Chaffee v. San Francisco Public Library Commission

C

haffee contends state and local law required the Commission to provide each speaker three minutes to make comments, and that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to defendants.

As discussed in a decision announced by Division Two of the First Appellate District, involving the same plaintiff and many of the same defendants: “On appeal from a grant of summary judgment, we exercise our independent judgment in determining whether there are triable issues of material fact and whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317 , 334-335 [ 100 Cal.Rptr.2d 352 , 8 P.3d 1089 ].) Summary judgment is properly granted if there is no question of fact and the issues raised by the pleadings must be decided as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c); Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826 , 843 [ 107 Cal.Rptr.2d 841 , 24 P.3d 493 ] (Aguilar).) In moving for summary judgment, a defendant may show that one or more elements of the cause of action cannot be established by the plaintiff or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (o)(2); Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 849.) Once the defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto. (25 Cal.4th at p. 849.) The plaintiff may not rely upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings to show that a triable issue of material fact exists but instead, must set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto. (Ibid.) [][] The moving party must support the motion with evidence including affidavits, declarations, admissions, answers to interrogatories, depositions, and matters of which judicial notice must or may be taken. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (b); Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 843.) Similarly, any adverse party may oppose the motion and 1 “where appropriate,” ’ may present evidence including affidavits, declarations, admissions to interrogatories, depositions, and matters of which judicial notice must

“The rules governing statutory construction are well settled. We begin with the fundamental premise that the objective of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent. [Citations.] To determine legislative intent, we turn first, to the words of the statute, giving them their usual and ordinary meaning. [Citations.] When the language of a statute is clear, we need go no further. However, when the language is susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation, we look to a variety of extrinsic aids, including the ostensible objects to be achieved, the evils to be remedied, the legislative history, public policy, contemporaneous administrative construction, and the statutory scheme of which the statute is a part. [Citations.]” (People v. Flores (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1059 , 1063 [ 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 63 , 69 P.3d 979 ].) Thus, although we look first to the statutory language, we do not give the words a literal meaning if to do so would result in an absurd result that was not intended. (People v. Pieters (1991) 52 Cal.3d 894 , 898 [ 276 Cal.Rptr. 918 , 802 P.2d 420 ].) We should avoid an interpretation “ ‘which renders a part of the statute or ordinance “surplusage.” ’ ” (Baldwin v. City of Los Angeles (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 819 , 838 [ 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 178 ].) We must give due consideration to the public entity’s view of the meaning of its ordinance. (City of Walnut Creek v. County of Contra Costa (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 1012 , 1021 [ 162 Cal.Rptr. 224 ].) However, we are not bound by the public entity’s views, as interpretation of laws is ultimately a judicial function. (City of Long Beach v. Department of Industrial Relations (2004) 34 Cal.4th 942 , 951 [ 22 Cal.Rptr.3d 518 , 102 P.3d 904 ]; Crumpler v. Board of Administration (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 567 , 578 [ 108 Cal.Rptr. 293 ].) We use the same rules to interpret ordinances. (Carson Harbor Village, Ltd. v. City of Carson Mobilehome Park Rental Review Bd. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 281 , 290 [ 82 Cal.Rptr.2d 569 ].)

Arguably, the language of the Sunshine Ordinance and the Commission bylaws is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation. Accordingly, we will look to appropriate extrinsic aids to ascertain its meaning.

Defendants argue the legislative history suggests the “up to three minutes” language in the Sunshine Ordinance was intended to give agencies flexibility in determining the length of public comments. The predecessor to the

In light of the foregoing, we agree with the trial court that the undisputed evidence shows defendants did not violate the Sunshine Ordinance or the Brown Act in the September 4, 2003, meeting at issue here. Higueras stated in his declaration that before the meeting, he anticipated four items would be lengthy. Those items were the presentation of a report by two members of the library staff concerning the library’s “affinity centers”; the presentation, discussion, and potential commission action on the 2003-2006 Strategic Plan for the library; the presentation by the city librarian on a proposed gift recognition policy; and a closed session with deputy city attorneys concerning pending litigation. Based on his judgment of the time required for the Commission to consider those four items and the other items on the agenda, Higueras concluded the Commission would not be able to complete its meeting in a reasonable period unless public comment was somewhat shortened. According to Higueras, meetings generally last between two and a half and three hours. When Higueras left the meeting after three hours, it was still in progress, and the meeting minutes indicate it lasted more than four hours. This showing was sufficient to meet defendants’ initial burden on summary judgment to show that one or more elements of the action could not be established or there was a complete defense to the cause of action, and the burden accordingly shifted to plaintiff to show the existence of a triable issue of material fact. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (o); Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 849.)

In our view, plaintiff failed to meet his burden. He stated in a declaration that it was not unusual for the Commission meetings to have 12 or 13 items, and the 12-item agenda at the September 4, 2003, meeting was not unusually long. Whatever the number of agenda items that are usual at the Commission meetings, plaintiff presented no evidence that Higueras did not reasonably expect the four items he enumerated to be lengthy, or that the Commission did not reasonably apply its bylaws in the circumstances.

he judgment is affirmed.

Reardon, Acting P. J., and Sepulveda, J., concurred.