Fiscal v. City & County of San Francisco

Opinion

I.

INTRODUCTION

In 2005, the voters of the City and County of San Francisco (City), a home rule charter city, passed Proposition H, a local ordinance prohibiting (1) virtually all City residents from possessing handguns; and (2) all City residents, without exception, from selling, distributing, transferring and manufacturing firearms and ammunition. A legal challenge to the ordinance resulted in the trial court holding that key aspects of the ordinance were preempted by state law. Based on its further determination that the invalid portions of the ordinance were not severable from the arguably valid portions, the court found that the ordinance was preempted in its entirety. Lastly, the trial court held that the City’s home rule power under the California Constitution, article XI, section 5, subdivision (a) (municipal home rule for charter cities) did not override state preemption because the field being regulated was one of statewide, rather than local, concern. We agree with the trial court’s conclusions, and affirm the judgment in all respects.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This appeal concerns Proposition H (Prop. H or ordinance), a municipal ordinance enacted by the City’s voters in November 2005. The “Findings” section of Prop H states that “[h]andgun violence is a serious problem in San Francisco . . . ,” accounting for 67 percent of injuries or deaths caused by firearms in the City in 1999. These findings also state that Prop. H is not intended to affect residents from other jurisdictions with regard to handgun possession. Therefore, “the provisions of Section 3 [banning handgun possession in the City] apply exclusively to residents of the City and County of San Francisco.” Section 1 also invokes the City’s “home rule” power and describes that power as allowing “counties to enact laws that exclusively apply to residents within their borders, even when such a law conflicts with state law or when state law is silent.”

Prop. H contains two substantive provisions, section 2 and section 3. Section 2 is entitled “Ban on Sale, Manufacture, Transfer or Distribution of Firearms in the City and County of San Francisco.” It states, in its entirety, that “[w]ithin the limits of the City and County of San Francisco, the sale, distribution, transfer and manufacture of all firearms and ammunition shall be prohibited.” There are no exceptions to this section.

Section 3 is entitled “Limiting Handgun Possession in the City and County of San Francisco.” It states that within City boundaries, “no resident of the City and County of San Francisco shall possess any handgun unless required for professional purposes, as enumerated herein.” Section 3 contains narrow exemptions to the City’s ban on possession of handguns for government employees carrying out the functions of government employment, active members of the United States Armed Forces or the National Guard, and security guards “while actually employed and engaged in protecting and preserving property or life within the scope of his or her employment. . . .” Section 3 indicates that any City resident may surrender his or her handgun “without penalty” at any district station of the San Francisco Police Department or to the San Francisco Sheriffs Department within 90 days after section 3 becomes effective. The City’s board of supervisors is charged with enacting penalties for violation of the ordinance.

Section 6 is entitled “State Law.” It provides that “[n]othing in this ordinance is designed to duplicate or conflict with California state law . . .” or to “create or require any local license or registration for any firearm, or create an additional class of citizens who must seek licensing or registration.” Additionally, the ordinance does not apply to “any person currently denied the privilege of possessing a handgun under state law . . . .”

After Prop. H passed, Paula Fiscal, several retired law enforcement and military personnel, two law enforcement associations, and several firearms rights groups (collectively, petitioners) sought a writ of mandate declaring Prop. H invalid. Among other arguments, petitioners challenged the ordinance on the grounds that it was preempted by state law.

The trial court granted petitioners’ request for writ of mandate, finding Prop. H unenforceable, primarily because it was preempted by three separate state laws regulating firearms. Specifically, the court determined that the key provisions of Prop. H, prohibiting the sale of firearms and possession of handguns by City residents, were preempted by Penal Code section 12026, subdivision (b) (prohibiting localities from restricting handgun possession in an individual’s home, business, or private property), Government Code section 53071 (indicating an express intent by the Legislature to occupy the whole field of firearms licensing and registration) and the Unsafe Handgun Act (UHA), Penal Code sections 12125 to 12233 (establishing a protocol for designating which handguns may be sold in California). Finally, the trial court found that any residual portions of Prop. H arguably valid were not severable because the court could not disentangle the various bans without exceeding its powers by deleting and adding words, i.e., rewriting the ordinance. The court further concluded that the subject of Prop. H “dealing with the possession and use of handguns” is one of statewide concern and therefore controlled by the applicable state law. This appeal followed.

in.

DISCUSSION

A. Introduction

Before addressing the issues raised in this case, we briefly note what is not at issue in this appeal. This case is not about the public policy choices that the voters in San Francisco have made by enacting Prop. H. Thus, we need not, and do not, pass judgment on the merits of Prop. H, or engage ourselves in the sociological and cultural debate about whether gun control is an effective means to combat crime. (Compare Ayres & Donohue, Shooting

B. California Preemption Analysis and Standard of

Review

In O’Connell v. City of Stockton (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1061 [ 63 Cal.Rptr.3d 67 , 162 P.3d 583 ] (O’Connell), our Supreme Court recently restated the guiding principles for determining whether a local ordinance is displaced by a state measure. The court explained, “ ‘Under article XI, section 7 of the California Constitution, “[a] county or city may make and enforce within its limits all local, police, sanitary, and other ordinances and regulations not in conflict with general [state] laws.” [f] “If otherwise valid local legislation conflicts with state law, it is preempted by such law and is void.” [Citations.] [][] “A conflict exists if the local legislation ‘ “duplicates, contradicts, or enters an area fully occupied by general law, either expressly or by legislative implication.” ’ ” [Citations.]’ (Sherwin-Williams Co. v. City of Los Angeles (1993) 4 Cal.4th 893 , 897 [ 16 Cal.Rptr.2d 215 , 844 P.2d 534 ], italics added, fn. omitted (Sherwin-Williams); see also American Financial Services Assn. v. City of Oakland (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1239 , 1251 [ 23 Cal.Rptr.3d 453 , 104 P.3d 813 ] (American Financial).)” (O’Connell, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1067.)

The O’Connell court explained the italicized terms as follows: “A local ordinance duplicates state law when it is ‘coextensive’ with state law. (Sherwin-Williams, supra, 4 Cal.4th at pp. 897-898, citing In re Portnoy (1942) 21 Cal.2d 237 , 240 [ 131 P.2d 1 ] [as ‘finding “duplication” where local legislation purported to impose the same criminal prohibition that general law imposed’].)

“A local ordinance contradicts state law when it is inimical to or cannot be reconciled with state law. (Sherwin-Williams, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 898, citing Ex parte Daniels (1920) 183 Cal. 636 , 641-648 [ 192 P. 442 ] [as finding ‘ “contradiction” ’ in a local ordinance that set the maximum speed limit for vehicles below that set by state law].)

“A local ordinance enters a field fully occupied by state law in either of two situations—when the Legislature ‘expressly manifests] ’ its intent to

The O’Connell court went on to say: “When the Legislature has not expressly stated its intent to occupy an area of law, we look to whether it has impliedly done so. This occurs in three situations: when ‘ “(1) the subject matter has been so fully and completely covered by general law as to clearly indicate that it has become exclusively a matter of state concern; (2) the subject matter has been partially covered by general law couched in such terms as to indicate clearly that a paramount state concern will not tolerate further or additional local action; or (3) the subject matter has been partially covered by general law, and the subject is of such a nature that the adverse effect of a local ordinance on the transient citizens of the state outweighs the possible benefit to the” locality.’ (Sherwin-Williams, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 898.)” (O’Connell, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1068.)

Because the City in this case is a charter city, the home rule doctrine also comes into play. Article XI, section 5, subdivision (a) of the California Constitution reserves to charter cities the right to adopt and enforce ordinances that conflict with general state laws, provided the subject of the regulation is a “municipal affair” rather than one of “statewide concern.” (Johnson v. Bradley (1992) 4 Cal.4th 389 , 398-399 [ 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 470 , 841 P.2d 990 ].) “ ‘Because the various sections of article XI fail to define municipal affairs, it becomes necessary for the courts to decide, under the facts of each case, whether the subject matter under discussion is of municipal or statewide concern. This question must be determined from the legislative purpose in each individual instance.’ . . .” (City of Santa Clara v. Von Raesfeld (1970) 3 Cal.3d 239 , 246 [ 90 Cal.Rptr. 8 , 474 P.2d 976 ], quoting Professional Fire Fighters, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (1963) 60 Cal.2d 276 , 294 [ 32 Cal.Rptr. 830 , 384 P.2d 158 ].)

A trial court’s decision invalidating a local ordinance on grounds of preemption is reviewed de novo. (See City of Watsonville v. State Dept. of Health Services (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 875 , 882 [ 35 Cal.Rptr.3d 216 ]; Pieri v. City and County of San Francisco (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 886 , 889 [ 40 Cal.Rptr.3d 629 ].) Similarly, where a charter city ordinance is challenged on preemption grounds and is defended as a permissible exercise of the city’s home rule power, the challenge also presents a question of law which must be decided on a case-by-case basis. (Northern Cal. Psychiatric Society v. City of Berkeley (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 90 , 100 [ 223 Cal.Rptr. 609 ] (Northern Cal. Psychiatric Society).)

Certain classes of persons, while engaged in legitimate activities, are exempted from the operation of most of the statutory prohibitions governing handgun possession, including law enforcement agencies and officers (see, e.g., Pen. Code, §§ 12027, subd. (a)(1)(A), 12201, subds. (a), (b), 12287, subds. (a)(4), (5), 12302, 12031, subd. (b), including retired peace officers [Pen. Code, § 12027, subd. (a)(1)(A)], and the military [Pen. Code, § 12280, subds. (e), (f)(1)]).

Additionally, special exemptions and licenses are granted to certain individuals in the private sector, including the private security industry (Pen. Code, § 12031, subds. (b)(7), (d)(l)-(6)), entertainment industry professionals (Pen. Code, §§ 12072, subd. (a)(9)(B)(vi), 12026.2, subd. (a)(1), (8), 12305, subd. (a)), members of gun clubs (Pen. Code, §§ 12027, subd. (f), 12026.2, subd. (a)(2)), and private investigators (Pen. Code, § 12031, subd. (d)(3)). Any legal firearm may be possessed in public for hunting or shooting at a target range, or going to or from these places, one’s home and business, and certain other recognized activities (Pen. Code, § 12026.2, subd. (a)(3), (9).)

The broad language of Government Code section 53071, prohibiting “all local regulations, relating to registration or licensing” of firearms, indicates that the state has an interest in statewide uniformity of handgun licensing. (Italics added.) In finding Government Code section 53071 expressly preempted Prop. H, the trial court pointed out that the ordinance had the practical effect of “revoking or otherwise invalidating existing state licenses,” including those permitting the possession of handguns. The trial court went on to conclude that “[a] local regulation that invalidates existing licenses, but does not affirmatively create new licensing schemes, ‘relates’ to the state’s regulatory scheme of licensing firearms” and, consequently, is expressly preempted by Government Code section 53071. We agree.

While the City emphatically argues that Prop. H is a proper response to crime because it is aimed at criminals who use handguns in the commission of their unlawful acts, the City’s arguments fail to acknowledge that the ordinance will affect more than just criminals. It will also affect every City resident who has not, through some demonstration of personal disability or irresponsibility, lost his or her right to possess a handgun. Although a precise assessment of the impact of this ordinance is difficult to gauge because the

If the preemption doctrine means anything, it means that a local entity may not pass an ordinance, the effect of which is to completely frustrate a broad, evolutional statutory regime enacted by the Legislature. Section 3 of Prop. H stands as an obstruction to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of the legislative scheme regulating handgun possession in this state. For that further reason, it is preempted. (Sherwin-Williams Co. v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 4 Cal.4th at pp. 897-898 [local legislation is preempted if it is “inimical” to accomplishment of the state law’s policies].)

E. Section 2 of Prop. H Entitled “Ban on Sale, Manufacture, Transfer or Distribution of Firearms in the City and County of San Francisco” Is Preempted by State Law

Section 2 of the ordinance provides in full: “Within the limits of the City and County of San Francisco, the sale, distribution, transfer and manufacture of all firearms and ammunition shall be prohibited.” Unlike section 3, there are no exceptions contained in section 2. Presumably, if section 2 were enforced, there would be no sales of firearms or ammunition in the City. Storefront firearms dealers in the City would immediately go out of business. Other businesses that deal in the sale of firearms, such as auction houses that offer collectible firearms for sale, would also be adversely affected. The impact of the “transfer” and “distribution” bans are more difficult to gauge. A literal interpretation of the transfer/distribution ban could lead to absurd results, such as prohibiting law enforcement agencies from distributing firearms and ammunition to their officers.

We first note that the key provision of section 2, banning the sale of all firearms within City limits, runs into many of the same preemption obstacles as does section 3. First, it is at odds with Penal Code section 12026’s guarantee that City residents be able “to purchase, own, possess, keep, or carry” firearms at their homes, and businesses. (Italics added.) As the trial court recognized, “[a] local ordinance that substantially burdens the purchasing and possession of handguns by banning their sale is just as contrary to section 12026 as was the possession ban struck down by Doe.”

Lastly, we agree with the trial court that section 2’s city wide ban on the sale of firearms is impliedly preempted due to its duplication of, and contradiction with, the UHA (Pen. Code, §§ 12125-12233). The UHA was enacted in 1999 in response to the proliferation of local ordinances banning low cost, cheaply made handguns known as “Saturday Night Specials,” which called to the Legislature’s attention the need to address the issue of handgun sales in a more comprehensive manner. (See Stricker, Gun Control 2000: Reducing the Firepower (2000) 31 McGeorge L.Rev. 293 , 313 (Gun Control 2000).)

The UHA uniformly bans the sale of Saturday Night Specials in California, but it also includes provisions applicable to all handguns sold in the state, including those of higher quality. (Pen. Code, § 12125, subd (a).) For example, the UHA requires that all models of handguns meet certain quality assurance tests and other standards before being approved for sale in this state, including specified standards relating to the safe firing of the handgun and the ability to drop the handgun without it firing accidentally. (Pen. Code, §§ 12126, 12127, subd. (a).) The UHA charges the California Department of Justice with testing and compiling a list of handguns that “may be sold in this state pursuant to this title.” (Pen. Code, § 12131, subd. (a).) There are criminal penalties for violating the UHA (for instance, selling a Saturday Night Special) with potential imprisonment for up to one year in a county jail. (Pen. Code, § 12125, subd. (a).)

The trial court held that section 2’s wholesale ban on the sale of firearms within City limits, including all handguns, was impliedly preempted by the UHA. In reaching its conclusion, the trial court pointed out that, with respect to unsafe UHA-prohibited handguns, section 2 “duplicates state law by doubly banning them.” For UHA-approved handguns, section 2 conflicts with

The legislative history of the UHA also reveals that the issue of preemption was specifically raised with respect to the existing local bans on the sale of Saturday Night Specials as well as any future attempts by local governments to ban handgun sales more broadly. A report by the Senate Committee on Public Safety concluded that “[tjhis bill would appear to preempt any such local ordinance, both those already in existence and any proposed locally in the future.” (Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 15 (1999-2000 Reg. Sess.) as amended Apr. 5, 1999, p. 13.) In apparent response to this concern, a subsequent amended version of the April 5, 1999 version of the proposed bill addressed the question of preemption directly by including language expressly preserving the power of local governments to place a “more stringent requirement upon the manufacture, importation, transfer, sale, or possession of handguns.” (Assem. Amend, to Sen. Bill No. 15 (1999-2000 Reg. Sess.) June 2, 1999, p. 11, italics omitted.) Had the UHA been enacted with this quoted language, the City’s position, at least with regard to section 2 of Prop H, would have more persuasive bite. However, when the Legislature ultimately enacted the UHA, this language was deleted. (Assem. Amend, to Sen. Bill No. 15 (1999-2000 Reg. Sess.) June 16, 1999.)

Our Supreme Court has cautioned courts not to read too much into deletions from bills when ascertaining legislative intent. (See American Financial Services Assn. v. City of Oakland (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1239 , 1261-1262 [ 23 Cal.Rptr.3d 453 , 104 P.3d 813 ].) However, following passage of the UHA, cities, including San Francisco, repealed their own Saturday Night Special ordinances. We agree with the trial court’s conclusion that these repeals were in recognition of “the UHA’s preemptive effect on the topic”; and indeed, the City has offered no other explanation for its action.

The City next challenges the trial court’s finding that the UHA impliedly preempts section 2 by arguing there can be no conflict with state law because

We acknowledge courts have found, in the absence of express preemptive language, that a city or county may make additional regulations, different from those established by the state, if not inconsistent with the purpose of the general law. (See, e.g., Suter, supra, 57 Cal.App.4th at p. 1116 [finding an ordinance enacted by the City of Lafayette requiring persons seeking to sell, transfer or lease weapons to obtain local land use and police permits was not preempted by state law]); Fisher v. City of Berkeley (1984) 37 Cal.3d 644 , 704-709 [ 209 Cal.Rptr. 682 , 693 P.2d 261 ]; Northern Cal. Psychiatric Society, supra, 178 Cal.App.3d at p. 106.) We further acknowledge that, in spite of the UHA’s enactment, room has been left by the Legislature for some quantum of local handgun sales regulation. (See, e.g., Great Western, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 868 [upholding a Los Angeles County ordinance prohibiting the sale of firearms at gun shows on county property against a preemption challenge even though the UHA permits the type of sale barred by the ordinance].)

But, this case is not one where a local entity has legislated in synergy with state law. To the contrary, here the state and local acts are irreconcilable, clearly repugnant, and so inconsistent that the two cannot have concurrent operation. (Water Quality Assn. v. City of Escondido (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 755 , 765 [ 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 878 ], citing Western Oil & Gas Assn. v. Monterey Bay Unified Air Pollution Control Dist. (1989) 49 Cal.3d 408 , 419—420 [ 261 Cal.Rptr. 384 , 777 P.2d 157 ].) As the trial court recognized, section 2’s ban on the sale of handguns does not merely overlap with the UHA; instead, it “swallows the state regulations whole.” The City is not simply imposing additional restrictions on state law to accommodate local concerns; but instead, it has enacted a total ban on an activity state law allows. This difference was recognized in Great Western, which noted that total bans are not viewed in the same manner as added regulations, and justify greater scrutiny. (Great Western, supra, 27 Cal.4th at pp. 867-888.) Therefore, we agree that with the passage of the UHA, the Legislature has impliedly preempted local ordinances, such as section 2, which completely bans the sale of all handguns.

We next consider several cases the City claims have “resoundingly upheld local laws that prohibit gun sales, or otherwise restrict access to firearms.” The first of these cases, CRPA, supra, 66 Cal.App.4th 1302 , was decided shortly before the UHA was enacted, and indeed, concerned one of the local ordinances that was the precursor to its passage. In CRPA, the Second Appellate District held that a local ordinance which banned, within city limits, the sale of any handgun which the city classified as a Saturday Night Special was not preempted by Government Code section 53071 or Penal Code section 12026. (66 Cal.App.4th at p. 1302.)

The court declined to extend the reasoning of Doe to handgun sales, instead finding that “Doe identifies only ‘residential handgun possession’ as a preempted field,” and that “[t]he ordinance at issue here creates no permit or license requirement, and instead regulates only sales.” (CRPA, supra, 66 Cal.App.4th at p. 1319.) Additionally, the opinion concluded that the ban of one specific type of handgun does not conflict with Government Code section 53071’s express preemption of the field of registration and licensing. (66 Cal.App.4th at p. 1322.)

Thus, CRPA concluded that cities had some leeway to ban the sale of one particular type of gun deemed to present dangers to a local community above and beyond the dangers presented by handguns generally. However, that decision does not stand for the principle that municipalities are free to ban the sale of all firearms. The CRPA court was careful to make this distinction, emphasizing that “[t]he ordinance involved in the instant case does not ban possession of any handgun, but instead bans the sale of a limited category of handguns within city limits.” (CRPA, supra, 66 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1321-1322.) That clearly is inapposite to the facts of this case.

Moreover, at the time CRPA was decided there was “ ‘no [statutory] prohibition on, nor any express authorization for, the sale of Saturday night specials or other concealable firearms’ ” that would pose a potential conflict with a local ordinance prohibiting the sale of Saturday Night Specials. (CRPA, supra, 66 Cal.App.4th at p. 1322.) Shortly after CRPA was decided, the regulatory landscape relating to handgun sales was significantly altered when the Legislature passed the UHA. Thus, the court that decided CRPA had no opportunity to determine to what extent the UHA preempts local authority in

Finally, we consider a brace of recent cases decided by our Supreme Court, which the City argues supports its authority to ban the sale of firearms and ammunition. Answering questions certified from the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the California Supreme Court held in two companion cases that a county ordinance that prohibited the sale of firearms and ammunition at gun shows held on county property was not preempted by state law. (Great Western, supra, 27 Cal.4th 853 ; see Nordyke v. King (2002) 27 Cal.4th 875 [ 118 Cal.Rptr.2d 761 , 44 P.3d 133 ] (Nordyke).) Unlike the broader preemption question here, the question addressed by the Supreme Court was whether the Legislature intended to occupy the entire field of gun show regulation, including controlling the venues for such shows. The court answered this question in the negative, perceiving nothing in state law that expressly or impliedly prohibited a county from withdrawing its property from use for gun shows, based on its own calculation of the costs and benefits of permitting such use. The court emphasized that California law regulating activities at gun shows did not “mandate that counties use their property for such shows.” (Great Western, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 870; see Nordyke, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 884.)

The Supreme Court also held that, contrary to the claims of the gun show promoters, the local ordinances did not contradict state firearms law by promoting something prohibited by the state or by prohibiting something promoted by the state. “[T]here is no evidence in either the gun show statutes [, Penal Code sections 12071, 12071.1 and 12071.4,] or, as far as we can determine, in their legislative history, that indicates a stated purpose of promoting or encouraging gun shows.” (Great Western, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 868.) The court went on to hold that “[T]he overarching purpose of [the Penal Code sections] appears to be nothing more than to acknowledge that such shows take place and to regulate them to promote public safety.” (Ibid.) The court also pointed out that the statutes governing gun shows contemplate that firearm dealers at gun shows will be subject to applicable local regulations. (See Pen. Code, § 12071.4 [subjecting gun shows to local regulation].) (Great Western, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 865.) Accordingly, the county had the authority to prohibit the operation of gun shows held on its property and, at least to that extent, could “impose more stringent restrictions on the sale of firearms than state law prescribes.” (Id. at p. 870.)

These cases are palpably distinguishable from the case before us. In deciding Great Western and Nordyke, our Supreme Court was careful to confine its preemption analysis to the question of whether state law authorizing gun shows necessarily compelled counties to allow their property to be

In conclusion, we find the situations presented in CRPA, supra, 66 Cal.App.4th 1302 , Great Western, supra, 27 Cal.4th 853 , and Nordyke, supra, 27 Cal.4th 875 , are so different from those presented in this case as to make them inapposite here.

G. Statewide Concern or Municipal Affair?

Despite having found preemption, the City can nevertheless escape petitioners’ challenge if Prop. H relates to a purely “municipal affair,” because its city charter includes a “home rule” provision. (Bishop v. City of San Jose (1969) 1 Cal.3d 56 , 61 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 465 , 460 P.2d 137 ].) But “[a]s to matters which are of statewide concern, however, home rule charter cities remain subject to and controlled by applicable general state laws regardless of the provisions of their charters, if it is the intent and purpose of such general laws to occupy the field to the exclusion of municipal regulation (the preemption doctrine). [Citations.]” (Id. at pp. 61-62.)

Our Supreme Court also addressed this issue in its recent O’Connell case. There, the City of Stockton argued that even if its ordinance authorizing forfeiture of vehicles used in the commission of certain criminal acts was preempted by state law, it was lawful because the subject matter of the ordinance constituted a “municipal affair,” and did not involve a matter of “statewide concern.” (O’Connell, supra, 41 Cal.4th at pp. 1075-1076.) The Supreme Court summarily rejected that argument in O’Connell, noting that the illegal activities at issue, prostitution and trafficking in controlled substances, had been “comprehensively addressed through various provisions of this state’s Penal and Vehicle Codes, leaving no room for further regulation at the local level,” and therefore were “matters of statewide concern.” (Id. at p. 1076.)

We likewise have reason to reject summarily the City’s argument that Prop. H addresses only a municipal affair. When looked at as a whole, the

The judgment is affirmed. Petitioners are entitled to their costs on appeal.

Reardon, J., and Sepulveda, J., concurred.

Appellants’ petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied April 9, 2008, S160968.