People v. Chad S.

Another petition was filed on July 26, 1993, alleging that Chad was a minor within the meaning of section 602 because he had committed grand theft by stealing a firearm from his mother. Chad admitted the allegations. The court found that local programs had been ineffective in Chad’s rehabilitation. The court committed Chad to CYA, stayed the commitment, and ordered Chad to remain in juvenile hall for 90 days. Chad was ordered to attend school regularly; all prior orders remained in effect. Restitution was also ordered.

On March 7,1994, a section 602/777 petition was filed alleging that Chad had committed grand theft by taking a ring and currency from his mother. In addition, it was alleged that Chad was in violation of his probation and previous dispositions had been ineffective in his rehabilitation. Chad admitted the charges. The court found that Chad had failed to reform on probation and previous orders of the court had been ineffective in his rehabilitation. The court committed Chad to CYA.

Discussion

Consideration of Stayed CYA Commitment

The juvenile court here relied on the previously stayed commitment to CYA as a reason to commit Chad to CYA on the present petition.

Chad contends it was improper for the trial court to consider the previously stayed commitment as a reason to send him to CYA. Chad’s argument is based on the theory that a stay of commitment to CYA is unauthorized because such a stay is a determination of a dispositional issue in advance of the dispositional hearing. Chad asserts that the court’s almost exclusive reliance on the effect of the stayed commitment requires that the dispositional order be reversed.

The question of whether a juvenile commitment may be stayed has been the subject of several recent appellate court decisions.

The case of In re Ronnie P. (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1079 [ 12 Cal.Rptr.2d 875 ] from the First District, Division Two, is the starting point of the recent

The appellate court found it was error for the trial court to rely on a previously suspended or stayed commitment. The trial court’s comment was, “ T told him that if he ran, he’s going to go to the Youth Authority. So he’s going to the Youth Authority. That’s just the way it works.’ ” (In re Ronnie P., supra, 10 Cal.App.4th at p. 1088, fn. omitted.)

Addressing the question of whether juvenile court law authorizes the staying of a CYA commitment, the appellate court commented: “This practice has been codified at section 111, subdivision (e), which permits the court to enforce, upon a violation of ‘a condition or conditions of probation,’ a ‘stayed’ order for confinement in a county institution for up to 30 days. The expression of this narrow authorization implies the exclusion of any broader authority for ‘stayed’ dispositions, under the doctrine of ‘expressio unius estexclusio alterius.' [Citation.]” {In re Ronnie P., supra, 10 Cal.App.4th at p. 1087.)

The appellate court also found that a trial court may not “forego a thorough review of dispositional considerations in favor of a previously ‘stayed’ Youth Authority commitment.” {In re Ronnie P., supra, 10 Cal.App.4th at p. 1087.) The appellate court reasoned that self-executing or automatic penalties run counter to the objectives of the juvenile law and disregard the particular considerations required to be reviewed each time a ward comes before the court. {Id. at pp. 1087-1088.)

Although the Ronnie P. court found no place for a stayed CYA commitment in the juvenile court scheme, it recognized the value of such an order. “Of course, the threat of Youth Authority commitment may have a salutary effect on a particular minor’s attitude, and nothing said here should be understood to restrict the court’s ability to employ such a threat to encourage the minor’s reform. Further, a minor’s failure to heed such a warning may be taken as some evidence of resistance to rehabilitation. Aside from these purposes and effects, however, such a warning can have no legal bearing on a subsequent dispositional proceeding. Certainly it cannot operate to foreclose the imposition or continuation of a less restrictive placement.” {In re Ronnie P., supra, 10 Cal.App.4th at p. 1090, fn. 8.)

The First District Court of Appeal, Division One, agreed in part and disagreed in part with Ronnie P. in the case of In re Kazuo G. (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1 [ 27 Cal.Rptr.2d 155 ]. In Kazuo G., the juvenile court suspended a six-month commitment to a county institution. After the filing of a supplemental petition, the juvenile court committed Kazuo to the Boys Ranch for six months. Kazuo contended the juvenile court erred in automatically imposing the previously stayed commitment to the Boys Ranch without a complete reassessment of his current circumstances. (Id. at p. 4.) The appellate court agreed with Ronnie P. that the imposition of a previous stay may not be automatically lifted and the disposition chosen must be based on a reassessment of the circumstances. (Id. at pp. 4-6.) The appellate court in Kazuo G. disagreed with the dicta in Ronnie P. limiting the authority of a juvenile court to stay a commitment when it places a minor on probation.

“In In re Ricardo M. [(1975)] 52 Cal.App.3d 744 [ 125 Cal.Rptr. 291 ], the court held that section 730 authorizes confinement to juvenile hall as a condition of probation: ‘Its purpose is to demonstrate to the minor the road to which continuation of delinquency will lead. . . .’ [Citation.] For the same reason, the Supreme Court has upheld a stay of juvenile hall commitment as a condition of probation: ‘[T]he court could reasonably conclude that... the threat of further confinement if he again violated the conditions of probation would serve as a deterrent to delinquent behavior.’ [Citation.]

“We reiterate our agreement with Ronnie P. that a prior stay of a juvenile commitment may not be automatically lifted at a subsequent dispositional proceeding, but we find the Supreme Court’s holding in In re Lance W., supra, controlling. A juvenile commitment may be imposed and stayed when probation is granted—to serve as a warning to the minor where his continued delinquency will lead.” (In re Kazuo G., supra, 22 Cal.App.4th at pp. 8-9.)

The appellate court also found that subdivision (e) of section 777 does not limit the juvenile court’s authority to impose and stay a longer commitment; it is merely an exception to the requirement of a supplemental petition. The exception applies if the commitment is for 30 days or less. (In re Kazuo G., supra, 22 Cal.App.4th at pp. 8-10.)

The most recent published authority is In re Domanic B. (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 366 [ 28 Cal.Rptr.2d 439 ], from the First District, Division Five. The appellate court agreed with the analysis in In re Kazuo G. and held “that a juvenile court may impose a stayed or suspended CYA commitment, provided the general procedural requirements of Welfare and Institutions Code section 111, the filing of the supplemental petition and a noticed hearing thereon, are followed before the stay is lifted.” (23 Cal.App.4th at p. 367.) The appellate court in Domanic B. emphasized that a “suspended or stayed term functions as an important part of the rehabilitative process, as a probationary or conditional term.” (Id. at p. 373.) A suspended commitment may serve rehabilitative purposes by deterring further criminal acts.

Based on In re Lance W. (1985) 37 Cal.3d 873 [ 210 Cal.Rptr. 631 , 694 P.2d 744 ] and pertinent discussions contained in the above cases, a juvenile court should have available a tool which it can utilize to serve as a warning to the minor where his continued delinquency will lead. A “stayed commitment” serves this purpose. Section 777 authorizes a “stayed” commitment. It provides in pertinent part: “(e) The filing of a supplemental petition and the hearing thereon shall not be required for the commitment of a minor to a county institution for a period of 30 days or less pursuant to an original or a previous order imposing a specified time in custody and staying the enforcement of the order subject to subsequent violation of a condition or conditions of probation, provided that in order to make the commitment, the court finds at a hearing that the minor has violated a condition of probation.”

Thus, a stayed term of confinement in juvenile cases ordered by a court upon granting probation is generally valid unless lifting of the stay is automatic upon violation of probation. As discussed in the above cases,

A stayed commitment in the juvenile court system is different from what one normally associates with the term “stayed.” Unlike adult probationers who may choose to reject probation and accept incarceration, no such choice is offered a juvenile offender on probation. (In re Tyrell J. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 68 , 82 [ 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 33 , 876 P.2d 519 ].) There is, with limited exceptions, but one choice to be made by the juvenile court, and in order to make a new choice the appropriate procedures must be followed.

Although the court is limited to only one disposition, the juvenile court should not be prohibited from warning a minor, in forceful terms, that should he violate the terms of his probation he is likely headed for CYA.

A stay of a commitment in the juvenile court system is to be understood and applied within the structure of that unique system. It is a warning tool aimed at rehabilitation and is authorized as long as all procedures are followed and appropriate findings considered and made when lifting the stay. It cannot be automatic or self-executing.

The instant case is an excellent example of the proper utilization of a stayed commitment in the juvenile court system.

At the dispositional hearing on August 10, 1993, the trial court imposed a CYA commitment and then stayed the commitment. At the dispositional hearing on April 8, 1994, based on the filing of a new section 602/777 petition, the trial court committed Chad to CYA. Chad testified at the hearing that he now had a change in attitude and was ready to reform. The court’s reasoning for imposing a CYA commitment referred to the previous stayed CYA commitment. In particular, the trial court stated: “I am looking back here in this particular matter of the fact that there has been a California Youth Authority commitment. The fact that commitment was stayed does not make it any less a commitment. At the time that the minor was previously committed, and I am not looking at that and saying that because he was committed to the California Youth Authority, and it was stayed and

The judgment is affirmed.

Thaxter, J., and Harris, J., concurred.

Appellant’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied March 16, 1995.