Majority
Opinion
The City of Santa Monica and the city’s rent control board appeal from a judgment granting a peremptory writ of mandate, requiring it to grant to petitioners an exemption from the city’s rent control law. We reverse.
I
II
We agree with appellants that the portions of the writ which purport to hold all community care facilities exempt from the rent control regulations are beyond the scope of the jurisdiction of the trial court. This is not a class declaratory action. It involves only the status of the properties owned by respondents. It is true that, if the respondents secure, on this appeal, an exemption, that decision may become a precedent for cases involving other properties. But its precedential value, if any, must be determined in other, and future, litigation.
Santa Monica’s rental control legislation is found in a provision of its charter. That provision provides for regulation of “Any building, structure, or part thereof, or land appurtenant thereto, or any other rental property rented or offered for rent for living or dwelling house units, and other real properties used for living or dwelling purposes, together with all housing services connected with use or occupancy of such property such as common areas and recreational facilities held out for use by the tenant. ”[2] and it also defines “housing services” as follows: “Housing services include but are not limited to repairs, maintenance, painting, providing light, hot and cold water, elevator service, window shades and screens, storage, kitchen, bath and laundry facilities and privileges, janitor services, refuse removal, furnishings, telephone, parking and any other benefit, privilege or facility connected with the use or occupancy of any rental unit.”[3] The charter also exempts from regulation “rental units in any hospital . . . extended medical care facility ... or asylum.”[4]
1 As we point out below, we need not, and do not, determine on this appeal whether that exemption was valid or required under some theory of preemption.
2 Santa Monica City Charter, section 1801(h).
3 Santa Monica City Charter, section 1801(d).
4 Santa Monica City Charter, section 1801(c)(2).
The judgment appealed from is reversed.
Woods, P. J., and McClosky, J., concurred.
A petition for a rehearing was denied April 5, 1983, and respondents’ petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied June 1, 1983.
5 We are asked to rely on Klarfeld v. Berg (1981) 29 Cal.3d 893 [ 176 Cal.Rptr. 539 , 633 P.2d 204 ]. However, that case did not involve any issue of preemption. At the most it teaches us to interpret local rent control legislation according to the intent of its authors. That we have done here.