People v. Madrigal

Facts and Procedural Background^[1]

On August 3, 1993, defendant was charged by information in the instant case, No. TA025194, with receiving stolen property in violation of Penal Code section 496.^[2] On August 20, 1993, defendant pleaded no contest in the South Central District of the Los Angeles Superior Court (Compton) before Judge John J. Cheroske. Judge Cheroske suspended imposition of sentence and placed defendant on three years’ probation on condition defendant spend two hundred seventy days in jail (Compton case).

On December 9, 1993, defendant was charged by information in case No. VA026207 (People v. Madrigal (Super. Ct. L.A. County, 1993)) with attempted second degree burglary in violation of sections 664 and 459. On December 23, 1993, defendant pleaded guilty in the Southeast District of the Los Angeles Superior Court (Norwalk) before Judge Michael A. Cowell pursuant to a plea agreement in which defendant would be placed on probation for three years on condition defendant spend one year in jail (Norwalk case). It was also agreed that defendant’s probation in the Compton case would be revoked and reinstated with no additional time. Defendant was advised he would be on probation in both cases.

On January 7, 1994, defendant appeared in Norwalk before Judge John A. Torribio for sentencing.^[3] Judge Torribio was advised that the plea agreement included reinstatement of probation in the Compton case with no additional time. In the Norwalk case, Judge Torribio suspended imposition of sentence and placed defendant on three years’ probation on condition defendant spend one year in jail. The file for the Compton probation violation was not before Judge Torribio. Judge Torribio told defendant: “What I’ll do, Mr. Madrigal, what I intend to do on your violation of probation is to reinstate your probation on the same terms and conditions. [U Do you waive being present here in court when I find you in violation and reinstate your probation?” After defendant and defense counsel replied in the affirmative, Judge Torribio said: “Okay. That’s what I will do then and that will save him having to be brought back.”

On February 28, 1994, the prosecution filed with Judge Cheroske a motion to revoke the Compton probation based on the conviction in the

“ ““ “A superior court is but one tribunal, even if it be composed of numerous departments .... An order made in one department during the progress of a cause can neither be ignored nor overlooked in another department. . . ’ [Citations.] This is because the state Constitution, article IV, section 4 vests jurisdiction in the court, ‘. . . and not in any particular judge or department. . . ; and . . . whether sitting separately or together, the judges hold but one and the same court.’ ” ’ ” (Silverman v. Superior Court (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 145 , 150-151 [ 249 Cal.Rptr. 724 ].) “ ‘One department of the superior court cannot enjoin, restrain, or otherwise interfere with the judicial act of another department of the superior court.’ ” (Id. at p. 151.) The first department “ ‘to assume and exercise jurisdiction over a matter acquires exclusive jurisdiction.’ ” (Ibid.) “ ‘A judgment rendered in one department of the superior court is binding on that matter upon all other departments until such time as the judgment is overturned.’ ” (Ibid.)

In this case, the Compton probation violation was properly assigned to the Norwalk judge to whom the new criminal case had been assigned. This assignment was in accordance with Los Angeles Superior Court Rules, rule 2.5, which provides that a probation violation matter is to be heard by the same judge to whom the new criminal matter has been assigned, unless the file contains a written request from the judge who granted probation that the probation violation matter be heard by him or her.^[4] The Compton case file does not contain any such written request. Accordingly, Judge Torribio was vested with jurisdiction to hear the Compton probation violation on January 7, 1994.