People v. Moore

The hospital released Moore later that evening, and he walked to a convenience store nearby. Upon entering the store, he walked to the back and began pounding on an emergency exit door. The clerk, concerned about Moore's demeanor, called the police.

Moore opened the emergency exit door and entered a storage area between the store and a parking garage. The door closed behind him; it did not open from inside so his only available exit was through the parking garage. Distraught, Moore punched holes in the walls of the storeroom and threw things around and out of the room before leaving through the door to the parking garage. He then caused extensive damage to the parking garage before the police arrived and were able to subdue and arrest him. After the arrest, the police searched his backpack and found crystal methamphetamine.

Section 594, subdivision (a) defines the crime of vandalism as follows:

"(a) Every person who maliciously commits any of the following acts with respect to any real or personal property not his or her own, in cases other than those specified by state law, is guilty of vandalism:

(1) Defaces with graffiti or other inscribed material.

(2) Damages.

(3) Destroys."

The statute is part of a set of statutes dealing with malicious injury to property, and follows the language of the original malicious mischief statutes. ( People v. Campbell (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1488 , 1493, 28 Cal.Rptr.2d 716 ( Campbell ).) The malice requirement of such statutes was generally understood to require " 'more than mere intentional harm without justification or excuse; there must be a wanton and willful (or 'reckless' ) disregard of the plain dangers of harm, without justification, excuse or mitigation.' " ( Ibid ., quoting 2 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (2d ed. 1988) Crimes Against Property, § 678, pp. 761-762.)

Section 7, subdivision 4, however, explains that the use of the words "malice" or "maliciously" in the modern criminal statutes, including

As with the arson statute, the vandalism statute itself does not require any intent besides the intent to do the proscribed acts of defacing, damaging, or destroying property, and the term "maliciously" does not import any further specific intent or mental state. ( § 594 ; Atkins, supra , 25 Cal.4th at pp. 85-86, 92-93, 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 738 , 18 P.3d 660 .) Similarly, from a policy standpoint, vandalism is an aggressive act often committed impulsively, and more likely to be

The People charged Moore with two counts of vandalism resulting in property damage in excess of $400, possession of a controlled substance, and resisting an officer, and further alleged that he had a number of probation denial priors and two prior strikes. At trial, the prosecution played video footage of Moore causing damage to the store room and parking garage. Moore did not deny that it was him on the video or that he had caused the damage, but testified that he was under the influence of PCP and could not remember much of what happened after he entered the storage room.

Dr. Kelin, a psychologist familiar with the effects of PCP, testified that PCP causes hallucinations and often puts users in a violent, dissociative state, and opined that Moore was in such a dissociative state on the night of the incident. He evaluated Moore after the incident and determined Moore's many years of drug use had caused neurological impairments and possible psychopathology, but also found during a follow up exam that Moore had made significant cognitive improvements while in treatment following his most recent arrest. During Dr. Kelin's testimony, the court gave the jury a limiting instruction, explaining that any testimony regarding Moore's mental state was relevant only to the charge of resisting an officer.

At the conclusion of the trial, Moore asked the court to instruct the jury on voluntary intoxication as a defense to the charges of resisting an officer and vandalism. The prosecutor did not oppose the instruction as applied to the charge of resisting an officer, but asserted the defense was not applicable to vandalism because vandalism is not a specific intent crime. After extensive argument, the trial court ultimately agreed with the prosecutor that the voluntary intoxication evidence was not applicable to the vandalism charge. Thus, the court instructed the jury on voluntary intoxication only as a potential defense to the charge of resisting an officer, and further clarified that the jury could not consider evidence of voluntary intoxication as a defense to vandalism. The court did, however, permit Moore's counsel to argue during closing that Moore was not guilty of vandalism because he was so high on PCP that he had no idea what was going on and, thus, did not act maliciously.

The jury found Moore guilty on the charges of vandalism and possession of a controlled substance, but was unable to reach a verdict on the charge of resisting an officer.

Sentencing

After the verdict, Moore admitted his priors but asked the trial court to exercise

At the sentencing hearing, the court granted Moore's request to dismiss the prior strikes. Moore's counsel then focused on the custodial portion of the sentencing recommendation. She asserted that Moore had been doing well in an outpatient program and was helping to support a young child, and thus asked the court to allow Moore to continue with an outpatient, as opposed to residential, program. The court ultimately granted the request and replaced the term of custody in a residential treatment program with a condition requiring Moore to attend an approved outpatient program. Moore did not object to any of the remaining proposed conditions of probation and the court imposed them largely as proposed by the probation department.

Moore appeals.

DISCUSSION

Moore asserts the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on voluntary intoxication as a defense to the vandalism charges. We review assertions the trial court should have given a particular jury instruction de novo. ( People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690 , 733, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 396 , 996 P.2d 46 .)

Section 29.4 governs the admissibility of evidence of voluntary intoxication and states, in part, "[e]vidence of voluntary intoxication is admissible solely on the issue of whether or not the defendant actually formed a required specific intent, or, when charged with murder, whether the defendant premeditated, deliberated, or harbored express malice aforethought." (§ 29.4, subd. (b).) Evidence of voluntary intoxication is thus inadmissible to negate general criminal intent, and whether such evidence is admissible typically depends on whether the crime at issue is one of general or specific intent. ( People v. Atkins (2001) 25 Cal.4th 76 , 81-82, 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 738 , 18 P.3d 660 ( Atkins ).) General intent crimes require only a general criminal intent to commit the proscribed act, while specific intent crimes require an additional intent to do some further act or achieve some further consequence, typically denoted by language such as "with the intent to" or "for the purpose of". ( Atkins , at pp. 82, 86, 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 738 , 18 P.3d 660 ; see People v. Hood (1969) 1 Cal.3d 444 , 456-457, 82 Cal.Rptr. 618 , 462 P.2d 370 .)

Moore argues evidence of voluntary intoxication was admissible as a defense to

In Atkins , the California Supreme Court directly addressed whether evidence of voluntary intoxication is admissible to negate the required mental state for arson, which requires "willfully and maliciously" setting fire to or burning a structure, forest land, or property. ( Atkins, supra , 25 Cal.4th at p. 83, 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 738 , 18 P.3d 660 ; § 451, subd. (a).) The Court started by noting the statutory definition of "maliciously" as applied to arson is nearly identical to the general definition set forth in section 7, and concluded that neither the term "maliciously" or any other words in the statute required any specific intent or mental state. ( Atkins , at pp. 85-86, 92-93, 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 738 , 18 P.3d 660 .) The Court went on to distinguish arson from the offense of unlawfully setting a fire, explaining the malice element of arson requires "a deliberate and intentional act" of setting a fire or causing something to burn, while the latter offense requires only an "accidental or unintentional" act. ( Id. at p. 88, 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 738 , 18 P.3d 660 .) Finally, the Court considered the policy considerations surrounding voluntary intoxication as a defense to arson, and concluded it should not be a defense from a policy standpoint, because

The judgment is affirmed.

WE CONCUR:

HALLER, J.

AARON, J.