People v. Iverson

in the commission of the offenses. The court ordered execution of sentence stayed on counts III and VI pending any appeal, and ordered that upon completion of appellant’s service of sentence on count II, execution on counts III and VI was to be permanently stayed. This appeal is from the judgment of conviction.

For a period of four or five months, defendant had been dating the grandmother of Ms. J., a 15-year-old girl. About 2 a.m. on October 3, 1969, Ms. J. awakened and saw appellant standing by her bed. Appellant asked where the grandmother was. When Ms. J. answered that she did not know, appellant took a knife from his pants and asked again where the grandmother was. Although there was a telephone in the kitchen of the apartment in which Ms. J. lived, appellant told her he was going to take her to a nearby corner so that she could call the grandmother. Ms. J.’s mother and younger brother were sleeping in the apartment at the time. Although Ms. J. could smell alcohol on appellant’s breath, she had no trouble understanding him.

Appellant, holding Ms. J.’s arm as well as the knife, forced her to leave the apartment and enter an automobile. In the car, appellant pulled Ms. J.’s head down by his leg and held her down with his arm and elbow over her head and with the knife at her neck. For about 10 or 15 minutes appellant drove around; he seemed to have no difficulty in driving at that time. Appellant eventually stopped the car and stated he had changed his mind about calling the grandmother. After the auto had stopped, appellant engaged in three separate acts of intercourse with Ms. J. During this time, as Ms. J'. testified, appellant had a hand over her neck and a knife behind her neck.^[1]

Ms. J. asked appellant not to hurt her and promised not to tell if appellant would take her home. On the way home appellant stated, “1 know I’ve committed the biggest sin of all.” After arriving at home, Ms. J. immediately awakened her mother, and the police were called. A pelvic examination conducted on Ms. J. showed a tear of the hymen, a fresh blood clot on the entrance to the vagina, and the presence of seminal fluid and spermatozoa inside the vagina.

jury was unable to properly determine if the knife was a deadly weapon within the meaning of Penal Code, section 3024, we cannot say the jury also improperly concluded appellant was armed with the knife..The evidence amply supports the conclusion the knife was the one used by appellant.

Finally, we consider the issue whether People v. Daniels, supra, 71 Cal.2d 1119 , compels reversal of the kidnaping conviction. In Daniels, our high court held that brief movements of a victim which are merely incidental to the commission of a robbery and do not substantially increase the victim’s risk of harm over and above that necessarily present in the crime itself do not constitute kidnaping to commit robbery. (Pen. Code, § 209.) The Daniels principle is applicable to simple kidnaping under Penal Code, section 207. (People v. Williams, 2 Cal.3d 894 , 901 [ 88 Cal.Rptr. 208 , 471 P.2d 1008 ]; Cotton v. Superior Court, 56 Cal.2d 459 [ 15 Cal.Rptr. 65 , 364 P.2d 241 ].)

Ms. J. testified she was able to sit up in the car and observe the route the car was proceeding on its return to her apartment, /liter the police arrived at her apartment, Ms. J. retraced the route and took the police to a dead end alley directly behind appellant’s place of business; appellant, was found there asleep in his automobile. Officer Macklin of the Garden Grove Police Department testified the distance from Ms. J.’s apartment to that location was between two and three-fourths and four miles.

At the outset, we are faced with the question whether despite appellant’s failure to request an instruction properly defining kidnaping under Daniels, , such an instruction should have been given by the trial court sua sponte. We have found no reported case since Daniels determining this precise issue.^[2]

It is settled that in criminal cases, even when not requested, the court must instruct on the general principles of law relevant to' the issues raised by the evidence. (People v. Hood, 1 Cal.3d 444 , 449 [ 82 Cal.Rptr. 618 , 462 P.2d 370 ]; People v. Graham, 71 Cal.2d 303 , 318 [ 78 Cal.Rptr. 217 , 455 P.2d 153 ]; People v. Wilson, 66 Cal.2d 749 , 759 [ 59 Cal.Rptr. 156 , 427 P.2d 820 ].) The general principles of law governing the case are those principles closely and openly connected with the evidence adduced before the court which are necessary for the jury’s proper consideration of the case. (People v. Wilson, supra; People v. Wade, 53 Cal.2d 322 , 334 [ 1 Cal.Rptr. 683 , 348 P.2d 116 ].) At a minimum, it is the court’s duty to ensure the jury is adequately instructed on the law governing all elements of the case submitted to it to the extent necessary for

a proper determination in conformity with the applicable law. (People v. Sanchez, 35 Cal.2d 522 , 528 [ 219 P.2d 9 ].)

Under the governing principles, we conclude the court should have rendered instructions sua sponte properly defining kidnaping. The instructions given, in effect, relieved the jury from drawing the factual distinctions necessary for a valid determination on the issue of kidnaping.^[3] Thus, the jury could not have properly determined whether the asportation of Ms. J. was merely incidental to the commission of the offenses otherwise involved, i.e., rapes, nor could they make the determination that, if connected with the rapes, the asportation substantially increased the possibility of harm to Ms. J. over and above that necessarily present in the underlying crimes.

Whether movement substantially increases possibility of additional harm to the victim is a question of fact. It should be determined by the trier of fact, not by us as a matter of law. (People v. Anthony, 7 Cal.App.3d 751 , 766 [ 86 Cal.Rptr. 767 ].)

The jury might well have had some doubt as to the first prong of the Daniels test, whether the asportation of Ms. J. was “incidental” to the commission of the rapes, even though it found appellant, not guilty of burglary. In the context of its findings, the jury apparently concluded appellant did not have the intent to commit rape at the time he entered the apartment. However, the record would support a determination either that the intent was formed immediately after entry into the apartment, or at some time later while looking for a telephone to contact Ms. J.’s grandmother. In the former case, the asportation might have been only “incidental” to the contemplated rape (People v. Schafer, 4 Cal.App.3d 554 , 561 [ 84 Cal.Rptr. 464 ]); in the latter, however, the kidnaping may have been commenced before the intent to rape was formed and thus could not logically be said to be incidental to the rape. (Cf. People v. Tribble, 4 Cal.3d 826 , 830-832 [ 94 Cal.Rptr. 613 , 484 P.2d 589 ].)

The second prong of the Daniels test, seeks to determine whether the victim might suffer “significant physical injuries over and above those to which a victim of the underlying crime is normally exposed.” (People v. Timmons, 4 Cal.3d 411 , 414 [ 93 Cal.Rptr. 736 , 482 P.2d 648 ].) As an

appellate court, we might think Ms. J. was in greater danger of significant injury, other than that latent in the act of rape, in the isolated spot to which she was taken at knife-point than in the apartment in which her mother slept. (See People v. Miller, 12 Cal.App.3d 922 [ 91 Cal.Rptr. 97 ]; People v. Lynch, 14 Cal.App.3d 602 [ 92 Cal.Rptr. 411 ]; People v. Rocco, 21 Cal. App.3d 96 , 104 [ 98 Cal.Rptr. 365 ].) We might believe her resistance after her abduction could have invited a higher degree of risk of harm—both potentially and in severity—than where a mother’s additional response was possible.^[4] We might also come to the conclusion the movement by automobile involved in reaching the spot where the rapes occurred also substantially increased the risk of harm. As we have noted, while he drove the automobile appellant held Ms. J. down with a knife at her neck and he had also consumed a considerable amount of alcohol; Ibis movement, under the circumstances, could have substantially increased the risk of physical injury to Ms. J. beyond those risks to which a rape victim is normally exposed. However, a jury properly instructed might not have come to the same conclusion and could have done so rationally. The jury might well have concluded essentially the same risks would have inhered in the rapes had they occurred in the apartment. In fact, the jury could have reasonably concluded the risk of harm in the apartment was greater than in the spot to which Ms. J. was taken, because of the action appellant might have taken had Ms. J.’s mother intervened.

The trial court did not present either of the two= possible theories of Daniels to the jury for their guidance in deciding the case. Under the instructions given to it the jury could have found appellant guilty of kidnaping whether or not it concluded the asportation was part and parcel of the rapes as well as whether or not it decided there was no increase in risk to Ms. J.

Because we cannot say with conviction, had the jury been given proper instructions, that a different verdict would have been improbable on the