Scruby v. Vintage Grapevine, Inc.

Opinion

In this case we hold that a deed granting a nonexclusive easement of a specified width does not, as a matter of law, give the owner of the dominant tenement the right to use every portion of the easement. The trial court properly interpreted this easement to give the owner of the servient tenement the right to place improvements upon the easement as long as they do not unreasonably interfere with the right of the owner of the dominant tenement to ingress and egress.

John E. and Giovanna Scruby (Scruby) brought this action for declaratory and injunctive relief to resolve a dispute with Vintage Grapevine, Inc. (Grapevine), the owner of the adjacent property, concerning a nonexclusive easement, 52 feet in width, dedicated to road and utility purposes over Grapevine’s property. Scruby alleged certain aspects of Grapevine’s winery operations unlawfully interfered with Scruby’s right to fully use the easement. Grapevine cross-complained, alleging Scruby had unlawfully interfered with the winery’s use of its property. The trial court issued a judgment after a nonjury trial defining the scope of the easement. Both parties appeal.

Statement of Facts

Scruby is the owner of 1.03 acres of land and a single-family home at 7429 St. Helena Highway in Napa County, California. Grapevine owns and operates Cosentino Winery located at 7415 St. Helena Highway, consisting of 4.29 acres just south of Scruby’s property. The only access to Scruby’s landlocked property is over an easement on Grapevine’s property which was deeded to Scruby by Grapevine’s predecessor in 1986. The recorded easement grant deed describes the property and states that Scruby is granted “[a]

The Main Appeal

General Law of Easements

“An easement is a restricted right to specific, limited, definable use or activity upon another’s property, which right must be less than the right of ownership.” (Mesnick v. Caton (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 1248 , 1261 [ 228 Cal.Rptr. 779 ].) In construing an instrument conveying an easement, the rules applicable to the construction of deeds generally apply. If the language is clear and explicit in the conveyance, there is no occasion for the use of parol evidence to show the nature and extent of the rights acquired. (Wilson v. Abrams (1969) 1 Cal.App.3d 1030 [ 82 Cal.Rptr. 272 ]; County of Sacramento v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 300 , 313 [ 238 Cal.Rptr. 305 ].) If the language is ambiguous, extrinsic evidence may be used as an aid to interpretation unless such evidence imparts a meaning to which the instrument creating the easement is not reasonably susceptible. (Buehler v. Oregon-Washington Plywood Corp. (1976) 17 Cal.3d 520 , 526 [ 131 Cal.Rptr. 394 , 551 P.2d 1226 ].)

The owner of the dominant tenement must use his or her easements and rights in such a way as to impose as slight a burden as possible on the servient tenement. (Locklin v. City of Lafayette (1994) 7 Cal.4th 327 , 356, fn. 17 [ 27 Cal.Rptr.2d 613 , 867 P.2d 724 ].) Every incident of ownership not inconsistent with the easement and the enjoyment of the same is reserved to the owner of the servient estate. (Golden West Baseball Co. v. City of Anaheim (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 11 , 35 [ 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 378 ]; City of Los Angeles v. Ingersoll-Rand Co. (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 889 , 893-894 [ 129 Cal.Rptr. 485 ].)

The owner of the servient estate may make continued use of the area the easement covers so long as the use does not “interfere unreasonably”

The conveyance of an easement limited to roadway use grants a right of ingress and egress and a right of unobstructed passage to the holder of the easement. A roadway easement does not include the right to use the easement for any other purpose. (See Marlin v. Robinson (1932) 123 Cal.App. 373 , 377 [ 11 P.2d 70 ].) When the easement is “nonexclusive” the common users “have to accommodate each other.” {Applegate v. Ota (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 702 , 712 [ 194 Cal.Rptr. 331 ].) An obstruction which unreasonably interferes with the use of a roadway easement can be ordered removed “for the protection and preservation” of the easement. {Id. at pp. 712-713.)

While the parties are in agreement on the controlling principles of law, their dispute is with how the trial court applied these principles to the facts at hand.

Scope of the Easement Grant

Scruby’s principal argument, which serves as a springboard for their remaining arguments, is that the court erred in construing the easement to give them a mere roadway of reasonable and convenient access to their residence and that the correct interpretation would have allowed them the right to exclusive use of the entire specifically described easement area. Scruby emphasizes the grant gives them “[a] nonexclusive easement, 52 feet in width, for road and utility purposes.” Therefore, Scruby argues, they have “the right, as a matter of law, to use every portion of their 52-foot-wide easement, and the 100-foot diameter cul-de-sac, free of interference by [Grapevine].” (Italics in original.) Grapevine does not deny that Scruby has “the right to use the easement to come and go from their property unimpeded,” but Grapevine contends that Scruby has “not been granted the right to use discrete ‘portions of their easement’ which do not relate to the efficient ingress and egress to and from their own property.”

From the evidence presented and the court’s tour of the premises, the court agreed with Grapevine that the extent of Scruby’s right to use Grapevine’s land was limited to an easement of ingress and egress to and from the

Admission of Extrinsic Evidence

A great deal of extrinsic evidence about the original creation of the boundaries of this easement was admitted here without objection. Scruby now objects to the extrinsic evidence, asserting that the intent of the parties is evident from a mere examination of the unambiguous language of the instrument, and the terms of the instrument govern. Scruby maintains that an objection at trial was unnecessary because as a substantive rule of law, extrinsic evidence cannot be used to support a méaning to which the easement grant is not reasonably susceptible. (See Tahoe National Bank v. Phillips (1971) 4 Cal.3d 11 , 23 [ 92 Cal.Rptr. 704 , 480 P.2d 320 ].) Thus, we will consider whether the extrinsic evidence supports a reasonable interpretation of the easement.

As Scruby emphasizes, when the width of an easement is definitely fixed by the grant or reservation creating the same, its use may be interpreted as commensurate with the entire width thereof. (See, e.g., Ballard v. Titus (1910) 157 Cal. 673 , 681 [ 110 P. 118 ]; Tarr v. Watkins (1960) 180 Cal.App.2d 362 , 366 [ 4 Cal.Rptr. 293 ].) It is equally well settled, however, that “[t]he specification of width and location of surface rights-of-way does not always determine the extent of the burden imposed on the servient land. . . .” {Gaut v. Farmer (1963) 215 Cal.App.2d 278 , 282 [ 30 Cal.Rptr. 94 ], citations omitted.)

This point is aptly illustrated in Heath v. Kettenhofen (1965) 236 Cal.App.2d 197 [ 45 Cal.Rptr. 778 ], a case brought to our attention at oral argument which has been supplementally briefed by the parties. That case involved the proper interpretation of an easement almost identical to the one at issue here. Plaintiffs in Heath were granted an easement described as 40 feet in width for roadway and utility purposes. {Id. at p. 200.) Notwithstanding the specifically described easement area, the trial court interpreted this language as granting plaintiffs the right to reasonable use of the easement for access to and from their property. The court further held that defendant, the

The appellate court in Heath rejected this argument and upheld the trial court’s interpretation. In doing so, the court noted that the precise specification of width and location of an easement does not always determine the extent of the burden placed upon the servient tenement; rather, that burden can properly be measured by the use and purpose for which the easement has been granted. (236 Cal.App.2d at p. 204.) Furthermore, whether encroachments in the easement area constituted an unreasonable interference with plaintiff’s use presented “a question of fact, to be resolved in the first instance by the trial court, whose determination is to be upheld on appeal if supported by substantial evidence.” {Id. at p. 205.)

When there is any ambiguity or uncertainty about the scope of an easement grant, the surrounding circumstances, including the physical conditions and character of the servient tenement and the requirements of the grantee, play a significant role in the determination of the controlling intent. (See Buehler v. Oregon-Washington Plywood Corp., supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 528.) We cannot say there is no ambiguity on the face of the easement grant here concerning the matter of the physical area over which Scruby has roadway use. The language of the easement does not specifically describe the intended roadway as 52 feet in width ending in a 100-foot cul-de-sac. Instead, it provides a “nonexclusive easement, 52 feet in width, for road and utility purposes.” This kind of ambiguity is frequently found, and the pertinent rule is accurately stated in 28 California Jurisprudence Third, Easements and Licenses, section 58, page 200 “[i]n determining the scope of an easement, extrinsic evidence may be used as an aid to interpretation unless such evidence imparts a meaning to which the instrument creating the easement is not reasonably susceptible.” (See also Annot. (1953) 28 A.L.R.2d 253 , 265.)

Resort to surrounding circumstances leaves no doubt in our minds, as it left no doubt for the trial court, that the easement before us can be reasonably construed as granting Scruby the right of ingress and egress to the property. The court’s opinion provides a full history of this easement and notes: “The court finds that the initial grant of easement in 1966 was made in connection with a planned subdivision of the lands to which the easement was to provide access. Because these lands were never subdivided according to plan, the easement remained in place to service Parcel A [Scruby’s

Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s findings in that regard. The record demonstrates that due to “a myriad of safety questions and concerns” Napa County had issued Grapevine a use permit with the condition that there would be a single entrance from Highway 29 onto Grapevine’s property to be used by both Scruby and the winery. The approved plan called for moving the entrance of the driveway several feet south along Highway 29. This slight reconfiguration allowed for a proper turning radius from Highway 29 to the winery property. As reconfigured, the entrance from the highway was still within the 52-foot easement area.

Scruby was provided the opportunity to object to the plan, but they did not. Thereafter, Scruby paved a separate portion of the easement leading from their property to the highway. The paving opened up two roads from Highway 29, in violation of Grapevine’s use permit. Grapevine had been notified to remove the paving or lose the winery’s use permit.

Upon viewing the scene, the court found “that for safety reasons a single entrance to the winery property is essential.” This finding was supported by expert testimony at trial detailing the safety hazards presented when two driveways, ten feet apart, access the same busy highway. The court further found that a single entrance was not an impediment to Scruby’s right to a reasonable mode of ingress and egress to their property. The court’s findings are fully supported and binding on appeal.

Grapevine’s Cross-appeal Resolving the Drainage Problem and Landscaping

In its cross-appeal, Grapevine argues it should be relieved of that portion of the judgment setting out specific requirements for its construction of a drainage system and modification of the landscaping, and instead, Grapevine should be given flexibility to resolve the drainage problem and respond to