Majority
Opinion
Michael J. Carden appeals from the judgment denying his petition for a peremptory writ of mandate. He contends: “I. The court erred in allowing respondent Board of Registration for Professional Engineers to apply a lengthy apprenticeship period in addition to the nine years of engineering work experience established by statute. II. Respondent had no authority to enlarge the requirements for registration as a fire protection engineer set forth in Business and Professions Code section 6767 and Bulletin 3-75. [III.] The court erred in awarding only half credit to Michael Carden for engagement Nos. 1, 2 and 3 because of administrative work disqualification. [IV.] The Board of Registration for Professional Engineers was re
The Professional Engineers’ Act (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6700 et seq.) specifies that “[t]he board [Board of Registration for Professional Engineers] may, by regulation, define the scope of each branch of professional engineering other than civil engineering for which registration is provided under this chapter.” (§ 6717.)[1]
Generally an applicant for registration as a professional engineer must “. . . furnish evidence of six years or more of experience in engineering work satisfactory to the board evidencing that applicant is competent to practice the character of engineering in the branch for which he is applying for registration, and successfully pass [an] examination.” (§ 6751.) However, in 1974 the Legislature added section 6767 to the Act empowering the board to “(a) . . . register an applicant without examination in any engineering discipline which the board has established pursuant to Section 6700 if the applicant, in the opinion of the board, has all the qualifications for such registration, and if the applicant complies with all the following: [f] (1) Furnishes evidence of nine years or more of experience in engineering work satisfactory to the board evidencing that the applicant is competent to practice the character of engineering in the branch for which he is applying for registration.” (Italics added.)[2]
Acting upon the authority granted it by the Legislature, the board in 1975 adopted a regulation providing: “An applicant for registration in a branch or specialty branch established by the board may be registered without examination if the applicant meets all of the requirements of the code and provides evidence of nine years or more of qualifying experience acceptable to the board as follows: . . . [t] (d) Fire Protection Engineers [f]
1 "‘Professional engineer,’ within the meaning and intent of this act, refers to a person engaged in the professional practice of rendering service or creative work requiring education, training and experience in engineering sciences and the application of special knowledge of the mathematical, physical and engineering sciences in such professional or creative work as consultation, investigation, evaluation, planning or design of public or private utilities, structures, machines, processes, circuits, buildings, equipment or projects, and supervision of construction for the purpose of securing compliance with specifications and design for any such work.” (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6701.)
2 Section 6767 also required the board to establish a final filing date for applications “no later than three years following the adoption of regulations by the board establishing each such discipline.” (Subd. (b).) It further specified the board “may adopt such regulations under provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act as are necessary to implement this section.” (Subd. (c).)
The board defined the term “fire protection engineering” as “that branch of pirofessional engineering which requires such education and experience as is necessary to understand the engineering problems relating to the safeguarding of life and property from fire and fire-felated hazards; and requires the ability to apply this knowledge to the identification, evaluation, correction, or prevention of presfent or potential fire and fire related panic hazards in buildings, groups of buildings, or communities, and to recommend the arrangement and use of fire resistant building materials and fire detection and extinguishing systems, devices, and apparatus in order to protect life and property. ...” (Cal. Admin. Code, tit. 16, § 404, subd. (n).)
It has described qualifying experience for registration as a professional engineer to be “that experience satisfactory to the Board which has been gained while performing engineering tasks on a full-time basis under the direction of a professional engineer.” (Cal. Admin. Code, tit. 16, § 424, subd. (c), italics added.)
The board made available to applicants seeking registration as professional engineers without the necessity of passing an examination Bulletin 3-75 setting forth certain general requirements for such registration. This bulletin also stated that the applicant “must furnish evidence of nine years of qualifying engineering work experience acceptable to the Board ...” and pointed out that “Qualifying experience for professional engineering registration means full-time employment or activity. It does not include part-time or short-time employment, overtime, trainee or orientation programs, technician or sub-professional levels of employment except for consultation by a fully qualified engineer.” (Italics added in part.) A second bulletin prepared by the board, Bulletin 75-4(b), described in detail the nature of fire protection engineering.
On December 21, 1976, appellant filed his application seeking registration as a fire protection engineer under section 6767 of the Business and Professions Code. His application revealed he had received a Bachelor of Science degree in Business Administration in 1962, but has no formal education in
Appellant was notified on June 8, 1977, that his application had been denied as a result of the board’s determination that engagements 3 and 4, “are considered as apprenticeship period. It appears applicant has had involvement with sprinkler design, which is a narrow facet in the broad spectrum of fire protection engineering. Only partial credit allowed for engagements 1 and 2.” In August 1977 appellant submitted additional information to respondent and requested a reevaluation of his application. On April 12, 1978, the board notified him it had “found no justification for change of its original findings.”
Appellant thereafter exercised his statutory right to an administrative hearing (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 485; Gov. Code, § 11500 et seq.) which commenced in June 1982. Two issues emerged which are relevant to the present appeal, i.e., the degree to which the engineering experience claimed by appellant should be deemed nonqualifying either because it (1) was at a subprofessional or “apprenticeship” level, or (2) involved management and administrative duties unrelated to professional engineering.
There was a consensus among all of the witnesses testifying that a person with no formal education in engineering must serve an apprenticeship in order to perform on a professional level. Each of the professional engineers called to testify by appellant agreed that the length of time required to reach such proficiency is necessarily dependent on the individual and that some will never achieve it. However, for the most part each of these witnesses concluded he, personally, had been able to perform as a professional within two years of his entry into the field. Appellant also maintained he had ceased doing work at the “technician-level” after engagement 5.
Daniel Jacobsen, the fire protection engineer who had evaluated appellant’s application in early 1977 was called as an expert by the board. He
3 Appellant listed his experience as follows: Total Engagement Dates Months Position 1 1972-1976 46 President 2 1969-1972 36 Vice President Operations 3 1966-1969 38 Contract & Design OEcer 4 1963-1966 34 Fire Sprinkler Designer 5 1958-1963 28 Fire Sprinkler-Fitter Apprentice
On the question of appellant’s administrative obligations during engagements 1 and 2, appellant claimed that while serving as his company’s vice president he had devoted only “[a]n hour a week, three hours every two and a half weeks, . . .’’to administrative affairs and approximately 1 percent of his time to sales. According to appellant, his father and a business manager had assumed primary responsibility for these matters. He further asserted that even when he became president his administrative duties did not increase appreciably, since he then delegated “a great majority” of such labors to others. He also maintained he had strictly limited his involvement in the sales aspect of the business. However, other witnesses called by appellant himself testified that when they had functioned in similar roles, they devoted 40 to 60 percent of their time to administrative matters.
Based upon his own judgment and the written information appellant had submitted to the board, Jacobsen initially estimated appellant had dedicated one-fourth of his time to professional engineering activities during engagements 1 and 2. However, after considering the testimony of the other witnesses, including appellant, Jacobsen “revised his evaluation to allow half credit for those two periods of time . . . .”
In his proposed decision the administrative law judge found, as had the board, that appellant had failed to furnish evidence of nine years or more of competent experience in fire protection engineering and that his application should consequently be denied. The board adopted this as its own decision on August 18, 1982.
On January 17, 1984, appellant unsuccessfully petitioned the superior court for a writ of mandate to compel the board to set aside its order and register him as a fire protection engineer. This appeal followed.
Appellant’s first two contentions urging that the board exceeded its statutory authority by denying him qualifying credit for “apprenticeship” en
4 Jacobsen apparently concluded the 28 months’ experience gained by appellant in engagement 5 was not “engineering-oriented” and therefore merited no consideration even as apprenticeship experience.
Appellant’s assertion that “an applicant who furnished evidence of nine years or more of engineering work experience would be satisfactorily qualified under the state standards” ignores the express language of section 6767 which requires experience “satisfactory to the board. ” (Italics added.) Implicit in this limitation is the recognition that not all engineering experience will inevitably qualify toward the nine-year minimum requirement.
Although the Legislature did not expressly mention an apprenticeship period, this fact, rather than suggesting a restriction on the board’s power, indicates only that the Legislature gave the board a general mandate to use its expertise and power to determine how qualifying engineering experience should be measured. (See Ralphs Grocery Co. v. Reimel (1968) 69 Cal.2d 172 , 182-183 [ 70 Cal.Rptr. 407 , 444 P.2d 79 ].)
Undoubtedly, in exercising that authority the board was cognizant that the Legislature’s purpose, in requiring those who would practice as professional engineers to apply for registration and to provide evidence of their qualifications, was to safeguard life, health, property, and public welfare. (See Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 6700, 6704.) Therefore, the board reasonably could have concluded that restricting qualifying experience to full-time engineering work at a professional level was necessary to effectuate those objectives.
Jacobsen testified that after conducting “a detailed review” of appellant’s application and supporting documents, he concluded “[h]is work has been concentrated mainly in sales, design, installation, office administration and labor relations, in connection with the installation if [sic] extinguishing systems, almost exclusively, automatic sprinkler systems. This is a very narrowed facet of the overall spectrum of fire protection engineering and is largely accomplished at the technical level—. ...” Nevertheless, Jacobsen indicated that having been acquainted with appellant’s father, he “knew that the instruction that [appellant] got during his apprenticeship must have been of the highest quality” and he therefore “felt confident in knowing [he] was doing right in charging only six years apprenticeship [spanning engagements 3 and 4] versus the eight to twelve that most have set forth in this supplementary guideline.” The administrative law judge ultimately determined that appellant should receive 19 months credit for his experience during engagement 3 and the board adopted his finding.
Appellant’s third contention is also unmeritorious. It is well-settled that “[i]n cases involving applications for a license, the courts have largely deferred to the administrative expertise of the agency. [Citation.] Courts are relatively ill-equipped to determine whether an individual would be qualified, for example, to practice a particular profession or trade. [Citation.] In a case involving the agency’s initial determination whether an individual qualifies to enter a profession or trade the courts uphold the agency
Applying these principles to the instant case, the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that none of the experience gained by appellant during engagements 3 through 5 was qualifying because it did not constitute fulltime engineering work performed at a professional level. Given this fact, the board certainly cannot be faulted for adopting the administrative law judge’s finding that appellant was entitled only to partial credit for engagement 3.
Similarly, ample evidence supported a finding that appellant devoted one-half of his time during engagements 1 and 2 to administrative responsibilities. There was great disparity between the testimony of appellant and that of his colleagues concerning the time spent on such matters. Appellant made no attempt to offer or elicit any explanation for this discrepancy, even though it was, and is, clear from the wording of Business and Professions Code section 6767 that he had the burden of demonstrating his entitlement to registration as a professional engineer. Under these circumstances the board was not obligated to give full faith and credit to appellant’s personal averments on the subject.
Appellant argues that “full credit should be given to an individual as long as it can be established by a preponderance of the evidence that the primary function of his/her job is the accomplishment of qualified engineering tasks and that he/she personally controls, and is responsible for the successful completion of, qualified engineering operations.” As we have ¡previously discussed, the Legislature determined that, in the absence of successfully completing an examination to prove one’s ability, nine years or more of qualifying engineering experience is imperative to insure the public health and safety. Requiring that this experience be gained during “full-time employment or activity” is certainly not an unreasonable means of guaranteeing that such a requisite degree of competency has been achieved. It is possible, of course, that the desired goals could be obtained by granting full credit to a person who devoted a negligible amount of his time to management functions unrelated to engineering. Nonetheless, an adjustment would yet remain appropriate where one-half of an individual’s time was occupied by management concerns. In any event, we need not now concern ourselves with a final resolution of this problem, since appellant
Lastly, appellant contends that the board “made no attempt in its letters . . . dated June 8, 1966, and April 12, 1978, to explain the rationale behind its decision to deny [his] application for licensing as a fire protection engineer.” Assuming that the standards set forth in Topanga Assn. for a Scenic Community v. County of Los Angeles (1974) 11 Cal.3d 506 [ 113 Cal.Rptr. 836 , 522 P.2d 12 ], would govern here,[5] the reasons given for the board’s denial of appellant’s application were adequate “to enable the parties to determine whether and on what basis they should seek review and, in the event of review, to apprise a reviewing court of the basis for the board’s action. ...” (Id., at p. 514.) “[G]reat specificity is not required. It is enough if the findings form an adequate analytic bridge between the evidence and the agency’s decision. [Citations.] In addition, findings are to be liberally construed to support rather than defeat the order under review. [Citations.]” (Fair Employment Practice Com. v. State Personnel Bd. (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 322 , 329 [ 172 Cal.Rptr. 739 ].)
The judgment is affirmed.
Roth, P. J., and Compton, J., concurred.
5 The court in Topanga concluded that variance boards like the ones involved in that case “must render findings to support their ultimate rulings. ” (11 Cal.3d at p. 510; italics added.) Limiting the requirement that findings be made to final administrative actions would appear to be imminently reasonable since review under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 is restricted to “any final administrative . . . decision” made as a result of a statutorily mandated evidentiary hearing.
Cases cited
- Ford Dealers Ass'n v. Department of Motor Vehicles 32 Cal.3d 347 at 356 p. 743
- Ralphs Grocery Co. v. Reimel 69 Cal.2d 172 at 182-183 p. 743
- Armistead v. State Personnel Board 22 Cal.3d 198 p. 744
- Southern California Jockey Club, Inc. v. California Horse Racing Board 36 Cal.2d 167 at 176 p. 744
- Bixby v. Pierno 4 Cal.3d 130 at 146 p. 745
- Professional Engineers in California Government v. State Personnel Board 70 Cal.App.3d 346 at 349 p. 745
- Topanga Ass'n v. County of Los Angeles 11 Cal.3d 506 p. 746
- Fair Employment Practice Commission v. State Personnel Board 117 Cal.App.3d 322 at 329 p. 746