Majority
Opinion
Real Party Victor Lawrence Pahl allegedly shot his wife and her attorney when they tried to inventory his pawnshop in connection
The homeowner’s policy in question contained the following language:
“Coverage L—Personal Liability
“If a claim is made or a suit is brought against an insured for damages because of bodily injury or property damage to which this coverage applies, we will:
“(1) Pay up to our limit of liability for the damages for which the insured is legally liable; and
“(2) Provide a defense at our expense by counsel of our choice. We may make any investigation and settle any claim or suit that we decide is appropriate. Our obligation to defend any claim or suit ends when the amount we pay for damages resulting from the occurrence equals our limit of liability.” Pahl claimed this language obligated State Farm to defend him in the criminal prosecution.
State Farm demurred, alleging the complaint failed to state a cause of action since the rights and duties described did not fall within any basic insuring agreement between real party and petitioner. The trial court overruled the demurrer and State Farm petitioned this court for a writ of mandate to compel the trial court to sustain the demurrer. We conclude the demurrer should have been sustained.
Ordinarily when a plaintiff pleads a contract and a controversy concerning the effect of terms of the contract a cause of action for declaratory relief has been stated and a demurrer is inappropriate. However, where the facts relied on by plaintiff do not support a declaration in his favor as a matter of law, demurrer is proper. (International Assn. of Fire Fighters v. City of Palo Alto (1963) 60 Cal.2d 295 , 301-302 [ 32 Cal.Rptr. 842 , 384 P.2d 170 ]; Haddad v. Electronic Production & Development, Inc. (1963) 219 Cal.App.2d 137 ,141 [ 33 Cal.Rptr. 89 ].) Under these circumstances mandate lies to compel the trial court to sustain the demurrer. (See Tyco Industries, Inc. v. Superior Court (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 148 , 153-154 [ 211 Cal.Rptr.
An insurer is not obligated to defend a suit which does not seek the recovery of damages covered by the claimant’s policy. (Giddings v. Industrial Indemnity Co. (1980) 112 Cal.App.3d 213 , 219-220 [ 169 Cal.Rptr. 278 ].) Insurance Code section 533 specifically provides, “An insurer is not liable for a loss caused by the wilful act of the insured____” But, Pahl argues, the insurance company’s duty to defend is much broader than its duty to indemnify. (G ray v. Zurich Insurance Co. (1966) 65 Cal.2d 263 , 275 [ 54 Cal.Rptr. 104 , 419 P.2d 168 ].) In Gray the court held an insurer had a duty to defend its insured in a personal injury action based on allegations of an intentional tort even though the applicable policy excluded injury intentionally caused. Part of the rationale of that decision was that the suit involved potential damages based on nonintentional conduct which was within the coverage of the policy. As long as the potentiality of coverage exists, the duty to defend also exists. But where there is no possibility of coverage, there is no duty to defend. This is such a case, Pahl’s homeowner’s policy does not cover any liability which might arise from the alleged criminal action.
In Jaffe v. Cranford Ins. Co. (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 930 [ 214 Cal.Rptr. 567 ], a psychiatrist was prosecuted for Medi-Cal fraud and theft. He claimed his malpractice carrier was obligated to pay his defense costs incurred in the criminal prosecution. The insurer’s demurrer to the psychiatrist’s suit for tortious breach of contract was sustained without leave to amend, and that ruling was affirmed on appeal. The court stated, “In the present case, the outcome of Jaffe’s criminal case could not result in damages payable under the policy since neither imprisonment nor a fine constitutes ‘damages’ for insurance purposes.” (Id., at p. 934.)
Pahl argues the criminal action could result in damages covered under the homeowner’s policy if he were required to make restitution to the victims. We have found no California case directly in point, nor have counsel provided us with any such authority.
We do note under California law an insurance carrier is not liable for any portion of a judgment rendered against its insured for punitive or exemplary damages. (See Peterson v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 147 , 156 [ 181 Cal.Rptr. 784 ]; Ford Motor Co. v. Home Ins. Co. (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 374 , 379 [ 172 Cal.Rptr. 59 ]; Annot., Insurance Coverage—Punitive Damages, 16
Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue (Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171 ,182 [ 203 Cal.Rptr. 626 , 681 P.2d 893 ]) directing respondent Orange County Superior Court to annul its order overruling petitioner’s demurrer and to enter a new and different order sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend.
Wallin, J., and Sonenshine, J., concurred.
The petition of real party in interest for review by the Supreme Court was denied June 17, 1987.
Cases cited
- International Ass'n of Fire Fighters v. City of Palo Alto 60 Cal.2d 295 at 301-302 p. 76
- Haddad v. Electronic Production & Development, Inc. 219 Cal.App.2d 137 at 141 p. 76
- Tyco Industries, Inc. v. Superior Court 164 Cal.App.3d 148 at 153-154 p. 76
- Newby v. Alto Riviera Apartments 60 Cal.App.3d 288 at 304 p. 77
- Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson 30 Cal.3d 721 at 740-741 p. 77
- Western Homes, Inc. v. Herbert Ketell, Inc. 236 Cal.App.2d 142 at 146 p. 77
- Giddings v. Industrial Indemnity Co. 112 Cal.App.3d 213 at 219-220 p. 77
- Gray v. Zurich Insurance 65 Cal.2d 263 at 275 p. 77
- Jaffe v. Cranford Insurance 168 Cal.App.3d 930 p. 77
- Peterson v. Superior Court 31 Cal.3d 147 at 156 p. 77
- Ford Motor Co. v. Home Insurance 116 Cal.App.3d 374 at 379 p. 77
- City Products Corp. v. Globe Indemnity Co. 88 Cal.App.3d 31 p. 78
- California State Automobile Ass'n Inter-Insurance Bureau v. Carter 164 Cal.App.3d 257 at 262 p. 78
- Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. 36 Cal.3d 171 at 182 p. 78