People v. Needham

Opinion

Defendant Van Hugh Needham pled guilty to possessing methamphetamine and an opium pipe after the court denied his motion to suppress evidence. On appeal, he claims (1) the police lacked reasonable suspicion to detain him, (2) he was detained for an

Facts and Proceedings

In the afternoon of July 24, 1998, a Hispanic male ran from the backyard of Luz Villegas’s home to the front yard and asked Villegas if he could hide in her house. Villegas also saw a White male (defendant) drive a motorcycle around Ledbetter Park three times. The Hispanic male stopped defendant, gave him some white bags, and got on the motorcycle as a passenger. A woman driving a white van then stopped to tell Villegas she had just been robbed by a man on a motorcycle.

Villegas then telephoned 911 to report that the Hispanic male had stolen something and had left with defendant on a motorcycle. Villegas described defendant as a White male with tattoos on his arm who had left through Eddy Road, had dropped off the Hispanic male, and had returned to Ledbet-ter Park. She called a second time to tell the sheriff’s department that defendant was parked in Ledbetter Park.

The 911 dispatcher, Denise Rutledge, did not recall Ms. Villegas providing any description of the man on the motorcycle other than that he was in Ledbetter Park and being followed by a white van. The dispatcher knew Ms. Villegas’s address because it automatically appears when calling 911.

Tulare County Sheriff’s Lieutenant Jay Salazar, who responded to the dispatcher’s call, recalled the dispatcher told him that a White male on a motorcycle with a Hispanic male passenger had been involved in a theft. The information Salazar received included the location of the suspected thieves: the Cutler area near Ledbetter Park.

Lieutenant Salazar found defendant sitting on a motorcycle (without a passenger) and detained him. Salazar handcuffed defendant because he was the only person fitting the description of a White male on a motorcycle in the park. Two other officers, Deputy Timothy Brian Fosnaugh and Sergeant Verissimo, arrived. Villegas also arrived and identified defendant, but the police removed the handcuffs after determining he was not involved in the robbery.

Deputy Fosnaugh then noticed the expired registration tags on defendant’s motorcycle. Fosnaugh confirmed his observation through dispatch, additionally learning that defendant was not the registered owner of the motorcycle.

The standardized procedure or established routine authorizing the inventory search need not be written. (People v. Steeley (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 887 , 889 [ 258 Cal.Rptr. 699 ].) However, “an inventory search must not be a ruse for a general rummaging in order to discover incriminating evidence.” (Florida v. Wells, supra, 495 U.S. at p. 4 [110 S.Ct. at p. 1635].)

Here, the Tulare County Sheriff’s Department has an oral policy concerning inventory searches based on the Vehicle Code that is taught to deputies through field training courses. Consistent with this policy, Deputy Fosnaugh searched inside containers that may have contained valuables or dangerous items. The police officer performed the inventory search pursuant to established policies and there is no evidence that the police used the inventory as a ruse to search for incriminating evidence.

Inventory searches are supported by a threefold rationale: “[1] to protect an owner’s property while it is in the custody of the police, [2] to insure against claims of lost, stolen, or vandalized property, and [3] to guard the police from danger.” (Colorado v. Bertine, supra, 479 U.S. at p. 372 [107 S.Ct. at p. 741]; South Dakota v. Opperman (1976) 428 U.S. 364 , 369 [ 96 S.Ct. 3092 , 3097, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 ]; Whren v. United States (1996) 517 U.S. 806 , 811, fn. 1 [ 116 S.Ct. 1769 , 1773, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 ].)

Consistent with this rationale, the purpose of the Tulare County Sheriff’s inventory policy is to catalog the contents of the vehicle in order to prevent unverifiable theft because the department is responsible for the property from an impounded vehicle. A further purpose of the sheriff’s

Deputy Fosnaugh testified that, because the policy is to check all valuables when conducting an inventory search, he looks for items of great value and then lists them on the towing form. Fosnaugh also explained that he searches bags and other containers before turning them over to the person claiming them because of the possibility that the property may contain a concealed weapon.

Thus, we conclude that the unwritten policy of the Tulare County Sheriff’s Department concerning inventory searches is sufficiently standardized to satisfy the Fourth Amendment and that in conducting the inventory search in this case, Deputy Fosnaugh exercised his discretion within that standard procedure.

In trying to convince us that the inventory search was unlawful, defendant asserts four arguments, none of which has merit.

First, defendant argues that bags temporarily attached to the exterior of a motorcycle are not the proper subject of an inventory search because they cannot be locked or securely stored inside the vehicle like bags in an automobile. According to defendant, such bags should be immediately returned to the person in possession. We disagree.

For purposes of the Fourth Amendment, “containers attached to the car . . . are ‘in’ the car.” (Wyoming v. Houghton (1999) 526 U.S. 295 [ 119 S.Ct. 1297 , 1301, 143 L.Ed.2d 408 ] [addressing the need for probable cause to search for incriminating evidence in a car].) We see no reason to treat motorcycles differently from cars in this respect. A motorcycle, like a car, is a vehicle. Thus, containers attached to a vehicle, whether a motorcycle or a car, are considered “in” the vehicle for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.

Nor is there any significant difference between bags and pouches temporarily attached to a vehicle and a more permanent receptacle, such as a glove compartment or trunk. Whether the receptacle was created by the defendant or a manufacturer, the space is used to hold items. Thus, bags attached to a motorcycle should be treated like any other closed receptacle for purposes of the Fourth Amendment because the bag is a part of the vehicle just like any other compartment or receptacle.

Second, defendant argues that the police officer had unfettered discretion in determining whether to search inside the containers. To the contrary, the

Third, defendant argues that the container search cannot be justified on the ground that the officers did not know whether the items belonged to defendant or the owner of the motorcycle. This argument ignores the justification for inventory searches. If the bags contained valuables that belonged to the owner of the motorcycle, the sheriff’s office would be responsible for their safekeeping. And if the bags contained a weapon that defendant could have used on the officers, checking the bag before returning it to defendant would have reduced the risk of that danger.

Fourth, defendant claims that officer safety does not justify the inventory search of a motorcycle because containers inside a closed vehicle being impounded present a different danger than that of a bag affixed to the outside of a motorcycle. We disagree. A gun, knife or small quantity of explosives carried in a pouch attached to a motorcycle is no less concealable and available than like items in a handbag inside a car.

We conclude that the inventory search of the motorcycle was reasonable in scope.

Disposition

The judgment is affirmed.

Wiseman, J., and Levy, J., concurred.

Appellant’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied July 12, 2000.