Sisemore v. Master Financial, Inc.

or unfair business practice under the unfair competition law (UCL) (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq.), and of violating Health and Safety Code section 1597.40. We also consider whether Project Sentinel had standing to allege a FEHA claim.

We conclude after de novo review that the lower court properly sustained without leave to amend the demurrer to the first cause of action for violation of Health and Safety Code section 1597.40. The court, however, erred when it sustained the demurrer to the fourth cause of action for violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act. Further, the court should have overruled the demurrer to the (FEHA) third cause of action. Plaintiffs have stated a claim for intentional source-of-income discrimination under FEHA; section 12955, subdivision (e) cannot be read so narrowly as to make it applicable only to tenants or potential tenants seeking rental housing. Plaintiffs have further stated a FEHA claim for disparate impact discrimination. Moreover, we hold that Project Sentinel alleged sufficient facts for standing to assert a FEHA claim. Finally, we conclude that Sisemore has stated a viable claim under the UCL (second cause of action). Accordingly, we will reverse.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The following material facts—which this court accepts as true for purposes of evaluating the trial court’s ruling on demurrer (Searle v. Wyndham Internat., Inc. (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 1327 , 1330, fn. 1 [ 126 Cal.Rptr.2d 231 ])—are alleged in the Complaint: Sisemore is a licensed operator of a family daycare home for 14 or fewer children. The principal source of her income is from her operation of the family daycare home. Sisemore has custody and care of her three-year-old daughter.

In June 2003, Sisemore—while she was renting the home out of which she operated her daycare business—contacted Nikki Caster, a loan processor, to assist in obtaining a loan to purchase a home. Caster in turn contacted Colleen Brehm, a representative of Master Financial; she explained Sisemore’s financial circumstances to Brehm, including the fact that Sisemore was then renting a home and that the principal source of her income was the operation of a daycare home. Brehm informed Caster that Sisemore could qualify for a particular loan product that Master Financial offered. That product consisted of a loan secured by a first deed of trust at an interest rate starting at 5.24 percent, and a loan secured by a second deed of trust at an interest rate starting at 9.99 percent. Brehm did not tell Caster or Sisemore that a term of the home loan prohibited Sisemore from using her intended home as a family daycare operation.

DISCUSSION

The following issues are presented in this appeal:

1. Whether Master Financial’s alleged policies constituted a prohibition or restriction on the use or occupancy of property as a family daycare home, such that Sisemore stated a claim for a violation of Health and Safety Code section 1597.40.

2. Whether Sisemore stated a cause of action for violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act (Civ. Code, § 51).

3. Whether plaintiffs stated a claim for intentional discrimination based upon source of income under FEHA (§ 12955 et seq.).

4. Whether plaintiffs stated a claim for disparate impact discrimination under FEHA, because Master Financial’s policies had a disproportionate effect on women or families with children.

5. Whether Project Sentinel alleged sufficient facts for standing to assert a FEHA claim.

6. Whether Sisemore stated a cause of action under the UCL (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200).

We are confronted initially with whether the matter from which the appeals have been taken is properly appealable. Although Master Financial here does not argue that plaintiffs’ separate appeals are defective because they challenge a nonappealable order, we cannot overlook this potential procedural infirmity: “The existence of an appealable judgment is a jurisdictional prerequisite to an appeal. A reviewing court must raise the issue on its own initiative whenever a doubt exists as to whether the trial court has entered a final judgment or other order or judgment made appealable by Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1. [Citations.]” (Jennings v. Marralle (1994) 8 Cal.4th 121 , 126-127 [ 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 275 , 876 P.2d 1074 ].) Since this issue is central to our jurisdiction, we address it on our own motion. (Olson v. Cory (1983) 35 Cal.3d 390 , 398 [ 197 Cal.Rptr. 843 , 673 P.2d 720 ]; Nguyen v. Calhoun (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 428 , 436 [ 129 Cal.Rptr.2d 436 ].)

The purported appeals taken by plaintiffs were from the order sustaining the demurrer. The record does not reflect the entry of a judgment or a dismissal on the demurrer order. An order sustaining a demurrer without leave to amend is not appealable, and an appeal is proper only after entry of a dismissal on such an order. (Berri v. Superior Court (1955) 43 Cal.2d 856 , 860 [ 279 P.2d 8 ]; Hill v. City of Long Beach (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1684 , 1695 [ 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 125 ].) On occasion, however, appellate courts have reviewed such orders, based upon justifications such as the avoidance of delay, the interests of justice, and the apparent intent of the trial court to have a formal judgment filed. (Reyna v. City and County of San Francisco (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 876 , 879 [ 138 Cal.Rptr. 504 ].) And when the trial court has sustained a demurrer to all of the complaint’s causes of action, appellate courts may deem the order to incorporate a judgment of dismissal, since all that is left to make the order appealable is the formality of the entry of a dismissal order or judgment. (Thaler v. Household Finance Corp. (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 1093 , 1098 [ 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 779 ]; see also Hinman v. Department of Personnel Admin. (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 516 , 520 [ 213 Cal.Rptr. 410 ] [appeal from order sustaining demurrer without leave to amend deemed proper to avoid delay and in furtherance of justice].)

Here, the order sustaining the demurrer to each of the four causes of action of the Complaint without leave to amend effectively ended plaintiffs’ ability to proceed fiirther with their case below. The only step left to make the order appealable was the formal entry of a dismissal order or judgment. We will accordingly deem the order on the demurrer to incorporate a judgment of dismissal and will review the order. (Thaler v. Household Finance Corp., supra, 80 Cal.App.4th at p. 1098.)

The standard of review is de novo. (Cryolife, Inc. v. Superior Court (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1145 , 1152 [ 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 396 ].) “In reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint against a general demurrer, we are guided by long-settled rules. ‘We treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. [Citation.] We also consider matters which may be judicially noticed.’ [Citation.] Further, we give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context. [Citation.] When a demurrer is sustained, we determine whether the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. [Citation.]” (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311 , 318 [ 216 Cal.Rptr. 718 , 703 P.2d 58 ]; see also Randi W. v. Muroc Joint Unified School Dist. (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1066 , 1075 [ 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 263 , 929 P.2d 582 ].)

“It is not the ordinary function of a demurrer to test the truth of the plaintiff’s allegations or the accuracy with which he describes the defendant’s conduct. A demurrer tests only the legal sufficiency of the pleading.” (Committee on Children’s Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197 , 213 [ 197 Cal.Rptr. 783 , 673 P.2d 660 ].) Thus, as noted, in considering the merits of a demurrer, “the facts alleged in the pleading are deemed to be true, however improbable they may be. [Citation.]” (Del E. Webb Corp. v. Structural Materials Co. (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 593 , 604 [ 176 Cal.Rptr. 824 ]; see also Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 493 , 496 [ 86 Cal.Rptr. 88 , 468 P.2d 216 ] [court reviewing propriety of ruling on demurrer is not concerned with the “plaintiff’s ability to prove . . . allegations, or the possible difficulty in making such proof’].)

On appeal, we will affirm a “trial court’s decision to sustain the demurrer [if it] was correct on any theory. [Citation.]” (Kennedy v. Baxter Healthcare Corp. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 799 , 808 [ 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 736 ], fn. omitted.) Thus, “we do not review the validity of the trial court’s reasoning but only the propriety of the ruling itself. [Citations.]” (Orange Unified School Dist. v. Rancho Santiago Community College Dist. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 750 , 757 [ 62 Cal.Rptr.2d 778 ].)

When a demurrer is sustained without leave to amend, the reviewing court must determine whether there is a reasonable probability that the complaint could have been amended to cure the defect; if so, it will conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by denying the plaintiff leave to amend. (Williams v. Housing Authority of Los Angeles (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 708 , 719 [ 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 374 ].) The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that it could have amended the complaint to cure the defect. (Campbell v. Regents of University of California (2005) 35 Cal.4th 311 , 320 [ 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 320 , 106 P.3d 976 ].)

A. Contentions of the Parties

Sisemore alleges in the first cause of action of her Complaint that Master Financial’s conduct in rejecting her loan application constituted a practice of discrimination against family daycare home providers in violation of Health and Safety Code section 1597.40. Specifically, Master Financial violated that statute when it (1) refused to lend to her if she operated her family daycare business in the home she was acquiring through the anticipated loan; (2) issued “a written instrument . . . publishing [Master Financial’s] stated policy of refusing to make home loans secured by a dwelling in which a licensed home day care is operated”; and (3) discriminated against other loan applicants who were home daycare operators.

Sisemore urges that Master Financial’s conduct was a violation of subdivision (b) of Health and Safety Code section 1597.40 because Master Financial’s letter refusing to make a loan to a family daycare home constituted a “written instrument . . . forbid[ding] or restricting] the . . . mortgaging of [] real property for use or occupancy as a family day care home.” She contends that the trial court erroneously held that no such claim was alleged because Master Financial’s written denial “[did] not purport to restrict any real property from being used or occupied as a family day care home.” (Boldface omitted.)

Sisemore argues further that she stated a cause of action for a violation of Health and Safety Code section 1597.40, subdivision (c). She urges that Master Financial’s denial of a loan was a “restriction or prohibition . . . [on] the acquisition, use, or occupancy of [] property for a family day care home for children,” proscribed by Health and Safety Code section 1597.40, subdivision (c). Sisemore argues that the court below erred by concluding that Master Financial’s alleged conduct “[did] not violate subdivision (c) because it [did] not impose restrictions on the purchase and use of real property.” She argues further that the court erred when it found that “[s]ubdivision[s] [(b) and] (c) do[] not require mortgage lenders to engage in the business of lending on day care homes.”

Master Financial responds that the statute does hot apply to the matters alleged by Sisemore. Specifically, Health and Safety Code section 1597.40 concerns the invalidity of written instruments or restrictive covenants impairing the use of real property for the operation of family daycare homes. Since Sisemore—Master Financial argues—did not allege the existence of such a written instrument or restrictive covenant, she failed to state a cause of action under the statute.

B. Viability of First Cause of Action

L. Health and Safety Code section 1597.40, subdivision (b)

Health and Safety Code section 1597.40, subdivision (b) provides: “Every provision in a written instrument entered into relating to real property which purports to forbid or restrict the conveyance, encumbrance, leasing, or mortgaging of the real property for use or occupancy as a family day care home for children, is void and every restriction or prohibition in any such written instrument as to the use or occupancy of the property as a family day

p. 1172, cols. 1-2: “instrument... a legal document (as a deed, will, bond, lease, agreement, mortgage, note, power of attorney, ticket on carrier, bill of lading, insurance policy, warrant, writ) evidencing legal rights or duties esp. of one party to,another . . .”; Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dict. (10th ed. 2001) p. 605, col. 2: “instrument ... a formal legal document (as a deed, bond, or agreement) . . . .”)

Sisemore asserts that Barrett v. Dawson (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1048 [ 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 899 ] (Barrett) supports a broad construction of the statute and the conclusion that Master Financial’s rejection letter constituted a “written instrument.” The chief issue in Barrett was whether a 1983 amendment to Health and Safety Code section 1597.40 (formerly codified as § 1597.501) was intended to make restrictive covenants that limited family daycare homes in residential areas void irrespective of whether the covenants predated the original enactment of the statute in 1981. Significantly, Barrett—unlike the case here—clearly concerned a written instrument; namely, a restrictive covenant contained in a document recorded when the neighborhood was developed in 1968. (Barrett, supra, at p. 1052.) Barrett simply does not support the conclusion that a mortgage lender’s letter rejecting a borrower based upon the anticipated use of the security as a family daycare home constitutes a “written instrument” under Health and Safety Code section 1597.40, subdivision (b).

“Words used in a statute or constitutional provision should be given the meaning they bear in ordinary use. [Citations.]” (Lungren v. Deukmejian (1988) 45 Cal.3d 727 , 735 [ 248 Cal.Rptr. 115 , 755 P.2d 299 ].) In this instance, we cannot reasonably construe Master Financial’s letter rejecting a mortgage loan based upon the nature of Sisemore’s anticipated use of the security to be a “written instrument” under subdivision (b) of Health and Safety Code section 1597.40.

2. Health and Safety Code section 1597.40, subdivision (c)

Health and Safety Code section 1597.40, subdivision (c) provides: “Except as provided in subdivision (d) [concerning family home daycare operated in rented or leased property], every restriction or prohibition entered into, whether by way of covenant, condition upon use or occupancy, or upon transfer of title to real property, which restricts or prohibits directly, or indirectly limits, the acquisition, use, or occupancy of such property for a family day care home for children is void.” Sisemore contends—independent of her claim under Health and Safety Code section 1597.40, subdivision (b)—that Master Financial violated subdivision (c) because it restricted or prohibited Sisemore from using the property she intended to acquire as a family daycare home. She argues that subdivision (c) affords broad protection

against practices that directly or indirectly limit, inter alia-, the use of property for family daycare, including Master Financial’s practice here.

We first reject Master Financial’s argument that no claim under subdivision (c) was stated because its rejection letter did not constitute a “written instrument.” While, as we have observed, this contention has merit under subdivision (b) of Health and Safety Code section 1597.40, nowhere is the term “written instrument” found in subdivision (c). There is no reason to import the requirement of a “written instrument” specified in subdivision (b) into the practices proscribed under subdivision (c).

Sisemore posits correctly that the scope of Health and Safety Code section 1597.40, subdivision (c) is broader than subdivision (b), in that the former subdivision does not require a “written instrument” as its subject. By its terms, subdivision (c) embraces “every restriction or prohibition entered into,” irrespective of whether it is part of a “written instrument.” Were we to interpret subdivision (c)—as suggested by Master Financial—to apply only to restrictions or prohibitions found in a “written instrument,” the proscriptions in subdivision (b) would be rendered unnecessary and surplusage. (Bowland v. Municipal Court (1976) 18 Cal.3d 479 , 489 [ 134 Cal.Rptr. 630 , 556 P.2d 1081 ] [rejecting interpretation of statute that would render other existing provisions unnecessary].)

But we do not believe that Health and Safety Code section 1597.40, subdivision (c) encompasses the type of conduct here, i.e., a mortgage lender’s rejection letter. The statute addresses restrictions or prohibitions “entered into,” thereby implying an arrangement more formal and binding than simply a lender’s stated policy regarding mortgage loans. (See Black’s Law Dict., supra, p. 572, col. 2: “enter. ... 3. To become a party to cthey entered into an agreementx”) The express intent of the Legislature in enacting Health and Safety Code section 1597.40 was that “family day care homes for children should be situated in normal residential surroundings so as to give children the home environment which is conducive to healthy and safe development.” (Health & Saf. Code, § 1597.40, subd. (a).) The Legislature declared “this policy to be of statewide concern with the purpose of occupying the field to the exclusion of municipal zoning, building and fire codes and regulations governing the use or occupancy of family day care homes for children, . . . and to prohibit any restrictions relating to the use of single-family residences for family day care homes for children except as provided by this chapter.” (Id., 2d par.) And the court in Barrett, supra, 61 Cal.App.4th at pages 1050-1051, identified the scope of the statute as declaring void any restrictive covenants that limited family daycare homes in residential neighborhoods. (See also Note, Family Day-Care Homes: Local Barriers Demonstrate Needed Change (1985) 25 Santa Clara L.Rev. 481 , 501

race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, disability, medical condition, marital status, or sexual orientation are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever.” As our Supreme Court has very recently emphasized: “The Act expresses a state and national policy against discrimination on arbitrary grounds. [Citation.] Its provisions were intended as an active measure that would create and preserve a nondiscriminatory environment in California business establishments by ‘banishing’ or ‘eradicating’ arbitrary, invidious discrimination by such establishments. [Citations.]” (Angelucci v. Century Supper Club (2007) 41 Cal.4th 160 , 167 [ 59 Cal.Rptr.3d 142 , 158 P.3d 718 ].)

And the Supreme Court has previously made clear that the listing of the particular bases for discrimination in Civil Code section 51 “is illustrative rather than restrictive. [Citation.]” (In re Cox (1970) 3 Cal.3d 205 , 216 [ 90 Cal.Rptr. 24 , 474 P.2d 992 ] (Cox).) Thus, in Cox, the high court concluded that the Act prohibited a business’s arbitrary exclusion of a customer on the ground that he associated with a male with long hair and unconventional dress. (Cox, at p. 216.) Similarly, in Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson (1982) 30 Cal.3d 721 , 740 [ 180 Cal.Rptr. 496 , 640 P.2d 115 ] (Marina Point), the court held that a blanket policy of excluding children or families with children from rental housing constituted discrimination under the Act, notwithstanding the fact that those groups were not specifically enumerated in the statute. (See also O’Connor v. Village Green Owners Assn. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 790 [ 191 Cal.Rptr. 320 , 662 P.2d 427 ] (O’Connor) [holding that a condominium development restricting residency to persons over 18 violated Act].)

In Harris, supra, 52 Cal.3d 1142 , the Supreme Court revisited whether discrimination based upon characteristics not specifically enumerated in Civil Code section 51 was potentially proscribed under the Act. After extensive discussion (see Harris, supra, at pp. 1154-1156), the court rejected the defendants’ position that only classes specifically identified in the statute were protected. The Harris court acknowledged that “[beginning with Cox in 1970, the Unruh Act has been construed to apply to several classifications not expressed in the statute. [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 1155.) It therefore rejected the defendants’ contention that the Legislature had repudiated the holdings in “Cox, Marina Point, O’Connor, and similar appellate decisions extending the Unruh Act beyond its specified categories of discrimination . . . .” (Id. at p. 1156.)

The Supreme Court, in Koebke v. Bernardo Heights Country Club (2005) 36 Cal.4th 824 , 840 [ 31 Cal.Rptr.3d 565 , 115 P.3d 1212 ] (Koebke), reiterated that in Harris it had “affirmed the principle articulated in [its] earlier decisions that the Act’s enumerated categories are illustrative, rather than

restrictive.” It explained that Harris had established a “a three-part analytic framework for determining whether a future claim of discrimination, involving a category not enumerated in the statute or added by prior judicial construction, should be cognizable under the Act.” {Ibid..)

Although the case was not mentioned by the Supreme Court, slightly over a year before Harris was decided, the Fourth District Court of Appeal (Division Three) held that a police officer had stated a claim for discrimination under the Act on the basis of his occupational status. In Long v. Valentino (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 1287 [ 265 Cal.Rptr. 96 ] (Long), the plaintiff, a police officer, attended a public meeting sponsored by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) that concerned police practices. (Id. at p. 1291.) After being ejected by an ACLU attorney, the plaintiff brought suit for damages, alleging, inter alia, a claim for unlawful discrimination under the Act. (Long, at p. 1293.) The appellate court concluded that the plaintiff had stated a claim under the Act based upon arbitrary occupational-status discrimination, and it rejected the defendants’ assertion that speech alone (i.e., words uttered ejecting the plaintiff) was not actionable. The court stated: “[A]n announcement such as ‘You can’t eat at my diner because you are a lawyer, bricklayer, female, or Indian chief’ would be actionable under the Unruh Act, although words alone were the means employed to effect the unlawful discrimination.” (Long, at p. 1297; see also McCalden v. California Library Ass’n (9th Cir. 1990) 955 F.2d 1214 , 1221 [noting that protected classes under the Act have been broadly defined to include, intér alia, “students, families with children, welfare recipients, and occupational groups”].) Moreover, the court disposed of the defendants’ argument that police officers were not entitled to protection under the Act, holding that “they are as much entitled to the protections of the Unruh Act as any other citizen. They may not be refused service in a restaurant, denied an apartment, or ejected from a public meeting merely because of their occupation* whether working a shift or on vacation.” (Long, supra, at p. 1298; see also id. at p. 1300 [citing other hypothetical examples of prohibited occupational-status discrimination by car rental agency, restaurateur, and transportation company].)

Sisemore urges that Long established a judicially recognized category (occupational status) that is protected from arbitrary discrimination under the Act. She argues that since the Supreme Court in Harris, supra, 52 Cal.3d 1142 did not disturb prior case authority identifying certain protected classifications not specified in Civil Code section 51, she stated a viable cause of action under Long for occupational-status discrimination.

We conclude that Sisemore has alleged a cognizable Unruh Civil Rights Act claim. At its most basic form, the fourth cause of action alleges that Master Financial arbitrarily discriminated against Sisemore solely on the

Roth, the plaintiff, a podiatrist, alleged that operators of medical buildings had, inter alia, violated the Act by limiting its commercial tenants to medical doctors. (25 Cal.App.4th at pp. 535-536.) The trial court granted summary adjudication in favor of the defendants on the Act claim. (25 Cal.4th at p. 536.) The Roth court posited that the question of whether a commercial landlord could “refuse to lease space to podiatrists [was] analytically no different from the question of whether the law requires a department store which caters to the high end of the market to purchase shoes from a manufacturer who makes less expensive, lower quality shoes. Or we could ask, does the law prohibit a landlord from limiting his tenancies to lawyers, merchants, or any specific trade or profession?” (Id. at pp. 536-537.) The court concluded that restrictions by a commercial landlord limiting tenants to certain occupations do not run afoul of the Act as long as the restrictions are not used as a pretext to exclude persons having personal characteristics protected under the Act. (25 Cal.App.4th at p. 537.) In so holding, the court noted that the choice of a profession is “a professional and, frequently, an economic choice, rather than a personal characteristic of the type enumerated in the [A]ct.” (Id. at p. 539.)

While a cursory reading of Roth might suggest that Sisemore’s occupational status is not protected under the Act against arbitrary discrimination of the kind alleged here, we conclude that Roth dictates no such conclusion. Roth concerned a commercial landlord’s decision to tailor its tenant base to a particular occupation to the exclusion of all others. This business decision provided a uniform tenancy for the commercial building, rather than an arbitrary exclusion of one particular occupational group.

Further, the procedural posture in Roth differs greatly from the status of our case. The trial court in Roth granted summary adjudication after receiving evidence concerning the defendants’ business justification for the allegedly discriminatory practice. Here, the court rejected the claim at the demurrer stage, without any evidence of Master Financial’s justification for refusing to make a mortgage loan to Sisemore because of her occupation. On the face of the pleadings, Master Financial arbitrarily rejected Sisemore as a borrower solely because of her occupation even though she otherwise met the lender’s qualifications. At this stage, it was improper for the court to have found that Sisemore had not stated a viable claim under the Act.

Moreover, Roth did not repudiate the holding in Long, supra, 216 Cal.App.3d 1287 , that the Act prohibits arbitrary occupational discrimination. Indeed, the Roth court neither cited Long nor held categorically that the Act does not protect against any form of occupational-status discrimination. (See Elisa B. v. Superior Court (2005) 37 Cal.4th 108 , 118 [ 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 46 , 117 P.3d 660 ] [“ ‘Language used in any opinion is of course to be understood

in the light of the facts and the issue then before the court, and an opinion is not authority for a proposition not therein considered’ ”].) We therefore conclude that Roth is distinguishable from the circumstances before us and does not compel the conclusion that Sisemore has failed to state a claim under the Act.

“ ‘The purpose [of the Act] is to compel a recognition of the equality of citizens in the right to the peculiar service offered . . .’ ” by an organization or entity covered by the Act. (Marina Point, supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 738; see also Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 712 , 733 [ 195 Cal.Rptr. 325 ].) As the Supreme Court has held, “[t]he Act is to be given a liberal construction with a view to effectuating its purposes. [Citations.]” (Koire v. Metro Car Wash (1985) 40 Cal.3d 24 , 28 [ 219 Cal.Rptr. 133 , 707 P.2d 195 ]; see also Angelucci v. Century Supper Club, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 167.) We conclude that a finding here that Sisemore stated a viable Unruh Civil Rights Act claim for occupational discrimination is consistent both with the holding in Long and the statute’s policy of prohibiting arbitrary denial of access to public accommodations.

A

. Background

In the third cause of action, plaintiffs allege that Master Financial committed unlawful housing practices in violation of FEHA. They assert that Master Financial, as a “. . . mortgage company or other financial institution that provides financial assistance for the purchase, organization, or construction of any housing accommodation[,] . . . discriminate[d] against [a] person or group of persons because of the ... sex,. . . familial status,. .. [or] source of income ... in the terms, conditions, or privileges relating to the obtaining or use of that financial assistance.” (§ 12955, subd. (e).)

There are two essential components to plaintiffs’ position. First, they assert that they properly alleged a claim for intentional discrimination against a group specifically protected under FEHA—namely, persons discriminated against based on the source of their income in violation of subdivision (e) of section 12955. Second, plaintiffs contend that they alleged a prima facie case of disparate impact discrimination in violation of subdivision (e) of section 12955 because Master Financial’s policy of not lending to home daycare operators disproportionately affected two protected classes, namely, women and families with children. Since a FEHA violation may be shown (as provided in section 12955.8, subdivision (b)) by establishing that an act prohibited by FEHA “has the effect, regardless of intent, of unlawfully discriminating on the basis of . . . sex . . . [or] familial status . . . ,” plaintiffs contend that they stated a viable disparate impact claim.

The court below concluded that neither plaintiff had alleged a viable FEHA claim. It concluded that the “source of income” category in section 12955, when the statute is “viewed as a whole and in conjunction with its legislative history, . . . [applies only to] prohibit[] discrimination on the basis of a person’s source of income in assessing his or her eligibility for rental housing. It does not prohibit discrimination on the basis of a person’s source of income in assessing his or her eligibility for a mortgage loan.” The court held further that plaintiffs’ disparate impact claim failed because the allegations did not “establish that the alleged discriminatory practices affect women as a group or families with children as a group. Instead, they establish that the discriminatory practices affect licensed home day care providers as a group. The FEHA does not protect this group.”

We address separately below plaintiffs’ intentional discrimination and disparate impact theories. We also address Master Financial’s assertion that the order sustaining the demurrer was proper (as to the entity plaintiff) on the additional ground that Project Sentinel lacks standing to assert a FEHA claim.

B. Plaintiffs’ Intentional Discrimination Claims under FEHA

Section 12955 makes a variety of discriminatory housing practices unlawful. Subdivision (e) of the statute—upon which plaintiffs’ intentional discrimination claims are based—makes it unlawful “[f]or any person, bank, mortgage company or other financial institution that provides financial assistance for, the purchase, organization, or construction of any housing accommodation to discriminate against any person or group of persons because of the race, color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, marital status, national origin, ancestry, familial status, source of income, or disability in the terms, conditions, or privileges relating to the obtaining or use of that financial assistance.” (Italics added.) Based upon Master Financial’s statements—(to Sisemore) that it “does not lend on day care homes,” and (to Project Sentinel) that it “will NOT make loans with home day care if the home day care income is required to qualify”—plaintiffs contend that they were denied a mortgage loan on the basis of source of income as proscribed by section 12955, subdivision (e).

Master Financial’s primary response is that the terms of section 12955 make it clear that the source-of-income discrimination provisions apply only in the context of discrimination by a landlord against an actual or potential tenant seeking rental housing. In support of this position, it cites subdivision (p)(l) of the statute, which ¡provides: “For the purposes of this section, ‘source of income’ means lawful, verifiable income paid directly to a tenant or paid to a representative of a tenant. For the purposes of this section, a landlord is not considered a representative of a tenant.” Master Financial

argues further that the legislative history of the 1999 amendment to section 12955 compels the conclusion that the source-of-income provisions protect only tenants or prospective tenants against discrimination by landlords.

The interpretation and application of a statute involve questions of law subject to de novo review. (Amdahl Corp. v. County of Santa Clara (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 604 , 611 [ 10 Cal.Rptr.3d 486 ].) We take a three-step sequential approach to interpreting statutory language. (See Halbert’s Lumber, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1233 , 1238-1239 [ 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 298 ] (Halbert’s Lumber).) First, we will examine the language at issue, giving “the words of the statute their ordinary, everyday meaning.” (Id. at p. 1238; see also Lungren v. Deukmejian, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 735.) If we conclude that the statutory meaning is free of doubt, uncertainty, or ambiguity, the language of the statute controls, and our task is completed. (Halbert’s Lumber, supra, at p. 1239; see also Security Pacific National Bank v. Wozab (1990) 51 Cal.3d 991 , 998 [ 275 Cal.Rptr. 201 , 800 P.2d 557 ].) Second, if we determine that the language is unclear, we will attempt to determine the Legislature’s intent as an aid to statutory construction. (Halbert’s Lumber, supra, at p. 1239.) In attempting to ascertain that intent, “we must examine the legislative history and statutory context of the act under scrutiny. [Citations.]” (Sand v. Superior Court (1983) 34 Cal.3d 567 , 570 [ 194 Cal.Rptr. 480 , 668 P.2d 787 ].) Third, if the clear meaning of the statutory language is not evident after attempting to ascertain its ordinary meaning or its meaning as derived from legislative intent, we will “apply reason, practicality, and common sense to the language at hand. If possible, the words should be interpreted to make them workable and reasonable [citations], . . . practical [citations], in accord with common sense and justice, and to avoid an absurd result [citations].” (Halbert’s Lumber, supra, at pp. 1239-1240.)

We will conform to this three-step procedure in our interpretation of the statutory language at issue here.

1. Whether language is clear on its face

On its face, the language of subdivision (e) of section 12955—prohibiting discrimination against “any person or group of persons” on the basis of source of income—appears clear on its face. “Person” is not limited in any way; in its ordinary sense, the language would suggest universal application to any man, woman, or child who is subjected to discrimination on the basis of his or her source of income in connection with the financing of the purchase, construction, or organization of housing.

prospective tenants as. outlined in the language quoted in the preceding paragraph. The proposed legislation was amended in July 1999, at which time appeared the “source of income” language that ultimately became part of the 1999 amendment to section 12955. Therefore, we conclude that the language cited by Master Financial in its demurrer does not support the conclusion that the legislative intent was to limit the class of persons protected against source-of-income discrimination to actual or prospective tenants seeking rental housing.

Master Financial also asserts that a heading to and introductory language concerning Senate Bill 1098 support its position regarding legislative intent. Specifically, it cites the following heading and preamble to a committee report for the proposed legislation: “SUBJECT [f] Landlord and Tenant Law—Rights of Parties upon Termination of Section 8 Contracts—Rental Information and Criteria—[][] DESCRIPTION [][] This bill would amend the landlord/tenant laws as follows: . . .” (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1098 (1999-2000 Reg. Sess.) as amended Apr. 7, 1999, p. 1.) But as we have noted, this description concerned an early iteration of Senate Bill 1098 that preceded its amendment in which source-of-income language appeared. Further, we find such descriptions in headings to analyses of proposed legislation to have little or no value in ascertaining legislative intent.

Of some significance here in evaluating legislative intent is a portion of the legislative counsel’s digest of the final version of Senate Bill 1098: “This bill would, until January 1, 2005, prohibit discrimination under [FEHA] on the basis of a person’s source of income, the failure to account for the aggregate income of coresidents, or the failure to exclude a government rent subsidy from that portion of the rent to be paid by the tenant in assessing his or her eligibility for rental housing.” (Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Sen. Bill No. 1098 (1999-2000 Reg. Sess.) Stats. 1999, ch. 590, italics added.) The legislative counsel’s use of the term “person” in the first clause to describe the class of individuals who would be protected under the bill against source-of-income discrimination—particularly when juxtaposed against the term “tenant” in the second clause-supports plaintiffs’ assertion that subdivision (e) of section 12955 was intended to protect all persons, not just tenants or prospective tenants, against source-of-income discrimination. (See Harris, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 1157, fn. 6 [courts may “ascribe[] to the Legislature the intentions expressed in the Legislative’s Counsel’s Digest of a statutory amendment”].)

In our effort to ascertain the intent of the Legislature here, we are mindful of the observation of Justice Sills that “reading the tea leaves of legislative history is often no easy matter. Even assuming there is such a thing as

listing service, real estate brokerage organization, or other service because of . . . source of income ...” Moreover, apparently broad proscriptions against source-of-income discrimination appear in four other subdivisions of section 12955. (See § 12955, subds. (d), (h), (k), (l).)

None of, the nine subdivisions of the statute that make reference to prohibiting source-of-income discrimination, on their face, appears to limit either the class of potential discriminatees to actual or prospective tenants or the proscription to landlord-tenant relationships. The trial court’s construction of the statute fails to harmonize—and in fact creates conflict between—the nine subdivisions of section 12955 appearing to provide broad coverage for source-of-income discrimination, on the one hand, and subdivision (p)(l), on the other hand. (See Bighorn-Desert View Water Agency v. Verjil (2006) 39 Cal.4th 205 , 218 [ 46 Cal.Rptr.3d 73 , 138 P.3d 220 ] [provisions that are related “ ‘should be read together and construed in a manner that gives effect to each, yet does not lead to disharmony with the others’ ”]; Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1379 , 1387 [ 241 Cal.Rptr. 67 , 743 P.2d 1323 ] [“[Statutory sections relating to the same subject must be harmonized, both internally and with each other, to the extent possible”].)

Second, an interpretation limiting persons protected against source-of-income discrimination under subdivision (e) of section 12955 to tenants or prospective tenants would conflict with our duty to make the language of the statute “ ‘workable and reasonable.’ ” (Regents of University of California v. Superior Court (1970) 3 Cal.3d 529 , 537 [ 91 Cal.Rptr. 57 , 476 P.2d 457 ], fn. omitted.) Rather than make section 12955, in its entirety, “work,” the trial court’s construction would result in subdivision (e)—as well as eight other subdivisions—being applied to individual cases in a much more restrictive manner than appears warranted by the statutory language. The across-the-board limitation of source-of-income discriminatees under section 12955 to tenants or prospective tenants is not a construction that makes the statutory language reasonable.

Third, we believe that allowing section 12955, subdivision (p)(1) to effectively trump the nine preceding subdivisions of section 12955 by severely restricting the statute’s protections against source-of-income discrimination would not be “in accord with common sense and justice.” (Halbert’s Lumber, supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at p. 1239.) FEHA is to be liberally construed. (§ 12933; Auburn Woods I Homeowners Assn. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1578 , 1590 [ 18 Cal.Rptr.3d 669 ] (Auburn Woods); see generally People ex rel. Dept. of Transportation v. Muller (1984) 36 Cal.3d 263 , 269 [ 203 Cal.Rptr. 772 , 681 P.2d 1340 ] [remedial statute should be liberally construed to promote its

objectives].) An interpretation of section 12955 limiting the statute’s apparently broad source-of-income discrimination protections to landlord-tenant circumstances would indeed be a narrow one.

Fourth, the trial court’s construction of the statute does not avoid, but in fact promotes, an absurd result. (Wasatch Property Management v. Degrate (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1111 , 1122 [ 29 Cal.Rptr.3d 262 , 112 P.3d 647 ] [a “statute should be interpreted to avoid an absurd result”].) It would make the apparent broad protections against source-of-income discrimination found in nine different subdivisions of section 12955 virtually meaningless. The application of source-of-income discrimination only to tenants or prospective tenants would render nugatory the “source of income” language in various subdivisions of the statute. For example, it is doubtful that section 12955, subdivision (j)—proscribing discrimination in connection with access to, membership in, or participation in, a multiple listing service, a real estate brokerage organization, or other services—would realistically prohibit any source-of-income discrimination if the only potential discriminatees were actual or prospective tenants. More to the point here, it is difficult to imagine that section 12955, subdivision (e) would have any real-world application if its source-of-income discrimination prohibitions to loans made to assist in “the purchase, organization, or construction of any housing accommodation” applied only to tenants.

We therefore conclude that subdivision (p)(l) of section. 12955 does not confine the protections afforded to potential discriminatees under section 12955, subdivision (e) to tenants or potential tenants seeking rental housing. Rather, since subdivision (e) prohibits source-of-income discrimination by “any person, bank, mortgage company or other financial institution that provides financial assistance for the purchase, organization, or construction of any housing accommodation,” the “source of income” definition in subdivision (p)(l) should be. read as having potential application only when the potential discriminatee is a tenant or potential tenant and the potential discrimination arises out of efforts to seek rental housing. In this manner, the apparent broad protections against source-of-income discrimination afforded under subdivision (e) are harmonized with subdivision (p)(l)’s definition of “source of income” in the context of potential tenant discrimination. Moreover, such an interpretation is a liberal construction of FEHA that is in furtherance of its broad objectives to proscribe discrimination in the employment and housing settings.

Plaintiffs have alleged that Master Financial discriminated against them on the basis of their source of income in connection with their efforts to obtain financial assistance to purchase a housing accommodation. They have stated a

the FHA. (Gilligan v. Jamco Development Corp. (9th Cir. 1997) 108 F.3d 246 .) Similarly, while an all-adult policy for an apartment building may have been facially nondiscriminatory—because, at the time, families with children were not a protected class—a disparate impact claim was held maintainable where it had a disproportionately adverse impact on minority tenants. (Betsey v. Turtle Creek Associates, supra, 736 F.2d at p. 988.) Likewise, a municipality’s refusal to approve a low to moderate income housing development for tenants displaced by a freeway was held to have had a disproportionate effect under the FHA because two-thirds of the displaced low-income tenants were minorities. (Keith v. Volpe, supra, 858 F.2d at p. 484.)

In Gilligan, Betsey, Keith, and other disparate impact cases, the challenged policy appears benign because it applies on its face to a group of individuals who are not members of a protected class. But the implementation of that policy has a disproportionate adverse effect upon members of a class that is protected. In this instance, the facially neutral practices are the alleged refusal to (1) make loans to daycare homes, and (2) fund mortgage loans where the source of income used to qualify for the loan is the operation of a daycare home. Because of the residency requirements for such facilities (Health & Saf. Code, § 1596.78), these practices effectively constitute the refusal to make loans to family home daycare operators. (Cf. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cisneros (6th Cir. 1995) 52 F.3d 1351 , 1360 [holding that scope of FHA was broad enough to include “redlining,” where discriminatory practice of limiting availability of property insurance directly impacted person’s ability to obtain housing].) Plaintiffs have alleged further that this facially neutral policy had a disproportionately negative impact on members of two protected classes—women and families with children, because licensed daycare home providers in Santa Clara County are made up of higher percentages of women and families with children than the percentages of those groups as reflected in the County’s general population. Therefore, since plaintiffs have alleged facts in the Complaint “of a violation causing a discriminatory effect” by alleging practices “that [have] the effect, regardless of intent, of unlawfully discriminating on the basis of . . . sex [or] . . . familial status” (§ 12955.8, subd. (b)), they have properly pleaded a disparate impact housing discrimination claim under FEHA.

But the court below reasoned that plaintiffs had failed to state a cause of action because the Complaint alleges only discrimination against licensed home daycare providers, a class that is not protected under FEHA. This rationale for sustaining the demurrer was flawed. As we have noted, the essence of a disparate impact claim is that a challenged policy, while facially neutral (i.e., not evidencing intentional discrimination against a protected class), in practice and effect is discriminatory toward a particular protected class. (Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc., supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 354, fn. 20.)

Thus, the fact that Master Financial’s policies, on their face, impacted an unprotected class (i.e., family daycare home operators) does not preclude a disparate impact claim.

Master Financial claims that its challenged policies concern economic matters and do not discriminate (even indirectly) on the basis of personal characteristics. But there is nothing in FÉHA that remotely suggests that housing discrimination—either disparate treatment or disparate impact discrimination—does not occur if the act or omission involved economic choices (rather than ones based upon personal characteristics). And the federal statute (the FHA) does not contain a limitation that housing.discrimination must be based upon personal characteristics. (See, e.g., Gilligan v. Jamco Development Corp., supra, 108 F.3d 246 [challenging policy of excluding prospective tenants with AFDC income]; National Fair Housing Alli. v. Prudential Ins. Co. (D.D.C. 2002) 208 F.Supp.2d 46 [challenging homeowners insurer’s “redlining” policy as having disparate impact on minorities seeking to purchase homes in certain regions].)

In addition, Master Financial asserts that Carter, supra, 122 Cal.App.4th 1313 , a case cited by the trial court in its ruling, is controlling. There, the plaintiff alleged that her employer’s reorganization demoting administrative managers" had a disparate impact on women and persons "over 40. (Id. at p. 1321.) But she asserted erroneously that “administrative managers were a ‘protected group.’ ” (Id. at p. 1322.) The appellate court concluded that the plaintiff had not presented sufficient evidence at trial to support a disparate impact claim because “her data set was incomplete” (id. at p. 1325); she had failed to present statistical evidence detailing the percentage of women and persons over 40 in the control group of all employees to compare it with the administrative managers affected by the company policy. (Id. at pp. 1325-1326.)

Carter is not controlling. First, Carter was an employment discrimination case decided after a trial; the appellate court held that the defendant’s JNOV (judgment notwithstanding the verdict) motion should have been granted due to the absence of plaintiff’s evidentiary showing. (Carter, supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at p. 1326.) Here, we examine only whether plaintiffs have pleaded sufficient ultimate facts in support of their disparate impact housing discrimination claim to survive demurrer. Second, in contrast to the circumstances in Carter—where the plaintiff made the erroneous assertion “that administrative managers were a ‘protected group’ ” (id. at p. 1322)— plaintiffs’ disparate impact claim here is not so ill-founded. As noted, plaintiffs do not claim that daycare home operators are a protected class.

D. Project Sentinel’s Standing to Sue

Master Financial contended in its demurrer that Project Sentinel lacked standing to maintain the third cause of action. The court did not specifically rule on this issue, having sustained the demurrer based upon a finding that neither plaintiff had stated a cause of action under FEHA. Master Financial renews this position on appeal.

FEHA authorizes the filing of suit by “[a]n aggrieved person” to seek relief for a discriminatory housing practice or a breach of a conciliation agreement. (§ 12989.1.) The act defines “aggrieved person” as “including] any person who claims to have been injured by a discriminatory housing practice or believes that the person will be injured by a discriminatory housing practice that is about to occur.” (§ 12927, subd. (g).) FEHA (§ 12927, subd. (f)) further defines “person” by reference to the federal definition of that term under FHA, section 3602(d) of title 42 of the United States Code, which reads: “ ‘Person’ includes one or more individuals, corporations, partnerships, associations, labor organizations, legal representatives, mutual companies, joint-stock companies, trusts, unincorporated organizations, trustees, trustees in cases under title 11 [bankruptcy], receivers, and fiduciaries.”

As we have noted, California courts often refer to federal decisional authority under the FHA in their interpretation of FEHA. (Auburn Woods, supra, 121 Cal.App.4th at p. 1591; Brown v. Smith (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 767 , 781 [ 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 301 ]; Broadmoor San Clemente Homeowners Assn. v. Nelson, supra, 25 Cal.App.4th at pp. 6-7.) In Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman (1982) 455 U.S. 363 [ 71 L.Ed.2d 214 , 102 S.Ct. 1114 ] (Havens Realty), the United States Supreme Court held that a nonprofit housing group had standing to bring suit under the FHA for alleged racial discrimination in housing. In so holding, the court held that the organization, by alleging that it had been required to devote significant resources to address the defendant’s practices, had claimed injury on its own behalf. (Havens Realty, at p. 379.)

In Walker v. City of Lakewood (9th Cir. 2001) 272 F.3d 1114 , the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal followed Havens Realty in reaching the conclusion that an independent fair housing services provider had standing to bring a claim under the FHA and FEHA. There, the court concluded that the provider had suffered injury in fact to support standing under the FHA, based upon allegations that the city with which it had contracted to provide services had retaliated against it and thwarted its ability to provide fair housing counseling services. (272 F.3d at pp. 1124-1125.) The Ninth Circuit held further that because the fair housing services provider had standing under the federal law, it likewise had standing under FEHA. (272 F.3d at pp. 1125-1126.)

Lastly, Project Sentinel cites a decision of the Fair Employment and Housing Commission. In Department of Fair Employment and Housing v. Green (1986) No. 86-07, FEHC Precedential Decisions 1986-1987, CEB 1, page 7, the Commission rejected the argument that a fair housing agency (Council) lacked standing to sue under FEHA. It reasoned: “In Havens Realty[, supra,] 455 U.S. 363 [ 102 S.Ct. 1114 ], the Supreme Court held that a housing group very similar to the Council would have standing to sue under the federal Fair Housing Act of 1968 ( 42 U.S.C. § 3604 ) if it could demonstrate that the need to send testers out to check the defendant’s rental practices had drained money from the group’s counseling and referral programs. We determine that the same rationale confers standing on the Council here, because the evidence amply demonstrates that the Council has suffered the diversion of resources the Department claims. Investigating a complaint of discrimination against respondent diverted resources away from the Council’s landlord-tenant counseling and public education activities.” (Department of Fair Employment & Housing v. Green, at p. 7, fn. omitted.) While this decision is not controlling (Smith v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1996) 12 Cal.4th 1143 , 1157 [ 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 700 , 913 P.2d 909 ]), we believe it has significant bearing on our resolution of the standing question here. (See Auburn Woods, supra, 121 Cal.App.4th at p. 1591 [“Commission’s interpretation of FEHA ‘is entitled to great respect’ ”].)

Master Financial cites this court’s decision in Midpeninsula Citizens for Fair Housing v. Westwood Investors (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 1377 [ 271 Cal.Rptr. 99 ] (Midpeninsula Citizens) in support of its contention that Project Sentinel lacks standing. There, a nonprofit corporation involved in eliminating housing discrimination brought suit under the Act to challenge an apartment building’s rental policy alleged to have been discriminatory. (Midpeninsula Citizens, at p. 1380.) The plaintiff contended that it was an “aggrieved person” under Civil Code section 52. (Midpeninsula Citizens, at p. 1382.) It urged us to apply Havens Realty, supra, 455 U.S. 363 , to find standing, a contention that we rejected because Havens Realty involved standing under a very different statute (the FHA) in which Congress intended to confer broad standing to sue. (Midpeninsula Citizens, supra, at pp. 1385-1386.) We concluded that, based upon a focused review of the Act and cases decided under it, the plaintiff did not have standing to sue: “[The] Legislature has specifically conferred standing to sue under the Unruh Act upon the victims of the discriminatory practices and certain designated others, i.e., district or city attorneys or the Attorney General. [Citations.] The California courts have not seen fit to endorse a more expansive interpretation of these standing requirements, and we decline to do so in this case.” (Midpeninsula Citizens, at p. 1386.)

Midpeninsula Citizens does not compel our conclusion here that Project Sentinel lacks standing. As we noted there: “Standing requirements will vary from statute to statute based upon the intent of the Legislature and the purpose for which the particular statute was enacted.” (Midpeninsula Citizens, supra, 221 Cal.App.3d at p. 1385.) Our high court has very recently reiterated this very point. (See Angelucci v. Century Supper Club, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 175.) Here, we address standing as it applies to a FEHA claim, and we are persuaded by Havens Realty, supra, 455 U.S. 363 , and its progeny that have found the existence of standing under the FHA under circumstances similar to those presented here. Since Project Sentinel has alleged that it has been required to divert scarce resources to address Master Financial’s alleged wrongful conduct, we conclude that Project Sentinel is a “person aggrieved” under section 12989.1 and has standing to assert a FEHA claim.

Business and Professions Code section 17200 provides: “As used in this chapter, unfair competition shall mean and include any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising and any act prohibited by Chapter 1 (commencing with Section 17500) of Part 3 of Division 7 of the Business and Professions Code.” As our high court has stated, “[t]he Legislature intended this ‘sweeping language’ to include ‘ “anything that can properly be called a business practice and that at the same time is forbidden by law.” ’ [Citation.]” (Bank of the West v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1254 , 1266 [ 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 538 , 833 P.2d 545 ], quoting Barquis v. Merchants Collection Assn. (1972) 7 Cal.3d 94 , 111, 113 [ 101 Cal.Rptr. 745 , 496 P.2d 817 ].) Included among such practices that may be the basis for a UCL claim are alleged violations of the Unruh Civil Rights Act (Midpeninsula Citizens, supra, 221 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1389-1393; Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Fisher Development, Inc. (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 1433 , 1440 [ 257 Cal.Rptr. 151 ]), and of FEHA (Alch v. Superior Court (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 339 , 401 [ 19 Cal.Rptr.3d 29 ]; Herr v. Nestlé U.S.A., Inc. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 779 , 789 [ 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 477 ]).

Since we have concluded that Sisemore has stated viable claims under the Unruh Civil Rights Act (see Discussion, pt. V, ante),.and under FEHA (see Discussion, pt. VI., ante), it necessarily follows that she has alleged.sufficient facts to support a cause of action under the UCL. Accordingly, the demurrer to the second cause of action should have been overruled.

DISPOSITION

We deem the order sustaining the demurrer to the Complaint without-leave to amend to have incorporated a judgment of dismissal; we reverse the judgment. The matter is remanded to the trial court with instructions to vacate its prior order sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend, and to issue a new order (a) overruling the demurrer as to Sisemore’s second, third, and fourth causes of action of the second amended complaint, (b) overruling the demurrer to the Project Sentinel’s third cause of action, and (c) sustaining without leave to amend the demurrer to Sisemore’s first cause of action.

Bamattre-Manoukian, Acting P. J., and McAdams, J., concurred.