Majority
Opinion
Appeal from judgment confirming arbitrator’s award (Code Civ. Proc., § 1294). We affirm.
Facts:
Appellant and respondent entered into a written contract whereby respondent, an architect, agreed to design several single family homes for appellant, a general licensed contractor since 1977. The agreement contained the following arbitration clause: “All disputes between the parties shall be decided by arbitration (AAA).” A dispute arose between the parties regarding payment for services rendered under the contract. Respondent submitted the controversy to arbitration. There were two hearings where both parties appeared. About two months thereafter, the arbitrator rendered his award in favor of respondent and ordering appellant to pay respondent certain sums and to pay arbitration fees.
Appellant petitioned the superior court to vacate the arbitration award on the grounds that the arbitration clause had been included fraudulently and that the
Issues on Appeal:
The question before us is whether one who chooses to submit to arbitration and loses may then, for the first time, seek judicial relief on the basis that the arbitration agreement was fraudulently induced and therefore invalid.
Discussion:
Arbitration has been encouraged and praised by the courts as an expeditious and economical method of relieving overburdened civil calendars. (Madden v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (1976) 17 Cal.3d 699 , 706 [ 131 Cal.Rptr. 882 , 552 P.2d 1178 ].) But while public policy favors arbitration, that policy does not extend to compelling arbitration where none was agreed. (Main v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 19 , 32 [ 136 Cal. Rptr. 378 ].) As was stated in Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co. (1962) 370 U.S. 238 , 241 [ 8 L.Ed.2d 462 ,466, 82 S.Ct. 1318 ], “ ‘arbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit.’”
The record indicates that appellant appeared at the arbitration hearing, where he testified in English on both direct and cross-examination, and presented witnesses on his behalf. Appellant stated in his declaration filed in support of
1 Appellant apparently relies upon Code of Civil Procedure section 1286.2, subdivision (d) which provides that one of the several grounds for vacation of an arbitrator’s award is when the arbitrator acts in excess of his power. The other listed grounds are inapplicable here.
Nothing in the record before us indicates any objection by appellant to the arbitrator’s authority to act in the matter. Had he desired to do so appellant, after respondent’s demand for arbitration, could have sought to restrain any arbitration proceedings by filing a petition in the superior court. (See Sauter v. Superior Court (1969) 2 Cal.App.3d 25 , 27 [ 82 Cal.Rptr. 395 ].) In subjecting his person to arbitration and in participating in the arbitration process both through the presentation of witnesses testifying on his behalf and through his own direct testimony, appellant in effect submitted to the arbitrator’s authority to decide both the substantive issue regarding liability for payments and the issue of whether there was a valid arbitration agreement. Consequently, he cannot now be heard to complain that the arbitrator was without jurisdiction to determine the issues because fraud vitiated the arbitration clause in the agreement.
Appellant’s reliance on Main v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., supra, 67 Cal. App.3d 19 , 27 is misplaced. In Main, plaintiff executed a written agreement authorizing defendants to buy and sell securities for plaintiff. The agreement provided that any dispute arising thereunder “shall be submitted to arbitration . . . .” Plaintiff filed an action in superior court against defendants alleging losses due to mismanagement. She alleged she was elderly and unschooled and was induced to sign the writing through the fraud and undue influence of defendants and their failure to inform her of the arbitration clause contained in fine print on the reverse side of the agreement. The superior court denied defendants’ motion to compel arbitration.
On appeal, the court in Main, relying, among other cases, on Moseley v. Electronic Facilities (1963) 374 U.S. 167 [ 10 L.Ed.2d 818 , 83 S.Ct. 1815 ], held that when a party alleges in the superior court that fraud permeated the entire contract, including the arbitration clause, that issue must be determined judicially and not by arbitration. The court explained that to allow the issue to be decided by arbitrators would lead to enforcement of an arbitration agreement even though steeped in the grossest kind of fraud. (Main v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., supra, 67 Cal.App.3d 19 , 25, 27.)
The judgment is affirmed.
Roth, P. J., and Compton, J., concurred.
Cases cited
- Madden v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals 17 Cal.3d 699 at 706 p. 559
- Main v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. 67 Cal.App.3d 19 at 32, at 27, at 25, 27 p. 559, p. 560
- Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co. 370 U.S. 238 at 241 p. 559
- Sauter v. Superior Court 2 Cal.App.3d 25 at 27 p. 560
- Moseley v. Electronic & Missile Facilities, Inc. 374 U.S. 167 p. 560
- Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Dennis 229 Cal.App.2d 541 at 544 p. 561