Elizarraras v. L.A. Private Security Services, Inc.

Opinion

A restaurant that serves alcoholic beverages hires a company to provide security for a dance party one evening on its premises. Two intoxicated minors attend the party and after an altercation, leave. The minors drive away and shortly thereafter are involved in a fatal accident.

Here we conclude the private security company did not breach a duty to the minors and it has statutory immunity under Business and Professions Code section 25602 for failing to prevent a minor from consuming alcoholic beverages.

Plaintiffs Alfonso and Beatriz Elizarraras appeal summary judgment in favor of L.A. Private Security Services, Inc., Jose Angel Bretado, and Federico Amezquita (collectively LAPSS). We affirm.

Facts

During the late evening of April 6, 2000, Sophia Elizarraras, age 15, and Patricia Yvette Castro, age 18, entered Leonardo’s, an Oxnard bar, dance club, and restaurant. Between 400 and 500 patrons were at Leonardo’s that evening for a party. The owners of Leonardo’s engaged LAPSS to supplement the security provided by Leonardo’s employee-security guards.

Sophia and Patricia had been drinking when they entered the club, and during the evening, they consumed alcohol. Near midnight, another female patron hit Sophia with a bottle or glass, causing her head to bleed. Leonardo’s employees intervened and offered Sophia medical assistance. She refused and she and Patricia either left or were escorted from the club. A Leonardo’s employee assisted Sophia in entering Patricia’s automobile and in securing her seat belt.

Shortly thereafter, Patricia drove northbound on the 101 Freeway at a speed of 100 miles an hour or more. She collided with a light pole near the

Victor Rubio, a Leonardo’s security guard stationed in the parking lot, testified that Sophia and Patricia were “very, very angry” when they walked from the back door of Leonardo’s to their automobile. Rubio offered to summon an ambulance but Sophia refused. Patricia “use[d] bad language” to deter Rubio from calling the police. She stated that she would take Sophia to a hospital. Rubio assisted Sophia into Patricia’s automobile and with her seat belt. Patricia left “burning rubber, very fast.”

Cindy Ramirez, Sophia’s friend, testified that a Leonardo’s security guard pushed Sophia out the back door. Ramirez saw the girls arrive at Leonardo’s and she believed that they had been drinking. They were “too happy” and “their eyes were kind of glossy.” Rubio saw the girls when they arrived at the Leonardo’s parking lot and he also believed the girls had been drinking.

Sophia’s sister, Lupe Elizarraras, declared that she saw Sophia and Patricia consuming beer and tequila at Leonardo’s that evening. The girls appeared “really drunk.”

The trial court granted summary adjudication of six issues raised by LAPSS. In its ruling, the trial judge reasoned that as a matter of law, LAPSS had no duty of care to Sophia or Patricia and its acts or omissions were not the proximate cause of the girls’ deaths. The heirs then dismissed the remaining cause of action against LAPSS, and the trial court entered summary judgment.

The heirs appeal and contend that LAPSS had a duty of care to the girls similar or identical to the duty of care owed by Leonardo’s.

Discussion

The heirs argue that LAPSS breached a duty of care to Sophia and Patricia by not acting as reasonable security guards under the circumstances. (Marois v. Royal Investigation & Patrol, Inc. (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 193 , 200 [ 208 Cal.Rptr. 384 ] [“By contracting with the business to provide security services, the security guard creates a special relationship [to] the

In sum, they contend that LAPSS breached its duty of reasonable care by not preventing minors or intoxicated patrons from entering Leonardo’s, not preventing minors who have entered from consuming alcohol there, not summoning medical assistance for Sophia, and not preventing Patricia from driving away.

In reviewing a summary judgment, we independently review the record before the trial court to determine if there is a triable issue of material fact. (Paz v. State of California (2000) 22 Cal.4th 550 , 557 [ 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 703 , 994 P.2d 975 ]; Buss v. Superior Court (1997) 16 Cal.4th 35 , 60 [ 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 366 , 939 P.2d 766 ].) A defendant may be entitled to summary judgment if he establishes that a complete defense exists to a cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subds. (o) & (p); Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826 , 849 [ 107 Cal.Rptr.2d 841 , 24 P.3d 493 ] [defendant meets his burden of showing a cause of action has no merit if he establishes that one or more elements of the cause of action cannot be established].)

The threshold element of a negligence cause of action is the existence of a duty of reasonable care. (Paz v. State of California, supra, 22 Cal.4th 550 , 559.) Whether a duty of care exists is a question of law to be determined on a case-by-case basis. (Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Center (1993) 6 Cal.4th 666 , 674 [ 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 137 , 863 P.2d 207 ].)

For several reasons, the trial court did not err by granting summary judgment.

First, undisputed evidence establishes that LAPSS is not a licensed seller of alcoholic beverages and it did not sell alcoholic beverages to Leonardo’s

The decisions upon which the heirs rely, Balard v. Bassman Event Security, Inc., supra, 210 Cal.App.3d 243 , and Marois v. Royal Investigation & Patrol, Inc., supra, 162 Cal.App.3d 193 , concern the liability of a security guard company for failing to protect a business patron from the criminal acts of third persons. In Marois, a customer of a fast-food restaurant was assaulted in the parking lot. In Balará, a female customer was sexually assaulted by men parked in an automobile near the business premises. Neither decision involved the sale or furnishing of alcohol to minors or sections 25602 and 25602.1.

Although Leonardo’s may have employed LAPSS in part to ensure that minors were not consuming alcoholic beverages, that job responsibility is not equivalent to a legal duty of care to underage patrons to prevent them from drinking or driving while intoxicated. (Jackson v. Clements (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 983 , 988 [ 194 Cal.Rptr. 553 ] [police officers who investigated party at which minors were consuming alcoholic beverages had no duty to prevent intoxicated minors from driving].)

Third, the heirs have not set forth specific facts showing a triable issue of material fact regarding causation and breach of an alleged duty to prevent the altercation between Sophia and the other patron, to provide medical assistance to Sophia, or to prevent Patricia from driving. (Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400 (2001) 25 Cal.4th 763 , 768 [ 107 Cal.Rptr.2d 617 , 23 P.3d 1143 ] [once defendant shows that plaintiffs cause of action cannot be established or that a complete defense exists, the burden shifts to plaintiff to show the existence of a triable issue of material fact]; Chaknova v. Wilbur-Ellis Co. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 962 , 974 [ 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 871 ] [same].) LAPSS security guard Amezquita declared that he did not see Sophia or Patricia that evening and therefore did not know if they were served alcoholic beverages or were intoxicated. He also did not see the altercation or the assault on Sophia. The assistant manager, the bartender, and a Leonardo’s security guard quickly broke up the altercation and offered Sophia medical

In view of our discussion, it is not necessary to discuss the remaining arguments advanced by LAPSS.

The judgment is affirmed. Respondents shall recover costs on appeal.

Yegan, J., and Coffee, J., concurred.