Muzzy Ranch Co. v. Solano County Airport Land Use Commission

Opinion

In 2002, respondent Solano County Airport Land Use Commission (Commission) adopted an airport land use compatibility plan for

At issue in this case is the adoption of an airport land use compatibility plan. “Each commission shall formulate an airport land use compatibility plan that will provide for the orderly growth of each public airport and the area surrounding the airport within the jurisdiction of the commission, and will safeguard the general welfare of the inhabitants within the vicinity of the airport and the public in general.” (§ 21675, subd. (a).) Commissions are also now obligated to formulate such plans for areas surrounding military airports, such as Travis; at the time the TALUP was adopted commissions were authorized to adopt land use plans for military airports but not required to do so. (§ 21675, subd. (b), as amended by Stats. 2002, ch. 971, § 7.) To assist ALUC’s in the performance of their duties, California’s Department of Transportation prepared the California Airport Land Use Planning Handbook (Jan. 2002) (Handbook). “An airport land use commission that formulates, adopts, or amends an airport land use compatibility plan shall be guided by” the Handbook. (§ 21674.7, subd. (a).)

A city or county general plan relating to an area covered by an ALUC land use plan must be consistent with the commission’s plan, unless the city or county governing body overrides the determination of the commission by a two-thirds vote. (Gov. Code, § 65302.3; Pub. Util. Code, § 21676, subd. (b).) The governing body must make specific findings that the portions of its general plan at issue are consistent with the purposes of article 3.5, as stated in section 21670. (Gov. Code, § 65302.3, subd. (c); Pub. Util. Code, § 21676, subd. (b).) Similarly, if a city or county proposes to amend its general plan or zoning ordinances within the planning area of an ALUC, it must first submit its proposed action to the commission for a determination of whether the action is consistent with the commission’s land use plan. (§ 21676, subd. (b).) The city or county may override the determination of the commission with a two-thirds vote of its governing body based on specific findings that the proposed action is consistent with the purposes of article 3.5, as stated in section 21670. (§ 21676, subd. (b).)

As a threshold issue, the parties dispute whether the consistency requirement is applicable because the amendment adding the requirement was enacted after the TALUP was adopted in June 2002. (Stats. 2002, ch. 971, § 7.) We need not resolve this issue because the TALUP is, in any event, consistent with the 1995 AICUZ for Travis.

At issue is the meaning of the requirement in section 21675, subdivision (b), that airport land use compatibility plans be “consistent with” the applicable AICUZ’s. Statutory construction is a question of law we decide de novo. (Regents of University of California v. Superior Court (1999) 20 Cal.4th 509 , 531 [ 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 257 , 976 P.2d 808 ].) Our primary objective in interpreting a statute is to determine and give effect to the underlying legislative intent. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1859.) We begin by examining the statutory language, giving the words their usual, ordinary meaning. (Curle v. Superior Court (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1057 , 1063 [ 103 Cal.Rptr.2d 751 , 16 P.3d 166 ].) “The meaning of a statute may not be determined from a single word or sentence; the words must be construed in context, and provisions relating to the same subject matter must be harmonized to the extent possible. [Citation.] . . . [E]ach sentence must be read not in isolation but in the light of the statutory scheme [citation]; and if a statute is amenable to two alternative interpretations, the one that leads to the more reasonable result will be followed [citation].” (Lungren v. Deukmejian (1988) 45 Cal.3d 727 , 735 [ 248 Cal.Rptr. 115 , 755 P.2d 299 ].) “If the terms of the statute are unambiguous, we presume the lawmakers meant what they said, and the plain meaning of the language governs.” (Estate of Griswold (2001) 25 Cal.4th 904 , 910-911 [ 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 165 , 24 P.3d 1191 ].)

Appellant contends that the requirement that the TALUP be “consistent with” the AICUZ means that the TALUP must literally “ ‘adopt’ or ‘incorporate’ Air Force identified areas of aircraft accident potential and noise” from the AICUZ. That construction finds some support in dictionary definitions of

Consideration of the legislative history of Senate Bill 1468 makes it clear that the act was a response to base closures after nearby development interfered with base operations. A background memorandum prepared by the Senate Bill author’s office explained that “Urban encroachment near military bases threatens to impact the missions of many of the state’s military bases. As major urban population centers spring up on once vacant land at the perimeter of military bases, the interests of residents, businesses, and government collide with the facility’s mission objectives .... The resulting constraint on mission activity is that the facility can no longer effectively fulfill its mission and could become a candidate for the next round of closures .... [f] ... H] Closures have meant a loss of jobs on a large scale, and economic disaster for many of the communities where the bases once stood.” In fact, the report listed Travis as one of the four (of 64) installations “facing the most significant pressure from urban growth.”

Similarly, Senate and Assembly committee reports state that military officials are “concerned about civilian land uses encroaching on military bases. When counties and cities approve development near bases, residents often object to noisy or dangerous military operations and force their relocation.” In a letter to the Senate Journal, the Senate Bill author wrote “[e]ncroachment on military activities in California is a matter of serious concern .... Increasingly, growth and development in the vicinity of military

We seek to adopt a construction that will render the statute “ ‘reasonable, fair and harmonious with its manifest purpose.’ ” (Conway v. City of Imperial Beach (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 78 , 85 [ 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 402 ].) Viewing the statutory scheme as a whole, we conclude that “consistent with” means that the land use plan must be compatible with the applicable AICUZ. Because the purpose of Senate Bill 1468 was to protect the operations of military installations from encroachment by development, compatibility in this context means that the land use plan must be at least as protective of airport operations as the applicable AICUZ, but it need not literally adopt the safety and noise standards in the AICUZ.

Critically, there is no reason to think that the Legislature intended to prohibit ALUC’s from adopting land use plans that prohibit more development than would be prohibited using the AICUZ safety and noise standards. Such a construction of the statute would not advance the legislative purpose of protecting military operations, and it could undermine that purpose by prohibiting ALUC’s from adopting restrictions which they deem necessary to prevent encroachment, even if those restrictions go beyond the recommendations in the relevant AICUZ. The Department of Transportation’s Handbook, to which ALUC’s are obligated to look for guidance (§ 21674.7, subd. (a)), emphasizes that an ALUC may need to provide greater protection for military operations than that provided by the applicable AICUZ. The Handbook states, “AICUZ compatibility criteria tend to be minimal in terms of the degree of protection from incompatible land uses which they afford. ALUCs and local jurisdictions can and should consider setting higher standards in their own respective compatibility planning. Ensuring a high degree of land use compatibility around military airports is particularly prudent given the economic importance which major bases have to the surrounding communities and the fact that land use compatibility is one of the factors considered in the government’s assessment of which bases to maintain in operation.” (Handbook, supra, at p. 3-37.)

Moreover, appellant’s construction of the statute would permit the military to dictate local land use policies and prevent local authorities from concluding that more protective measures are necessary to protect local safety and health. This would be inconsistent with the ALUC’s statutory responsibility for protecting the public health, safety, and welfare (§ 21674) and inconsistent with repeated assurances in the legislative history that the bill does not take away local control. The Senate Bill author’s background memorandum emphasized that “[Senate Bill] 1468 would encourage coordination between

To support its argument that the consistency requirement obligated the Commission to “adopt” or “incorporate” Air Force standards from the AICUZ, appellant seizes upon two statements in the legislative history. First, it relates that the language at issue was added to the act after a committee report pointed out that “ ‘[t]he airport land use planning law encourages but does not require ALUCs to recognize the military’s AICUZ designations of accident prevention zones and noise contours’ ” and recommended that Senate Bill 1468 “require ALUCs to revise their plans and adopt the AICUZ designations.” But the Legislature did not select the term “adopt”; instead it used the phrase “consistent with.”

Second, appellant points to a Department of Finance report, which includes a characterization of the bill’s purpose. The report states, “The author’s office reports that naval officials worry about conflicts between civilian development interfering with military bases. Therefore, the purpose of this bill is to provide the United States Department of Defense with a mechanism for working with local governments and the state to incorporate military bases and needs into state and local general plans. For every military airfield the military has developed Zones to identify potential accident zones and particular noise concerns. The sponsor would like the PUC [szc] to incorporate these Zones into their general plans.” Again, the more flexible phrase “consistent with” is used in the statute. The Senate and Assembly committee reports do not use the terms “incorporate” or “adopt.” Appellant points to nothing in the legislative history revealing an intent to require literal adoption of Air Force standards despite local desire to use even more protective standards. To the contrary, as noted previously, Senate and Assembly committee reports emphasize local decisionmaking.

As we define the phrase, appellant has not shown that the TALUP is not “consistent with” the 1995 AICUZ safety and noise standards. Appellant does

Ultimately, the Air Force granted the Commission’s request for exemption of Travis from release of a new AICUZ study, “contingent on [the Commission’s] adoption of the Travis AFB AICUZ 2000 study noise contour map and the AICUZ land use recommendations in their revision of the” TALUP. Appellant asserts that the Commission failed to comply with this requirement, but appellant has not shown that the TALUP failed to satisfy the Air Force’s expectations. Neither has appellant shown that the Commission failed to consider the 2000 AICUZ data. The record indicates that the Commission’s noise consultant considered such data to be critical to its work and that the consultant did consider the Air Force year 2000 contours. Appellant has not shown that any of the Commission’s actions surrounding the proposed 2000 AICUZ study provide a basis to invalidate the TALUP.

B. Selection of 60 dB CNEL Noise Contour

The TALUP recommends that local governments not allow new residential development in the 60 dB CNEL noise area at densities higher than allowed by current zoning. Appellant contends that the Commission acted unlawfully in using 60 dB CNEL as the basis for its noise contour rather than 65 dB CNEL as the noise contour.

The Commission’s selection of 60 dB CNEL as the basis for its noise contour is supported by the Handbook. The Handbook states, “[M]ost federal and state of California regulations and policies set DNL/CNEL 65 dB as the basic limit of acceptable noise exposure for residential and other noise-sensitive land uses. Often overlooked, though, is that this standard has been set with respect to relatively noisy urban areas. For quieter settings and many—if not most—airports in California, CNEL 65 dB is too high of a noise level to be appropriate as a standard for land use compatibility planning. This view is particularly evident with respect to evaluation of proposed new land use development. Even FAA policy has evolved to where

Appellant does not explain why it was arbitrary for the Commission to use the 60 dB CNEL noise contour, beyond the fact that the Air Force’s position in 1995 was- that residential land use was -appropriate in the 60 to 64 dB CNEL range. As we have explained, the Commission was not required by law. to adopt the same standard' as used in the AICUZ. It was not arbitrary or capricious ■ for the Commissioh to adopt the 60 dB CNEL standard in determining the compatibility of residential land uses.

C. Maximum Mission

Finally, appellant contends the TALUP is invalid because it is based on a “maximum mission” scenario devised by the Commission, instead of the Air Force’s own projection.

' . Section 21674.7, subdivision (a) provides that ALUC’s “shall be guided by” the Handbook in adopting or amending an airport land irse compatibility -plan. In support of its position, appellant cites to language in the Handbook which requires ALUC’s to hew closely to the predictions of airport operators in forecasting future activity. The Handbook states, “A caution with regard to updating of airport plans and forecasts for compatibility planning purposes, though, is that ALUCs must avoid assuming or suggesting that the layout or operation of the airport will change in a manner not anticipated by the entity responsible for the airport’s operation. Assumptions regarding the fúndamental role of the airport must remain as indicated in the adopted master plan or other policies of the' airport proprietor.” (Handbook, supra, at p. 2-6.)

However, that guidance does not apply to the TALUP. Regarding military airports the Handbook states, “Several factors make compatibility planning for military facilities distinct from that for civilian airports. [][]... [f] A particularly unique aspect of compatibility planning for military airports is

The TALUP’s approach to the “maximum mission” issue is consistent with the Handbook. The TALUP includes the Commission’s assumptions about potential future activity levels at Travis, accompanied by the caveat that “[preparation of aircraft operations forecasts in the traditional sense would not be very meaningful for [Travis] because activity levels are highly dependent upon world events and changes in the mission of the base.” For purposes of determining compatible uses, the TALUP assumes future operations at double the current level, which assumption “allows for future long-term growth in military aircraft activity that is not necessarily reflected in the ‘maximum mission’ scenarios presently envisioned by the Air Force.” The TALUP also assumes use of flight tracks not currently in use, use of a currently nonexisting assault landing strip, and establishment of a civilian air cargo hub at Travis. Appellant has not shown that any of these assumptions were unreasonable. The Handbook expressly mentions the possibility of increasing operations by multiples in order to account for potential growth, use of additional flight tracks and an additional strip would be consistent with growth in operations, and the Commission’s noise consultant referenced discussions about the possibility of cargo operations at Travis.

In light of the Handbook’s flexible approach to the issue, appellant has failed to establish that the Commission’s definition of the Travis “maximum mission” was arbitrary or capricious.

The judgment is affirmed.

Jones, R J., and Simons, J., concurred.