Big Oak Flat-Groveland Unified Sch. Dist. v. Superior Court of Tuolumne Cnty.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Doe's first amended complaint alleges that, while she was a 15-year-old sophomore at a high school within the district, she was molested by a teacher, Jeremy Monn, between April 2013 and July 2013. Monn demanded that Doe keep the facts of the sexual abuse a secret. There were red flags in the teacher's conduct that should have caused the district a reasonable suspicion that Monn was engaging in sexual abuse with students. Petitioners counseled Monn about his behavior, but failed to report it to law enforcement authorities. Petitioners suggested Monn find employment elsewhere; he became a

II. Childhood Sexual Abuse

"Historically, claims of childhood sexual abuse were governed by a one-year statute of limitations," but the statute was tolled until the child reach the age of majority. (

"Any and all claims for money or damages against the district shall be presented to and acted upon in accordance with Board policy and administrative regulation. [¶] ... [¶] Compliance with this policy and accompanying administrative regulation is a prerequisite to any court action, unless the claim is governed by statutes or regulations which expressly free the claimant from the obligation to comply with district policies and procedures and the claims procedures set forth in the Government Code."

Administrative Regulation 3320 provides, in part:

"The following time limitations apply to claims against the district:

"1. Claims for money or damages relating to a cause of action for death or for injury to person, personal property or growing crops shall be presented to the Governing Board not later than six months after the accrual of the cause of action. ( Government Code 905, 911.2 )

"2. Claims for money or damages specifically excepted from Government Code 905 shall be filed not later than six months after the accrual of the cause of action. ( Government Code 905, 911.2, 935 )"

Our interpretation is supported by California School Employees Assn. v. Azusa Unified School Dist . (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 580 , 199 Cal.Rptr. 635 ( Azusa ). Azusa was an action by a union to recover unpaid wages for its members. The defendant district argued, among other things, that the action was barred by the union's failure to comply with the claim presentation requirements of the Act. ( Azusa, at p. 584, 199 Cal.Rptr. 635 .) The court concluded that, while the wage claim was exempt from the Act's claim presentation requirements pursuant to section 905, subdivision (c), the district had adopted its own policy requiring presentation of claims for wages. ( Azusa, at pp. 586-587, 199 Cal.Rptr. 635 .) Presentation of a claim pursuant to that policy was a prerequisite to filing suit for unpaid wages. ( Id . at p. 587, 199 Cal.Rptr. 635 .) Relying on the " 'not governed by any other statutes' " language, the union argued the wage statute took precedence over the claim filing procedures prescribed by the Act. ( Azusa , at p. 587, fn. 3, 199 Cal.Rptr. 635 .) The court rejected the union's argument: "This argument is without merit. [The wage statute] does not prescribe the procedures for filing a claim for wages. Rather, this section only gives rise to the duty to pay wages. A reasonable construction of the language of Government Code section 935, when taken as a whole, permits a local entity to adopt the claims procedures prescribed by the Government Code or some other procedure for claims otherwise excepted from the filing requirements of Government Code section 900 et seq." ( Ibid. )

Similarly, in Tapia v. County of San Bernardino (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 375 , 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 431 ( Tapia ), the petitioner sought retroactive payment of salary and benefits from her employment with the county in a dispute over whether she was disabled. The county demurred, asserting the petitioner had failed to allege compliance with the claim presentation requirements. Although claims for salary were exempted by section 905, subdivision (c) from

Doe argues that, unlike Azusa and Tapia , the statute here, Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1, governs the procedure for bringing a claim under that section. That section prescribes "the time for commencement of the action" for childhood sexual abuse. ( Code Civ. Proc., § 340.1, subd. (a).) It does not mention, much less prescribe, the time or procedure for presenting a claim to a public entity prior to commencing an action for childhood sexual abuse. We agree with Azusa and Tapia that the type of statute referred to in section 935, subdivision (a), is a statute that prescribes procedures, such as claim presentation, for processing claims against a local public entity prior to filing suit against it.

The Supreme Court in Shirk, supra, 42 Cal.4th 201 , 64 Cal.Rptr.3d 210 , 164 P.3d 630 made the distinction between a statute of limitations and a statute or regulation imposing a claim presentation requirement. In Shirk , the court considered whether a 2002 amendment to Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1, which provided that certain causes of action for childhood sexual abuse that otherwise would have been barred solely by the applicable statute of limitations were revived during 2003, also revived a cause of action for childhood sexual abuse that was barred by the plaintiff's failure to present a timely claim to the local public entity defendant. ( Shirk, at pp. 204-205, 64 Cal.Rptr.3d 210 , 164 P.3d 630 .) The court stated: "In plain language, that provision expressly limited revival of childhood sexual abuse causes of action to those barred 'solely' by expiration of the applicable statute of limitations. [Citation.] The term ' "[s]tatute of limitations" is the collective term applied to acts or parts of acts that prescribe the periods beyond which a plaintiff may not bring a cause of action.' " ( Id . at pp. 211-212, 64 Cal.Rptr.3d 210 , 164 P.3d 630 .) The revival provision of Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1, however, made "no reference whatsoever to any revival of the period in which to present a claim under the government claims statute." ( Shirk, at p. 212, 64 Cal.Rptr.3d 210 , 164 P.3d 630 .) A cause of action barred by failure to present a timely claim "is not barred 'solely' by lapse of the applicable statute of limitations, the phrasing that the Legislature used in

B. Implied repeal of section 935

Doe's interpretation of section 905 as exempting childhood sexual abuse claims from local public entity claim presentation requirements, in addition to the claim presentation requirements set out in the Act, would effectively repeal or negate section 935 as to those claims. Doe has not pointed us to any language in either statute that would support this interpretation. Rather, she contends the legislative history of the amendment adding subdivision (m) to section 905 indicates this was the Legislature's intent. As previously discussed, however, Doe has not identified any ambiguous language in section 905(m) that requires interpretation by looking to the legislative history of that provision for the legislative intent. (See DaFonte v. Up-Right, Inc . (1992) 2 Cal.4th 593 , 601, 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 238 , 828 P.2d 140 .)

D. Other arguments

We reject Doe's argument that the district's regulation was barred because a local public entity cannot enact a regulation that is inconsistent with state statute. While liability of local government entities for torts is a matter of state concern, and thus may not be regulated by local ordinances or regulations inconsistent with state law as established by the Government Claims Act, the district did not enact inconsistent legislation, but merely exercised the authority affirmatively granted to it by the state in section 935. ( Ontario , supra , 12 Cal.App.4th at pp. 899-900, 16 Cal.Rptr.2d 32 .)

Doe argues the district failed to show that its board policy and administrative regulation barred her action due to failure to present a timely claim. She asserts Board Policy 3320 and Administrative Regulation 3320 are inconsistent with each other, and the board policy excludes causes of action described in Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1 from the claim presentation requirement. Her contention is without merit.

Board Policy 3320 identifies the causes of action for which a claim must be presented prior to filing suit. Administrative Regulation 3320 complements it by prescribing the time periods within which claims must be presented. Board Policy 3320 states: "Any and all claims for money or damages against the district shall be presented to and acted upon in accordance with Board policy and administrative regulation. [¶] ... [¶] Compliance with this policy and

Administrative Regulation 3320 sets out the time limits for presentation of claims against the district:

"1. Claims for money or damages relating to a cause of action for death or for injury to person, personal property or growing crops shall be presented to the Governing Board not later than six months after the accrual of the cause of action. ( Government Code 905, 911.2 )

"2. Claims for money or damages specifically excepted from Government Code 905 shall be filed not later than six months after the accrual of the cause of action. ( Government Code 905, 911.2, 935 )"

The first subdivision merely repeats the time requirements of the Act, referencing the applicable statutes. Doe seems to contend the second subdivision is inconsistent with Board Policy 3320 because it does not contain the same limitation excluding claims "governed by statutes or regulations which expressly free the claimant from the obligation to comply with district policies and procedures and the claims procedures set forth in the Government Code" that is set out in Board Policy 3320. The second subdivision governs those claims excepted from section 905, but for which the district requires presentation of a claim. If the district did not require presentation of a claim, or if a statute or regulation freed the claimant from the district's claim presentation requirement, no time limit would be needed because no claim presentation would be required. In other words, Administrative Regulation 3320 would not apply. Thus, the provisions of Board Policy 3320 and Administrative Regulation 3320 are not inconsistent.

Doe appears to argue the district has not shown it complied with section 53051, which requires public entities to file a statement containing

WE CONCUR:

POOCHIGIAN, J.

DETJEN, J.

" 'An order overruling a demurrer is not directly appealable, but may be reviewed on appeal from the final judgment. [Citation.] Appeal is presumed to be an adequate remedy and writ review is rarely granted unless a significant issue of law is raised, or resolution of the issue would result in a final disposition as to the petitioner.' " ( Boy Scouts of America National Foundation v. Superior Court (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 428 , 438, 141 Cal.Rptr.3d 819 ( Boy Scouts ).) Here, writ review is warranted because the petition raises a significant issue regarding whether a government claim must be presented to a local public entity, pursuant to an enactment of that entity, before an action may be filed against that entity on a claim of childhood sexual abuse pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1. Additionally, unless Doe can amend to allege facts excusing her failure to present a claim to the district, resolution of the petition in petitioners' favor will result in a final disposition of the action in their favor.

"A demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the factual allegations in a complaint." ( Regents of University of California v. Superior Court (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 549 , 558, 163 Cal.Rptr.3d 205 .) "The standard of review for an order overruling a demurrer is de novo." ( Casterson v. Superior Court (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 177 , 182, 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 637 .) Although the matter arrives in this court "by the unusual path of a writ petition challenging" the order, "the ordinary standards of demurrer review still apply." ( City of Stockton v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 730 , 746-747, 68 Cal.Rptr.3d 295 , 171 P.3d 20 ( Stockton ).) In reviewing the ruling on a demurrer, we use the de novo standard, exercising our independent judgment concerning whether the complaint states a cause of action as a matter of law. ( Traders Sports, Inc. v. City of San Leandro (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 37 , 43, 112 Cal.Rptr.2d 677 .) We also review issues of statutory construction de novo. (

The current version of Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1, subdivision (a), provides:

"(a) In an action for recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual abuse, the time for commencement of the action shall be within eight years of the date the plaintiff attains the age of majority or within three years of the date the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered that psychological injury or illness occurring after the age of majority was caused by the sexual abuse, whichever period expires later, for any of the following actions:

"(1) An action against any person for committing an act of childhood sexual abuse.

"(2) An action for liability against any person or entity who owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, where a wrongful or negligent act by that person or entity was a legal cause of the childhood sexual abuse which resulted in the injury to the plaintiff.

"(3) An action for liability against any person or entity where an intentional act by that person or entity was a legal cause of the childhood sexual abuse which resulted in the injury to the plaintiff." ( Code Civ. Proc., § 340.1, subd. (a).)

Section 935, however, provides in part:

"(a) Claims against a local public entity for money or damages which are excepted by Section 905 from Chapter 1 (commencing with Section 900) and Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 910) of this part, and which are not governed by any other statutes or regulations expressly relating thereto, shall be governed by the procedure prescribed in any charter, ordinance or regulation adopted by the local public entity.

"(b) The procedure so prescribed may include a requirement that a claim be presented and acted upon as a prerequisite to suit thereon." ( § 935, subds. (a), (b).)

Petitioners contend the district enacted such a regulation on January 4, 2008, before

A. Plain meaning

Interpretation and application of statutes are questions of law, which we review de novo. ( Boy Scouts , supra , 206 Cal.App.4th at p. 446, 141 Cal.Rptr.3d 819 .) "Our fundamental task in construing a statute is to ascertain the intent of the lawmakers so as to effectuate the purpose of the statute." ( Day v. City of Fontana (2001) 25 Cal.4th 268 , 272, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 457 , 19 P.3d 1196 .) In construing legislative intent, we give "the language its usual, ordinary import and accord[ ] significance, if possible, to every word, phrase and sentence in pursuance of the legislative purpose. A construction making some words surplusage is to be avoided." ( A.M. v. Ventura Unified School Dist . (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 1252 , 1257, 208 Cal.Rptr.3d 234 .) If there is no ambiguity in the language, "then we presume the lawmakers meant what they said, and the plain meaning of the language governs. [Citations.] If, however, the statutory terms are ambiguous, then we may resort to extrinsic sources, including the ostensible objects to be achieved and the legislative history. [Citation.] In such circumstances, we ' "select the construction that comports most closely with the apparent intent of the Legislature, with a view to promoting rather than defeating the general purpose of the statute, and avoid an interpretation that would lead to absurd consequences." ' " ( Day, at p. 272, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 457 , 19 P.3d 1196 .)

Section 905 provides: "There shall be presented in accordance with Chapter 1 (commencing with Section 900) and Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 910) all claims for money or damages against local public entities except any of the following ...." Section 945.4 provides that, with exceptions not relevant here, "no suit for money or damages may be brought against a public entity on a cause of action for which a claim is required to be presented in accordance with Chapter 1 (commencing with Section 900) and Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 910) of Part 3 of this

The plain meaning of the language of section 935 permits the local public entity to impose its own claim presentation requirement on claims that section 905 excepts from the Act's claim presentation requirements, as long as the local claim presentation period is no shorter than the period prescribed by the Act (six months, in this case). ( §§ 935, subds. (a), (b), (c), 911.2, subd. (a).) The district's Board Policy 3320 and Administrative Regulation 3320 impose such a claim presentation requirement on claims exempted by section 905 from the claim presentation requirements of the Act. They require presentation of a claim falling within any of the 15 exempt categories of claims within six months after accrual of the cause of action.

Doe asks that we consider the legislative history of the enactment of subdivision (m) of section 905, but she has not identified any language of the section that is ambiguous and requires interpretation. If statutory language is clear and unambiguous, there is no need for construction; we resort to the legislative history of the statutory provision only if its terms are ambiguous. ( Ontario , supra , 12 Cal.App.4th at p. 901, 16 Cal.Rptr.2d 32 .) Section 905(m) is clear. There is no dispute that it exempts causes of action for childhood sexual abuse from the claim presentation requirements of the Act. Thus, because no ambiguity in section 905(m) has been shown, we have no occasion to consider the legislative history of that provision.

The parties disagree, however, about the effect of section 935 on Doe's claim presentation obligations. As the court in Ontario stated, " Sections 905 and 935, read together, are perfectly clear. Section 905 creates exemptions from the state-mandated claims procedure; section 935 permits local public entities to enact their own procedures to cover the exempted claims. Section 935, by its terms, covers all '[c]laims against a local public entity for money or damages which are excepted by Section 905.' " ( Ontario , supra , 12 Cal.App.4th at pp. 901-902, 16 Cal.Rptr.2d 32 .) Thus, a local public entity may impose its own claim presentation requirement on any of the types of claims listed in section 905, including claims described in section 905(m).

Section 935, subdivision (a), provides that claims against local public entities that are excepted by section 905 from the Act's claim presentation requirement, "and which are not governed by any other statutes or regulations expressly relating thereto," are governed by the local public entity's procedures. Doe contends her claim under section 905(m) is governed by another statute, because section 905(m) expressly mentions Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1. We disagree.

We conclude Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1 is not another statute expressly relating to government claims for childhood sexual abuse against a local public entity, which governs such claims and precludes the local public entity from imposing its own claim presentation procedures on such claims pursuant to section 935.

"Generally, we will presume that the enactment of a statute does not impliedly repeal existing statutes." ( Apartment Assn. of Los Angeles County, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 13 , 22, 92 Cal.Rptr.3d 441 .) "Where two statutes touch upon a common subject, we must construe them with reference to each other and seek to harmonize them in such a way that neither becomes surplusage." ( Lincoln Place Tenants Assn v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 425 , 440, 66 Cal.Rptr.3d 120 .) "The governing principles in determining whether a statute repeals another by implication are well established. [Citation.] The law shuns repeals by implication. [Citation.] In fact, ' "[t]he presumption against implied repeal is so strong that, 'To overcome the presumption the two acts must be irreconcilable, clearly repugnant, and so inconsistent that the two cannot have concurrent operation. The courts are bound, if possible, to maintain the integrity of both statutes if the two may stand together.' " ' " ( Stop Youth Addiction, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc . (1998) 17 Cal.4th 553 , 569, 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 731 , 950 P.2d 1086 .) Sections 905 and 935 are not " ' " 'irreconcilable, clearly repugnant, and so inconsistent that the two cannot have concurrent operation.' " ' " ( Stop Youth Addiction , at p. 569, 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 731 , 950 P.2d 1086 .) They are, in fact, coordinated. " Section 905 creates exemptions from the state-mandated claims procedure; section 935 permits local public entities to enact their own procedures to cover the exempted claims. Section 935, by its terms, covers all '[c]laims against a local public entity for money or damages which are excepted by Section 905.' " ( Ontario , supra , 12 Cal.App.4th at pp. 901-902, 16 Cal.Rptr.2d 32 .)

Doe argues that, even in Ontario, the court stated "that, in applying the 'plain meaning' rule, '[l]iteral construction should not prevail if it is contrary to the legislative intent apparent in the statute.' " ( Ontario , supra , 12 Cal.App.4th at p. 902, 16 Cal.Rptr.2d 32 .) The intent apparent in

Doe has not identified any ambiguity in the language of section 905(m) or section 935 that would warrant resort to the legislative history of either statute. We decline to hold that any portion of section 935 has been impliedly repealed by the enactment of section 905(m), when the two can be harmonized to give effect to both.

C. Legislative Counsel Bureau letter

Doe also refers us to a letter from the Legislative Counsel Bureau (Legislative Counsel) to Senator Jim Beall, dated March 11, 2016, apparently as evidence of legislative intent. The Legislative Counsel states that " section 935, subdivision (a) permits a school district to adopt a procedure for the presentation of a claim excepted by section 905 only if it is not governed by a statute or regulation that expressly relates to the claim." It opines: " Section 905 lists childhood sexual abuse claims among its exceptions, and defines those claims in terms of the statute that establishes the timeframe for victims of childhood sexual abuse to file lawsuits-that is, '[c]laims made pursuant to Section 340.1.' By definition, then, such claims are expressly governed by statute. It follows necessarily that such claims do not fall within the class of claims excepted by section 905 for which a local public entity may adopt its own claims procedure." (Fns. omitted.) The letter, however, was written years after the legislation enacting section 905(m) was passed.

"Opinions of the Legislative Counsel ordinarily are 'prepared to assist the Legislature in its consideration of pending legislation' [citation], and therefore such opinions often shed light on legislative intent." ( St. John's Well Child & Family Center v. Schwarzenegger (2010) 50 Cal.4th 960 , 982, 116 Cal.Rptr.3d 195 , 239 P.3d 651 .) In contrast, when an opinion was not part of the legislative history, but was prepared long after adoption of the statute, "[i]t is, rather, a post hoc expression of the Legislative Counsel's opinion of what the Legislature meant when it adopted [the statute]; and like any such opinion-even that of an appellate court-it is only as persuasive as its reasoning." ( Grupe Development Co. v. Superior Court (1993) 4 Cal.4th 911 , 922, 16 Cal.Rptr.2d 226 , 844 P.2d 545 .) The Legislative Counsel's opinion does not consider or apply Azusa and Tapia , which held, contrary to the Legislative Counsel's conclusion, that the phrase " 'not governed by any other statutes or regulations expressly relating thereto,' " as used in

Further, the cases on which the opinion relies for the proposition that, effective January 1, 2009, the government claim presentation requirement no longer applied to causes of action for childhood sexual abuse, did not discuss the effect of section 935. (See

In this proceeding we are reviewing the trial court's ruling on a demurrer. Compliance with the claim presentation requirement is an element of Doe's cause of action against the district. ( Bodde, supra , 32 Cal.4th at p. 1240, 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 534 , 90 P.3d 116 .) To survive a demurrer, Doe's complaint must allege facts either demonstrating or excusing compliance with the requirement of claim presentation. ( Id . at pp. 1240-1241, 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 534 , 90 P.3d 116 .) Doe's complaint did not allege compliance. It also did not allege facts showing Doe's compliance was excused by the district's failure to maintain accurate information in the Roster of Public Agencies, in compliance with section 53051. Doe has not asserted she could amend her complaint to truthfully allege the district's failure to comply with section 53051 as a means of excusing her failure to present a timely claim to the district.

We conclude none of Doe's contentions excuse her failure to allege compliance or excuse from compliance with the claim presentation requirements of the district's board policy and administrative regulation.

DISPOSITION

Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue directing respondent court to vacate its order overruling petitioners' demurrers to the first amended complaint