Bougere v. County of Los Angeles

Opinion

The question presented in this civil rights case is whether the Los Angeles County Sheriff acts on behalf of the State of California or the County of Los Angeles in setting policies pertaining to the assignment of inmates within the Los Angeles County jail. The answer to this question depends on whether the sheriff’s action in this regard can be characterized as a law enforcement function, in which case the sheriff acts as a state official

DISCUSSION

Appellant contends that the sheriff’s function in determining where inside the jail a particular inmate should be assigned is merely a custodial function and not a law enforcement function. As such, appellant argues that the sheriff was not performing this function as a state actor, but as a local officer subject to suit under section 1983. He finds support for his position in the federal cases of Streit and Cortez. The county, on the other hand, contends that the Sheriff was performing a law enforcement duty on behalf of the state and is therefore immune from section 1983 liability. While acknowledging the federal authority, the county finds authority for its position in the more recent California Supreme Court decision in Venegas. As discussed below, we conclude that in setting and implementing policies and procedures pertaining to the placement of inmates at the county jail, the sheriff was performing a law enforcement function on behalf of the state and is therefore immune from section 1983 liability.

We review de novo a judgment of dismissal following the sustaining of a demurrer without leave to amend, exercising our independent judgment as to whether a cause of action has been stated as a matter of law. {People ex rel. Lungren v. Superior Court (1996) 14 Cal.4th 294 , 300 [ 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 855 , 926 P.2d 1042 ]; Moore v. Regents of University of California (1990) 51 Cal.3d 120 , 125 [ 271 Cal.Rptr. 146 , 793 P.2d 479 ].)

Section 1983

provides in relevant part: “Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .”

Cities, counties and local officers sued in their official capacity are considered “persons” under section 1983 and may be sued directly for constitutional violations carried out under their own regulations, policies, customs or usages by persons having “ ‘final policymaking authority’ ” over the actions at issue, though they cannot be held vicariously liable for their

The Streit court stated: “Although the general issue of overdetention was presented in both Peters and the cases at hand, the factual scenarios are quite distinct. In Peters, the [sheriff] acted upon a facially-valid warrant in its detention of the plaintiff, where as here, in conducting [automated, computerized database] checks, the [sheriff] is conducting its own administrative search for outstanding warrants, wants, or holds upon which it would be required to act, if they existed. Although this distinction may be perceived as subtle, for purposes of our analysis, it is critical. Acting upon a warrant is a law enforcement function with which the [sheriff] is tasked under California state law. [Citation.] Searching for wants and holds that may or may not have been issued for persons whom the state has no legal right to detain is an administrative function of jail operations for which the [sheriff] answers to the County. [Citations.]” {Streit, supra, 236 F.3d at p. 564.)

Following Streit, the Ninth Circuit in Cortez, supra, 294 F.3d 1186 , held that the sheriff acted on behalf of the county in establishing and implementing a policy of separating gang members from nongang members inside the county jail. In Cortez, jail officials transferred an inmate, who was a former gang member, to a special gang unit upon learning he had a gang tattoo. Immediately upon the transfer, the inmate’s life was threatened and his cell-mates ultimately beat him to death. {Id. at pp. 1187-1188.) Relying on Streit, the Cortez court found that the sheriff was “acting in his administrative capacity, rather than as a law enforcement officer” in setting policies pertaining to inmate housing. {Cortez, supra, at p. 1192.) The Cortez court likened the sheriff in his position as administrator of the jail to a public school administrator, stating: “Just as public school administrators may be held accountable for violence and harassment occurring on school grounds, so too are sheriffs responsible to prevent and quell violence in the jail, not as law enforcement officials, but as administrators wielding control over persons entrusted to their custody.” {Id. at p. 1191.) The Cortez court therefore rejected the county’s argument that the sheriff’s actions in failing to protect the deceased inmate were taken in his law enforcement capacity to keep the

Su

bsequent to Streit and Cortez, the California Supreme Court held in Venegas, supra, 32 Cal.4th at page 839 that “California sheriffs act as state officers while performing state law enforcement duties such as investigating possible criminal activity.” There, sheriff’s deputies stopped the plaintiffs’ car on suspicion of car theft, searched the car and the plaintiffs’ home and later arrested the passenger, though no charges were ever filed against him. (Id. at pp. 827-828.) In reaching its decision, the Venegas court relied on Peters, which Streit and Cortez rejected, and its own earlier decision in Pitts v. County of Kern (1998) 17 Cal.4th 340 [ 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 823 , 949 P.2d 920 ] (Pitts).

In Pitts, the California Supreme Court concluded that a California district attorney acts on behalf of the state, not the county, when preparing to prosecute and prosecuting crimes and training and developing policies for prosecutorial staff. The court reached its decision after analyzing various California constitutional and statutory provisions applicable to district attorneys. In Peters, supra, 68 Cal.App.4th 1166 , the appellate court extended Pitts’s analysis to California sheriffs in concluding that sheriffs act as state officers performing state law enforcement functions when setting policies concerning the release of jail inmates.

The Peters court emphasized that the identical constitutional and statutory provisions applicable to district attorneys in Pitts also applied to sheriffs. For example, article V, section 13 of the California Constitution provides that the Attorney General is the chief law enforcement officer of the state and “shall have direct supervision over every district attorney and sheriff... in all matters pertaining to the duties of their respective offices, and may require any of said officers to make reports concerning the investigation, detection, prosecution, and punishment of crime in their respective jurisdictions as the Attorney General may seem advisable.” (Peters, supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at p. 1174, third italics added.) “Similarly, Government Code

Peters further cited to Brandt, supra, 84 Cal.App.3d 598 , which observed: “Except in rare instances, the [county] board of supervisors has no direct authority over the jail, and even where direct authority is given, its exercise is made discretionary by statute. The only clear and present duty enjoined by law upon a board of supervisors with regard to a county jail is to provide the sheriff with food, clothing, and bedding for prisoners (Pen. Code, § 4015) and to pay as a county charge other expenses incurred in the keeping of prisoners (Gov. Code, § 29602). ... H] ...[][]... a board of supervisors has no legal authority to use its budgetary power to control employment in or operation of the sheriff’s office [citation]. Only the sheriff has control of and responsibility for distribution and training of personnel and the specific use of the funds allotted to him.” (Brandt, supra, 84 Cal.App.3d at pp. 601-602, fn. omitted; see Peters, supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at p. 1176.)

As in Pitts, the Peters court acknowledged that other constitutional and statutory provisions could support the argument that a sheriff acts as a county official. For example, article XI, section 1, subdivision (b), of the California Constitution provides for “an elected county sheriff” and section 4, subdivision (c), provides for “an elected sheriff” in each county. Government Code section 24000 includes sheriffs within the general category of county officers. But the court concluded that “these formal designations of sheriffs as county officials are outweighed by the functional independence of sheriffs from control by county boards of supervisors in performing their law enforcement functions.” (Peters, supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at p. 1176.)

The Venegas court also reviewed (and criticized) two federal cases that reached seemingly contrary results to Pitts and Peters, concluding that the federal cases erred in failing to follow the guidance given by Pitts and Peters. (Venegas, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 835.) In Brewster v. Shasta County (9th Cir. 2001) 275 F.3d 803 (Brewster), the Ninth Circuit concluded that a sheriff’s department was acting as a county agent during a murder investigation in which the plaintiff alleged that the sheriff’s deputies manipulated a witness into making a false identification, failed to test physical evidence and ignored exculpatory evidence pursuant to the sheriff’s policies on arrests and crime

The Supreme Court in Venegas stated that Pitts and Peters “more accurately reflect California law.” (Venegas, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 830.) The court further stated: “Pitts and Peters are clearly confined, respectively, to situations in which district attorneys and sheriffs are actually engaged in performing law enforcement duties, such as investigating and prosecuting crime, or training staff and developing policy involving such matters.” (Id. at p. 838.)

V. The Demurrer was Properly Sustained

As an initial matter, we note that appellant does not allege any particular policy implemented by the sheriff that led to his injuries. A municipal entity can only be liable under section 1983 for constitutional violations carried out under its own “regulations, policies, customs, or usages.” (Venegas, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 829.) For this reason alone, the demurrer was properly sustained to appellant’s section 1983 claim. In his brief on appeal, appellant states: “It is clear that the policy of the County of Los Angeles, and its ‘get tough’ anti-gang philosophy concerning inmates is clearly responsible for the injuries caused by appellant herein . . . .” He further states that “[t]he actions of the sheriff’s Department in this case . . .

In Peters, the court rejected the argument that the sheriff is a county policymaker in “ ‘the specific function of operating the county jail system,’ ” stating: “This attempt to characterize the sheriff’s conduct as merely operational or administrative is not persuasive on the facts of this case. The function involved in this case is determining whether to release a person who may be subject to arrest on an outstanding warrant. This is a law enforcement function. (Gov. Code, §§ 26601, 26602; Pen. Code, § 816; compare Pitts, supra, 17 Cal.4th at pp. 362-363 [rejecting any distinction between prosecuting and setting policies or training employees how to prosecute] with id. at p. 363 [‘Our conclusion as to which entity the district attorney represents might differ were plaintiffs challenging a district attorney’s alleged action or inaction related to hiring or firing an employee, workplace safety conditions, procuring office equipment, or some other administrative function arguably unrelated to the prosecution of state criminal law violations. Those considerations are not presented here.’].)” (Peters, supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1177-1178.)

The sheriff’s duties to preserve the peace (Gov. Code, § 26600) and to “prevent and suppress any affrays, breaches of the peace, riots, and insurrections” (Gov. Code, § 26602) are law enforcement functions and do not lose this status simply because they are carried out within the confines of a jail, which the sheriff is charged with operating (Gov. Code, § 26605). Inmates at the county jail typically consist of those persons who have been arrested for committing state crimes and are awaiting trial, persons who have already been sentenced, and those detained as witnesses or under civil process or contempt orders. We cannot find that a sheriff’s policies relating to the safekeeping of such persons is merely an “administrative function arguably unrelated to the prosecution of state criminal law violations.” (Pitts, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 363.)

Accordingly, we conclude that in setting and implementing policies and procedures concerning the assignment of inmates in the county jail, the sheriff acts as a state officer performing state law enforcement duties, and not

DISPOSITION

The judgment in favor of the county is sustained. Each side to bear its own costs.

Boren, P. J., and Ashmann-Gerst, J., concurred.

Appellant’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied September 20, 2006, S145794.