San Francisco Ecology Center v. City & County of San Francisco

County of Mendocino, supra; cf. Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors (1972) 8 Cal.3d 247 , 263, fn. 8 [ 104 Cal.Rptr. 761 , 502 P.2d 1049 ]; Robie, California’s Environmental Quality Act: A Substantive Right to a Better Environment? (1973) 49 LA.Bar Bull. 17, 42-43.)

The EQA is to be interpreted broadly to afford full protection to the environment (No Oil, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (1974) 13 Cal.3d 68 , 83 [ 118 Cal.Rptr. 34 , 529 P.2d 66 ]; Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors, supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 259). Several commentators have accordingly suggested that a public agency must assign greater weight to environmental, as opposed to economic, factors in determining whether to approve a project which carries risks of unavoidable environmental harm. (See 5 Pacific L.J. 92, 110; Note (1973) 9 Cal.Western L.Rev. 536, 543.) While economic and environmental values may be given equal weight under the comparable federal statute (see Calvert Cliffs’ Coord. Com. v. United States A. E. Com’n, supra, 449 F.2d 1109 , 1113, 1123; accord, Port of New York Authority v. United States (2d Cir. 1971) 451 F.2d 783 , 789; Daly v. Volpe (W.D.Wash. 1974) 376 F.Supp. 987 , 995; Montgomery v. Ellis (N.D.Ala. 1973) 364 F.Supp. 517 , 522; contra, Sierra Club v. Froehlke (S.D.Tex. 1973) 359 F.Supp. 1289 , 1370, revd. on other grounds 499 F.2d 982 ), the federal precedents are of diminished value in view of substantial differences between the federal and state statutes. The needs of economic growth are expressly recognized in the congressional declaration of policy under the National Environmental Policy Act. The federal government is directed to “fulfill the social, economic, and other requirements of present and future generations of Americans” as well as environmental goals ( 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (a)), and subdivision (b)(5) of the code seeks to establish “a balance between population and resource use which will permit high standards of living and a wide sharing of life’s amenities; . . .” The federal government is required only to give “appropriate consideration” to environmental values under the act ( 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2)(B)). The state statute, on the other hand, suggests that environmental protection is of paramount concern. A sense of urgency is conveyed in several provisions of the statute. Public Resources Code section 21000, subdivision (d), requires the state to “take immediate steps to identify any critical thresholds for the health and safety of the people of the state and take all coordinated actions necessaiy to prevent such thresholds being reached.” Subdivision (g) emphasizes that activities should be regulated “so that major consideration is given to preventing environmental damage.” (Italics added; see Cal.Admin.Code, tit. 14, § 15012.) Section 21001, subdivision (d),

declares that “the long-term protection of the environment shall be the guiding criterion in public decisions.”

The legislative histoiy of the EQA also supports the view that environmental values are to be assigned greater weight than the needs of economic growth. In the legislative study from which the statute emerged, it was said that: “Economic growth has always been regarded as a major criterion of our economy’s performance. Growth implies that our economy is well functioning and providing an ever greater benefit to society. By 1971, our gross national product (GNP), the total market value of all goods and services produced in a year, will be more than one trillion dollars. California’s total output is greater than $100 billion, an output surpassed by only six countries in the world. Does this growth in affluence mean we are better off than before? Not necessarily. Economic growth means that the goods and services produced for the market have increased, but it tells us nothing of the composition or quality of this output. More importantly, with respect to the environment, economic growth does not reflect the increase in those products which are not sold, such as smog and pollution. Paradoxically, if smog increases and, thus, the number of anti-smog devices sold increases, growth appears to have occurred. Clearly, we are not better off because of this spurious growth concept.” (Cal. Assem. Select Com. on Environmental Quality, Environmental Bill of Rights (1970) p. 17.) “An environment that is healthful to man should command the highest priority, for a degraded environment poses a physical threat to man.” (Id., p. 35 [italics added]. Accord, County of Inyo v. Yorty (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 795 , 804 [ 108 Cal.Rptr. 377 ].) The act thus requires decisionmakers to assign greater priorities to environmental values than to economic needs. That is not to say that the courts will substitute their judgment for that of the responsible agency. (See Plan for Arcadia, Inc. v. City Council of Arcadia (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 712 , 725-726 [ 117 Cal.Rptr. 96 ].)

The San Francisco International Airport is owned by the city and operated by the San Francisco Airports Commission. The airports commission is empowered to construct improvements or related facilities at the airport. The city, airports commission and city planning commission are all local, public agencies within the definition of Public Resources Code sections 21062 and 21063 (San Francisco Admin. Code, ch. 31, § 31.05, subd. (a)). Under the provisions of chapter 31 of the San Francisco Administrative Code, the department of city planning is charged with the responsibility of preparing a draft EIR for projects

Supervisors, supra, 8 Cal.3d 247 , 260-261; Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Coastside County Water Dist. (1972) 27 Cal.App.3d 695 , 701 [ 104 Cal.Rptr. 197 ].) The report should provide decisionmakers with information which enables them to make a decision which intelligently takes account of the environmental consequences (Cal.Admin.Code, tit. 14, § 15012; see Trout Unlimited v. Morton (9th Cir. 1974) 509 F.2d 1276 , 1282). However, an evaluation of the environmental effects of a proposed project need not be exhaustive (see Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton (D.C.Cir. 1972) 458 F.2d 827 , 836). The sufficiency of an EIR is to be reviewed in the light of what is reasonably feasible (Environmental Def. F., Inc. v. Corps of Eng. of U.S. Army (5 th Cir. 1974) 492 F.2d 1123 , 1131; National Helium Corporation v. Morton (10th Cir. 1973) 486 F.2d 995 , 1002, cert. den. 416 U.S. 993 [ 40 L.Ed.2d 772 , 94 S.Ct. 2405 ]; Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, supra, 458 F.2d at p. 834). Preparation of an EIR need not be interminably delayed “to include all potential comments or results of works in progress which might shed some additional light on the subject of the impact statement. . . . The courts should look for adequacy and completeness in an impact statement, not perfection.” (National Helium Corporation v. Morton, supra, 486 F.2d at p: 1004; see also Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Eng., U.S. Army (8 th Cir. 1972) 470 F.2d 289 , 297, cert. den. 412 U.S. 931 [ 37 L.Ed.2d 160 , 93 S.Ct. 2749 ].) The agency charged with preparation of the report is not barred from making reasonable forecasts (see Scientists’ Inst, for Pub. Info., Inc. v. Atomic Energy Com’n (D.C.Cir. 1973) 481 F.2d 1079 , 1092 [ 156 App.D.C. 395 ]), and disagreements among experts do not require the invalidation of an EIR. (Life of the Land v. Brinegar (9th Cir. 1973) 485 F.2d 460 , 472, cert, den. 416 U.S. 961 [ 40 L.Ed.2d 312 , 94 S.Ct. 1979 ].) While the decision-makers must take account of environmental objections (Silva v. Lynn (1st Cir. 1973) 482 F.2d 1282 , 1285; accord, People v. County of Kern (1974) 39 Cal.App.3d 830 , 841-842 [ 115 Cal.Rptr. 67 ]), satisfactoiy answers to these objections may be provided by reference to the EIR itself (see Lathan v. Volpe (W.D.Wash. 1972) 350 F.Supp. 262 , 265, vacated on other grounds 506 F.2d 677 ).

Appellants complain that the EIR may have overestimated the number of passengers who would use the airport in 1985. But decision-makers are not precluded from forecasting future needs; indeed, they are encouraged to make reasonable forecasts in the preparation of the EIR (see Scientists’ Inst, for Pub. Info., Inc. v. Atomic Energy Com’n, supra, 481 F.2d at p. 1092). Here the estimates were supported by expert opinion. If subsequent studies undermine the projections upon which the EIR is based, opponents should bring the new data to the attention of the decisionmakers (Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Eng., U.S. Army, supra, 470 F.2d at p. 297). These observations also apply to the EIR’s projections of aircraft noise levels in 1986.

It is claimed that the estimated economic benefits of the project were not substantiated inasmuch as the estimates were allegedly based on hearsay. But the rules of evidence which govern the trial of a court action do not apply to the collection of data in the preparation of an EIR. “[I]t is well settled that supporting studies need not be physically attached to the EIS. They only need be available and accessible.” (Trout Unlimited v. Morton, supra, 509 F.2d at p. 1284; see also Life of the Land v. Brinegar, supra, 485 F.2d at pp. 468-469.) There, is no evidence that the supporting study was unavailable for appellants’ perusal; hence, appellants can hardly complain that the estimate was not supported by competent analysis. Likewise, a study of existing air pollution levels was referred to in the EIR, but appellants apparently chose to ignore it. They cannot now claim that the EIR does not sufficiently describe the existing hazards of air pollution.

The EIR is assailed for allegedly failing to examine the possibility of mitigating auto traffic problems by rescheduling flights. But the supplementary data indicates that the option of rescheduling flights in cooperation with the federal authorities had been explored. Appellants also argue that an EIR is incomplete if it does not contain cost-benefit computations. Neither the EQA nor the National Environmental Policy Act requires computation of a cost-benefit ratio. Such studies may be useful, but they are not indispensable to an environmental impact statement (Trout Unlimited v. Morton,, supra, 509 F.2d at pp. 1286-1287, fn. 14; Sierra Club v. Lynn (5th Cir. 1974) 502 F.2d 43 ,60-61; United Family Farmers v. Morton (D.C.S.D. 1974) 6 E.R.C. 1822, 1826; Warm Springs Dam Task Force v. Gribble (N.D.Cal. 1974) 378 F.Supp. 240 , 246-247; Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Armstrong (N.D.Cal. 1972) 352 F.Supp. 50 , 57, affd. 487 F.2d 814 , cert. den. 416 U.S. 974 [ 40 L.Ed.2d 564 , 94 S.Ct. 2002 ]).

The final EIR must include the responses of the proponent agency to significant environmental points raised in the review and consultation process. (Cal.Admin.Code, tit. 14, § 15146.) Appellants contend that the responses were inadequate; but the final EIR responded to objections relating to noise, air pollution, traffic problems, growth-inducing impact and tax burdens on San Francisco residents. While the responses were not exhaustive, they do evince good faith and reasoned analysis. (See People v. County of Kern, supra, 39 Cal.App.3d at p. 842.) We cannot say that the trial court erred in concluding that the EIR was adequate.

Appellants claim that the administrative findings supporting the decisions of the airports commission and board of supervisors were inadequate. In the absence of a statutory requirement, administrative findings will be deemed adequate if they are sufficient to apprise interested parties and the courts of the bases for the administrative action. (See Topanga Assn, for a Scenic Community v. County of Los Angeles (1974) 11 Cal.3d 506 , 515-517 [ 113 Cal.Rptr. 836 , 522 P.2d 12 ].) The resolutions attacked by appellants identify certain adverse environmental effects and prospective benefits of the project; they reflect the judgment that the social, economic and environmental benefits of the project outweigh its significant environmental risks. Since the resolutions adequately expose the agency’s mode of analysis, they must be sustained if supported by substantial evidence. People v. County of Kern, supra, 39 Cal.App.3d 830 , does not require a contrary conclusion. There, the court had invalidated an EIR because the agency had failed to respond to objections raised against the proposed project (39 Cal.App.3d at p. 842). The sufficiency of administrative findings was not an issue in that case. Moreover, insofar as County of Kern suggests that agencies must set forth reasons why the benefits of the project outweigh significant environmental objections (see also Burger v. County of Mendocino, supra, 45 Cal.App.3d 322 ), the resolutions indicate that both the airports commission and the board of supervisors had complied with this requirement.

The findings of the airports commission and board of supervisors are supported by substantial evidence. Several witnesses testified that the project would make the San Francisco International Airport an exceptionally convenient, safe and compact airport. The expanded termináis will, according to some evidence, improve the operational efficiency and safety of the airport and reduce noise levels by accommodating larger and quieter aircraft. Adjacent communities will benefit