People v. Jones

Opinion

The People appeal from an order dismissing a criminal action against respondent, Calvin Coolidge Jones. They claim the trial court erred when it granted respondent’s motion to suppress evidence. We disagree and affirm.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Shortly before 9 p.m. on August 31, 1989, Oakland Police Officer James Burns was on patrol in a marked car when he saw three men standing in a group near the corner of 12th and Peralta Streets. When Burns was about 30 feet from the men, one of them handed respondent “what appeared to be U.S. currency.” Respondent “received” the money in his left hand.

Burns knew that the area was one of “very high narcotics activity, sales and use”; thus, he decided to “contact” respondent to obtain his name,

Based upon these facts, an information was filed charging respondent with possession of cocaine for sale. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11351.) Enhancements based upon seven prior convictions were also alleged.

In November 1989, respondent filed a motion to suppress evidence pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5. Essentially respondent argued his initial detention was improper and that the search of his person could not be justified. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court agreed, granted the suppression motion, and ordered the action against respondent dismissed. This timely appeal followed.

The People claim the trial court erred in granting the motion to suppress. They maintain Burns’s initial contact with respondent was a consensual encounter and not a detention and, thus, was constitutionally permissible. The People also argue Burns was justified in seizing respondent’s forearm because he suddenly reached for his back pocket. We will discuss the detention issue first.

For purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis, there are basically three levels of police contacts or interactions with individuals. First are “consensual encounters.” They are police-individual interactions which result in no restraint of an individual’s personal liberty whatsoever, i.e., no

Our initial task is to determine whether the initial interaction between respondent and Burns was a consensual encounter or a temporary detention.

Law enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment by merely approaching an individual on the street or in another public place, and asking him if he is willing to answer some questions. (Florida v. Royer (1983) 460 U.S. 491 , 497 [ 75 L.Ed.2d 229 , 236, 103 S.Ct. 1319 ].) A person has been “ ‘seized’ ” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in . view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave. (United States v. Mendenhall (1980) 446 U.S. 544 , 554 [ 64 L.Ed.2d 497 , 509, 100 S.Ct. 1870 ]; see also INS v. Delgado (1984) 466 U.S. 210 , 215 [ 80 L.Ed.2d 247 , 254-255, 104 S.Ct. 1758 ].) As the Supreme Court has noted, “The test is necessarily imprecise, because it is designed to assess the coercive effect of police conduct, taken as a whole, rather than to focus on particular details of that conduct in isolation. Moreover, what constitutes a restraint on liberty prompting a person to conclude that he is not free to ‘leave’ will vary, not only with the particular police conduct at issue, but also with the setting in which the conduct occurs.” (Michigan v. Chesternut (1988) 486 U.S. 567 , 573 [ 100 L.Ed.2d 565 , 572, 108 S.Ct. 1975 ].)

Here, respondent was standing on the sidewalk with two other men when he was suddenly confronted with a marked police car pulling across the street toward him. The car then parked diagonally against traffic a mere 10 feet away. When respondent began to leave, Officer Burns got out from the car and said something like, “ ‘Stop. Would you please stop.’ ” We believe the coercive effect of Burns’s conduct was clear. A reasonable man does not believe he is free to leave when directed to stop by a police officer who has arrived suddenly and parked his car in such a way as to obstruct traffic. Clearly, appellant was detained.

Here, unlike the situation presented in King, there is no indication that respondent and Burns were acquainted. Further, we construe Burns’s conduct here to be much more coercive. The People’s reliance on King does not compel a different result.

Having concluded respondent was detained by Burns, we must now determine whether that detention was justified. In order to justify an investigative stop or detention in a case such as this, the circumstances known or apparent to the officer must include specific and articulable facts causing him to suspect that (1) some activity relating to a crime has taken place, is occurring, or is about to occur; and (2) the person he intends to stop or detain is involved in that activity. (In re James D., supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 914.) Not only must he subjectively entertain such a suspicion, it must be objectively reasonable for him to do so. (Ibid.)

Here, Burns admitted at the suppression hearing that he had no “probable cause” interest in respondent. Even if he had, the mere fact that respondent received money from another person on the street in an area known for drug activity is insufficient justification for a detention. (Cf. People v. Bower (1979) 24 Cal.3d 638 , 645 [ 156 Cal.Rptr. 856 , 597 P.2d 115 ].)

Since the respondent’s detention was illegal, the evidence obtained as a result of that detention was properly suppressed. Having reached this conclusion, we need not address the People’s further argument: that Burns’s search of respondent was justified.

Smith, Acting P. J., and Benson, J., concurred.