores occupied by it. We also hold that petitioner is entitled to such rent from the other occupants of the ground floor stores and the occupant of the parking lot. Accordingly, petitioner is entitled to a writ of assistance permitting it to collect rents from real party and such other occupants. (See Marblehead Land Co. v. Los Angeles County, 276 F. 305 , 308.) With regard to the rents which real party has collected from such other occupants, real party holds the same as a trustee for petitioner and is to deliver and pay the same to petitioner upon its demand subject to all reasonable charges actually paid by real party incident to the management, maintenance and operation of the subject premises. (See Regents of University of California v. Morris, supra, 266 Cal.App.2d 616 , 625.) Since these rents have already been collected and such other occupants have apparently assumed that they were paying the rents to the proper party,

Finally, consistent with the foregoing, we hold, for the reasons herein-before set out, that petitioner is not entitled to a writ of assistance to permit it to occupy the vacant rooms in the hotel without giving real party the subject 90-day notice. This holding, of course, is not intended to preclude petitioner from taking immediate possession of any of the ground floor stores or the parking lot if such premises are abandoned or voluntarily vacated by the occupants thereof.

In summary, it follows that petitioner is not entitled to a writ of mandate commanding respondent court to vacate its order of May 11, 1970 denying petitioner’s motion for an order for a writ of assistance to permit petitioner to occupy the vacant portions of said condemned premises, for the management thereof, to compel real party to furnish petitioner a list of the occupants of the hotel rooms, and to collect rents from said occupants; but petitioner is entitled to a writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its order of May 11, 1970 denying petitioner’s motion for an order for a writ of assistance to collect rents from real party and the occupants of the ground floor stores and the adjacent parking lot. Petitioner is also entitled to a writ of mandate directing the trial court to enter an order for a writ of assistance to permit petitioner to collect rents upon the real property involved from real party for the premises occupied by it and from the other occupants of the ground floor stores, and from the occupant of the adjacent parking lot. The trial court is also directed, if application is made by petitioner, to enter an order fixing the reasonable rent due from real party for the premises occupied by it and to require real party to account to petitioner for the rents received from the other occupants of the ground floor stores and the parking lot. Upon such accounting the trial court shall also determine the amount, if any, and give credit to real party therefor, of the reasonable charges actually paid and discharged by real party in the management, maintenance and operation of the premises occupied by the tenants of the

Sims, J., and Elkington, J., concurred.

The petition of the real party in interest for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied February 10, 1971.