Fuimaono v. Samoan Congregational Christian Church of Oceanside

Opinion

This action for corporate dissolution constitutes the second chapter in a continuum of discord originating within the membership of the defendant Samoan Congregational Christian Church of Oceanside (Samoan Oceanside Church). The particular dispute erupted when the Board of Directors of the Samoan Oceanside Church discharged its minister (one of the plaintiffs herein) and hired another, thereby incurring official disapproval of higher ecclesiastical authority within the parent church body, as well as opposition from a minority of the membership of the Samoan Oceanside Church. The first unhappy chapter is related in Samoan Congregational etc. Church in U.S. v. Samoan Congregational etc. Church of Oceanside, ante, page 69 [ 135 Cal.Rptr. 793 ], We there held that the parent ecclesiastical body could not compel the forfeiture of assets of the Samoan Oceanside Church.

Plaintiffs in the case at bench are the discharged minister and a minority (constituting approximately 40 percent of the total membership), who side with the Reverend Talani Fuimaono in his refusal to acknowledge discharge by the Board of Directors of the defendant

Defendant Samoan Oceanside Church opposes dissolution, questions plaintiffs’ status to sue, and denies there are grounds for dissolution.

The Attorney General is joined as a necessary party to these proceedings. His office is neutral on the issues tendered by the complaint, but insists that the assets of the Samoan Oceanside Church are impressed with a charitable trust and therefore as a matter of law cannot be distributed for private benefit, and if dissolution is granted the assets must be distributed for church purposes under the ey pres doctrine. The parties concede the correctness of the position of the Attorney General and stipulate that if judgment be awarded to plaintiffs it would not result in a transfer of assets to any individual, but that a judgment might be made transferring the assets to a nonprofit religious organization of similar denomination serving the north county area of San Diego.

After nonjury trial, the court found plaintiffs did have legal standing to sue to dissolve; there was internal dissension between the factions and they were so deadlocked that the church corporation could no longer conduct its business to the advantage of its members. It therefore decreed dissolution and ordered the assets of the Samoan Oceanside Church be liquidated or encumbered in a manner to be determined by the court, to the end that 40 percent of defendant church’s assets be transferred to a newly formed religious corporation. From the interlocutory judgment, Samoan Oceanside Church and Reverend Talo Poumele appeal.

Samoan Oceanside Church argues the trial court committed prejudicial error in “prematurely” holding that such internal dissension existed, so that the corporate business could no longer be conducted to the

During the pendency of the present action, further evidence supporting the fact of dissension, and dissension of such character as to prevent further successful operation of the business of the church to the advantage of its membership, is found in the inability of the two factions to worship in the same church. One side used the church facilities in the morning and the other used it in the afternoon. However, this did not work out satisfactorily. Discord reached such a degree of intensity as to provoke a street confrontation, with 50 or 60 members from one faction facing off, shouting at an approximately equal number from the opposing faction on the other side of the street. The sheriff was summoned to keep the peace. How, in light of evidence such as the foregoing, the business of the church could be conducted to the

Defendants would impose a duty on the trial court to require the church members “to exhaust its internal procedural remedies” before seeking “drastic judicial intervention.” The analogy invoked is not valid. A religious nonprofit corporation is not an administrative body bound by fixed rules governing its access to the courts. In ordering dissolution, the court did not permit the church members to avoid or “abrogate their responsibilities to the corporation,” but rather vindicated the minority church members’ rights when the statutory criteria had been met. There is no doubt but that the powers of a court of equity are broad and flexible so as to fashion the remedy that justice requires (Wuest v. Wuest, 53 Cal.App.2d 339 , 346 [ 127 P.2d 934 ]; 27 Am.Jur.2d, Equity, p. 624), and it may well be that time-delay may be a factor in a just result in a particular matrix. However, no authority is cited by defendants requiring the trial judge in a corporate dissolution action to delay the act that the evidence and law require in order to look to the causes, to the reasons underlying the dispute, or that it act as a conciliation court attempting to resolve the dispute, to ameliorate or to remedy the causes for dissolution, however deeply this might be desired.

Defendants make these further assignments of error: It is urged the trial court committed error in failing to find that the defendant corporation’s bylaws (dealing with the required number of persons to be present to constitute a quorum) were amended de facto; secondly, defendants contend the trial court erred in failing to find that the plaintiff Reverend Fuimaono was dismissed in accord with appropriate corporate procedures; and, thirdly, whether a new election should have been ordered. These contentions will be disposed of jointly, for they share common misconceptions. Code of Civil Procedure section 634 does not require findings as to eveiy minute matter upon which evidence is received at the trial (Coleman Engineering Co. v. North American Aviation, Inc., 65 Cal.2d 396 , 410 [ 55 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 420 P.2d 713 ]); .nor are findings required relating to issues immaterial to the determination of the case (Kanner v. Globe Bottling Co., 273 Cal.App.2d 559 , 568 [ 78 Cal.Rptr. 25 ]). The findings of the trial court satisfactorily dispose of all the basic issues raised.

The judgment is aifirmed.

Brown (Gerald), P. J., and Cologne, J., concurred.