County of San Diego v. Arzaga

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In May 2004, County filed a complaint alleging that Arzaga was the father of Karen, who was bom in January 1989. Arzaga denied paternity in his answer, and subsequent DNA testing resulted in a finding that Arzaga was not Karen’s biological father.

County subsequently moved for a judgment of parentage, and for an order that Arzaga pay $959 in monthly child support payments and health insurance coverage for Karen. The matter proceeded to trial on the theory of parentage by estoppel, with trial occurring over the course of three days in October and November 2005.

The parties stipulated before trial that Arzaga was not Karen’s biological father. At trial, Karen’s mother, Maria R.,^[1] testified that she met Arzaga in 1985 and they began a dating relationship lasting approximately one year. In 1988, they resumed their relationship for some period of time. Maria became pregnant that year and gave birth to Karen in January 1989. In 1990, Maria and Arzaga again resumed a relationship lasting five years, with Maria and Arzaga staying at each other’s houses several days during the week. Maria testified that during this time, Arzaga behaved toward Karen “like her father” and Karen addressed him as “Papi.” Arzaga never objected or corrected Karen. County admitted photographs into evidence of Karen and Arzaga and other members of his family during various holidays and Karen’s third or fourth birthday. County introduced Christmas cards from Arzaga to Karen when she was eight, nine, 12 and 13 years old in which he signed the card, “Daddy,” and referred to Karen as his daughter, or “Mija,” which is a Spanish term for daughter. It also introduced copies of four checks dated in March, April and May of 1997, signed by Arzaga and payable to Maria with notations, “for Karen” or “Karen’s support” in the memo section. Maria testified Arzaga provided Karen with money at other times, although, it was “not constant”; when he first saw Karen he gave Maria $100, and after 1997, he provided her with money until about 2001. Maria stated Arzaga “was not really supporting [Karen], but when he wanted, he would give her money, $100.”

That same day, the court entered a signed minute order stating that the matter was calendared to January 17, 2006, “for child support.”^[2] Arzaga filed a notice of appeal stating he was appealing from the “judgment after court trial” entered on November 8, 2005.

DISCUSSION

County contends Arzaga’s appeal from the trial court’s statement of decision is premature and should be dismissed because it was not the trial court’s final determination on the merits of the matter. Specifically, County points out the court set a further hearing to determine the amount of Arzaga’s child support, and argues because that issue remained outstanding, the statement of decision from which Arzaga appeals was merely interim. We disagree with County that these circumstances render the order nonappealable.

An appealable judgment or order is a jurisdictional prerequisite to an appeal. (Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1; Griset v. Fair Political Practices Com. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 688 , 696 [ 107 Cal.Rptr.2d 149 , 23 P.3d 43 ]; Jennings v. Marralle (1994) 8 Cal.4th 121 , 126 [ 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 275 , 876 P.2d 1074 ].) “California is governed by the ‘one final judgment’ rule which provides ‘interlocutory or interim orders are not appealable, but are only “reviewable

Here, the Legislature has expressly designated a court’s order for parentage in a local agency action for child support as a final determination. When a local child support agency brings an action for support of a child, as here, “[a] final detennination of parentage may be made in [the] action ... as an incident to obtaining an order for support.” (Fam. Code, § 17404, subd. (a).)^[3] In such a case, the final determination is appealable. (City and County of San Francisco v. Givens (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 51 , 53-54, fn. 2 [ 101 Cal.Rptr.2d 859 ].) The fact that Arzaga appealed from the trial court’s statement of decision does not change our conclusion. Although an informal opinion or decision is not normally an appealable judgment or order, a memorandum of decision may be appealable when signed and filed, and constitutes the trial judge’s final judicial determination on the merits. (Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Brotherhood of Teamsters (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 430 , 434, fn. 1 [ 147 Cal.Rptr. 835 ]; see also Estate of Lock (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 892 , 896 [ 176 Cal.Rptr. 358 ] [“A memorandum of decision may be treated as an appealable order or judgment when it is signed and filed, and when it constitutes the trial judge’s determination on the merits”].) These requirements are met by the court’s statement of decision.

Arzaga contends the trial court erred in determining he was Karen’s father—that County’s trial evidence did not establish the elements of parentage by estoppel as set out in Clevenger v. Clevenger (1961) 189 Cal.App.2d 658 [ 11 Cal.Rptr. 707 ] {Clevenger) and its progeny. The contention has merit.

In Clevenger, the court addressed “the duty of support which a husband owes to his wife’s illegitimate child when the husband, from the date of the birth of the child, accepts the child into his family, publicly acknowledges the child as his own and treats the child as if he were legitimate.” {Clevenger, supra, 189 Cal.App.2d at p. 662.) The court held that under some circumstances, the husband would be estopped from asserting he is not the father of the child to avoid liability for the child’s support. {Ibid) To set the foundation for the elements of estoppel, “the facts should show . . . that the husband represented to the [child] that he was his [or her] father, that the husband intended that his representation be accepted and acted upon by the child, that the child relied upon the representation and treated the husband as his [or her] father and gave his [or her] love and affection to him, [and] that the child was ignorant of the true facts . . . .” {Id. at p. 671, citing Safway Steel Products, Inc. v. Lefever (1953) 117 Cal.App.2d 489 [ 256 P.2d 32 ].) The court emphasized that the doctrine was narrowly limited, restricted to cases in which “the putative father . . . represents to the child expressly or by implication that he is the child’s natural father and the child believes him to be the natural father.” {Clevenger, at p. 674.) It explained, “We do not suggest that the husband who supports his wife’s child by another man necessarily incurs liability for the support of that child. Here, if the facts so show, we predicate an estoppel upon the child’s acceptance of the representation of the putative father that he is the natural father.” {Ibid.) The Clevenger court added a second limitation; “the representation .must be of such long continuance that it frustrates the realistic opportunity of discovering the natural father and truly establishes the paternal relationship of the . . . father and the child.” {Id. at p. 675.)^[4]

We have not found any case applying the doctrine of paternity by estoppel to an alleged father where the factual circumstances established that the alleged father acted without knowledge that he was not truly the child’s biological parent. To the contrary, in each case it is apparent the father knew the true facts. Equitable estoppel is a principle grounded in fundamental fairness, and “ ‘ “takes its life . . . from the equitable principle that no man [may] profit from his own wrongdoing in a court of justice.” ’ ” (Lantzy v. Centex Homes (2003) 31 Cal.4th 363 , 383 [ 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 655 , 73 P.3d 517 ]; see Cordova v. 21st Century Ins. Co. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 89 , 106 & fn. 56 [ 28 Cal.Rptr.3d 170 ]; Valle, supra, 53 Cal.App.3d at p. 840.) In general, the knowledge attributable to the party to be estopped must be actual and not merely presumptive knowledge. (La Mancha Dev. Corp. v. Sheegog (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 9 , 17 [ 144 Cal.Rptr. 59 ]; Meyer v. Glenmoor Homes, Inc. (1966) 246 Cal.App.2d 242 , 264 [ 54 Cal.Rptr. 786 ]; Primm v. Joyce (1948) 87 Cal.App.2d 288 , 291 [ 196 P.2d 829 ] .)^[5] While we are sensitive to the emotional detriment that can result to a child who has relied upon conduct of a person who has held himself out as a father, it would be unfair, in our view, to apply the doctrine to an individual whose conduct was based on his mistaken belief that he actually was the child’s natural father.

It was plainly the trial court’s intent to reach the contrary conclusion based on the evidence. However, its factual finding serves to defeat application of the parentage by estoppel. The finding, supported by Arzaga’s testimony set forth above and the fact that the DNA testing took place only after County filed its lawsuit, demonstrates that at the time Arzaga made his representations to Karen and held himself out to her as her father, he was not “apprised of the facts.” (Valle, supra, 53 Cal.App.3d at p. 841.) As a consequence, the doctrine of parentage by estoppel cannot apply.