Citizens for Open Access to Sand & Tide, Inc. v. Seadrift Ass'n

Opinion

The trial court sustained respondents’ demurrer to the present action for implied dedication of a public recreational easement and declaratory and injunctive relief without leave to amend. We conclude that appellant’s action is barred by a settlement incorporated into judgments entered in prior suits, and affirm the judgment.

Statement of Facts and Procedural History

Throughout this century a tide of controversy and litigation over the competing rights of private ownership and public access has swept over the sands of the Bolinas Sandspit, and more specifically a northwesterly part of it known as the Seadrift Sandspit. The matter now before us represents the latest wave of litigation to lap these shores.

In February of 1950, title to the Seadrift property between the ordinary high-water mark of the Pacific Ocean—known as the “Atherton Line”—and the low-water mark of the Bolinas Lagoon was quieted in the William Kent Estate Company, and soon thereafter development in the area commenced. Seadrift subsequently became a residential subdivision of over 300 parcels.

After obtaining the quiet title decree in 1950, the William Kent Estate Company constructed a fence perpendicular to the Atherton Line to exclude the public from the private Seadrift property. A suit initiated by the State of California in 1960 to mandate removal of the fence by William Kent Estate Company culminated more than a decade later in the voluntary withdrawal of a portion of the fence. Thus, the public continued to use the beach and lagoon for recreational activities.

The current dispute traces its genesis to 1983, when respondents obtained an emergency permit from the California Coastal Commission (hereafter the CCC) to construct a rock revetment seawall to protect homes in the Seadrift subdivision from storm damage. A permanent permit for installation and maintenance of the seawall was requested from Marin County (hereafter the County), the local governmental authority for coastal development under the California Coastal Act of 1976 (Pub. Resources Code, § 30000 et seq.). The County proposed to issue the permanent permit upon the condition that respondents dedicate to the public the beach on the Seadrift Sandspit, but on the advice of counsel, the County eventually approved the permit without any dedication requirements.

The chair and vice-chair of the CCC and a Seadrift property owner appealed the County’s decision to issue a permanent permit without dedication conditions or public access provisions to the CCC in 1987. Concurrently, the CCC and the Attorney General investigated the prescriptive rights of the public to recreational use of the Seadrift beach, and the extent to which the seawall interfered with those rights. The CCC concluded “that there are public prescriptive rights on the sandy beach,” and professed an intent to “pursue that” on behalf of the public if necessary.

The CCC, joined by the State Lands Commission (hereafter the SLC) and the Attorney General, also asserted that the entire Bolinas Sandspit remained public domain owned by the federal government, rather than by respondents as private property. On behalf of the State of California, an administrative action was therefore instituted before the Bureau of Land Management (hereafter the BLM). On March 6, 1989, after a hearing at which respondents, their title companies, and the state agencies appeared, the BLM determined that under the doctrine of “administrative finality” the federal

Respondents demurred to the second amended complaint, again on the ground of appellant’s lack of standing to assert an easement on behalf of the public, which had “already been represented” by the CCC, the SLC and the California Attorney General in proceedings that determined the nature of “public easement rights by implied dedication” in the Bolinas Sandspit. The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend, and this appeal followed.

Discussion

Appellant argues that it has standing to bring an action “on behalf of its members” for implied dedication of an easement “to establish the public’s rights to use of the beach,” and is not precluded by the settlement agreement from doing so in this proceeding. Respondents maintain that the settlement agreement is binding upon appellant and bars the present action “for implied dedication and public prescriptive rights.” Respondents also challenge appellant’s standing to “claim an easement for the benefit of the public.”

Our review is governed by well-settled principles. “When reviewing an order sustaining a demurrer without leave to amend, this court must treat the demurrer as admitting all properly pleaded facts, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. We must read the complaint as a whole and give it a reasonable interpretation. [Citation.] If the complaint, liberally construed, can state a cause of action, or if it is reasonably possible that the plaintiffs can cure the complaint by amendment, the trial court should not sustain a demurrer without leave to amend.” (Koch v. Rodlin Enterprises (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1591 , 1595 [ 273 Cal.Rptr. 438 ].)

I. Respondents’ Right to Raise the Issue of the Binding Effect of the Settlement Agreement.

Appellant submits that the trial court’s previous denial of respondents’ summary judgment motion, and this court’s denial of the petitions for writ of

Although not so expressed by appellant, the argument implicates principles of the law of the case doctrine, which holds that where an appellate court states in its opinion a principle of law necessary to the decision, that principle becomes law of the case and must be adhered to in all subsequent proceedings, including appeals. (People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764 , 786 [ 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 543 , 897 P.2d 481 ]; Clemente v. State of California (1985) 40 Cal.3d 202 , 211 [ 219 Cal.Rptr. 445 , 707 P.2d 818 ]; Bovard v. American Horse Enterprises, Inc. (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 832 , 841 [ 247 Cal.Rptr. 340 ].) Law of the case is a doctrine of procedure founded upon the concepts of judicial economy and finality of court rulings. (People v. Stanley, supra, at p. 786; George Arakelian Farms, Inc. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1279 , 1291 [ 265 Cal.Rptr. 162 , 783 P.2d 749 ]; Searle v. Allstate Life Ins. Co. (1985) 38 Cal.3d 425 , 435 [ 212 Cal.Rptr. 466 , 696 P.2d 1308 ].) “Application of the rule is now subject to the qualifications that ‘the point of law involved must have been necessary to the prior decision, that the matter must have been actually presented and determined by the court, and that application of the doctrine will not result in an unjust decision.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Shuey (1975) 13 Cal.3d 835 , 842 [ 120 Cal.Rptr. 83 , 533 P.2d 211 ]; see also People v. Pacini (1981) 120 Cal.App.3d 877 , 883 [ 174 Cal.Rptr. 820 ].)

It is now settled that pretrial denial of a writ petition does not establish law of the case unless the denial is accompanied by a written opinion following the issuance of an alternative writ. (Kowis v. Howard (1992) 3 Cal.4th 888 , 891 [ 12 Cal.Rptr.2d 728 , 838 P.2d 250 ]; Melamed v. City of Long Beach (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 70 , 75 [ 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 729 ].) Thus, our prior summary denial of respondents’ writ petition has no preclusive effect upon consideration of the issue on appeal from the ruling on the demurrer. (Melamed, supra, at p. 75.)

II. The Effect of the Settlement Agreement.

We turn then to the merits of respondents’ claim that the settlement agreement is binding upon appellant and forecloses relitigation of the claim of implied dedication of a public easement. Respondent’s argument is based

A. Final Decision on the Merits.

The settlement agreement, as incorporated into the judgments in the Kelly and federal court actions, meets the first requirement of res judicata that there was a final decision on the merits, which “ ‘ “. . . includes any prior adjudication of an issue in another action that is determined to be sufficiently firm to be accorded conclusive effect.” ’ (Sandoval v. Superior Court (1983) 140 Cal.App.3d 932 , 936 [ 190 Cal.Rptr. 29 ], quoting Rest.2d Judgments, § 13, italics added by Sandoval court.)” (Western Mutual Ins. Co. v. Yamamoto (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1474 ,1482-1483 [ 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 698 ].) “[A] stipulated judgment may properly be given collateral estoppel effect, at least when the parties manifest an intent to be collaterally bound by its terms.” (California State Auto. Assn. Inter-Ins. Bureau v. Superior Court (1990) 50 Cal.3d 658 , 664 [ 268 Cal.Rptr. 284 , 788 P.2d 1156 ]; see also McLaughlin v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1132 , 1152 [ 29 Cal.Rptr.2d 559 ]; Gates v. Superior Court (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 301 , 311 [ 223 Cal.Rptr. 678 ].) “‘A judgment entered ... by consent or stipulation, is as conclusive a . . . bar as a judgment rendered after trial.’ (4 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed. 1971) Judgment, § 170, p. 3312; De Weese v.

C. Identity of Parties.

Appellant complains that it did not participate in the settlement agreement or the prior actions, so the requisite identity of parties is absent. Appellant maintains that as a nonprofit “public interest” group it had standing to bring an action for implied dedication of a public recreational easement despite the previous settlement consummated by respondents and the CCC, the SLC, and the Attorney General. Appellant’s position is that government agencies cannot, by entering into a settlement of a dispute over public use of coastal areas, usurp the right and standing of public interest groups to litigate “public access by way of implied dedication.”

Although not a party to the settlement agreement, appellant may be bound by its terms if we determine that privity with the parties to the Kelly and federal court actions existed. (See Armstrong v. Armstrong (1976) 15 Cal.3d 942 , 951 [ 126 Cal.Rptr. 805 , 544 P.2d 941 ].) The concept of privity for the purposes of res judicata or collateral estoppel refers “to a mutual or successive relationship to the same rights of property, or to such an identification in interest of one person with another as to represent the same legal rights (Zaragosa v. Craven (1949) 33 Cal.2d 315 [ 202 P.2d 73 , 6 A.L.R.2d 461 ]; Teitelbaum Furs, Inc. v. Dominion Ins. Co., Ltd. [1962] 58 Cal.2d [601,] 604 [ 25 Cal.Rptr. 559 , 375 P.2d 439 ]; Rynsburger v. Dairymen’s Fertilizer Coop., Inc. (1968) 266 Cal.App.2d 269 [ 72 Cal.Rptr. 102 ]) and, more recently, to a relationship between the party to be estopped and the

Our Supreme Court has recognized that: “Privity is not susceptible of a neat definition, and determination of whether it exists is not a cut-and-dried exercise. (Clemmer v. Hartford Insurance Co. (1978) 22 Cal.3d 865 , 875 [ 151 Cal.Rptr. 285 , 587 P.2d 1098 ]; Lynch v. Glass (1975) 44 Cal.App.3d 943 , 947 [ 119 Cal.Rptr. 139 ].)” (Aronow v. LaCroix (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 1039 , 1048 [ 268 Cal.Rptr. 866 ]; Miller v. Superior Court (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 376 , 383 [ 214 Cal.Rptr. 125 ].) In the final analysis, the determination of privity depends upon the fairness of binding appellant with the result obtained in earlier proceedings in which it did not participate. (Miller v. Superior Court, supra, at p. 384-385.) “ ‘Whether someone is in privity with the actual parties requires close examination of the circumstances of each case.’ (People v. Henderson (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 1129 , 1151 [ 275 Cal.Rptr. 837 ].)” (Victa v. Merle Norman Cosmetics, Inc., supra, 19 Cal.App.4th at p. 464.) The issue of privity before us is a legal one, presented on undisputed facts, so we undertake a de novo review of the trial court’s decision. (Ibid.)

We are persuaded that appellant, along with the public as a whole, was adequately represented by the state agencies vested with authority to litigate the issue of public access to the Bolinas Sandspit. A party is adequately represented for purposes of the privity rule “if his or her interests are so similar to a party’s interest that the latter was the former’s virtual representative in the earlier action. (United States v. Geophysical Corp. (9th Cir. 1984) 732 F.2d 693 , 697.)” (Helfand v. National Union Fire Ins. Co.

The record further shows that in the Kelly and federal court actions the participating state agencies zealously pursued the rights of the public to use the Bolinas Sandspit. When respondents applied for a permit to construct the seawall, the County and the CCC proposed to issue the permit only upon the condition of dedication of a public access easement. After an investigation, the CCC and the Attorney General not only claimed “public prescriptive rights on the sandy beach,” but through administrative channels also challenged respondents’ title to the property. The settlement agreement specifically delineated the right of citizens of the state, including those counted as members of appellant, to use the property. Thus, the state agencies asserted the same interests in the property as appellant, and, upon our review of the record, seem to have been equally motivated to reach a successful conclusion of the litigation on behalf of the public.

That the prior litigation ended in a settlement rather than a successful judgment after trial does not diminish the worthiness of the effort. (See Helfand v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., supra, 10 Cal.App.4th at pp. 902-903.) The settlement agreement was the product of a reasonable compromise, and does not carry with it even the hint of any abdication of the role of public agent by the parties to the prior litigation. To the contrary, the CCC, SLC, the County, and Attorney General engaged in a lengthy, vigorous conflict with respondents to obtain public access rights, and in the end obtained a result that appears quite favorable to the public. Thus, the state agencies not only acted on behalf of the public, including appellant’s members, but the representation provided was in all respects effective. (Alaska Sport Fishing Ass’n v. Exxon Corp. (9th Cir. 1994) 34 F.3d 769 , 773; Lewis v. County of Sacramento (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 214 , 218-219 [ 266 Cal.Rptr. 678 ]; Gates v. Superior Court, supra, 178 Cal.App.3d at pp. 307-308.) “ ‘[W]hen a party acts in a representative capacity, and as such is lawfully authorized to litigate the questions at issue for those whom he represents, they as well as he are bound by the judgment. [Citation.]’ (Murdock v. Eddy (1940) 38 Cal.App.2d 551 , 554 [ 101 P.2d 722 ].)” (Estate of Baumann (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 927 , 935 [ 247 Cal.Rptr. 532 ].)

Nor, we conclude, is the res judicata effect of the settlement agreement negated by appellant’s failure to control or directly participate in the Kelly

In the prior actions, the CCC, SLC and the Attorney General acted in a representative capacity for the public, including the members of appellant, to promote interests identical to those at issue here. We do not suggest that a citizens group such as appellant would never have standing to bring a representative or class suit to establish public prescriptive rights, particularly if the state agencies entrusted with authority to act in the public interest failed to do so. But, the rights of public access to the Bolinas Sandspit were thoroughly represented by the designated state agencies as parties to the settlement agreement, and in the action for implied dedication of a public easement now before us appellant does not claim any individual private property rights separate and apart from those already adjudicated. Under the doctrine of res judicata, appellant must be considered in privity with the parties to the settlement agreement, and accordingly has no independent standing to bring a repetitive suit to litigate matters previously determined in actions pursued for the public benefit by state agencies acting in a representative capacity. (Alaska Sport Fishing Ass’n v. Exxon Corp., supra, 34 F.3d at p. 773; Lewis v. County of Sacramento, supra, 218 Cal.App.3d at pp. 218-219; Gates v. Superior Court, supra, 178 Cal.App.3d at p. 308; County of Tulare v. Boggs, supra, 146 Cal.App.3d at p. 242.)

D. Policy Considerations.

Finally, we discern no public policy reason for refusing to invoke the doctrine of res judicata. Precluding the present suit by appellant will not result in any manifest injustice to appellant or adverse impact upon the public. In granting res judicata effect to preclude suit by appellant, we do not cavalierly disregard the compelled absence of appellant from the Kelly action by the trial court’s denial of the motion to intervene. We are convinced, however, based upon the particular and rather unique circumstances presented to us, that the claims asserted by appellant in the present case were commendably advanced during negotiation and ratification of the settlement agreement. Appellant’s current complaint with the nature and extent of the easement granted to the public by the settlement agreement does not, in our view, compromise the ardent advocacy of the public interest previously afforded by the state agencies. Only because we find that the right of public access to the Bolinas Sandspit was considered, litigated and thoroughly protected do we accord binding effect to the settlement agreement in this proceeding despite appellant’s lack of direct participation in the prior actions. Further, appellant and its members remain free, as we have indicated,