People v. Mark C. (In re Mark C.)

electronics search condition; and several of the other probation conditions imposed by the juvenile court, including conditions that prohibit him from possessing weapons and narcotics, are unconstitutionally vague and overbroad and "lack proof of scienter," and must therefore be modified.

We conclude that the juvenile court abused its discretion in imposing the electronics search condition, and we modify the probation condition to strike the language at issue. In all other respects, we affirm the juvenile court's dispositional order.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

We draw our brief statement of the facts from reports prepared by the police and the Alameda County Probation Department. On the afternoon of November 17, 2014, defendant Mark C., then 14 years old, was being escorted to the office of his high school's assistant principal in connection with a fight that had taken place during the lunch period. When a campus supervisor reported that she saw a suspicious bulge near Mark's waistband, a police officer pat searched him and retrieved a folding pocket knife with a blade two and three-fourths inches long. A search of Mark's backpack revealed a canister of pepper spray, which is considered contraband at the school. Mark told the police that he carried the items for self defense, and that some people disliked and provoked him.

Mark was arrested, and in February 2015 the district attorney filed a wardship petition pursuant to section 602, subdivision (a), alleging that Mark possessed a knife with a blade longer than two and one-half inches on school grounds, in violation of Penal Code section 626.10.

At Mark's request, the matter was referred to the probation department for consideration of informal supervision pursuant to section 654.2. At a hearing in March, the juvenile court received the probation department's report, which concluded that Mark was suitable for informal supervision, even though his alleged violation of Penal Code section 626.10 made him presumptively ineligible under section 654.3. Mark argued that informal supervision was appropriate because he had "the benefit of a stable family home, with both his mother and stepfather being very supporting of him and fully willing to cooperate with probation services"; and because there had already been intervention and he had "made a turnaround." Mark also argued that he was doing better in school, although his grades from the most recent semester were poor. The juvenile court found that the case was not suitable for informal supervision, stating that "bringing a knife and pepper spray to school is a very, very serious offense or are serious offenses.... [W]e're going to need a standard probation for the situation, ... not a 654.2 given the seriousness of the weapons he brought to school."

"informal supervision." The statutory scheme specifically excludes from eligibility a minor who is alleged to have violated section 626.10 of the Penal Code, as Mark was alleged to have done, "except in an unusual case where the interests of justice would best be served and the court specifies on the record the reasons for its decision." (§ 654.3, subd. (c).) The juvenile court must make its own determination of a minor's suitability for informal supervision, independent of the probation officer, and must consider all relevant evidence in making that determination. ( In re Armondo A. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1185 , 1189-1191, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 101 ( Armondo A. ).)

We review the juvenile court's order denying informal supervision for abuse of discretion. ( Armondo A., supra, 3 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1189-1190, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 101 .) We reverse only if the juvenile court "has exceeded the limits of legal discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd determination." ( In re Katelynn Y. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 871 , 881, 147 Cal.Rptr.3d 423 .) We do not "reweigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the juvenile court." ( Ibid. )

scope of its authority over adults." ' [Citation.] This is because juveniles are deemed to be 'more in need of guidance and supervision than adults, and because a minor's constitutional rights are more circumscribed.' [Citation.] Thus, ' "a condition of probation that would be unconstitutional or otherwise improper for an adult probationer may be permissible for a minor under the supervision of the juvenile court." ' [Citations.]" ( Id. at p. 910, 106 Cal.Rptr.3d 584 .)

"[W]hile the juvenile court may impose a wider range of probation conditions [than are permitted for adults], those conditions are permissible only if ' " 'tailored specifically to meet the needs of the juvenile.' " ' " ( In re D.G. (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 47 , 53, 113 Cal.Rptr.3d 639 ( D.G. ).) This restriction has particular application to search conditions imposed on juveniles. For adults, probation is a privilege and adults may waive their Fourth Amendment rights by consenting to warrantless searches " 'in exchange for the opportunity to avoid service of a state prison term.' [Citation.]" ( People v. Balestra (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 57 , 65, 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 77 ( Balestra ), quoting In re York (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1133 , 1150, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 308 , 892 P.2d 804 .) For juveniles, however, probation " ' "is an ingredient of a final order for the minor's reformation and rehabilitation." ' ( In re Tyrell J. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 68 , 81, 8 Cal.4th 727A, 81, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 33 , 876 P.2d 519 , overruled on another ground in In re Jaime P. (2006) 40 Cal.4th 128 , 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 430 , 146 P.3d 965 .) A juvenile 'cannot refuse probation [citations] and therefore is in no position to refuse a particular condition of probation.' ( In re Binh L. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 194 , 202, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 678 ( Binh ).) Courts have recognized that a 'minor cannot be made subject to an automatic search condition; instead, such condition must be tailored to fit the circumstances of the case and the minor.' (See People v. Rios (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 584 , 597, 122 Cal.Rptr.3d 96 ; see also Binh, supra, 5 Cal.App.4th at p. 203, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 678 .)" ( In re Erica R. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 907 , 914, 192 Cal.Rptr.3d 919 ( Erica R. ).)

As we explained in Erica R., the juvenile court's discretion in imposing conditions of probation is broad but not unlimited. ( Erica R., supra, 240 Cal.App.4th 907 , 192 Cal.Rptr.3d 919 .) Our Supreme Court has stated criteria for assessing the validity of a condition of probation: upon review, "[a] condition of probation will not be held invalid unless it '(1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality[.]' " ( Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 486, 124 Cal.Rptr. 905 , 541 P.2d 545 .) "Conversely, a condition of probation which requires or forbids conduct which is not itself criminal is valid if that conduct is reasonably related to the crime of which the defendant was convicted or to future criminality." ( Ibid. ) Adult and juvenile probation conditions are judged by the Lent standard. ( D.G., supra, 187 Cal.App.4th at p. 52, 113 Cal.Rptr.3d 639 .)

b. Analysis

The Lent "test is conjunctive-all three prongs must be satisfied before a reviewing court will invalidate a probation term." ( People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375 , 379, 87 Cal.Rptr.3d 199 , 198 P.3d 1 ( Olguin ).) We therefore consider the electronics search condition with respect to

The second inquiry under Lent is quickly addressed. The electronics search condition relates to Mark's use of electronic devices; using such devices is not in itself criminal, nor is using password-protected services such as social media.

With the first two questions answered "no," the first two prongs of the Lent test are satisfied, and we must therefore consider whether the electronics

In Olguin, our Supreme Court upheld a probation condition that required the probationer to keep his probation officer informed of the presence of any pets at his place of residence. ( Olguin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 387, 87 Cal.Rptr.3d 199 , 198 P.3d 1 .) The court's primary concern was with the safety of the probation officer during unscheduled visits to the probationer's residence. The court noted that "[p]robation officer safety during these visits and searches is essential to the effective supervision of the probationer" ( id. at p. 381, 87 Cal.Rptr.3d 199 , 198 P.3d 1 ); that "[a]nimals can be unpredictable and potentially dangerous when faced with a stranger in their territory" ( ibid. ); and that once the probation officer had information about a pet, he or she might "be accompanied by animal control officers during any search" ( id. at p. 383, 87 Cal.Rptr.3d 199 , 198 P.3d 1 ), or "request that defendant detain or relocate a pet during a search." ( Ibid. ) The pet notification condition was held to be "a simple task [that] imposes no undue hardship or burden, and ... clearly falls within the bounds of reason." ( Id. at p. 382, 87 Cal.Rptr.3d 199 , 198 P.3d 1 .) The condition was "reasonably related to the supervision of the defendant and hence to his rehabilitation and potential future criminality." ( Id. at p. 380, 87 Cal.Rptr.3d 199 , 198 P.3d 1 .) "[I]t is reasonable to permit the probation officer ... to make the initial determination whether, in the officer's view, possession of a particular pet will have an impact on, or interfere with, probation supervision." ( Id. at p. 386, 87 Cal.Rptr.3d 199 , 198 P.3d 1 .)

fail to require "scienter." If a vague or overbroad probation condition can be modified "without reference to the particular sentencing record developed in the trial court" ( In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875 , 887, 55 Cal.Rptr.3d 716 , 153 P.3d 282 ( Sheena K. )), an issue of law arises that is subject to de novo review on appeal. ( In re Shaun R. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1129 , 1143, 116 Cal.Rptr.3d 84 .)

Mark did not object to any of these probation conditions at the time the juvenile court imposed them. Though his arguments are made for the first time on appeal, we address the merits because the arguments "present pure questions of law based solely on facial constitutional grounds and do not require a review of the sentencing record, and are easily remediable on appeal." ( Victor L., supra, 182 Cal.App.4th at p. 907, 106 Cal.Rptr.3d 584 ; see Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 888, 55 Cal.Rptr.3d 716 , 153 P.3d 282 .)

a. Applicable Law

Sheena K. sets forth the fundamental legal principles that we apply here: "A probation condition that imposes limitations on a person's constitutional rights must closely tailor those limitations to the purpose of the condition to avoid being invalidated as unconstitutionally overbroad." ( Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 890, 55 Cal.Rptr.3d 716 , 153 P.3d 282 .) Furthermore, "[a] probation condition 'must be sufficiently precise for the probationer to know what is required of him, and for the court to determine whether the condition has been violated,' if it is to withstand a challenge on the ground of vagueness. [Citation.]" ( Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 890, 55 Cal.Rptr.3d 716 , 153 P.3d 282 .)

"The essential question in an overbreadth challenge is the closeness of the fit between the legitimate purpose of the restriction and the burden it imposes on the defendant's constitutional rights-bearing in mind, of course, that perfection in such matters is impossible, and that practical necessity will justify some infringement." ( In re E.O. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1149 , 1153, 115 Cal.Rptr.3d 869 .) To survive a challenge for vagueness, a probation condition that prohibits certain conduct must provide the probationer with adequate notice of what is prohibited. ( Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 890, 55 Cal.Rptr.3d 716 , 153 P.3d 282 .) To determine whether notice is adequate, a court is "guided by the principles that 'abstract legal commands must be applied in a specific context,' and that, although not admitting of 'mathematical certainty,' the language used must have ' "reasonable specificity." ' " ( Ibid. quoting

A condition that is unconstitutionally overbroad or vague may sometimes be saved by modifying it. ( Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 892, 55 Cal.Rptr.3d 716 , 153 P.3d 282 [approving the Court of Appeal's modification to cure a vague probation condition]; People v. Forrest (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 1074 , 1083-1085, 188 Cal.Rptr.3d 736 [modifying a probation condition to cure overbreadth].) In particular, a condition that is unconstitutionally vague may sometimes be saved by modifying it to "impose an explicit knowledge requirement." ( Sheena K., supra, at p. 892, 55 Cal.Rptr.3d 716 , 153 P.3d 282 .) Thus, an unconstitutionally vague condition that prohibits association with gang members may be cured by modifying it to prohibit association with anyone the defendant knows to be a gang member. ( Id. at pp. 890-892, 55 Cal.Rptr.3d 716 , 153 P.3d 282 .)

Our colleagues in Division One have examined the distinction between knowing what you are supposed to avoid, which is pertinent to vagueness, and the mens rea of willfulness, which is required for a probation violation. ( People v. Gaines (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1035 , 1039, 195 Cal.Rptr.3d 842 ( Gaines ).) "[P]robation may not be revoked unless the evidence shows that a probationer's conduct constituted a willful violation of the terms of his or her probation. [Citation.] Thus, sentencing courts need not include a requirement that a probationer knowingly violated a condition in order to protect against enforcement of unwitting violations." ( Ibid. )

We turn now to the conditions that Mark challenges here.

b. Analysis

i. Weapons Possession

The juvenile court imposed the following weapons condition: "You are not to possess, own, or handle any firearm, knife, weapon, fireworks, explosives or chemicals that can produce explosives, including matches and lighters ... [p]epper spray or any other deadly or dangerous weapon."

Mark contends that the condition does not adequately describe the terms "weapon" and "any other deadly or dangerous weapon"; that as written the condition would prohibit Mark from using normal household items, such as kitchen knives or ammonia (because it can be used to produce explosives); and that the provision lacks any requirement of knowledge or intent, with the result that Mark would violate his probation if he inadvertently carried a bag containing a cigarette lighter for his mother. Mark's proposal to remedy the condition's deficiencies reveals the extent to which questions of knowledge

and mens rea underlie his objections: "You are not to knowingly possess any object that you know is a dangerous, illegal or deadly weapon. You are not to knowingly possess any other object that you know can be used to cause bodily injury or death, including but not limited to firearms, knives, fireworks, explosives, chemicals that can produce explosives, pepper spray, matches or lighters, where you intend to cause such harm." (Emphasis added.)

Mark argues that his modification is aligned with the approach taken by our colleagues in Division Four in In re Kevin F. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 351 , 191 Cal.Rptr.3d 144 ( Kevin F. ). In Kevin F., the

related paraphernalia or poisons unless prescribed by a physician. Do not use any non-prescription drugs without the approval of your legal guardian." (Emphasis omitted.) The Attorney General contends that there are no constitutional deficiencies in the prohibition as stated by the juvenile court. Neither party cites any authority as specifically addressing the vagueness of probation conditions that prohibit the possession of drugs.

Gaines is instructive here. There, the court considered a challenge to a probation condition that prohibited the defendant from possessing or using " 'narcotics, dangerous drugs, or narcotic paraphernalia,' " where defendant argued that the term " 'dangerous drugs' " was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad and should be replaced with the term " 'controlled substances.' " ( Gaines, supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1040-1041, 195 Cal.Rptr.3d 842 .) The court modified the condition to prohibit possessing or using " 'narcotics, controlled substances, or narcotic paraphernalia without a valid prescription.' " ( Id. at p. 1042, 195 Cal.Rptr.3d 842 .)

Noting the similarity between the language approved in Gaines and the language used by the juvenile court here, we conclude that the condition is constitutional as stated. The phrase "other controlled substances" makes it clear that the prohibited "drugs" are limited to drugs that are controlled substances, and therefore the category is sufficiently clear that there is no need to specify a knowledge requirement.

iii. Knowledge Requirements for Other Conditions

Without providing us any specific argument or authority, Mark contends that five other probation conditions should be modified. He contends that the school presence condition should be modified to state that he must not knowingly be on school grounds; the curfew to state that he not knowingly violate the curfew set by his parent or guardian; the association condition to state that he not knowingly associate with anyone he knows to use, deal or possess illegal drugs; the obedience condition to state that he not knowingly disobey his parent or guardian; and the alcohol condition to state that he must not knowingly use or possess alcoholic beverages.

In the absence of evidence, argument or authority to suggest that a reasonable probationer

DISPOSITION

The probation conditions ordered by the juvenile court are modified to strike the phrase "electronics including passwords." In all other respects, the juvenile court's dispositional order is affirmed.

We concur:

Kline, P.J.

Richman, J.

including a requirement that he submit to warrantless searches of his "electronics including passwords" (electronics search condition).

On appeal, Mark raises three issues: the juvenile court erred in not placing him under informal supervision; the juvenile court erred in imposing the

including the electronics search condition. The terms also include other conditions, several of which Mark contests: a weapons condition, stating that defendant cannot "possess, own, or handle any firearm, knife, weapon, fireworks, explosives or chemicals that can produce explosives, including matches and lighters ... [p]epper spray or any other deadly or dangerous weapon"; a drug condition, stating that defendant cannot "use or possess narcotics, drugs, other controlled substances, related paraphernalia or poisons unless prescribed by a physician"; a school presence condition, limiting defendant's presence on the campus or grounds of any school; a curfew, requiring defendant to "[m]aintain curfew set by parent/guardian"; an association condition, prohibiting defendant from associating with "anyone you know to use, deal or possess illegal drugs"; an obedience condition, requiring defendant to "[o]bey parent(s) or guardian(s)"; and an alcohol condition, stating that defendant cannot "use or possess alcoholic beverages."

Mark objected to the search condition at the time it was imposed, but did not object to the other conditions. This appeal timely followed.

DISCUSSION

We first address Mark's challenge to the juvenile court's denial of his request for informal supervision, and then turn to his challenges to the probation conditions.

A. The Juvenile Court's Denial of Mark's Request for Informal Supervision

1. Applicable Law

Section 654.2, subdivision (a), provides that "[i]f a petition has been filed by the prosecuting attorney to declare a minor a ward of the court under Section 602, the court may, without adjudging the minor a ward of the court and with the consent of the minor and the minor's parents or guardian, continue any hearing on a petition for six months and order the minor to participate in a program of supervision as set forth in Section 654." Such a program of supervision is commonly known as "informal probation" or

2. Analysis

Because Mark was alleged to have violated Penal Code section 626.10, he is "presumptively ineligible" for informal supervision under section 654.3. (See Kody P. v. Superior Court (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 1030 , 1033, fn. 2, 40 Cal.Rptr.3d 763 .) The presumption is overcome only in an "unusual case where the interests of justice would be best served and the court specifies on the record the reasons for its decision." (§ 654.3, subd. (c).)

Mark, however, does not attempt to characterize his case as unusual in any respect, but rather contends that the trial court erred in denying informal supervision for other reasons: there was no reason to doubt his claim that the items were carried for self-defense; the informal supervision program is sufficient to monitor his behavior and allow the standard probation conditions to be applied; he had already begun improving his behavior at home and performance at school; it was "unreasonable" to "brand" him "as a delinquent" for his first contact with the juvenile justice system; and a criminal record could harm him "in the longer term." Mark cites no evidence or authority to support a finding that his case is unusual on any of those grounds, and he points to nothing in the record that suggests the juvenile court abused its discretion in reaching its conclusion.

The record reflects that the juvenile court read and considered the probation department's report, and heard and considered arguments of counsel. (See Armondo A., supra, 3 Cal.App.4th at p. 1191, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 101 ["[d]ue process ... requires the juvenile court to consider all relevant evidence in exercising its

"only when the trial court finds ' "the minor would not benefit from education, treatment and rehabilitation." ' " ( In re Joshua S. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 670 , 676, 122 Cal.Rptr.3d 188 .) From that, Mark argues, "If it can be an abuse of discretion to deny [deferred entry of judgment] to [a statutorily] eligible minor charged with a felony offense, then it is even more likely an abuse of discretion to deny informal supervision to an eligible minor charged with a misdemeanor."

The analogy is inapt. We recognize that deferred entry of judgment, like informal supervision, is an alternative rehabilitative option that is available to the juvenile court. ( In re C.Z. (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 1497 , 1502, 165 Cal.Rptr.3d 409 .) But even if we agreed that case law on the denial of deferred entry of judgment would be persuasive here, Mark's argument fails, because it likens his case to one in which an eligible minor is denied deferred entry of judgment, and his offense makes him ineligible for informal supervision except in an "unusual" case. (§ 654.3, subd. (c).)

terms of juvenile probation is even greater than that allowed for adults. '[E]ven where there is an invasion of protected freedoms "the power of the state to control the conduct of children reaches beyond the

search condition as imposed on Mark is reasonably related to future criminality. ( Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 486, 124 Cal.Rptr. 905 , 541 P.2d 545 .)

Mark argues that the condition is not reasonably related to future criminal activity, noting that the condition does not rest on any evidence concerning Mark or minors in general, but rather rests entirely on the juvenile court's assertion that it has found "minors on a regular basis will buy or sell drugs using the Internet and post photos and texts of themselves and information about their use of drugs and possession of paraphernalia." The Attorney General counters that the condition reasonably relates to future criminality because "[i]t aids in deterring further offenses and in monitoring compliance with the other terms of probation, including the drug condition as the court stated." For this argument, the Attorney General relies on Balestra and Olguin, but the cases are distinguishable.

In Balestra, the defendant pleaded guilty to a count of elder abuse and then challenged the condition of her probation that required her to submit to warrantless searches. ( Balestra, supra, 76 Cal.App.4th at pp. 62, 66-68, 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 77 .) The Court of Appeal upheld the search condition, explaining that "a warrantless search condition is intended to ensure that the subject thereof is obeying the fundamental condition of all grants of probation, that is, the usual requirement ... that a probationer 'obey all laws.' Thus, warrantless search conditions serve a valid rehabilitative purpose." ( Id. at p. 67, 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 77 .) The court also noted that the information obtained through such searches can measure the effectiveness of the probationer's supervision. ( Ibid., citing People v. Reyes (1998) 19 Cal.4th 743 , 752, 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 734 , 968 P.2d 445 .) At issue in Mark's case, however, is not the warrantless nature of the searches. Mark does not challenge warrantless searches of his person, vehicle, room, or property. He challenges the scope of the search condition, which extends to all password-protected uses of his electronic devices.

The probation condition in Olguin did not extend the scope of the warrantless search of the probationer's residence, rather it facilitated the search of the residence by mitigating the potential of any pet residing with the probationer "to distract, impede, and endanger probation officers in the exercise of their supervisory duties." ( Olguin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 378, 87 Cal.Rptr.3d 199 , 198 P.3d 1 .) Thus, it enabled the "probation officer to supervise his or her charges effectively." ( Id. at pp. 380-381, 87 Cal.Rptr.3d 199 , 198 P.3d 1 .)

The juvenile court here stated that the purpose of the electronics search condition was to supervise Mark's compliance with prohibitions against buying, selling, and using illegal drugs. The Attorney General contends that access to Mark's electronics and password-protected information would make it easier for the probation officer to determine whether Mark is complying with other terms of his probation as well.

We do not read Olguin to hold that every condition that might enable a probation officer to supervise his or her minor charges more effectively is necessarily "reasonably related to future criminality." ( Olguin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 381, 87 Cal.Rptr.3d 199 , 198 P.3d 1 .) Such a reading would effectively eliminate the reasonableness requirement that the court in Olguin discusses at some length. ( Id. at p. 382, 87 Cal.Rptr.3d 199 , 198 P.3d 1 .) Requiring Mark to copy his probation officer on all his emails, and forward all his postings on social media to his probation officer might also facilitate his probation officer's supervision of him, as would requiring him to wear a body camera. But Olguin no more justifies these hypothetical probation conditions than the actual electronics search condition in this case.

Moreover, both Olguin and Balestra involved adult probationers. Both opinions stated explicitly that probation is a privilege, not a right ( Olguin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 384, 87 Cal.Rptr.3d 199 , 198 P.3d 1 ; Balestra, supra, 76 Cal.App.4th at p. 65, 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 77 .) But the situation for a minor is different. Adults, but not minors, have the right to refuse probation. Accordingly, search conditions that apply to a minor must be tailored to fit the minor's particular rehabilitative needs; if they are not, they are invalid under Lent . ( Erica R., supra, 240 Cal.App.4th at p. 914, 192 Cal.Rptr.3d 919 .)

acts. ( Erica R., supra, 240 Cal.App.4th at p. 913, 192 Cal.Rptr.3d 919 , citing D.G., supra, 187 Cal.App.4th at p. 53, 113 Cal.Rptr.3d 639 .)

Accordingly, we conclude that the electronics search condition here is invalid under Lent, and therefore we will strike the language "electronics including passwords" from the search condition imposed by the juvenile court. Because we hold that the condition is invalid under Lent, we do not reach Mark's constitutional and statutory arguments.

2. Objections to Other Probation Conditions

Mark contends that the conditions imposed by the juvenile court that concern weapons possession, the possession or use of drugs, presence on school grounds, maintaining a curfew, association with possessors or users of drugs, obedience to his parents and the possession or use of alcoholic beverages are unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, in part because they

People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1090 , 1116-1117, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 277 , 929 P.2d 596 .) This means that if a category is essentially clear, so that people of common intelligence know whether something falls within it, there is no need for the condition to include a specific requirement that the probationer knows that something falls within the category.

Gaines, supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at p. 1040, 195 Cal.Rptr.3d 842 .)

Accordingly, we decline to modify the weapons condition imposed by the juvenile court.

ii. Possession or Use of Drugs

The juvenile court imposed a drug condition, which requires that Mark not "use or possess narcotics, drugs, other controlled substances, related paraphernalia or poisons unless prescribed by a physician." The term "controlled substances" is defined by statute. (See Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11053 -11058.)

Mark contends that because the condition includes the term "drugs" it is vague and overbroad. He claims the prohibition "could include perfectly legal items that are available at every pharmacy without prescription," and that as written, it precludes him from being given aspirin by his mother or a school nurse. He also contends that a knowledge requirement must be added, and would have us modify the condition to read as follows: "Do not knowingly use or possess narcotics, prescription drugs, other controlled substances,

could be confused as to the requirements set out in these conditions as imposed by the juvenile court, we decline to modify them to include express mens rea requirements. (See Gaines, supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at p. 1040, 195 Cal.Rptr.3d 842 .)