Majority
Opinion
Petitioner (defendant) seeks a writ of prohibition restraining respondent superior court from conducting any further proceedings involving selection of a jury in defendant’s pending trial.
Defendant is charged with two counts of second degree murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 189) and two counts of gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated (Pen. Code, § 191.5, subd. (a)). Respondent court filed
In promulgating Court Ops Memo No. 75, respondent superior court purports to extend sealing of juror identifying information throughout all civil and criminal proceedings, in effect adopting a procedure ensuring anonymity of jurors absent granting of a petition for access to personal juror identifying information.[1]
Subdivision (a)(2) of Code of Civil Procedure section 237 was amended in 1995 to read: “Upon the recording of a jury’s verdict in a criminal jury
1 In pertinent part, Court Ops Memo No. 75 reads: “Code of Civil Procedure section 206.237 was amended in 1995 (SB 508) requiring the court to seal all record of personal juror identifying information at the conclusion of a criminal jury proceeding. It is the policy and procedure of the Placer County Superior and Municipal Courts to follow the same procedure for both criminal and civil jury trials. “Procedure “1. Jury Services prepares two random lists for each department. One random for the judge and one for the clerk. “2. Roll call is taken by the clerk, no attorneys or parties present and off the record. The prospective jurors oath is administered to the prospective jury panel prior to hardship screening and completion of juror questionnaire. “3. Clerk/judge - initial hardships on the record (in some departments), outside of the presence of attorneys and parties. “4. Remaining jurors are given a juror number badge to wear, see sample attached. . . . Clerk records that number on the random list next to the appropriate name. Jurors will be known by this number for the remainder of the trial. “5. Questionnaires are completed, juror uses the assigned number instead of name at the top of the questionnaire. Using the random list, the clerk fills the jury box by calling the assigned numbers as recorded on the random list. . . . The juror questionnaire forms will not be signed by prospective jurors. “6............................ “7. If a petition for access to juror personal identifying information is received, the court shall give all potentially affected jurors at least 15 days notice of the hearing date and an opportunity to oppose the unsealing of juror personal identifying information.” (Emphasis in original text.) We are mystified by respondent court’s comment: “Ct. Ops. Memo #75 does not mandate juror anonymity ... but merely controls some of the procedures and paper trail with respect to the court’s jury selection system.” The procedure adopted by respondent court unequivocally bars parties, counsel and others from access to juror identifying information, absent granting of a petition for access to that information.
In amending Code of Civil Procedure section 237 to limit access to juror identifying information only after return of jury verdict in a criminal case, the Legislature addressed the subject of confidentiality of juror identifying information, determining that such information shall be sealed only upon return of jury verdict in a criminal action.[2]
As a local court rule or practice, Court Ops Memo No. 75 is invalid if inconsistent with statute.[3] (Kalivas v. Barry Controls Corp. (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1152 , 1158 [ 57 Cal.Rptr.2d 200 ], citing Mentzer v. Hardoin
2 Contrary to respondent court’s claims, requiring anonymous juries in a civil and criminal trials is not “complimentary [¿ic] to the mandate of C.C.P. § 237(b) [sic].” The impetus for the amendment to Code of Civil Procedure section 237 was concern for the protection of jurors in criminal trials from postverdict harassment: “The purpose with respect to this bill is to protect jurors from dangerous, threatening, or harassing investigations.” (Assem. Com. on Public Safety, 3d reading analysis of Sen. Bill No. 508 (1995-1996 Reg. Sess.) June 6, 1995, p. 3.) Similarly, “[t]he [bill’s] sponsor[, the Attorney General,] states that this bill is necessary because there have been incidents when a defendant has received information about the jurors and has harassed or threatened them, by mail, from prison.” (Ibid.)
3 We note that respondent court does not purport to have complied with the requisites for promulgation of a local rule. (See Gov. Code, § 68070; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 981; Simmons v. City of Pasadena (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th Supp. 1 , 5 [ 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 102 ].) Respondent court states Court Ops Memo No. 75 is not a local rule, but merely an “internal management tool” because it directs conduct of the court and does not “affect the substantive rights of the parties nor mandate any procedures which the parties or attorneys must follow.” However, the procedure adopted by respondent court bars parties, counsel and others from access to juror identifying information. Moreover, the Placer County Local Rules are replete with rules directing the conduct of the court and its staff (see, e.g., Cal. Rules of Court, rule 981(b); Placer County Local Rules, rules 10.9, 10.12, 20.1.8(E), 20.1.13, 40.4(B)(2).)
Having complied with the procedural requirements delineated in Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171 [ 203 Cal.Rptr. 626 , 681 P.2d 893 ], we are authorized to issue a preemptory writ in the first instance. “Although ‘[t]he writ to be issued does not exactly conform to the prayer of the petition; . . . this court is not limited by the prayer, and may grant the relief it deems appropriate.’ [Citations.]” (George M. v. Superior Court (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 755 , 760 [ 247 Cal.Rptr. 330 ].)
Let a peremptory writ of prohibition issue restraining respondent superior court from implementing or otherwise giving effect to Court Ops Memo No. 75. Upon finality of this decision, the previously issued stay is vacated.
Sims, J., and Scotland, J., concurred.
Cases cited
- Mentzer v. Hardoin 28 Cal.App.4th 1365 at 1372 p. 759
- Wells Fargo Bank v. Superior Court 206 Cal.App.3d 918 at 923 p. 759
- Iverson v. Superior Court 167 Cal.App.3d 544 at 548 p. 759
- St. Vincent Medical Center v. Superior Court 160 Cal.App.3d 1030 at 1034 p. 759
- Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. 36 Cal.3d 171 p. 759
- George M. v. Superior Court 201 Cal.App.3d 755 at 760 p. 759