People v. Goodyear

Opinion

Introduction

Defendant Richard Goodyear (hereinafter defendant) appeals from a judgment entered on a plea of guilty to possession of amphetamines for the purpose of sale in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11378 on the ground that his motion to suppress under Penal Code section 1538.5 was improperly denied.

The Case

The reporter’s transcript reflects the following: On the morning of October 8, 1975, at approximately 7:50 a.m., Michael Lomax, a customer service agent employed at United Airlines, while on duty in the lobby of Los Angeles International Airport, was approached by defendant who announced that he was late for his flight and requested Mr. Lomax to check in his bag. Mr. Lomax checked defendant’s ticket and noticed that he was booked on an 8 a.m. flight to Milwaukee. He informed defendant that because the bag was so small he could carry it on board the plane. He further advised defendant that he could not guarantee that the bag if checked through would get on the same plane; it might go on a later flight. Defendant nonetheless told Lomax to check the bag. Mr. Lomax did so; he marked “V.S.” (“voluntary separation”) on the baggage tag; and handed defendant the claim check and directed him toward the plane.

Mr. Lomax became suspicious of defendant for several reasons: (1) defendant was not as excited or nervous as late passengers usually are;

On appeal defendant contends that the contraband (approximately 55,000 mini-bennies) was inadmissible because it was acquired as the result of an illegal search of his luggage and that his motion under Penal Code section 1538.5 was improperly denied.

Discussion

We conclude that Michael Lomax’s search of defendant’s luggage was lawful and Officer Vanover’s conduct was reasonable and proper in all respects.

As to Mr. Lomax’s Conduct:

The “exclusionary rule” does not apply to evidence obtained in a search conducted by a private citizen not acting as a government agent. (See Dyas v. Superior Court, 11 Cal.3d 628 , 632 [ 114 Cal.Rptr. 114 , 522 P.2d 674 ]; People v. McKinnon, 7 Cal.3d 899 , 912 [ 103 Cal.Rptr. 897 , 500 P.2d 1097 ]; People v. Scott, 43 Cal.App.3d 723 , 726 [ 117 Cal.Rptr. 925 ].)

In the instant case the evidence supports the trial court’s implied finding that Lomax’s search was essentially of a private nature and that he was not acting as a state agent in accordance with the criteria set forth by the California Supreme Court in People v. McKinnon, supra. Here, Lomax, employed by United Airlines for five and one-half years, was not hired and paid by police to search packages in hopes of finding evidence; he was not participating in a joint operation with law enforcement officers to obtain incriminating evidence against defendant nor was he acting at the express direction or request of law enforcement officers. There was no police participation until after Mr. Lomax, checking to insure there were no weapons or explosives in the suitcase, discovered the 55,000 mini-bennies, which is insufficient to transform him into a state agent.

In United States v. Burton (8th Cir. 1973) 475 F.2d 469 , the ticket agent became suspicious of a passenger who checked in two bags because he fit the “hijacker’s profile” and the weight distribution of one bag seemed unusual. The ticket agent opened the bag with a skeleton key, found a loaded revolver, and notified a United States Marshall who subsequently arrested the passenger and seized the weapon. The court held that the search was essentially of a private character. Following Burton, the court

In the case at bench Mr. Lomax became suspicious of defendant not only because of his unusual behavior but because he fit the federal anti-hijacking profile formerly used in airport security. His decision to open the bag was based on company guidelines to protect the public and his own intuition. There were no federal regulations or police department directives mandatory that he inspect checked-in luggage. The decision, being his own, is not subject to Fourth Amendment restraints. (See United States v. Ogden (9th Cir. 1973) 485 F.2d 536 , 538.) Clearly, the alleged infringing of defendant’s constitutional rights pales when balanced with the “public interest” of insuring that innocent citizens, airborne and cruising at thousands of feet elevation, be free from the dangerous conditions of the possibility of weapons or explosives being placed in checked-in baggage.

As to Officer Vanover’s Conduct:

We hold that Officer Vanover was not required to obtain a search warrant before examining defendant’s luggage. “Airport searches are singularly unsuited to the warrant procedure.” (People v. Hyde, 12 Cal.3d 158 , 168 [ 115 Cal.Rptr. 358 , 524 P.2d 830 ].) The exigencies of the situation at bench obviate the necessity for a warrant. Here, the piece of luggage was an easily movable object—to hold it while waiting for a warrant would also constitute a seizure. The plane with defendant aboard was due to leave in less than 10 minutes. We hold that under such circumstances, a warrantless search is permissible. (See People v. McKinnon, supra, 7 Cal.3d at pp. 907-909; United States v. Ogden, supra, 485 F.2d at p. 540.)

We further hold that whether Officer Vanover observed the contraband in an already opened bag or whether he opened the bag himself is immaterial. Here, Mr. Lomax, acting upon “compelling urgency,”

Accordingly, by reason of the foregoing, we conclude there was substantial evidence to support the trial court’s ruling that the contraband at issue was not the product of an illegal search and seizure.

The judgment is affirmed.

Wood, P. J., and Thompson, J., concurred.

Appellant’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied February 26, 1976.