Ogunsalu v. Superior Court of San Diego Cnty.

In this case, we conclude that the vexatious litigant prefiling requirements of

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The California Commission on Teacher Credentialing (Commission) notified Cornelius Oluseyi Ogunsalu that it had found probable cause to recommend the suspension of his preliminary teaching credentials for 21 days and that Ogunsalu's application for a clear credential would be granted only upon completion of the suspension. The Commission's letter notifying Ogunsalu of its adverse action recommendation informed him of options that were available to him to respond to the recommendation, one of which was to request an administrative hearing to challenge the recommendation. Ogunsalu requested an administrative hearing. The Commission issued an official accusation and statement of issues (Accusation) regarding Ogunsalu. (Ed. Code, § 44242.5, subd. (c)(3)(B).) The Accusation required Ogunsalu to timely request a hearing. (Gov. Code, § 11505.) Although not included in the record, Ogunsalu presumably timely requested a hearing as the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) assigned hearing dates to the matter and served the notice of assigned hearing dates on Ogunsalu.

Ogunsalu requested a continuance of the administrative hearing before the Commission. An administrative law judge (ALJ) of the OAH denied the continuance on the ground Ogunsalu had not shown good cause for the continuance. Ogunsalu, who is a vexatious litigant, sought to challenge the denial of the continuance request by filing a petition for writ of mandate in the superior court. (See Gov. Code, § 11524, subd. (c) [party may seek judicial review of denial of continuance of administrative hearing within 10 working days of denial].) The court denied his request to file new litigation by vexatious litigant under section 391.7.

Ogunsalu then requested permission from this court to file a petition for a writ directing the superior court to vacate its order denying his request to file the petition for writ of mandate in that court. In the proposed filing, he contended that the superior court had abused its discretion by relying on his status as a vexatious litigant to deny his request to file the petition for writ of mandate, because he is a "defendant" in the administrative hearing before the Commission and sought to "appeal" a ruling against him in that proceeding.

We denied the request on the grounds the prefiling requirements for vexatious litigants applied and Ogunsalu had not shown his proposed filing had merit. Ogunsalu petitioned the California Supreme Court for review. The Supreme Court granted the petition and transferred the matter to this court "for reconsideration in light of John v.Superior Court (2016) 63 Cal.4th 91 , 201 Cal.Rptr.3d 459 , 369 P.3d 238 [ ( John ) ]". We solicited and obtained an informal response from the Commission, and thereafter issued an order to show cause.

The Commission contends that the prefiling requirements apply to Ogunsalu because he was the plaintiff who sought to commence new litigation in the superior

hereinafter § 391(a).) A "[p]laintiff" is defined as "the person who commences, institutes or maintains a litigation or causes it to be commenced, instituted or maintained." ( Id . at subd. (d).) A " '[d]efendant' means a person (including corporation, association, partnership and firm or governmental entity) against whom a litigation is brought or maintained or sought to be brought or maintained." (§ 391, at subd. (e), hereinafter § 391(e).) Here, Ogunsalu is the "plaintiff" because he commenced litigation (the writ of mandate proceeding) in the superior court. The OAH is the "defendant" because it is the governmental entity against whom Ogunsalu bought the litigation. Under the plain language of the vexatious litigant statutes, the underlying administrative proceeding does not qualify as "litigation." (§ 391(a).) We are bound to apply the express definitions drafted by the Legislature to the facts before us. (See Delaney v. Superior Court (1990) 50 Cal.3d 785 , 804, 268 Cal.Rptr. 753 , 789 P.2d 934 ["It is bedrock law that if 'the law-maker gives us an express definition, we must take it as we find it....' "].)

Nonetheless, we are sympathetic to Ogunsalu. If section 391(a) defined "litigation" as "any civil action or proceeding, commenced, maintained or pending in any state or federal court or any administrative proceeding " then Ogunsalu qualifies as a defendant under section 391(e), i.e., a person against whom litigation is brought or maintained or sought to be brought or maintained. Under the principles set forth in Mahdavi and John , Ogunsalu's filing of the writ of mandate in superior court, essentially the appeal of an adverse ruling in the administrative proceeding brought against his preliminary teaching credentials,

court and in this court. The Commission further contends that both the superior court and this court properly denied Ogunsalu's requests for permission to file new litigation, because the proposed litigation lacked merit in that Ogunsalu had not shown good cause to continue the administrative hearing. Attached to the informal response are copies of a letter and the ALJ's proposed decision revoking Ogunsalu's teaching credential, which indicate the hearing that Ogunsalu sought to continue had already occurred and the proposed decision would be presented to the Commission at its February 2017 meeting.

DISCUSSION

As a preliminary matter, this court cannot grant Ogunsalu any meaningful relief on his writ petition, because the administrative hearing he sought to continue has already concluded, and the petition is therefore moot. ( Lockaway Storage v. County of Alameda (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 161 , 174-175, 156 Cal.Rptr.3d 607 [case is moot if events have made any effective relief impracticable or impossible].) Nonetheless, a reviewing court may exercise its inherent discretion to resolve an issue rendered moot by subsequent events if the question to be decided is of continuing public importance and is a question capable of repetition, yet evading review. ( People v. Gregerson (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 306 , 321, 135 Cal.Rptr.3d 188 .) Accordingly, we will decide the briefed issue to clarify the law, but dismiss the writ as moot.

On its own motion or the motion of any party, a trial or appellate court is authorized to enter a prefiling order prohibiting a self-represented vexatious litigant from "filing any new litigation in the courts of this state ... without first obtaining leave of the presiding justice or presiding judge of the court where the litigation is proposed to be filed." (§ 391.7, subd. (a), hereinafter § 391.7(a).) The vexatious litigant prefiling requirement is akin to a licensing or permit system, which constitutes a " 'practical means of managing competing uses of public facilities [.]' [Citation.] When a vexatious litigant knocks on the courthouse door with a colorable claim, he may enter." ( Wolfgram v. Wells Fargo Bank (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 43 , 60, 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 694 .) But, that entry may be conditioned on representation by counsel or permission from the presiding judge to proceed in propria persona along with the posting of security. (§ 391.7, subds. (a) & (b).)

Id. at p. 98, 201 Cal.Rptr.3d 459 , 369 P.3d 238 .)

Relying on John , Ogunsalu contends the superior court abused its discretion by relying on his status as a vexatious litigant to deny his request to file the petition for writ of administrative mandate, because he was a "defendant" in the administrative hearing before the Commission and sought to "appeal" a ruling against him in that proceeding. John does not directly address the issue before us whether the person responding to an administrative writ proceeding who then initiates a writ of mandate proceeding in the superior court to challenge a ruling in the administrative proceeding is considered a "defendant" under the vexatious litigant statutes. Nonetheless, the plain language of the vexatious litigant statutes provides the answer to this question.

"[T]he objective of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent." ( People v. Flores (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1059 , 1063, 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 63 , 69 P.3d 979 .) To determine legislative intent, we must examine the words of the statute, giving them their usual and ordinary meaning and construing the words and clauses in the context of the statute as a whole. ( People v. Murphy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 136 , 142, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 387 , 19 P.3d 1129 .) "If there is no ambiguity in the language of the statute, 'then the Legislature is presumed to have meant what it said, and the plain meaning of the language governs.' [Citation.] 'Where the statute is clear, courts will not "interpret away clear language in favor of an ambiguity that does not exist." ' " ( Lennane v. Franchise Tax Bd. (1994) 9 Cal.4th 263 , 268, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 563 , 885 P.2d 976 .)

"Litigation" means "any civil action or proceeding, commenced, maintained or pending in any state or federal court." (§ 391, subd. (a),