People v. Wilkins

Opinion

By information defendant was charged with a violation of section 4463 of the Vehicle Code in that on January 28, 1971, he wilfully and unlawfully had possession of a counterfeited registration card with intent to prejudice, damage, cheat, and defraud the state Department of Motor Vehicles. Defendant pleaded not guilty, his motion under Penal Code section 1538.5 was heard and denied, and the cause submitted on the testimony contained in the preliminary hearing transcript subject to the usual stipulations. Defendant was found guilty as charged. The offense was declared to be a misdemeanor. Proceedings were suspended and de

Bradley McGrath, a police officer for the City of Los Angeles, testified that he responded to a call to go to U.S.C. where he met a security officer who advised him of observing defendant “prowling numerous vehicles,” that investigation had disclosed defendant was a suspect in a theft from the university and that the card defendant had shown was used in the selling of the property back to the university. He was shown a crime report to this effect. McGrath placed defendant under arrest for receiving stolen property, placed him in the police vehicle and returned with his partner Janowicz to where defendant’s 1962 Chevrolet panel truck was parked. As he approached the truck it was night. The officer shined his flashlight inside and observed blank vehicle registrations lying on the seat. He opened the door and saw blank sheets of selective service cards, a paper describing how to make a California driver’s license and numerous tools in the vehicle. People’s One was observed before the car door was opened. Defendant was then handcuffed and taken to the station and booked. L. A. Le Fluer, a special investigator for the state Department of Motor Vehicles testified that People’s One were not authentic registration cards from the department and explained why. He stated that they contained the same format or information as is shown in the regular registration document for the department, including the seal but were fraudulent copies. People’s One was further described as a blank format of the vehicle registration card. No information such as name of owner, description of vehicle, license and tab numbers were on the forms and as such could not have been issued by the department.

Discussion

It is first argued that the contraband should have been suppressed as its seizure was the result of an illegal detention or search. We do not agree. It appears from the record before us that at the time and place in question Officer Reiss was in fact a private citizen employed by a private university in the protection of private property. The events all occurred on property of the university. Penal Code section 837 subdivision 1 provides that a private person may arrest another for a public offense committed or attempted in his presence, and subdivision 3 provides that he may do so when a felony has in fact been committed and he has reasonable cause for believing the person arrested has committed it. In

“In Coverstone v. Davies, 38 Cal.2d. 315 , 320 [ 239 P.2d 876 ], the Supreme Court construed former section 836, subdivision 1, of the Penal Code (identical in terms with present § 837, subd. 1) and expressly declared that an arrest by a peace officer was authorized ‘. . . when

“Without question, the evidence above recited is more than adequate to sustain the trial court’s implied determination that there was probable cause for the investigators’ actions. They had every reason to believe that when their decoy, Bobrick, gave the prearranged signal, the driver’s license had been given in exchange for the money paid and without the required tests. Indeed, the unusual circumstance here revealed is the jury’s action in acquitting appéllant on this count. However, the acquittal, or conviction, of appellant has no bearing on the legality of the arrest. As stated in Coverstone v. Davies, supra, 38 Cal.2d 315 , 319: ‘The fact that [the persons arrested] were exonerated in the criminal proceeding has no bearing upon the legality of the arrest. (Cf. Neves v. Costa, 5 Cal.App. 111 , 118 [ 89 P. 860 ]; Wilson v. Loustalot, 85 Cal.App.2d 316 , 325 [ 193 P.2d 127 ], to the effect that the finding of guilt in the subsequent criminal proceeding cannot legalize an arrest unlawful when made. The converse would appear to be equally true.)’ ” It follows that proof of the commission of the felony is not necessary. Pursuing the matter further we note that Officer Reiss did not seize the contraband in this case. Upon arrival of the police officer McGrath, Reiss advised McGrath of the facts leading up to defendant’s detention. The observations made by Reiss, coupled with the statements of defendant to him may be classed as information conveyed by a citizen informer to a police officer and, under the circumstances, was such as to give Officer McGrath reasonable cause to arrest defendant. (Pen. Code, § 836, subd. 3.) In People v. Guidry, 262 Cal.App.2d 495 , the court said at 497-498 [ 68 Cal.Rptr. 794 ]: “There is probable cause for an officer to arrest if the information that was acted upon would cause a reasonably prudent man to believe and conscientiously entertain an honest and strong suspicion that the accused is guilty. (People v. Ingle (1960) 53 Cal.2d 407 , 412-413 [ 2 Cal.Rptr. 14 , 348 P.2d 577 ]; People v. Chacon (1963) 223 Cal.App.2d 739 , 742 [ 35 Cal.Rptr. 799 ].)

“In the case at bench the evidence consists mainly of information supplied by Mrs. Marshall. Information from a known informer of unproved reliability is relevant on the issue of probable cause but it is ordinarily not enough. (People v. Talley (1967) 65 Cal.2d 830 [ 56 Cal.Rptr. 492 ,

It is argued that possession of the contraband (People’s One) was not a violation of Vehicle Code section 4463 in that a blank registration

“Here appellant admitted making the licenses for Lloyd Cress; he also admitted that the licenses were made for the purpose of passing checks; and likewise admitted was the fact that he made ‘white’ copies of the forgeries which were given unsigned to Lloyd Cress and later returned by him with signatures thereon. The evidence amply supports that finding

It is claimed that to construe section 4463 to include possession of counterfeit blank registration cards would, in this case, constitute a denial of due process of law in violation of article I, section 10 of the United States Constitution. It is argued that the statute in question, at least prior to this decision, did not clearly encompass the conduct of defendant and that to convict defendant thereunder would, in effect constitute the creation and application of an ex post facto law, thus depriving him of due process in the sense of fair warning that his contemplated conduct constitutes a crime. (Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 [ 12 L.Ed.2d 894 , 84 S.Ct. 1697 ].) We do not agree. We are constrained to conclude that a mature university student would be aware that the possession of counterfeit blank vehicle registration forms might well be

Finally it is claimed that there is no evidence that defendant possessed the specific intent to defraud required by the statute. This contention has no merit. Specific intent as an element of a crime may be proved by circumstantial evidence. (People v. Rodriguez, 272 Cal.App.2d 80 , 86 [ 76 Cal.Rptr. 818 ]; People v. Williams, 252 Cal.App.2d 147 , 154-155 [ 59 Cal.Rptr. 905 ].) The record shows that defendant was in possession of printed sheets of registration cards for 1971. They were in rolls as though they had come off a printing press. There were several forms on a single sheet. He also had possession of blank sheets of selective service cards and a large paper describing how to make a California driver’s license. From these facts and others set forth above the trial court could reasonably infer that defendant possessed the requisite intent to defraud.

The judgment (order granting probation) is affirmed.

Schweitzer, Acting P. J., and Cobey, J., concurred.