Majority
Opinion
Elaine Mein appeals the denial of her petitions for mandate against the San Francisco Bay Conservation and Development Commission (BCDC). BCDC denied her an after-the-fact permit to fill a portion of the San Francisco Bay (Bay) for a private home, and subsequently issued a cease-and-desist order requiring her to remove all or large portions of the fill. We conclude that substantial evidence supports BCDC’s findings that the project did not comply with statutory requirements for Bay fill (Gov.
I
In 1985 Mein purchased a bayfront parcel on Sandy Beach Road in Vallejo. The property included a storm-damaged house and deck constructed partly on piles over the Bay. In June 1985 Mein replaced 18 deteriorated pilings beneath the old deck; she obtained a permit from Solano County for this construction but none from BCDC.
In November 1985, through her architect and contractor, Alfred Wastlhuber, Mein obtained a Solano County permit to demolish the existing house and deck and build a larger replacement house and deck. The permit contained a written notation, “BCDC permit required by owner.” Mein nevertheless commenced construction in April 1986 without any application having been made to BCDC. In September 1986 a BCDC enforcement officer told Mein by letter that a BCDC permit was needed for her construction and that all work should cease until one was obtained. Finishing work nevertheless continued until November, when Mein occupied the house. The completed house and deck rested on substantially increased fill, covering an additional 1,550 square feet of Bay surface.
Mein applied for a permit in January 1987, which the BCDC denied after staff analysis and public hearing. A cease-and-desist order followed.
Preliminarily, Mein contends the trial court should have independently reviewed the BCDC findings rather than relying on substantial evidence, because she had a vested right to rebuild the house. Mein, however, did not repair or rehabilitate the existing structure on her property but demolished it and built a substantially larger deck and house, for which she could claim no vested right. (See Whaler’s Village Club v. California Coastal Com. (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 240 , 253 [ 220 Cal.Rptr. 2 ].) Moreover, the McAteer-Petris Act provides a procedure for claiming exemption on ground of vested rights; Mein did not avail herself of that procedure and thus waived any such right. (§§ 66632.1, 66656, subd. (a); Davis v. California Coastal Zone Conservation Com. (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 700 , 708 [ 129 Cal.Rptr. 417 ].) The trial court therefore properly applied the substantial evidence standard to BCDC’s factual findings. We independently review BCDC’s legal conclusions.
1 All further statutory references are to the Government Code unless otherwise noted.
The Act was intended to prevent further piecemeal filling of the Bay (§ 66601), and pursuant to that goal section 66605 sets out limitations on new fill. Further filling is to be authorized only when its public benefits clearly outweigh its harm, and is additionally limited to three types of uses: water-oriented uses, minor fill for improving shoreline appearance and minor fill for improving public access. The term “water-oriented uses” is not defined, but the Act provides an exemplary list: “ports, water-related industry, airports, bridges, wildlife refuges, water-oriented recreation and public assembly, water intake and discharge lines for desalinization plants and power generating plants requiring large amounts of water for cooling purposes.” (§ 66605, subd. (a).) In addition to limiting fill to these three types of land use, section 66605 mandates that fill be allowed only when no alternative upland site is available (subd. (b)) and that the area filled be the minimum necessary to achieve the purpose of the fill (subd. (c)).
BCDC found that Mein’s house is not a water-oriented use, that it does not qualify as minor fill for improving shoreline appearance, and that it was not the minimum amount of fill needed for its purpose. Mein contends each of these findings was erroneous.
Water-oriented Use
BCDC concluded that housing is not a water-oriented use within the meaning of section 66605. It relied on a previously obtained informal opinion letter from the Attorney General (Dec. 29, 1983), which cited the language, purposes and history of the Act and the provisions of the Bay Plan. Mein contends BCDC’s position is legally erroneous and constitutes a procedurally defective amendment of the Bay Plan.
Mein argues, first, that BCDC has ignored a distinction between “water-oriented priority land uses” (§ 66611) and “water-oriented uses” (§ 66605);
Second, Mein asserts that the Act and the Bay Plan both state policies in favor of residential development of the Bay. The provisions she cites, however, all refer to development of the shoreline, not the Bay itself. (§ 66605.1; Bay Plan, supra, Summary: Major Plan Proposal No. 7, p. 3, Other Uses of the Bay and Shoreline, Policy Nos. 1, 3, p. 30.) The contrast between proper uses of the Bay and its shoreline is a pervasive theme of the Act, one section of which refers to planning for “the conservation of the water of the bay and the development of its shoreline.” (§ 66603.)
If the Act is to fulfill the legislative purpose of preventing piecemeal filling from gradually eliminating large portions of the Bay surface, fill must be restricted to uses which cannot be practically accommodated on upland sites. Section 66605 implements that policy by direct mandate (subd. (b)) and by the restriction to water-oriented uses (subd. (a)). All the uses in subdivision (a)’s illustrative list, with the possible exception of airports, are functionally dependent on proximity to the water. Housing has no such necessary connection to the Bay. Housing, like a myriad of other land uses, may but need not be built on or near the Bay. An interpretation of section 66605 which included these uses under the rubric of “water-oriented” would make the term meaningless in practice and would frustrate the purposes of the Act.
The Bay Plan, which is endorsed in the Act as the guiding document for Bay planning (§§ 66603, 66632, subd. (f)), makes clear that housing is not
BCDC’s conclusion that housing is not a water-oriented use is thus in accord with the Act and the Bay Plan. Mein also argues that such an administrative position may not be formulated by means of case-by-case adjudication but must be the subject of formal rulemaking. She cites section 66652, which provides that BCDC may amend the Bay Plan after notice and hearing, and requires 90 days notice of any proposed amendment which “defines a water-oriented use.” Her argument fails for two reasons. First, the statute is permissive only; BCDC “may” amend the Bay Plan, but need not do so in order to decide individual applications. (See Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. v. California Coastal Farms, Inc. (1982) 31 Cal.3d 469 , 478 [ 183 Cal.Rptr. 231 , 645 P.2d 739 ] [well-settled principle of administrative law that agency has discretionary choice between proceeding by rulemaking or adjudication].) Second, as discussed above, the Bay Plan already provides that housing is not a water-oriented use. The BCDC conclusion thus cannot be considered an amendment to the Bay Plan, and Mein raises no objection to the manner by which the Bay Plan itself was adopted.
Finally, Mein argues generally that the BCDC position is an attempt to “extirpate housing from its jurisdictional territory” and that it “effectively precludes residential development on San Francisco Bay.” In the Bay Plan, however, BCDC explicitly recognizes that fill may be approved for portions of individual nonwater-oriented projects where such bayward extensions are needed “to enable actual use of the water . . . or to use the Bay as an asset in the design of the structure.” (Bay Plan, supra, Other Uses of the Bay and Shoreline, Policy No. 2, p. 30.) BCDC has adopted a regulation implementing that policy (Cal. Code Reg., tit. 14, § 10702). BCDC found that Mein’s house did not qualify under this regulation, and in this court Mein challenges neither that finding nor the validity of the regulation.
This case does not raise any question concerning repairs to existing housing, or the replacement of one house with another occupying the same Bay
II
Minor Fill for Improving Shoreline Appearance
BCDC’s regulation implementing this portion of section 66605, subdivision (a) requires, among other things, that the fill be the minimum necessary to improve shoreline appearance. (Cal. Code Reg., tit. 14, § 10700, subd. (b).) BCDC found that Mein had filled more than the minimum necessary to remedy the unsightful condition of the storm-damaged property. Mein contends that the regulation is unauthorized and that the BCDC’s finding was erroneous. Both claims lack merit.
The “minimum necessary” limitation follows directly from section 66605, subdivision (c), which provides that, whatever the purpose of the fill, BCDC should not approve more than the minimum necessary for that purpose. BCDC found Mein’s home exceeded the minimum necessary because the shoreline appearance could have been improved by repairing a damaged seawall and building a house similar in scale to the old house and to the surrounding properties. Mein argued that such a house could not have accommodated the large west-facing windows which were used in the new house, a passive solar energy design. BCDC responded that “minimum necessary” does not mean the minimum necessary for the particular size or style desired by the applicant. We agree. Section 66605, subdivision (c) limits the fill to the minimum necessary for its purpose, which here (Mein claims) was to improve shoreline appearance. Solar energy generation is a distinct and different purpose, and Mein points to nothing in the record showing such a design was necessary for rebuilding at this site.
I
n its cease-and-desist order BCDC provided Mein three alternative courses of compliance: (1) removal of the entire house, deck and piles; (2) removal of 1,553 square feet of Bay coverage, whether deck or house, and 1,170 square feet of the house itself, returning the project to the size and coverage of the old house; (3) removal of a two-story portion of the house and specified portions of the deck. Mein contends the conditions were designed to decrease residential use of the Bay, a goal which she argues is not statutorily permitted.
A cease-and-desist order issued by BCDC “may be subject to such terms and conditions as the commission may determine are necessary to insure
In explaining compliance alternatives (2) and (3), BCDC stated they would reduce the intensity of residential use on the Bay while still allowing Mein to retain some benefit from the construction. BCDC errs in identifying “increased residential use” in itself as a harm to be remedied. The Act focuses on fill as the evil to be avoided. Housing, as a nonwater-oriented use, does not justify filling the Bay, but nowhere does the Act or the Bay Plan disapprove of residential use of existing fill. Conditions (2) and (3) were nonetheless within the scope of BCDC’s enforcement discretion, because the administrative record contains substantial evidence and unchallenged findings to the effect that the increased size of the house adversely affected shoreline appearance and Bay views. BCDC did not abuse its discretion in formulating the three compliance alternatives.
The judgment is affirmed.
King, J., and Haning, J., concurred.
Cases cited
- Whaler's Village Club v. Califonia Coastal Commission 173 Cal.App.3d 240 at 253 p. 731
- Davis v. California Coastal Zone Conservation Commission 57 Cal.App.3d 700 at 708 p. 731
- Agricultural Labor Relations Board v. California Coastal Farms, Inc. 31 Cal.3d 469 at 478 p. 734
- Leslie Salt Co. v. San Francisco Bay Conservation & Development Commission 153 Cal.App.3d 605 at 617 p. 736