People v. Daniels

Around 9:00 p.m. that same evening, Tamarra Hillian arrived to visit Ray Jedkins, a friend of hers from high school, at Jedkins's apartment. Jedkins's cousin, LeWayne Carolina, was also at the apartment. As Hillian sat in the apartment living room watching television, there was a knock at the door. Jedkins answered the door and spoke with Daniels, who was standing outside, for "a little while" before Jedkins let Daniels inside. Daniels and Jedkins walked into the kitchen and chatted with Carolina before Jedkins returned to the living room. A few minutes later, Daniels walked into the living room and demanded money while pointing a large firearm in Jedkins's direction. Jedkins handed Daniels a wad of money from his pocket. Then, Hillian heard gunshots and covered her face. Jedkins climbed out the living room window. After the gunshots stopped, Daniels ran out of the apartment. Hillian never saw Daniels point the gun at her or Carolina.

After Daniels fled the apartment, Hillian tried to stand up, but her leg crumpled and she fell to the floor. She had been shot in the hand and in the leg. She crawled to the kitchen telephone and saw that Carolina had been fatally shot. As Hillian attempted to dial for help, Jedkins returned to the apartment and called 911. Sacramento police officers later arrived at the Stonegate apartment complex and collected nine-millimeter and .380 bullet casings from the scene. Forensic pathologist Dr. Gregory Reiber, who

The Camaro veered off the road and eventually stopped. Shortly thereafter, several Sacramento City police officers arrived at the scene. Officer Brian Ellis advised Daniels to put up his hands outside of the vehicle. Daniels raised his left hand but claimed his right hand was stuck. As Sergeant Steven Weinrich reached into the Camaro to extract Daniels, Daniels fired his Tec-9 firearm. Weinrich returned fire and was shot as he retreated behind the car. One bullet was later found lodged in Weinrich's bulletproof vest, while another bullet entered his upper thigh.

1. Prior Statements by Daniels

The penalty trial commenced on January 23, 2001. The prosecution began its

Deputy Sheriff Mark Goddard, who was advised by dispatch of the carjacking, observed Daniels in the Camaro and pulled him over. But once Goddard pulled in from behind, Daniels took off, weaving through traffic at speeds up to 80 miles per hour.

The case was subsequently assigned, for all purposes, to Judge Long. At the outset of proceedings on January 5, 2001, Judge Long confirmed that Daniels was representing himself and that Judge Ransom had advised him of the pitfalls of self-representation. Daniels then acknowledged that he had received the amended information in this case. Thereafter, Judge Long arraigned Daniels on the amended information, reading aloud each of the 22 charges and the sentencing enhancements. After reading each charge, the court asked, "Do you understand the charges?" Daniels responded affirmatively as to each charge. While arraigning Daniels on counts 12 and 21, the special-circumstance murder counts, Judge Long informed him that these were serious felonies. The court explained that, as to these charges, if Daniels were found guilty of these charges, the case would proceed to a penalty phase where the People would seek the death penalty. Daniels said he understood. After the court finished reading all the charges, the following colloquy transpired:

"THE COURT: Sir, did you understand all those charges?

"MR. DANIELS: Yes, sir.

The court read aloud all 22 charges from the amended information and confirmed, after each offense, that Daniels understood the charge just read. Daniels acknowledged that he could be put to death if he were found guilty and the special circumstances found true. Daniels was informed that if he were disruptive, he would be removed from the courtroom and an attorney would be brought in to complete the case on his behalf. We reject Daniels's argument that the court's inquiry was inadequate because it did not review the elements of the charges, possible defenses, or possible punishments besides the death penalty-or confirm that counsel had done so with Daniels. Although an "exploration into ... possible defenses and possible punishments" may be useful to help a defendant understand "just what he is getting himself into" ( Lopez , supra , 71 Cal.App.3d at p. 573, 138 Cal.Rptr. 36 ), it

Daniels also raises an argument unrelated to the sufficiency of the court's admonitions. He insists that, because his written request to represent himself was coupled with a request to plead guilty, it should have been apparent to the court that Daniels was trying to circumvent the statutory limitation on his ability to plead guilty. Daniels argues that the court should have sua sponte appointed additional counsel or determined whether Daniels was able to negotiate a plea that would not

On review, Daniels argues that-by waiving counsel and jury trial and then failing to present any defense-he effectively pleaded guilty without consent of counsel, in violation of section 1018. He contends that because his conviction obtained in violation of section 1018, it must be reversed. Moreover, Daniels asserts that reversal is warranted because the proceedings below lacked the reliability required by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.

2. Analysis

Section 1018 provides, in relevant part: "No plea of guilty of a felony for which the maximum punishment is death, or life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, shall be received from a defendant who does not appear with counsel, nor shall that plea be received without the consent of the defendant's counsel." In 1973, the Legislature amended the statute to add the requirement that defense counsel consent to a guilty plea in capital cases. (Stats. 1973, ch. 719, § 11, p. 1301.) We have recognized this amendment to be a component in an overhaul of California's death penalty laws, following the high court's decision in Furman v. Georgia (1972) 408 U.S. 238 , 92 S.Ct. 2726 , 33 L.Ed.2d 346 , in an effort to eliminate arbitrariness in the imposition of the death penalty. (See People v. Chadd (1981) 28 Cal.3d 739 , 750, 170 Cal.Rptr. 798 , 621 P.2d 837 ( Chadd ).) The consent of counsel requirement is rooted "in the state's strong interest in reducing the risk of mistaken judgments in capital cases and thereby maintaining the accuracy and fairness of its criminal proceedings." ( People v. Alfaro (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1277 , 1300, 63 Cal.Rptr.3d 433 , 163 P.3d 118 ( Alfaro ).)

A submission "is defined by the rights a defendant surrenders." (

C. Waiver of Counsel in Violation of Section 686.1

Daniels also contends the trial court erred under section 686.1 by failing to deny Daniels's Faretta motion. When Daniels's waiver of counsel was accepted, he had already expressed to the court his desire to plead guilty to all charges and had repeatedly declined advisory counsel and an investigator. Daniels argues that his passivity throughout the proceedings undermined the fairness and reliability of the judgment, such that his right to self-representation should have been subordinated or revoked based on recognized limits of the high court's Faretta decision and Eighth Amendment reliability requirements in capital cases.

Section 686.1 requires defendants in capital cases to be represented by counsel during all stages of the preliminary and trial proceedings. This provision predates the high court's decision in Faretta and may only be applied where Faretta is not implicated. (See People v. Johnson (2012) 53 Cal.4th 519 , 526, 136 Cal.Rptr.3d 54 , 267 P.3d 1125 [explaining that post- Faretta , " Penal Code section 686.1... cannot be given effect"].) We acknowledge the importance of ensuring proceedings are fair and " 'appear fair to all who observe them.' " ( Indiana v. Edwards (2008) 554 U.S. 164 , 177, 128 S.Ct. 2379 , 171 L.Ed.2d 345 .) But once a court determines that a competent defendant has knowingly and voluntarily asserted the right to self-representation under Faretta , the court is not authorized to revoke that right in an attempt to ensure that the defense case meets some minimum level of effectiveness. The "likelihood or actuality of a poor performance by a defendant acting in propria

On January 5, 2001, Daniels appeared, self-represented, before Judge Long. Judge Long provided Daniels with further admonitions about the waiver of counsel. Then, the court accepted Daniels's waiver of his right to trial by jury in favor of a court trial as reflected in the following colloquy:

"THE COURT: The other question I think I might raise with you is do you intend to proceed in terms of the guilt phase, and if there is a penalty phase, by way of a jury trial or by way of a court trial?

"MR. DANIELS: Court trial.

"THE COURT: Are you satisfied that that's what you want to do?

forcing you to waive your right to jury trial and proceed by way of court trial?

"MR. DANIELS: No.

"THE COURT: Are you presently under the influence of any substance that would cause you not to be able to think clearly?

"THE COURT: Do you know what you are doing?

"MR. DANIELS: Yes.

"THE COURT: All right. Do the People join, also?

Consistent with our precedent and in recognition of the fact-intensive nature of our inquiry, we first analyze the trial court's record advisements preceding its acceptance of Daniels's jury waiver. The trial court's admonitions are relevant only to the extent that they shed light on the state of a defendant's knowledge at the time of waiver about the nature of the right he or she would give up and the consequences of doing so. Yet the in-court colloquy serves an essential purpose of facilitating meaningful appellate review of a defendant's waiver of fundamental constitutional rights. Following the high court's decision in Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238 , 89 S.Ct. 1709 , 23 L.Ed.2d 274 , this court amended our test for determining the validity of guilty pleas-one that previously required explicit admonitions-to align with the federal test. ( People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132 , 1175, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 268 , 824 P.2d 1315 .) In that regard, we established that a guilty plea is effective "if the record affirmatively shows that it is voluntary and intelligent under the totality of the circumstances." ( Ibid . ) We further explained that "explicit admonitions and waivers still serve the purpose that originally led us to require them: They are the only realistic means of assuring that the judge leaves a record adequate for review." ( Id. at pp. 1178-1179, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 268 , 824 P.2d 1315 ; accord, Koontz , supra , 27 Cal.4th at p. 1071, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 859 , 46 P.3d 335 ["the purpose of the suggested Lopez admonitions is to ensure a clear record of a knowing and voluntary waiver of counsel"].) A meaningful colloquy-or lack thereof-bears on our ability, on review, to confirm whether a valid waiver of rights was given.

This court has persistently declined to mandate any specific admonitions describing aspects of the jury trial right. (See, e.g., Weaver , supra , 53 Cal.4th at p. 1074, 139 Cal.Rptr.3d 355 , 273 P.3d 546 ; People v. Sivongxxay (2017) 3 Cal.5th 151 , 170, 219 Cal.Rptr.3d 265 , 396 P.3d 424 ( Sivongxxay ).) We continue to eschew any rigid rubric for trial courts to follow in order to decide whether to accept a

What the court did in this case-immediately after accepting Daniels's counsel waiver on December 20, 2000-was ask if Daniels wished to confirm the jury trial date. Daniels replied: "Yes. Keep it the same date for jury." He did not ask about waiving a jury. In fact, it was the judge who broached the issue on January 5, 2001. He did so by asking whether Daniels wished to proceed by jury trial or court trial. In response to the court's inquiry, Daniels opted for a court trial. Up until that point, Daniels never explicitly requested or referenced a court trial. (Cf. Sivongxxay , supra , 3 Cal.5th at p. 167, 219 Cal.Rptr.3d 265 , 396 P.3d 424 [defendant initiated request to waive jury].)

Our concurring and dissenting colleagues may believe Daniels demonstrated "some legal sophistication by filing a written motion to represent himself and referring to his 'Faretta' right." (See conc. & dis. opn. of Corrigan, J., post , 221 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 824, 400 P.3d at p. 424.) That's some definition of "legal sophistication." The "written motion" was a fill-in-the-blank Faretta form motion; Daniels failed even to fill in all the blanks. He also handwrote a note to the judge that stated, "I am also Requesting that I Be allowed to Represent myself, my feretta [ sic ] Rights." This misspelled reference to Faretta perhaps disclosed the gist of his aim to represent himself, but Daniels's request does not demonstrate legal sophistication, much less his understanding of the jury trial right. Even a defendant with enough acumen to invoke the Faretta right by filling

This reasoning reinforces an important principle: Courts generally rely on counsel to transmit to defendants critical information about whether to waive the jury trial right and the consequences of waiving it, and they do not assume that defendants otherwise already possess requisite information to make a knowing and intelligent waiver. DeRobertis does not hold that a bare-bones mention of trying the case to a judge rather than jury, without further explanation, would be sufficient in the absence of advice from competent counsel or other affirmative indications of the defendant's legal sophistication. (Cf. Adams , supra , 317 U.S. at pp. 270-271, 63 S.Ct. 236 [self-represented defendant indicated that he had studied law and repeatedly demanded a bench trial]; Maryland v.Bell (1998) 351 Md. 709 , 720 A.2d 311 , 319-320 [distinguishing prior decision in which the defendant "was given no explanation of the nature of a jury trial," other than a minimal mention of trying the case before the court rather than a jury, from a case in which the defendant was advised of certain "other fundamentals of a jury trial," and the defendant and "his trial counsel also had discussed the right to a jury trial prior to the hearing"].)

To facilitate courts' enforcement of constitutional safeguards, we offer general guidance for trial courts in ensuring a defendant's knowing and intelligent jury waiver in favor of court trial. As explained in our recent Sivongxxay decision, this court recommends that trial judges conduct a waiver colloquy expressly relaying at least four "basic mechanics of a jury trial": "(1) a jury is made up of 12 members of the community; (2) a defendant through his or her counsel may participate in jury selection; (3) all 12 jurors must unanimously agree in order to render a verdict; and (4) if a defendant waives the right to a jury trial, a judge alone will decide his or her guilt or innocence." ( Sivongxxay , supra , 3 Cal.5th at p. 169, 219 Cal.Rptr.3d 265 , 396 P.3d 424 .) Additional questioning may assist the court in ensuring a defendant comprehends what the jury right entails and the consequences of waiving it. (See id. at pp. 169-170, 219 Cal.Rptr.3d 265 , 396 P.3d 424 .) In situations where a defendant has waived counsel, we also endorse the practice of appointing standby counsel for the limited purpose of discussing with the defendant the decision to waive a jury. (See, e.g., U.S. v. Sammons (6th Cir. 1990) 918 F.2d 592 , 595 [self-represented defendant

Given these facts, the People's contention raises a fundamental question: How much weight to afford such prior pleas in assessing the totality of the circumstances indicating whether a jury trial right waiver is "knowing and intelligent"? It is true that we have previously inferred some degree of a defendant's knowledge and intelligence of the jury right from a vaguely

F. Cumulative Error

Daniels urges us to consider the cumulative effect of errors in his trial. A majority of this court would hold that no error occurred affecting his guilt convictions or the true findings of special circumstances. Hence, Daniels's claim of cumulative error fails.

We, the undersigned, agree that most of Daniels's claims are unavailing. But we cannot conclude from this record that the trial court's acceptance of Daniels's jury waiver complied with the constitutional requirements that the waiver must be knowing and intelligent. Because we find Daniels's waiver of jury trial was invalid in consideration of the totality of the circumstances, we would reverse Daniels's convictions with respect to all counts tried (counts 12-16 and 20-22), the true findings establishing the presence of special circumstances, and his death sentence. Accordingly, we dissent from the court's judgment today to affirm the validity of Daniels's jury trial waivers for the guilt phase and special-circumstance determinations, and we concur in the reversal of Daniels's death judgment on the basis of an invalid penalty phase waiver.

In all other respects, we would affirm.

We Concur:

Werdegar, J.

Liu, J.

CONCURRING OPINION BY LIU, J. TO THE LEAD OPINION, CONCURRING AND DISSENTING IN THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

I agree with today's lead opinion that David Scott Daniels, a capital defendant proceeding without counsel, did not make a knowing and intelligent jury trial waiver. The fact that Daniels repeatedly and "most emphatically" said he understood what he was doing

Instead of quoting this language in Collins as the standard by which we assess whether a jury trial waiver is knowing and intelligent, Justice Corrigan cites Adams v. U.S. ex rel. McCann (1942) 317 U.S. 269 , 63 S.Ct. 236 , 87 L.Ed. 268 and U.S. ex rel. Williams v. DeRobertis (7th Cir. 1983) 715 F.2d 1174 , and asserts that it is enough if the defendant understands " 'that the choice confronting him was, on the one hand, to be judged by a group of people from the community, and on the other hand, to have his guilt or innocence determined by a judge.' " (Conc. & dis. opn. of Corrigan, J., post , 221 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 823, 400 P.3d at p. 423.) But Collins is the controlling authority here, and I do not agree that simply knowing a jury is comprised of people from the community amounts to a " ' " 'full awareness' " ' " of the nature of the jury trial right. ( Collins , supra , 26 Cal.4th at p. 305, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836 , 27 P.3d 726 .) It is true that Collins "invalidated the defendant's jury trial waiver for lack of voluntariness ." (Conc. & dis. opn. of Corrigan, J., post , at p. 823, fn. 3, 400 P.3d at p. 423, fn. 3.) But we have repeatedly applied Collins to assess whether a jury trial waiver was knowing and intelligent. (See People v. Sivongxxay (2017) 3 Cal.5th 151 , 166, 171, 219 Cal.Rptr.3d 265 , 396 P.3d 424 ( Sivongxxay );

Cuéllar, J.

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION BY CORRIGAN, J. TO THE LEAD OPINION, CONCURRING AND DISSENTING IN THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

Corrigan, J.

I concur in the court's judgment affirming all guilty verdicts and all true findings against defendant David Scott Daniels. I also concur in the court's judgment insofar as it vacates the unauthorized sentence of death in connection with count 21 and directs the superior court to amend the abstract of judgment to reflect a sentence of 15 years to life on that count. I join in Justice Cuéllar's lead opinion setting forth the statement of facts (part I) and its resolution of all issues except part II.D.

I respectfully dissent from the court's reversal of the death judgment for the murder of LeWayne Carolina (count 12). I would conclude that Daniels knowingly and intelligently waived his right to a jury trial in favor of a bench trial for both the guilt and the penalty phases.

"The Sixth Amendment teaches that we should accord the competent defendant,

The court then asked Daniels if he wished to proceed "by way of jury trial or by way of court trial." Daniels replied, "Court trial." The following colloquy ensued:

"THE COURT: Are you satisfied that that's what you want to do?

"MR. DANIELS: Yes.

"THE COURT: Do you understand that you have an absolute right to proceed by way of jury trial both in the guilt phase and at [the] penalty phase, if there is a penalty phase, if you want to do that? Do you understand me?

"THE COURT: What you are telling me then is that you wish to waive your right to a jury trial in the guilt phase and in the penalty phase which basically means if there is [ sic ] two phases, you will not have a jury determine your fate, but rather the Court will make certain findings based upon what you have been charged with? Do you understand that?

"MR. DANIELS: I understand.

"THE COURT: Although I reference jury trial, you have a right not only to-these charges, you have a right to a jury trial and a court trial, but my understanding is you don't want either one of those, you wish to plead guilty and to admit, right?

"MR. DANIELS: Yes.

"THE COURT: So when I reference just jury trial, is the understanding between the People and you, Mr. Daniels, that although I just say jury trial, that it also pertains to court trial rights? Do you understand that?

"THE COURT: Now, is there anything at all that I have done or said so far that you do not understand?

"MR. DANIELS: No.

"THE COURT: All right. You have the right to a jury trial. Do you understand that?

"THE COURT: Do you realize that by pleading guilty or admitting the truth and validity of the prior felony convictions alleged against you[,] you will give up your right to a jury trial as to these matters?

"THE COURT: And do you give your right up to a jury trial as it pertains to these matters?

"MR. DANIELS: I do."

Daniels in fact presented no defense or argument. He apologized to the victims' families.

In a statement to the probation officer after trial, Daniels explained that "he chose not to fight the case, choosing to plead guilty to the majority of the charges, to put this matter behind him and to bring some closure to this case. He felt it would be unfair to the victims and their surviving

Daniels contends that his jury trial waiver was invalid because the court did not advise him that a jury is made up of 12 members who must be impartial and must unanimously agree on a verdict; nor did it explain the consequences of a hung jury. His arguments are contrary to settled precedent.

We have consistently eschewed any rigid formula or particular form of words that a trial court must use to ensure that a jury trial waiver is knowing and intelligent. ( Sivongxxay , supra , 3 Cal.5th at pp. 169-170, 219 Cal.Rptr.3d 265 , 396 P.3d 424 ; see Lawley , supra , 27 Cal.4th at p. 140, 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 614 , 38 P.3d 461 [discussing waiver of the right to counsel]; see also Iowa v. Tovar (2004) 541 U.S. 77 , 88, 124 S.Ct. 1379 , 158 L.Ed.2d 209

The court was not constitutionally required to go further and enumerate specifics, such as that a jury is made up of 12 members of the community, that the jury members must be impartial, and that their verdict must be unanimous. The high court " 'has never held that a defendant, when waiving the right to a jury, constitutionally is entitled to be canvassed by the trial court, let alone to require a specifically formulated canvass....' " (

Whether the defendant is represented or not, the trial court's role is the same. The court must satisfy itself that the defendant's waiver of his constitutional rights is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. (See Adams , supra , 317 U.S. at pp. 277-278, 281, 63 S.Ct. 236 .) But it need not do more. "The general rule is that a trial court ordinarily is not required to give any advisement to a self-represented defendant who chooses to represent himself or herself after knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily forgoing the assistance of counsel." ( People v. Barnum (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1210 , 1214, 131 Cal.Rptr.2d 499 , 64 P.3d 788 .) Barnum considered whether the trial court was required to advise a self-represented defendant of the privilege against self-incrimination before the defendant was called as a witness by the prosecution or testified on his own behalf. ( Id . at pp. 1217-1225, 131 Cal.Rptr.2d 499 , 64 P.3d 788 .) A long-standing Court of Appeal rule had imposed such a duty based on the logic that " '[w]hen a defendant goes to trial upon a charge of a criminal nature without the benefit of counsel, it is the duty of the court to be alert to protect the

Daniels argues the trial court was required to inform him that a consequence of his penalty phase waiver would be the loss of the right to an independent trial court review of the penalty imposed by a jury. As he acknowledges, we have previously held that the failure to so advise does not vitiate a jury waiver. ( People v. Robertson , supra , 48 Cal.3d at p. 38, 255 Cal.Rptr. 631 , 767 P.2d 1109 .) Moreover, Daniels did not completely forgo an independent review of the death verdict. "When the judge renders a decision on penalty, and thereafter carefully reviews that decision on motion for modification pursuant to [Penal Code] section 190.4, the defendant is afforded ample due process." ( People v. Deere (1985) 41 Cal.3d 353 , 359-360, 222 Cal.Rptr. 13 , 710 P.2d 925 , disapproved on other grounds as recognized in People v. Brown (2014) 59 Cal.4th 86 , 110-111, 172 Cal.Rptr.3d 576 , 326 P.3d 188 .) The trial court did so here.

My colleagues in the plurality assert that "[i]n capital cases, the trial court must scrupulously discharge its responsibility to

We Concur:

Cantil-Sakauye, C.J.

Chin, J.

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION BY KRUGER, J. TO THE LEAD OPINION, CONCURRING IN THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

Kruger, J.

This case illustrates the difficulties that can arise on appeal when a trial court fails to "advise a defendant of the basic mechanics of a jury trial in a waiver colloquy" or to take other "steps as appropriate to ensure, on the record, that the defendant comprehends what the jury right entails." ( People v. Sivongxxay (2017) 3 Cal.5th 151 , 169, 219 Cal.Rptr.3d 265 , 396 P.3d 424 ( Sivongxxay ).) Under the unusual circumstances of this case, my preference would be to order further proceedings to allow the parties to make a more robust record concerning the intelligence of defendant David Scott Daniels's jury waiver. (Cf. Lopez v. United States (D.C. 1992) 615 A.2d 1140 , 1147-1148 [limited remand for further proceedings to determine whether waiver was knowing and intelligent]; Jackson v. Com. (Ky. 2003) 113 S.W.3d 128 , 136 [similar]; State v. Anderson (2002) 249 Wis.2d 586 , 603, 638 N.W.2d 301 [similar]; State v. Aragon (1997) 123 N.M. 803 , 809, 945 P.2d 1021 [similar]; Com. v. DeGeorge (1984) 506 Pa. 445 , 450, 485 A.2d 1089 [similar]; also cf. People v. Lightsey (2012) 54 Cal.4th 668 , 702-710, 143 Cal.Rptr.3d 589 , 279 P.3d 1072 [limited remand for retrospective competency hearing]; People v. Leahy (1994) 8 Cal.4th 587 , 610, 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 663 , 882 P.2d 321 [limited remand for hearing regarding admissibility of expert evidence].) "If I were to insist upon the disposition I prefer, however, there would be no judgment of this court...." ( People v. Harris (1984) 36 Cal.3d 36 , 72, 201 Cal.Rptr. 782 , 679 P.2d 433 (conc. opn. of Grodin, J.).) To avoid that outcome, I concur in the judgment set out in our per curiam opinion, which resolves the case in the manner that most closely reflects my own views on what the record before us establishes about the

A criminal defendant is permitted to waive his or her jury trial rights-but only if the record demonstrates the waivers are express, voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. ( Collins , supra , 26 Cal.4th at p. 305, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836 , 27 P.3d 726 .) That proves to be a problem in this case. We, the undersigned, cannot conclude that defendant David Scott Daniels's

2. LeWayne Carolina Homicide

Jennifer O'Neal and Daniels were dating and had known each other about four years. At approximately 6:30 p.m. on December 28, 1999, Daniels picked up O'Neal and O'Neal's eight-year-old daughter in his car. O'Neal

About 10 minutes after the group had arrived at the apartment complex, Lamar returned alone to the car. He appeared scared and looked as though he was praying. Daniels returned to the car soon after, holding his left side and gasping for air. Daniels told O'Neal, "I've been shot. That guy shot me." Daniels drove the car away from the apartment complex and back to Martina's house, swerving while appearing to nod off. At Martina's house, O'Neal and the other adults attempted to treat Daniels's bullet wounds on his left arm and left side near his back. Martina saw that Daniels had a gun, one she would identify in court as similar to the nine-millimeter gun found on Daniels at his arrest.

Martina drove Daniels, O'Neal, and O'Neal's daughter back to the Ramada Inn. In the hotel room, Daniels told O'Neal that there were three other men and a woman in the Stonegate apartment. He said a man in the kitchen started shooting, and Daniels had returned fire. Daniels told O'Neal he shot the woman, who had been yelling, and also shot the man sitting on the couch. He said "he would not be taken alive" by law enforcement. While relaying his account of events, Daniels smoked a cocaine cigarette. Martina observed a smaller gun on the dresser, which Daniels explained he got from the man who shot him in the apartment.

3. LaTanya McCoy Homicide

On December 30, 1999, local law enforcement authorities issued an arrest warrant for Daniels for the murder of LeWayne Carolina. On the morning of January 2, 2000, Sacramento Police Detective Michael Kaye was conducting surveillance in front of Martina's house. Around 6:00 a.m., Daniels drove a silver Chevrolet Camaro down the street, making unusual maneuvers before he paused in front of the residence. When the Camaro pulled away, Kaye followed in pursuit. Kaye broadcasted the Camaro's direction of travel to responding patrol units.

Officer Shaunda Davis of the Sacramento Police Department was on patrol, positioned on a nearby road. She activated the patrol car's overhead lights, as did officers in another patrol car, in anticipation of a felony vehicle stop. Daniels initially pulled over, but then drove off at a high speed before the officers could position themselves for a vehicle stop. Fog limited visibility. Police dispatchers were advised that Daniels's car was traveling on Mack Road at speeds up to 100 miles per hour. Daniels's car weaved in and out of

Sacramento County Sheriff's deputies testified regarding two confiscated letters written by Daniels while in jail in April and June of 2000. In one six-page letter addressed to a woman named Nikki, Daniels stated that he felt responsible for McCoy's death and wished that he had died instead of McCoy. He also wished he had "killed every last one" of the police officers he shot. Daniels wrote he was not afraid to die and preferred death to life in prison. He stated he knew he would get caught and "that's why [he] robbed every bank an [ sic ] store in sight." Included with an 11-page letter from Daniels to his aunt was a printout labeled "Daniels Investigation Time Line," which contained admissions and details of crimes committed between November 16, 1999, and January 1, 2000. The listed offenses included 6 bank robberies, 17 robberies, 2 carjackings, and a shootout with the Turlock Police Department.

2. Prior Convictions

During the guilt phase, Daniels admitted to two prior felony convictions: a January 1986 felony conviction for attempted first degree burglary ( §§ 664,

Jose Campos testified that on the evening of December 30, 1999, Daniels walked into the garage of Campos's home in Turlock with a firearm and

As part of his analysis of Daniels's decision to exercise his right to self-representation, Judge Long made several inquiries about Daniels's mental state that day. Daniels responded that he was thinking clearly, he knew what he was doing, he was taking

"THE COURT: All right. The Court makes findings as follows: One, the defendant, Mr. Daniels, is competent, he understands the nature of the charges, he understands and represents that his mind is clear whereby if he wished to present a defense, he would know how to do that to these charges. [¶] The Court also finds that Mr. Daniels understands and is aware of the risk and dangers of representing himself, and I further find that he is waiving his right to a lawyer and proceeding to trial by way of self-representation. And I find that this choice for him to represent himself is done knowingly, freely, and intelligently, and without any force or coercion. The Court then will grant you your right to represent yourself."

Daniels signed a record of Faretta warnings in open court and affirmed that he understood the warnings contained in the document.

2. Analysis

Daniels argues the court failed to meaningfully inquire into his understanding of the charges. The record contains no indication that Daniels ever discussed the risks of self-representation with counsel. Daniels asserts that neither Judge Ransom nor Judge Long inquired as to Daniels's legal experience or informed him of the complexities of trial. Further, Judge Long did not address Daniels's statement that he did not view self-representation to be disadvantageous.

As established by the high court in Faretta , a defendant has a federal constitutional right to the assistance of counsel during

First, Daniels was made thoroughly aware of the " 'dangers and disadvantages of self-representation.' " ( Lopez , supra , 71 Cal.App.3d at p. 572, 138 Cal.Rptr. 36 .) The court advised him that it is "never wise" for an unskilled person to represent oneself. The court also told him that it would not grant him any special treatment, and he would be subject to the same standards expected of an attorney. Judge Ransom and Judge Long both emphasized to Daniels that he would be opposed by a trained prosecutor, whom Judge Long described as "one of the experts in this county in prosecuting [death penalty] cases." Judge Long analogized the expected disparity in lawyering skills to "a flag football team going up against the Tennessee Titans." Daniels signed a "Record of Faretta Warnings" form, attesting that he had been advised of the court's oral admonitions-including that he had the right to counsel at all stages of the case; it is generally "not a wise choice" to represent oneself in a criminal matter; he would not receive any special treatment from the court; and he would be required to comply with all rules of criminal procedure and evidence just like an attorney would. Finally, Daniels was twice provided a form explaining his library privileges as a self-represented inmate. Daniels

Despite the absence of direct questions by Judge Ransom about Daniels's mental competence, Daniels points to nothing in the record that would have raised a question about his competence. (See

Daniels argues that the "truncated, non-adversarial proceedings" of this case do not advance section 1018's constitutional and policy purposes of ensuring reliable

Daniels is correct to emphasize the significance of section 1018's prohibition against guilty pleas in capital cases. But his refusal to participate in his defense at trial did not amount to a slow plea in violation of section 1018. Further, we reject his related claims that the nonadversarial nature of the proceedings below rendered the judgment unreliable in violation of the Eighth

We reject Daniels's argument that the Eighth Amendment's requirements outweigh an individual's interest in self-representation merely because

upon what you have been charged with? Do you understand that?

"MR. DANIELS: I understand.

"THE COURT: And more specifically in the posture that we are presently in, that I will be the Judge that will make those determinations. Do you understand that?

"THE COURT: Do you understand that if you go by way of the court trial rather than jury trial, I will decide whether the prosecution has proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt in the guilt phase of the trial, it will be my job to determine whether you are guilty or not guilty of the charges and allegations made against you? Do you understand that?

"THE COURT: Do you understand that I will determine whether the special circumstances are true or not true? Do you understand that?

"MR. DANIELS: Yes.

"THE COURT: Do you understand if I find you guilty of murder, of special circumstances, in the guilt phase of the trial, I will also determine whether the punishment is life without the possibility of parole or the death penalty in the penalty phase of the trial? You understand that?

"MR. DANIELS: Yes, I understand.

"THE COURT: Have you understood everything that I have told you relative to your right to proceed by way of jury trial or by way of court trial?

People waive their right to a jury trial in the penalty phase?

"[THE PROSECUTOR]: Yes, People join.

"THE COURT: All right. Do you know what you have just done, sir?

"MR. DANIELS: Yes.

"THE COURT: All right. The Court finds that Mr. Daniels understands and freely and voluntarily waives his right to jury trial and has elected to proceed by way of court trial in the guilt phase and also by way of court trial in the penalty phase if, in fact, there is a penalty phase. And these waivers are now made part of the records of this Court."

The record contains no jury waiver form, and there is no indication that one was ever signed by Daniels.

During the afternoon session of that January 5th proceeding, Daniels-still self-represented-stated his intent to plead guilty to the noncapital counts and to enter pleas admitting the truth and validity of two prior convictions. In preparation for accepting these pleas, the court obtained oral waivers of Daniels's constitutional rights, including the right to jury trial, as shown in the following exchange:

"THE COURT: All right. You have the right to a jury trial. Do you understand that?

"THE COURT: Do you realize that by pleading guilty or admitting the truth and validity of the prior felony convictions alleged against you, you will give up your right to a jury trial as to these matters?

"THE COURT: And do you give your right up to a jury trial as it pertains to these matters?

"MR. DANIELS: I do."

If the trial court is not persuaded the waiver is knowing and intelligent, the court cannot accept it. (See

When the guilt phase commenced a week and a half later, on January 16, 2001, the court sought to orally confirm that Daniels maintained his desire to proceed by way of court trial. The court stated, "We also talked about your right to a jury trial with members of these communities that would determine whether or not-the question of guilt or innocence. [¶] Do you remember that?" The court was mistaken on this point: it had not previously informed Daniels that members of the community would determine guilt or innocence. Nonetheless, Daniels responded "Yes" to the court's query of whether he recalled such an advisement. This exchange reveals a discrepancy between what the court evidently believed it told Daniels and what it actually told him. Daniels's affirmative response as to whether he remembered the purported previous advisement, despite no record it was given, ultimately provides little support for conclusion that Daniels's waiver was based on full awareness of the nature of the jury trial right.

The appellate record contains a January 4, 2001, memorandum with the subject line "Waivers," which was filed by the prosecutor. In this memorandum, the prosecutor requested that the court conduct supplemental

The People point out that Daniels "never expressed confusion or asked for clarification regarding his jury trial right." While this may be true, we decline to infer Daniels's knowledge from his failure to ask unprompted questions of the court. And though an utterance of bewilderment might have weighed in favor of our finding Daniels's waiver to not be knowledgeable, the absence of such an expression does not push us toward the inverse finding of a knowing waiver. The phrase "You don't know what you don't know" encapsulates the futility of relying on defendants to raise questions or identify misunderstandings on their own when they lack the very basis to understand what lies beyond the scope of their knowledge.

We do not dispute that Daniels expressly affirmed-multiple times-his desire to waive a jury for all trial phases. But we decline to conflate a knowing, intelligent waiver with an emphatic one. The former is constitutionally required; the latter is not. Moreover, our concurring and dissenting colleagues are mistaken in declaring that we "dismiss Daniels's repeated affirmations that he understood his right to a jury trial and the consequences of forgoing it." (Conc. & dis. opn. of Corrigan, J., post, 221 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 824, 400 P.3d at p. 424.) Not once did Daniels say he understood what the jury right entails. We are not persuaded that Daniels's purported "overarching aim ... to accept responsibility for the charged crimes" is relevant to whether his jury trial waiver was knowing and intelligent. (Conc. opn. of Kruger, J., post , at p. 831, 400 P.3d at p. 429.) That a defendant "may have made a 'tactical choice' to waive a jury tells us nothing about whether he understood what he would be giving up by making such a choice." ( U.S. v. Shorty (9th Cir. 2013) 741 F.3d 961 , 969 ( Shorty ).) Nor was

A proper weighing of the totality of the circumstances forces us to take into account Daniels's lack of representation, even if it was his own choice to exercise his right to self-representation. The sparseness of the colloquy's substance in this case is especially conspicuous given that Daniels was without the benefit of counsel when he proffered his waiver. Counsel plays a crucial part in transmitting information to the client. Time and time again, our precedent has recognized as much, incorporating within the totality of relevant circumstances not only the fact of representation by counsel, but also record references to discussions between counsel and defendant. (See, e.g., Weaver , supra , 53 Cal.4th at p. 1075, 139 Cal.Rptr.3d 355 , 273 P.3d 546 [valid waiver, in part, because "the court gave [the defendant] ample time to consider and reconsider his decision and

The People maintain that Daniels was sufficiently aware of essential aspects of a jury trial because of his extensive experience with the criminal justice system, and not merely because of the advisements given in this case. The record contains certified copies of five of Daniels's prior felony convictions. Two of these convictions were introduced at the guilt phase to establish prior strikes within the meaning of the Three Strikes Law: a January 1986 conviction for attempted first degree burglary; and a July 1991 robbery conviction. During the penalty phase, the prosecution additionally introduced certified copies of three prior convictions as evidence

Nor can we ignore that the plea colloquies describing certain elements of the jury right preceded Daniels's jury waiver in this matter by a decade in one case, 11 years in another case, and 13 years in another. Unless we

In California, an effective waiver of the right to a jury trial requires that a defendant's waiver be express, voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. ( Holmes , supra , 54 Cal.2d at pp. 443-444, 5 Cal.Rptr. 871 , 353 P.2d 583 [waiver must be "express[ed] in words ... and will not be implied from a defendant's conduct"]; Collins , supra , 26 Cal.4th at p. 305, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836 , 27 P.3d 726 [court may not accept a defendant's waiver of a jury trial "unless it is knowing and intelligent ... as well as voluntary"].) In Ernst , we found that the failure to obtain the defendant's express waiver of his right to a jury trial required reversal. ( People v. Ernst (1994) 8 Cal.4th 441 , 446, 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 238 , 881 P.2d 298 .) In Collins , we held that the court's error of inducing an involuntary waiver from the defendant amounted to a structural defect. ( Collins , supra , 26 Cal.4th at p. 312, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836 , 27 P.3d 726 .) Knowledge and intelligence are required components of an effective waiver of jury trial and are equally pivotal as the requirements that a waiver be express and voluntary. Hence, a court's failure to obtain a knowing and intelligent waiver falls within the

The court has already found that Daniels's death judgment warrants reversal on the

For the average reader (or writer) of judicial opinions, it is perhaps elementary what a jury is and how it functions in a criminal trial. But we cannot assume such knowledge among the general populace or even in "a literate high school graduate." (Conc. & dis. opn. of Corrigan, J., post , 221 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 824, 400 P.3d at p. 424.) Although schoolchildren are "capable" of understanding the concept of a jury trial ( People v. Barrett (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1081 , 1130, 144 Cal.Rptr.3d 661 , 281 P.3d 753 (conc. & dis. opn. of Liu, J.)), the state of our citizenry's actual knowledge of basic civics leaves much to be desired.

The jury's role in a capital case is particularly likely to be unfamiliar. The defendant is unlikely ever to have experienced a capital trial (certainly this was Daniels's first), and the jury performs a unique function when considering whether to render a death verdict. "Unlike its role at the guilt phase, the jury's role in a capital penalty trial 'is not merely to find facts, but also-and most important-to render an individualized, normative determination about

Finally, Justice Corrigan contends that the validity of Daniels's jury trial waiver follows from our recent decision in Sivongxxay . (Conc. & dis. opn. of Corrigan, J., post , 221 Cal.Rptr.3d at pp. 822-823, 825, 827-828, 400 P.3d at pp. 422-423, 424-425, 426-427.) But the defendant in Sivongxxay proceeded with the assistance of counsel, whereas Daniels did not. Our opinion in Sivongxxay repeatedly emphasized the importance of this fact. (See Sivongxxay , supra , 3 Cal.5th at p. 167, 219 Cal.Rptr.3d 265 , 396 P.3d 424 ["Although defendant is a Laotian refugee with no formal education and limited English proficiency, he was represented by counsel."]; id . at p. 173, fn. 7, 219 Cal.Rptr.3d 265 , 396 P.3d 424 ["By contrast, because defendant, who was represented by counsel at all pertinent times, had a right to a jury trial with regard to the special circumstance allegation at the time he entered his jury waiver [citation], his comprehensive waiver is properly understood as subsuming that right."]; id . at p. 174, fn. 8, 219 Cal.Rptr.3d 265 , 396 P.3d 424 ["[H]ere the relevant circumstances include not only the colloquy, but also ... the fact

B

ecause the outcome of this case turns heavily on the colloquies between Daniels and the court, they are set forth in detail here. On August 7, 2000, before the preliminary hearing, Daniels informed the court that he "wish[ed] to plead guilty." When his counsel interjected, "He doesn't mean that," Daniels retorted, "I know exactly what I'm saying. We discussed this already." Counsel told the court that she had advised Daniels to enter not guilty pleas so that the case could proceed to preliminary hearing. Daniels responded, "I understand exactly what she is saying. What I am saying [is] I am prepared to enter a plea of guilty." The court replied that Daniels could not enter a guilty plea without his counsel's consent. Defense counsel proposed a sentence of life without the possibility of parole in exchange for defendant's guilty plea, but the prosecutor refused. The court then entered pleas of not guilty. Following a preliminary hearing, Daniels was held to answer on 22 of 24 charges.

On December 7, 2000, after Daniels was arraigned on the information, he filed a letter requesting that he be allowed to represent himself and to plead guilty to the charges. In the letter, he stated, "I fully understand that I am charged with the Capitol [ sic ] offense of Murder penal code section 187 with the special circumstances." Daniels also filed a written motion in support of his request. On December 20, the court questioned Daniels about his choice to waive counsel. It advised him that he was facing the death penalty and that, even if he chose self-representation, he could not plead guilty to the capital charges. Daniels said he understood. The court admonished Daniels about his right to be represented by counsel and the risks of self-representation. Daniels affirmed that he understood each of the court's admonishments and that he wanted to exercise his "Faretta" right. Daniels executed a written waiver, and the court granted his request to proceed pro se. When asked if he wanted the assistance of advisory counsel, Daniels declined. The court asked, "Are you sure of that?" and Daniels responded, "Positive."

Two weeks later, on January 5, 2001, Daniels appeared before a different judge for trial. Again, the court extensively discussed Daniels's desire to represent himself. After reviewing the charges, the court emphasized that they were "very, very serious" and that the special circumstance allegations exposed him to the death penalty. Daniels said that he understood. The court warned that the prosecutor was an expert in capital litigation, it is unwise to elect self-representation, and Daniels would be at a "severe disadvantage."

they are true or not true. Do you understand that?

"MR. DANIELS: I understand."

Daniels confirmed that he was waiving his right to jury trial of his own free will, he had not received any threats or promises, and he was not under the influence of any substance that would cloud his judgment. The court then

and proceed by way of court trial, is that true?

"[MR. DANIELS]: Yes, I do, Your Honor.

"THE COURT: Do you understand fully that what this means is that I will try the question of your guilt or your innocence. [¶] Do you understand that?

"[MR. DANIELS]: I understand, Your Honor.

"THE COURT: And if, in fact, we go to a penalty phase, that I will, in fact, try the question about whether or not aggravating factors outweigh those mitigating factors. [¶] Do you understand-do you understand that?

"[MR. DANIELS]: I do.

"THE COURT: And despite me telling you all of this, you still wish to proceed in the legal posture that you are presently in?

"[MR. DANIELS]: Yes, Your Honor. I do."

During the guilt phase, Daniels presented no evidence or argument and engaged in no cross-examination. The trial court convicted him on all counts and found true all special allegations and enhancements.

II. DISCUSSION

The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant "the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury...." ( U.S. Const., 6th Amend.)

My colleagues in the plurality dismiss Daniels's repeated affirmations that he understood his right to a jury trial and the consequences of forgoing it with the observation that " 'You don't know what you don't know.' " (Conc. & dis. opn. of Cuéllar, J., ante , 221 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 803, 400 P.3d at p. 406.) But a review of the entire record casts no doubt on Daniels's understanding. He was a literate high school graduate who had been gainfully employed. He showed some legal sophistication by filing a written motion to represent himself and referring to his "Faretta" right. He spoke most emphatically about his ability to comprehend the proceedings. When his counsel questioned his desire to plead guilty, he retorted, "I know exactly what I'm saying. We discussed this already." He assured the court that he "fully underst [ood]" the charges against him. He told the court he was "positive" that he did not need the assistance of advisory counsel. He emphasized his confidence that the court would give him a fair trial. He had repeated opportunities to ask questions or express reservations. He did neither. At one point, the court observed that it had

So too here. Regarding the right to a jury, a defendant could be told that the jury will be instructed on the law, will deliberate in private, can discuss the case with no one,

Notwithstanding these deficiencies, I agree with Justice Corrigan that the record before us sufficiently demonstrates that defendant's choice to waive his right to jury trial on the charges related to special-circumstance murder was "made with eyes open." (

The record provides no comparable indication with respect to defendant's penalty phase waiver, however. Although the record clearly reflects defendant's desire to accept legal responsibility for his crimes by pleading guilty, the record does not reflect that defendant affirmatively sought the penalty he received. True, defendant did not put on his own case in mitigation. But when the People rested at the penalty phase, defendant asked the court for a few days to use the law library. When proceedings resumed, defendant apologized to the families of Carolina and McCoy, admitting his crimes against the deceased and expressing "deep remorse and sadness." (Conc. & dis. opn. of Cuéllar, J., 221 Cal.Rptr.3d at 786, 400 P.3d at p. 392.) Based on this record, it is unclear what defendant hoped to achieve at the penalty phase. I therefore cannot conclude that information about the fundamental attributes of a jury trial would have been irrelevant to, or merely confirmatory of, defendant's choice to waive a penalty phase jury. Nor do I think it clear, on this record, that defendant already understood these attributes. The penalty phase of a capital trial is "the only context in which California law authorizes a jury to decide the appropriate punishment for a criminal offense." ( Sivongxxay , supra , 3 Cal.5th at p. 213, 219 Cal.Rptr.3d 265 , 396 P.3d 424 (conc. & dis. opn. of Liu, J.).) None of the decade-old advisements defendant received in connection with earlier criminal cases touched on the characteristics of a

The jury lies at the heart of California's criminal justice system and its capital sentencing

A

. Guilt Phase Evidence

The People presented the following evidence during the guilt phase of trial. Daniels did not present any guilt phase evidence or argument.

1. Armed Robberies and Carjacking

From November 26 through December 27, 1999, Daniels committed several armed robberies of businesses in Sacramento. The robberies proceeded in substantially the same fashion: Daniels would enter a bank or store, pull out a firearm or insinuate that he had a firearm, and demand money from the cash register. On one occasion, Daniels led a customer and a clerk to the back of the store, took $25 from the customer's wallet, and bound the customer's and clerk's necks and faces with cable wire before taking $1,000 dollars from the store's cash register.

On January 1, 2000, Daniels approached Gabriel Tover and Lisa Lovado outside a Blockbuster Video in Stockton, holding what looked to be a machine gun or an Uzi. Daniels pointed his firearm at Tover and demanded the keys to a silver 1995 Chevrolet Camaro; Tover obliged. After also taking Lovado's purse and Tover's wallet, Daniels got into the car and drove off.

Around 8:00 p.m., Daniels, O'Neal, and O'Neal's daughter went to the Ramada Inn on Auburn Boulevard, where O'Neal rented a room. Daniels made a phone call in the lobby, as well as some calls in the hotel room. Daniels smoked three cocaine cigarettes between approximately 8:00 and 9:30 p.m. Daniels, O'Neal, and O'Neal's daughter left the hotel together by car.

They picked up a woman named Marcie, then drove to Martina Daniels's house in South Sacramento where they picked up Martina and her friend Lamar. Lamar recommended a place where Daniels could buy illegal drugs. Daniels drove the car and its passengers to an apartment complex on Mack Road. He seemed "very high" and "very hyper." His driving was "okay, a little fast, but he was driving normally." When they arrived at the Stonegate apartment complex, Daniels indicated he would be right back, and both he and Lamar exited the car. O'Neal described Daniels's demeanor as "very aggressive" and observed that "he was

At the penalty phase, the prosecution introduced certified copies of three prior convictions: a March 1988 felony conviction for possession of a controlled substance ( Health & Saf. Code, § 11350 ); an October 1990 felony conviction for sale of a controlled substance ( Health & Saf. Code, § 11352 ); and a February 1998 felony conviction for second degree burglary ( § 459 ). Daniels acknowledged he had seen copies of these prior convictions.

3. Uncharged Crimes

The prosecution introduced evidence of several uncharged crimes that occurred in December 1999. Specifically, the prosecution elicited a bank teller's testimony regarding Daniels's armed robbery of the Washington Mutual Bank in Stockton on December 11, 1999, and his departure from the bank with about $6,000 in stolen cash. In addition, business proprietor Vorn Chan and his daughter Junda Chan testified about an armed robbery of Lim's Market in Stockton on December 22, 1999, during which a man took money from the cash register and Vorn's personal effects before driving off in a Toyota pickup owned by Vorn's son-in-law. Neither Vorn nor Junda identified Daniels as the perpetrator of the robbery, but Daniels indicated that he committed a crime at Lim's Market in the printout he had included in the letter to his aunt.

Witnesses testified that on December 30, 1999, Daniels was driving with an unidentified female on the J14 highway in Merced County. After driving off the roadway at a high speed, he exited his car in a daze and

4. Statement of Apology

Daniels declined to present evidence or deliver a closing argument during the penalty phase trial. He did, however, offer a lengthy apology-expressing deep remorse and sadness-to the Carolina and McCoy families. Daniels stated that he had "no intention on doing anything" to Carolina. He spoke of being a father to four boys, and apologized in particular to Carolina's father. He "accept[ed] some responsibility for that accident" that killed McCoy. The chance to apologize to the families, he said, "means a lot to me, and I have to live with this for the rest of my life." He also noted that "it took a long time for me to really prepare myself to say this" to the family members. The court would later identify Daniels's statement as potentially mitigating evidence, stating, "During the penalty phase, Mr. Daniels addressed the families of the victims. At that time, Mr. Daniels did express some remorse for his actions and took some responsibility for the crimes. These facts may constitute a mitigating factor."

A. Knowing and Intelligent Waiver of the Right to Counsel

Daniels contends that the record does not reflect a valid waiver of the right to counsel. To wit, he argues that the court did not adequately advise him of the complexities of a capital trial, made no meaningful inquiry into his understanding of the charges and possible defenses, and ignored his comment that he did not view self-representation as a disadvantage. We reject this claim.

1. Background

At a court proceeding on April 28, 2000, Daniels asked to speak to the judge. Judge Ransom told Daniels that he had to speak through his lawyer. Daniels responded, "I'm not agreeing with nothing that's going on. I'm not agreeing with nothing that's going on here-I'm not agreeing with nothing that's going on here." The proceeding terminated without further discussion.

In a letter dated December 7, 2000, Daniels advised the court, "I am Respectfully Requesting that I be allowed to withdraw my 'Not Guilty' Plea and enter a 'Guilty Plea.' I am also Requesting that I Be allowed to Represent

About two weeks later, on December 20, 2000, Judge Ransom engaged Daniels in a colloquy regarding the benefits of counsel and the drawbacks of self-representation. In response to the court's questioning, Daniels indicated that he knew he had the right to counsel at all stages of the case, he

"THE COURT: Are there any questions you need to ask me relating solely to the nature of the charges that the People of the State of California have filed against you?

"MR. DANIELS: No, sir."

Thereafter, by asking a series of yes or no questions, Judge Long warned Daniels about the dangers of self-representation. Despite the fact that the judge informed Daniels that the prosecutor in this case was "one of the experts in this county in prosecuting" death penalty cases, Daniels expressed his desire to continue self-representation. During this colloquy, the following exchange occurred:

"THE COURT: You understand that these are very, very serious matters and that whatever your legal training is and I don't know what it is, I'm going to get into that, that you, sir, are placing yourself at a severe disadvantage? Do you understand that?

"MR. DANIELS: Yes, your Honor. I don't look at it as a disadvantage.

"THE COURT: You do not look at it as a disadvantage?

"MR. DANIELS: No.

"THE COURT: All right...."

"THE COURT: Are there other areas that you think I need to explore at this time? Oh, and further, if you did want a lawyer, do you understand that I would appoint a lawyer for you and give you what additional time you need to prepare for this trial? Do you understand that?

"MR. DANIELS: Yes, I do.

"THE COURT: And even with that offer, you still want to represent yourself and proceed to trial?

"MR. DANIELS: Yes, your Honor."

Daniels again declined advisory counsel. Following a 15-minute recess for Daniels to reflect on his decision, the court concluded its advisements and ruled on Daniels's Faretta motion:

"THE COURT: All right. We are again on the record. Mr. Daniels, have you had an opportunity to think about, you know, the colloquy we have gone through relative to you representing yourself?

"MR. DANIELS: Yes.

"THE COURT: Now, let me ask you this: You have told me that you understand the nature of all these charges and what could happen to you, right?

"MR. DANIELS: Yes, I understand.

"THE COURT: And if you wish to present a defense, that is kind of like up to you, but if you wish to do that, your mind is clear and your thoughts and you understand the charges where if you wish to do that, you feel you could do that?

"THE COURT: You do?

"MR. DANIELS: Yes, I do.

"THE COURT: All right. Is there anything else?

"[THE PROSECUTOR]: No, your Honor, not on that issue.

In determining the validity of a trial court's decision to permit the exercise of a defendant's Faretta right, we have treated the suggested advisements and inquiries set forth in People v. Lopez (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 568 , 138 Cal.Rptr. 36 ( Lopez ) as a useful reference for courts to ensure the knowing and voluntary waiver of counsel. ( Koontz , supra , 27 Cal.4th at pp. 1070-1073, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 859 , 46 P.3d 335 .) Lopez suggests the court provide advisements falling into three general categories: (1) ensuring the defendant's awareness of the " 'dangers and disadvantages'

Second, the court conducted an inquiry into Daniels's intellectual capacity, as recommended in Lopez . Both Judge Ransom and Judge Long asked about Daniels's education level. Daniels stated that he had a high school education and could read and write. He told the court that he had previously been employed "off and on" as a mailroom clerk, a job which required that he read and understand

Daniels stated that he did not view self-representation as a disadvantage. "All right," replied the court, without asking why Daniels felt this way. If Daniels's statement had conveyed some understanding that his waiver of counsel was conditional, the court would have been obligated to accept the condition or else deem the waiver ineffective. (See People v. Carter (1967) 66 Cal.2d 666 , 670, 58 Cal.Rptr. 614 , 427 P.2d 214 ["waiver of counsel which is made conditional by a defendant cannot be effective unless the condition is accepted by the court"].) But Daniels's statement does not divulge a conditional waiver, such as one contingent upon the receipt of some undisclosed benefit. In light of the court's admonitions, Daniels's statement at most reflects his personal preference to control his own defense-which, no matter how ill-advised, he was entitled to do under Faretta . (See Faretta , supra , 422 U.S. at p. 834, 95 S.Ct. 2525 ["the defendant ... must be free personally to decide whether in his particular case counsel is to his advantage"].) Accordingly, Daniels fails to persuade that the court had a duty to clarify what Daniels meant, or else invalidate the waiver.

Third, Daniels was informed by both Judge Ransom and Judge Long that, if he chose to represent himself, he could not later claim inadequacy of representation. (See

Representing himself, Daniels expressly waived the right to a trial by jury. At trial, he did not present any evidence or argument, did not raise any objections, and did not conduct cross-examination. Daniels argues that his actions at trial were tantamount to a guilty plea in violation of section 1018, and that the proceedings were insufficiently reliable so as to violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. He seeks reversal of the murder convictions and the special-circumstance findings. For reasons elucidated below, this claim is one we reject.

1. Background

At a court appearance on April 28, 2000, Daniels asked to speak with the judge. Judge Ransom informed Daniels that he would need to speak through his lawyer. In response, Daniels stated, "I'm not agreeing with nothing that's going on. I'm not agreeing with nothing that's going on here-I'm not agreeing with nothing that's going on here."

On August 7, 2000, at a proceeding to set a date for Daniels's preliminary hearing, Daniels told Judge Ransom that he wished to plead guilty. Daniels's counsel confirmed that Daniels was facing the death penalty for these charges. The court informed Daniels that he was not permitted to plead guilty without his counsel's consent; the court then entered Daniels's plea of not guilty.

On August 23, 2000, in response to the court's request that Daniels waive his right to a continuous preliminary hearing so that the court could start later the next day, Daniels told the court, "[I'm] willing to waive all my rights ... and go no further in the matter." The next day, after Daniels was held to answer, he repeated his desire to plead guilty. The court asked counsel if, "in light of the seriousness of the offense," he wished to enter pleas of not guilty and denials of enhancements on behalf of Daniels; counsel replied in the affirmative. At Daniels's arraignment a week later, the court refused Daniels's request to address the court in private after the court asked Daniels whether he wanted counsel.

In a letter dated December 7, 2000, Daniels wrote to Judge Ransom: "I am Respectfully Requesting that I be allowed to withdraw my 'Not Guilty' Plea and enter a 'Guilty Plea.' I am also Requesting that I Be allowed to Represent myself, my feretta [ sic ] Rights. I fully understand that I am charged with the Capitol [ sic ] offense of Murder penal code Section 187 with the special circumstances." He enclosed a partially completed fill-in-the-blank Faretta

The case was reassigned from Judge Ransom to Judge Long for all purposes on January 5, 2001. Despite Judge Ransom's prior admonition, Daniels again attempted to plead guilty to all charges. The court prohibited Daniels from pleading guilty to the murders and related counts (counts 12-16, 20-22), but allowed him to enter

In addressing Daniels's argument regarding the nature of proceedings in his case, we find instructive People v. Sanders (1990) 51 Cal.3d 471 , 273 Cal.Rptr. 537 , 797 P.2d 561 . There, the defendant, who was represented by counsel, claimed that his decision not to present evidence at the penalty phase of trial was tantamount to a guilty plea in violation of section 1018. ( Id. at p. 527, 273 Cal.Rptr. 537 , 797 P.2d 561 .) We rejected this argument, finding that section 1018 did not govern, in part because the defendant's "choice did not amount to an admission that he believed death was the appropriate penalty, nor did he give up his right to confront or cross-examine those testifying against him at the penalty phase." ( Ibid. ) We found section 1018's scope not so broad as to encompass the defendant's choice to not participate in his trial. ( Ibid. )

Daniels's argument does not persuade us that the trial court should have appointed counsel after realizing that Daniels intended to forgo presentation of any trial defense. In affirming the Sixth Amendment's right of self-representation upon a

We are not persuaded that Daniels's contentions warrant reconsideration of prior decisions by this court. The trial court committed no error in violation of section 686.1.

D. Knowing and Intelligent Waiver of the Right to a Jury Trial

Daniels also asserts that the record does not reflect valid waivers of the right to a jury trial in favor of a bench trial. As we explain below, we would find this claim meritorious because the record fails to demonstrate his knowing and intelligent waiver. We find such error to be structural, requiring reversal of Daniels's convictions on all counts tried.

1. Background

On December 20, 2000, Judge Ransom engaged Daniels in a Faretta colloquy and found that Daniels's decision to represent himself was knowing and intelligent. Immediately after accepting Daniels's counsel waiver, the court asked if Daniels wanted to confirm the jury trial date, to which Daniels

"MR. DANIELS: Yes.

"THE COURT: Do you understand that you have an absolute right to proceed by way of jury trial both in the guilt phase and at penalty phase, if there is a penalty phase, if you want to do that? Do you understand me?

"THE COURT: What you are telling me then is that you wish to waive your right to a jury trial in the guilt phase and in the penalty phase which basically means if there is [ sic ] two phases, you will not have a jury determine your fate, but rather the Court will make certain findings based

"MR. DANIELS: Yes.

"[THE PROSECUTOR]: If I could just interject one thing. You did touch on it, but he would also have the right to have the jury determine the truth or not truth of the special circumstances. I think you did mention that.

"THE COURT: Yes. If you waived jury, then the jury will not determine the truth and validity of the special circumstances, that will be my job to determine whether they are true or not true. Do you understand that?

"MR. DANIELS: I understand.

"THE COURT: Now, in terms of waiving your right to jury trial in both the guilt and if there is a penalty phase, that phase also, are you doing this of your own free will?

"THE COURT: Have any threats been made against you or any members of your family to get you to waive your right to a jury trial?

"MR. DANIELS: No.

"THE COURT: Have you been subject to any force to get you to waive your right to a jury trial?

"THE COURT: Is there some consideration or secret promise or deal or something that I am not aware of that's making you or

"[THE PROSECUTOR]: Yes.

"THE COURT: Also in the waiver of jury trial rights as to the guilt phase and also if there is a penalty phase, that the

At the start of the penalty phase, the court again informed Daniels that he had a right to have a jury to try the penalty phase, and the court would empanel a jury to determine penalty if he so chose. Daniels still wished to proceed by court trial.

2. Analysis

The record demonstrates Daniels personally and expressly waived a jury trial regarding guilt, special circumstances, and penalty. This Daniels does not deny, and indeed, the record reveals no equivocation in his request to waive a jury for all phases of trial. He makes no claim that his waiver was coerced or otherwise involuntary. What Daniels instead contends is that his waiver was infirm because the record does not demonstrate he made his waiver with full awareness of the nature of the right being relinquished. The court, he contends, did not inform him that a jury would be comprised of 12 impartial members who must reach a unanimous verdict, nor did it explain the consequences of a hung jury. The record contains no indication that counsel discussed the jury trial right during the course of representation, and Daniels asserts that he received no advisements from counsel regarding this right.

Our inquiry into the totality of the circumstances requires us to take nuanced account of the full set of relevant facts in this case. (See Adams v. U.S. ex rel. McCann (1942) 317 U.S. 269 , 278, 63 S.Ct. 236 , 87 L.Ed. 268 ( Adams ) ["[W]hether or not there is an intelligent, competent, self-protecting waiver of jury trial by an accused must depend upon the unique circumstances of each case."].) In our prior cases, we have assessed whether a knowing and intelligent waiver was given by examining factors such as the nature of the colloquy prior to the court's acceptance of a waiver, the presence of counsel and references to discussions between the defendant and counsel regarding the jury right, and the existence and contents of a written waiver. For instance, this court has upheld an express jury waiver made "with counsel's consent and agreement" where other circumstances bolstered the conclusion that defendant's waiver was knowing and intelligent. ( People v. Cunningham (2015) 61 Cal.4th 609 , 637, 189 Cal.Rptr.3d 737 , 352 P.3d 318 .) In Cunningham , the represented defendant received "a full explanation from the court of the right and the consequences of the waiver." ( Ibid. ) The defendant expressly acknowledged, moreover, that "(1) he had an absolute right to a jury trial in both the guilt and penalty phases of his trial, (2) in a jury trial, if one of the 12 jurors was not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was guilty, the jury could not return a guilty verdict, (3) if he waived his right to a jury trial, instead of 12 people deciding the issue of his guilt or innocence, the judge alone would make that decision, and (4) it could be easier for the prosecution to convince only one person, as opposed to 12, that defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." ( Id. at p. 636, 189 Cal.Rptr.3d 737 , 352 P.3d 318 .)

We were persuaded, in another case, that a knowing and intelligent waiver had been taken after considering how the defendant had executed two written waivers reflecting his desire to give up his right to trial by jury; one of the forms, also signed by counsel, stated that defense counsel " 'fully explained' " to the defendant the terms " 'jury trial' " and " 'court trial' " and the " 'difference between a "jury trial" and

To its credit, the court obtained Daniels's express waiver for three separate phases of trial: guilt, special circumstances, and penalty. The prosecutor, perhaps cognizant of the People's interest in ensuring that the record reflected a valid waiver, interjected at one point to confirm that Daniels would waive a jury for the special-circumstance determinations. What remains both striking and relevant, however, is that the court accepted Daniels's waiver without ever inquiring as to Daniels's understanding

Confidence does not imply comprehension. Individuals are entirely capable of categorically asserting a position without awareness that the roots of that position lie in ignorance or lack of reflection. It was incumbent upon the court to verify, not merely to assume, that Daniels indeed grasped the actual nature of the jury right-even if only at a basic level. In his own mind, Daniels may have had an impression of what a jury trial is. Just what impression that was-and whether it

As we have found, ante , Daniels's waiver of counsel was knowing and intelligent. But while Daniels's choice to represent himself meant that he agreed to assume certain duties of counsel, perhaps to his detriment, this decision did not constructively vest him with the knowledge and intelligence he was entitled to have as a defendant entering a jury trial waiver. It bears repeating that our cases do not treat a jury trial waiver as valid solely because a defendant has counsel; we have ascribed importance to the presence of counsel only insofar as it tells us something about the state of a defendant's substantive awareness of the nature of the jury trial right and the consequences of forgoing it.

Here, Daniels's waiver of counsel did not signify his willingness to forgo access to basic, meaningful information about his separate

The jury trial right, by contrast, is not subject to forfeiture. ( Collins , supra , 26 Cal.4th at p. 305, fn. 2, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836 , 27 P.3d 726 [the jury trial right is a "fundamental constitutional right that, although clearly waivable, may be waived only if there is evidence in the record that the decision to do so was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary"], as cited in Barnum , supra , 29 Cal.4th at p. 1224, 131 Cal.Rptr.2d 499 , 64 P.3d 788 .) The question here thus is not, as in Barnum , whether self-represented litigants should receive special admonitions about trial practice to avoid inadvertent or ill-advised forfeitures of constitutional rights. The question is instead whether we can conclude that "there is evidence in the record that [a defendant's waiver decision] ... was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary" ( Collins at p. 305, fn. 2, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836 , 27 P.3d 726 ), where no such evidence appears, solely because the defendant chose to forgo representation by counsel. Thus, Barnum is of little relevance in the instant case.

Similarly, cases from other jurisdictions do not aid the People here. Our concurring and dissenting colleagues draw on DeRobertis , a habeas case from the Seventh Circuit, for the proposition that a knowing and intelligent waiver requires only that a defendant "understood that the choice confronting him, was on the one hand, to be

A court may not accept a jury waiver that is not "knowing and intelligent, that is, ' " 'made with a full awareness both of the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.' " ' " ( Collins , supra , 26 Cal.4th at p. 305, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836 , 27 P.3d 726 .) Here, the court may have advised Daniels of a modicum of meaningful information about the nature of a jury trial before accepting his waiver, insofar as it told him that the right applied to each of

A failure to obtain an informed waiver results in a complete denial of defendant's right to a jury trial. (See People v. Tran (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1160 , 1169, 191 Cal.Rptr.3d 251 , 354 P.3d 148 .) Both the high court and this court hold that the complete deprivation

The court obtained Daniels's waivers of jury trial for guilt, special circumstance determinations, and penalty immediately in succession after conveying roughly the same information. Constitutional inadequacies, we find, pervade the entire trial. Daniels was denied his fundamental right to a jury trial under the state and federal Constitutions. We cannot attempt to assess the prejudice Daniels suffered as a result of this deprivation. In accordance with precedent from both the high court and our court, we would reverse the judgment of the superior court on all counts tried, on the basis of structural error arising from Daniels's ineffective waivers of jury trial. We respectfully dissent from the judgment of the court, which affirms the guilt convictions for all counts tried and the true findings of special circumstances.

The record is even more bereft of support for the conclusion that Daniels's penalty phase waiver was valid. Any weight that could conceivably be accorded to Daniels's prior pleas, for example, would be diminished in an assessment of whether there is support in the record to conclude that Daniels's jury waiver at the penalty phase was knowing and intelligent. Even supposing Daniels retained the information received orally in connection with guilty pleas to burglary and drug charges over 10 years prior, we are not persuaded there is an adequate basis to presume Daniels's knowledge that any particular jury attributes would necessarily translate to the unique context of punishment determinations in capital trials.

Although the court provided Daniels another opportunity to opt for a jury trial right before the penalty phase, it did not describe any aspect of a jury's role in the penalty phase or otherwise add to what had been conveyed to Daniels earlier in the trial. A defendant's decision to waive the right to have a jury determine whether he or she will

The federal Constitution imposes a "special ' "need for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment." ' " ( Johnson v. Mississippi (1988) 486 U.S. 578 , 584, 108 S.Ct. 1981 , 100 L.Ed.2d 575 .) The judicial duty to ensure a valid waiver "is not to be discharged as a mere matter of rote, but with sound and advised discretion, with an eye to avoid unreasonable or undue departures from that mode of trial or from any of the essential elements thereof, and with a caution increasing in degree as the offenses dealt with increase in gravity." ( Patton , supra , 281 U.S. at pp. 312-313, 50 S.Ct. 253 ; accord, Martin , supra , 704 F.2d at pp. 272-273 ; see also U.S. v. U.S. Dist. Court for E. Dist. of Cal. (9th Cir. 2006) 464 F.3d 1065 , 1069 [U.S. Supreme Court in Patton "emphasized the pivotal role of trial by jury in the criminal context, particularly where the defendant is charged with a serious crime"].) A societal interest in the integrity of the capital process may at times outweigh a defendant's stated preferences in controlling his or her own case. For example, as discussed, ante , state law prevents any defendant from pleading guilty to capital charges without consent of counsel, in light of "the state's strong interest in reducing the risk of mistaken judgments in capital cases and thereby maintaining the accuracy and fairness of its criminal proceedings." ( Alfaro , supra , 41 Cal.4th at p. 1300, 63 Cal.Rptr.3d 433 , 163 P.3d 118 .) In capital cases, the trial court must scrupulously discharge its responsibility to protect the integrity of the judicial process and maintain constitutional safeguards. We concur in the judgment of the court to find Daniels's penalty phase waiver invalid, and we agree Daniels's death judgment must be reversed.

E. Sentence of Death Imposed in Connection with Daniels's Conviction of Second Degree Murder

Count 21 charged Daniels with the murder of LaTanya McCoy and alleged a multiple-murder special circumstance. (See § 190.2, subd. (a)(3).) The court convicted Daniels of McCoy's murder in the second degree and found true the special circumstance. The court later sentenced Daniels to death on count 21, in addition to imposing a death sentence on count 12, the first degree murder of LeWayne Carolina committed while engaged in the commission of robbery and burglary.

Daniels argues, and the People agree, that the death sentence imposed for the second degree murder of LaTanya McCoy was legally unauthorized. The death penalty may only be imposed where the defendant has been convicted of first degree murder and the factfinder has found true

Judges have long recognized these shortcomings in the citizenry's knowledge of civics and the role of courts. Retired United States Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor has called attention to the "steady decline" of civics education over the past generation (O'Connor & Hamilton, A democracy without civics? (Sept. 18, 2008) The Christian Science Monitor, at p. 9), with particular concern for students' understanding of "the importance of an independent judiciary" (Singer, Trailblazing Justice Now Has Games on Docket , N.Y. Times (Mar. 28, 2016) p. B1). Justice O'Connor is not alone. (See Cantil-Sakauye & Padilla, Engage, protect your democracy , The Sacramento Bee (Sept. 17, 2015) p. 7B [noting that "more than 20 percent of Californians typically do not report for jury service when summoned" and urging California schools to get civics education "back on track" by "teach[ing] students how our government works, how the three branches provide checks and balances, and how to participate in our democracy"].)

There is an additional reason why courts cannot assume that laypeople know the fundamental features of a jury trial: Those features vary from one setting to the next. The unanimity requirement, for instance, has long been considered an essential aspect of jury trials (3 Blackstone, Commentaries 375-376), and under the California

In sum, the record here shows that Daniels was intent on waiving a jury trial. But it does not show that he made the decision, as to the guilt phase or the penalty phase, " ' " 'with a full awareness both of the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.' " ' " ( Collins , supra , 26 Cal.4th at p. 305, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836 , 27 P.3d 726 .)

The record demonstrates that Daniels personally and expressly waived the right to jury trial on the issues of guilt, special circumstances, and penalty. Daniels now contends, however, that the record does not demonstrate his waiver was knowing and intelligent. He faults the trial court for failing to advise him that a jury consists of 12 members, that the jurors must be impartial, and that they must unanimously agree in order to reach a verdict. He also assigns as error the trial court's failure to advise him about the consequences of non-unanimity. He claims that his penalty phase waiver was invalid "for the same reasons that his earlier waiver of a jury at the guilt phase was invalid" and for the additional reason that he was not told his waiver of a jury trial would result in the "loss of the right to an independent trial court review of the penalty imposed by a jury." Daniels asserts that he received no advisements from counsel before discharge regarding the jury trial right.

Daniels's arguments are unpersuasive. As recently as two months ago, we reaffirmed that that there is no "rigid formula or particular form of words that a trial court must use in taking a jury waiver." ( People v. Sivongxxay (2017) 3 Cal.5th 151 , 169, 219 Cal.Rptr.3d 265 , 396 P.3d 424 ( Sivongxxay ).) We rejected a rule "that a jury waiver colloquy invariably must discuss juror impartiality, the unanimity requirement, or both for an ensuing waiver to be knowing and intelligent." ( Id . at p. 168, 219 Cal.Rptr.3d 265 , 396 P.3d 424 .) Here, Daniels personally entered an express waiver of his right to jury trial three separate times: twice before trial began and a third time before the start of the penalty phase. During the colloquy, the trial court informed Daniels that he had a right to be tried by a jury made up of members of the community and that, if he waived jury trial,

"THE COURT: And more specifically in the posture that we are presently in, that I will be the Judge that will make those determinations. Do you understand that?

"MR. DANIELS: I understand.

"THE COURT: Do you understand that if you go by way of the court trial rather than jury trial, I will decide whether the prosecution has proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt in the guilt phase of the trial, it will be my job to determine whether you are guilty or not guilty of the charges and allegations made against you? Do you understand that?

"THE COURT: Do you understand that I will determine whether the special circumstances are true or not true? Do you understand that?

"MR. DANIELS: Yes.

"THE COURT: Do you understand if I find you guilty of murder, of special circumstances, in the guilt phase of the trial, I will also determine whether the punishment is life without the possibility of parole or the death penalty in the penalty phase of the trial? You understand that?

"MR. DANIELS: Yes, I understand.

"THE COURT: Have you understood everything that I have told you relative to your right to proceed by way of jury trial or by way of court trial?

"[THE PROSECUTOR]: If I could just interject one thing. You did touch on it, but he would also have the right to have the jury determine the truth or not truth of the special circumstances. I think you did mention that.

"THE COURT: Yes. If you waived jury, then the jury will not determine the truth and validity of the special circumstances, that will be my job to determine whether

asked, "Do you know what you are doing?" to which Daniels replied, "Yes." After obtaining a waiver from the People, the court again asked Daniels, "Do you know what you have just done, sir?" to which Daniels again replied, "Yes." The court found a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of the right to jury trial.

Daniels declined the services of a defense investigator. He then stated his desire to plead guilty to the noncapital counts and to

"THE COURT: And you would have a right to a jury trial, certainly in terms of the guilt phase, and if we get beyond the guilt phase, you would have that same right if you wish to have that right as it pertains to the question of penalty. [¶] Do you understand what I am telling you at this stage?

"[MR. DANIELS]: Yes, Your Honor.

"THE COURT: And despite that, it is still your request and still your view that you wish to waive any jury in this matter

A criminal defendant may waive the right to a jury trial in favor of a bench trial. ( Patton v. United States (1930) 281 U.S. 276 , 299, 312, 50 S.Ct. 253 , 74 L.Ed. 854 ; Cal. Const., art. I, § 16.) The question of an effective waiver of a federal constitutional right is governed by federal standards. ( People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132 , 1175, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 268 , 824 P.2d 1315 ( Howard ).) "[T]he law ordinarily considers a waiver knowing, intelligent, and sufficiently aware if the defendant fully understands the nature of the right and how it would likely apply in general in the circumstances-even though the defendant may not know the specific detailed consequences of invoking it." ( United States v. Ruiz (2002) 536 U.S. 622 , 629, 122 S.Ct. 2450 , 153 L.Ed.2d 586 .) Additionally, the California Constitution requires that a criminal jury trial waiver be "by the consent of both parties expressed in open court by the defendant and the defendant's counsel." ( Cal. Const., art. I, § 16.)

A proper advisement and waiver of the jury trial right on the record generally establishes a defendant's voluntary and intelligent admission. ( People v. Mosby (2004) 33 Cal.4th 353 , 356, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 262 , 92 P.3d 841 ( Mosby ).) Our inquiry is not limited to the waiver colloquy, however. The test of a valid waiver ultimately turns, not on whether specific warnings or advisements were given, but whether "the record affirmatively shows that [the waiver] is voluntary and intelligent under the totality of the circumstances." ( Howard , supra , 1 Cal.4th at p. 1175, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 268 , 824 P.2d 1315 [guilty plea waiver]; accord, Sivongxxay , supra , 3 Cal.5th at p. 166, 219 Cal.Rptr.3d 265 , 396 P.3d 424 [waiver of jury trial]; People v. Lawley (2002) 27 Cal.4th 102 , 140, 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 614 , 38 P.3d 461 ( Lawley ) [waiver of counsel].) We

Additionally, Supreme Court precedent teaches that a knowing and intelligent waiver of the jury trial right can depend as much on tactics as on the contours of the right. In Adams , supra , 317 U.S. 269 , 63 S.Ct. 236 , a case involving a self-represented defendant, the court observed that "[t]he less rigorous enforcement of the rules of evidence, the greater informality in trial procedure-these are not the only advantages that the absence of a jury may afford to a layman who prefers to make his own defense. In a variety of subtle ways trial by jury may be restrictive of a layman's opportunities to present his case as freely as he wishes. And since trial by jury confers burdens as well as benefits, an accused should be permitted to [forgo] its privileges when his competent judgment

Here, the court explained the basic mechanism of a jury trial, that members of the community would adjudge defendant's guilt or innocence and the appropriate penalty. It also explained the consequence of waiving that right, that the court alone would make such determinations. The court was not required to go further and explain "every single conceivable benefit and burden of the choice being made" ( People v. Robertson (1989) 48 Cal.3d 18 , 38, 255 Cal.Rptr. 631 , 767 P.2d 1109 ), in the same degree of detail counsel might have chosen.

Finally, I would not impose a higher standard for a jury trial waiver in a capital case (conc. & dis. opn. of Cuéllar, J., ante , 221 Cal.Rptr.3d at pp. 810-811, 400 P.3d at pp. 412-413), or distinguish between the validity of Daniels's guilt and special circumstance waivers and his penalty phase waiver (conc. & dis. opn. of Cuéllar, J., ante , at pp. 810-811, 400 P.3d at pp. 412-413; conc. & dis.

I also disagree with the assertion that Daniels's strategy differed between the guilt and penalty phases. (Conc. opn. of Kruger, J., post , 221 Cal.Rptr.3d at pp. 831-832, 400 P.3d at p. 430.) True, Daniels did not ask to be sentenced to death. But this is largely beside the point for two reasons. First, the judge was just as capable as the jury of returning a life without parole sentence. Daniels clearly expressed his confidence in Judge Long to make that decision, declaring immediately before the penalty phase that "I trust and have faith in you, whatever your decision is." Second, Daniels consistently employed the same strategy throughout the trial. He contested no part of the prosecution's case and presented no argument, leaving the outcome in the hands of the judge. Before the penalty phase began, Daniels was again offered the services of counsel, either appointed or advisory, and an investigator, as well as additional time to prepare a penalty phase defense. He declined. Empaneling a jury for the penalty phase trial would have required that the bulk of the guilt phase evidence be presented again, undermining Daniels's desire to bring closure to the case and not further burden the victims and their surviving family members. As with the guilt phase, an advisement regarding the normative role of the jury in selecting penalty would not have made Daniels's waiver materially more informed in light of the strategy he employed.

It is always possible to elaborate on the extent of a right being waived. When asked if he waives his right to counsel, a defendant could be told that a

Although the trial court that accepted defendant's jury trial waiver painstakingly confirmed that defendant understood he was choosing to have the court make findings about his guilt, the truth of the special circumstances, and ultimately the penalty, the transcript nevertheless reveals an important omission: The court never asked defendant whether he understood the alternative before him-that is, the nature of the jury right he was waiving. The court itself supplied no information on the subject,

Here, too, whether particular information bears on the intelligence of a jury waiver must depend, at least in part, on the goal that the waiver is intended to serve. Unlike most jury waivers, defendant's waiver as to guilt and special circumstances was plainly not made with an eye to "self-protect[ion]," or to secure any litigation "advantages." ( Adams , supra , 317 U.S. at p. 278, 63 S.Ct. 236 .) As such, while an express advisement about the fundamental attributes of jury trial might have made even clearer to defendant the protection that a jury might afford, there is every indication that he did not want that protection at his trial on the substantive